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1. Introduction 
The concept of legislative act was first formally introduced into EU law by the Lisbon Treaty. 
It has thus formed part of EU law for no more than some 10 years. Prior to that, 
representatives of various branches of the legal profession used “the language of legislation” 
when speaking of EC law, but terms such as “legislative acts” were used descriptively. 
Nothing hinged as a matter of positive EC law on whether an act was legislative or not. The 
language of legislation was used essentially for reasons of convenience when speaking of 
instruments of EC law. 
Legislative acts started gaining more prominence in professional literature with the 
development of interest in the rule of law and democratic deficit in the EC.
1
 That seems to 
have coincided with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the debates surrounding it
2
 as 
well as the early attempts to have the EC become a party to the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
3
 Rule of law and democracy became prominent 
subjects of EC scholarship – both in the realms of law and of political science. These matters 
brought into focus the role which legislation played in the EC. It was noticed that the acts 
existing in EC law – regulating ever larger area of everyday life of citizens of the EC member 
states – eluded classification into existing and well-understood groups known from national 
law; classification which was directly relevant for hierarchy of norms and typology of acts 
which are commonly understood as the hard core of constitutional law. 
The first constitutive treaty which contained an express reference to legislation of the EC (as 
opposed to legislation of member states) was the Treaty of Amsterdam adopted in 1997. Its 
Article 207(3) tasked the Council with determining when it was acting in legislative capacity. 
It also had annexed to it a protocol on the role of national parliaments
4
 future incarnations of 
which would, in time, come to accord national parliaments a certain role in the adoption of 
legislative acts of the EU. 
The next attempt to “rectify” the situation was the Constitutional Treaty. Legislative acts 
were the subject of not inconsiderable discussion in the work of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe which was tasked with the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. The task was to 
increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the EC and simplify the instruments 
employed by it when exercising public authority all while having a keen eye on ensuring the 
                                                 
1
 There is a vast literature on both these topics. For relatively early examples see Joseph Weiler, European 
Democracy and its Critique. Five Uneasy Pieces (1995 EUI); Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s “Democratic 
Deficit”: The Question of Standards, (1998) 4 European Law Journal 5; Maria Luisa Fernandez Esteban, The 
rule of law in the European constitution (1999 Kluwer). For a good overview see Armin von Bogdandy and 
Jürgen Bast (eds.), Principles of European constitutional law (2
nd
 ed., 2009 Hart). 
2
 See, for instance, the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Maastricht-Urteil (BVerfGE 89, 155) 
(commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty judgment). 
3
 Opinion 2/94 of the ECJ Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
4
 Protocol (No 9) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union (1997) 
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rule of law.
5
 The result – the Constitutional Treaty – purported to be the first constitutive 
treaty which would fully introduce the language of legislation into EC law. It would offer 
typology of acts and set forth the interaction of various institutions (which was also in 
constant development at the time) as far as those acts were concerned. From the 
Constitutional Treaty onwards there would be legislative acts in EC law allaying concerns 
about legitimacy
6
 and democratic deficit as well as safeguarding the interests of the citizen. 
The system would also be easier to understand for the citizens thus finally dealing with the 
dissatisfaction of the citizens at having some ill-understood Brussels authority impose rules 
on them. 
As is well known, the Constitutional Treaty never came into force. Its provisions on 
legislative acts were, however, reworked finding their way into the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Lisbon Treaty became the first constitutive treaty which makes legal consequences hinge on 
whether something is or is not a legislative act. The term was no longer descriptive. That is 
essentially the position currently obtaining in EU law. 
The crucial provisions of the constitutive treaties in this respect are Articles 289 – 291 and 
294 TFEU. Much of this thesis is dedicated to their analysis. Article 289 TFEU sets forth two 
legislative procedures and explains the meaning of legislative acts by reference to those 
procedures. Article 294 TFEU details one of the legislative procedures. Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU deal, respectively, with delegated acts and implementing acts. The latter two are 
instruments of law which are not adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties, but 
on the basis of some “secondary” instruments of EU law;7 they form part of the same system 
as legislative acts. 
The present thesis seeks to answer two questions. 
1. What concept of legislative act obtains in EU law? 
2. Have the objectives which were sought to be achieved by means of introduction of 
“language of legislation” (legislative acts) into EU law been met? 
                                                 
5
 See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken (14 and 15 December 2001), 
especially pages 22 and 23 (the so-called “Laeken Declaration”), SN 300/1/01 REV 1. 
6
 For a good overview of the issues which have been raised in this respect see Andreas Føllesdal, Legitimacy 
Theories of the European Union, Working Paper 04/15 (Centre for European Studies of University of Oslo; 
ARENA Working Papers). 
7
 This classification (if one may use that word) runs parallel with that set forth in Article 288 TFEU. According 
to Article 288 TFEU acts of the EU are divided into regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions. Thus, any act of the EU would necessarily need to find a place in both of these classifications (e.g. be 
a regulation which is a legislative act or a decision which is a delegated act). 
It should be noted that Article 288 TFEU is by no means a complete catalogue. There exist a number of other 
acts. On the one hand there acts which have never been expressly provided for in the constitutive treaties, such 
as communications and notices. Some areas of law are widely regulated by such acts; competition law could be 
an example here. See Andrew Macnab (ed.), Bellamy & Child materials on European Union law of competition 
(8
th
 ed., 2015 OUP). On the other hand there are “legacy acts”, i.e. acts which were provided for by some 
previous version of the constitutive treaties, but are no longer provided for by the current constitutive treaties. 
Framework decisions could be examples of such acts. Their role now is regulated by Title VII of Protocol (No 
6) on Transitional Provisions annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. 
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The answer to the first question is needed for essentially three reasons. First, unlike prior 
constitutive treaties the Lisbon Treaty makes certain consequences hinge on whether a 
particular instrument is a legislative act or not. A paradigm example here could be the 
national parliaments’ supervision over compliance of legislative acts of the EU with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Such supervision exists only in relation to 
legislative acts.
8
 One, therefore, needs to know which acts are legislative. In such situations 
where the consequence hinges on an act being legislative it is imperative to have the 
necessary criteria for making that determination. The clearer the criteria are, the better – the 
fewer there are disputes. Without such criteria it would simply be impossible to go about 
everyday activities where those activities are what hinges on an act being legislative. 
Second, and seemingly in more theoretical vein (although in reality no less importantly for 
the purposes of everyday life), knowing what sets legislative acts apart from all others is 
important for “constitutional” purposes of any polity. Legislation is the usual means of 
prescribing general rules applying in a polity, specifically the highest ranking rules bar those 
contained in the constitutive instrument. Without understanding how one determines 
legislative acts it is virtually impossible to determine whether the polity is democratic or not, 
or subject to the rule of law or not; whether the general rules are duly legitimated or not 
(ultimately by the citizens of that polity); whether fundamental rights are respected or not 
(considering that virtually any secondary rule of law is a restriction of some right of some 
person). 
Third, the existing academic commentary, while praising introduction of legislative acts into 
EU law, is mostly critical of concepts of legislative acts of the EU most frequently put 
forward.
9
 However, no commonly accepted treatment of legislative acts in EU law has thus 
far been offered: various (frequently contradictory) approaches abound without any one being 
dominant.
10
 
The answer to the second question is desirable to evaluate the “worth” of introducing the 
“language of legislation” into EU law. That could, in turn, give indications for future action: 
are some changes needed or does the current system function as desired? 
It is submitted that 2017 is a very suitable moment for undertaking this analysis. The system 
has been in operation for some ten years. A not inconsiderable amount of practice has 
therefore been generated offering the source material necessary for an analysis. Importantly 
this practice includes case law: the CJEU has in recent years handed down several judgments 
addressing typology of acts in EU law.
11
 The scholarship dealing with legislative acts in EU 
law, which has developed over the last ten years, is also detailed enough to provide a good 
grounding for the analysis to be undertaken in this thesis. However, neither the system nor 
the scholarship has not yet reached maturity: while certain aspects of the system have been 
                                                 
8
 Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and in Protocol (No 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality 
9
 See section 4.2 of this thesis. 
10
 See, inter alia, section 4.2 of this thesis. 
11
 See, for instance, sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.8 and 4.3 below. 
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considered in detail, the system itself has not yet been perfectly understood.
12
 Nor has the 
system been in existence for so long as to become inflexible: there is room for developments 
and changes in response to criticism; certain questions seem not yet to have been addressed at 
all.
13
 
The main body of this thesis is divided into three parts. Following this introduction (section 
1), section 2 analyses the procedures employed for adoption of legislative acts seeking, inter 
alia, to determine any patterns to their use in the constitutive treaties. Since the constitutive 
treaties tie (at least to an extent
14
) legislative procedures with legislative acts, such an 
analysis could give an indication about the scope of the concept of legislative act as well as 
the role they play in the EU system (which, lest it is forgotten, is institution-wise very 
different from constitutional systems of member states from which the concept of legislative 
act derives). Section 3 analyses Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, which were likewise introduced 
into EU law by the Lisbon Treaty as part of introducing legislative acts into EU law. It seeks 
to establish the scope of those articles as well as the relationship between delegated and 
implementing acts, on the one hand, and legislative acts, on the other. Section 4 tackles head 
on the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts seeking to formulate the 
concept of legislative act obtaining in EU law. Finally (in section 5), some overall 
conclusions are formulated. 
2. Ordinary legislative procedure and special legislative procedure 
2.1. Introduction 
Neither constitutive treaty speaks of legislative power. However both constitutive treaties 
frequently speak of legislative acts and legislative procedures. Article 289 TFEU is the 
provision which explains the meaning of these terms. It reads as follows. 
1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294. 
2. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure. 
3. Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts. 
4. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, legislative acts may be adopted 
on the initiative of a group of Member States or of the European Parliament, on a 
                                                 
12
 As evidenced in significant differences in approaches of academic commentators considered in this thesis. 
13
 For instance, in the field of interplay between legislative and regulatory acts. See section 4.3 below. 
14
 No commentator writing after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has expressly and openly denied such a 
connection outright. 
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recommendation from the European Central Bank or at the request of the Court of 
Justice or the European Investment Bank. 
At first glance this provision seems rather neat: there are two types of legislative procedure, 
and legislative acts are the instruments adopted via a legislative procedure. It is easy – indeed 
tempting – to assume that legislative procedures and legislative acts are (respectively) the 
ways to exercise and the corollaries of legislative power. A closer look, however, reveals 
legislative procedures and legislative acts to be less than clear matters of EU law. 
2.2. Ordinary legislative procedure 
2.2.1. Procedure 
The name – ordinary legislative procedure – derives from the Constitutional Treaty15 and so 
does the wording currently set forth in Article 294 TFEU. It reads as follows. 
1.   Where reference is made in the Treaties to the ordinary legislative procedure for 
the adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply. 
2.   The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the 
Council. 
3.   The European Parliament shall adopt its position at first reading and communicate 
it to the Council. 
4.   If the Council approves the European Parliament's position, the act concerned 
shall be adopted in the wording which corresponds to the position of the European 
Parliament. 
5.   If the Council does not approve the European Parliament's position, it shall adopt 
its position at first reading and communicate it to the European Parliament. 
6.   The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led 
it to adopt its position at first reading. The Commission shall inform the European 
Parliament fully of its position. 
7.   If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the Council's position at first reading or has not taken a decision, the act 
concerned shall be deemed to have been adopted in the wording which corresponds to 
the position of the Council; 
(b) rejects, by a majority of its component members, the Council's position at first 
reading, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted; 
                                                 
15
 See Alan Dashwood and Angus Johnstone, The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1483 
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(c) proposes, by a majority of its component members, amendments to the Council's 
position at first reading, the text thus amended shall be forwarded to the Council and 
to the Commission, which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments. 
8.   If, within three months of receiving the European Parliament's amendments, the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority: 
(a) approves all those amendments, the act in question shall be deemed to have been 
adopted; 
(b) does not approve all the amendments, the President of the Council, in agreement 
with the President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a 
meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 
9.   The Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission 
has delivered a negative opinion. 
10.   The Conciliation Committee, which shall be composed of the members of the 
Council or their representatives and an equal number of members representing the 
European Parliament, shall have the task of reaching agreement on a joint text, by a 
qualified majority of the members of the Council or their representatives and by a 
majority of the members representing the European Parliament within six weeks of its 
being convened, on the basis of the positions of the European Parliament and the 
Council at second reading. 
11.   The Commission shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and 
shall take all necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
12.   If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee does not 
approve the joint text, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
13.   If, within that period, the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, the 
European Parliament, acting by a majority of the votes cast, and the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority, shall each have a period of six weeks from that approval in 
which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint text. If they fail to do 
so, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
14.   The periods of three months and six weeks referred to in this Article shall be 
extended by a maximum of one month and two weeks respectively at the initiative of 
the European Parliament or the Council. 
15.   Where, in the cases provided for in the Treaties, a legislative act is submitted to 
the ordinary legislative procedure on the initiative of a group of Member States, on a 
recommendation by the European Central Bank, or at the request of the Court of 
Justice, paragraph 2, the second sentence of paragraph 6, and paragraph 9 shall not 
apply. 
11 
 
In such cases, the European Parliament and the Council shall communicate the 
proposed act to the Commission with their positions at first and second readings. The 
European Parliament or the Council may request the opinion of the Commission 
throughout the procedure, which the Commission may also deliver on its own 
initiative. It may also, if it deems it necessary, take part in the Conciliation Committee 
in accordance with paragraph 11. 
It repeats verbatim Article III-396 of the Constitutional Treaty. The precursor of the ordinary 
legislative procedure in EU law
16
 was “the procedure referred to in Article 251” (as it was 
called in the constitutive treaties). It was commonly referred to as the co-decision 
procedure.
17
 That precursor procedure had been set out in the Article bearing number 251 of 
the treaty ever since the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Immediately before 
that (i.e. between the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam) it was set forth in Article 189b. Before that the relevant Article (which was very 
substantially changed by the Single European Act) of the then EEC Treaty was 149. 
Looking at Article 251 EC as it stood between the coming into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,
18
 one notices the difference in 
language compared to Article 294 TFEU. Article 251 EC read as follows. 
1. Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the adoption of an act, the 
following procedure shall apply. 
2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the 
Council. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the 
European Parliament: 
- if it approves all the amendments contained in the European Parliament's opinion, 
may adopt the proposed act thus amended, 
- if the European Parliament does not propose any amendments, may adopt the 
proposed act, 
- shall otherwise adopt a common position and communicate it to the European 
Parliament. The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons 
which led it to adopt its common position. The Commission shall inform the 
European Parliament fully of its position. 
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the common position or has not taken a decision, the act in question shall 
be deemed to have been adopted in accordance with that common position; 
                                                 
16
 The Constitutional Treaty never came into force. 
17
 See Alan Dashwood and Angus Johnstone, The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1484 
18
 No amendments were made to Article 251 EC by the Treaty of Nice. 
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(b) rejects, by an absolute majority of its component members, the common position, 
the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted; 
(c) proposes amendments to the common position by an absolute majority of its 
component members, the amended text shall be forwarded to the Council and to the 
Commission, which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments. 
3. If, within three months of the matter being referred to it, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, approves all the amendments of the European Parliament, the act 
in question shall be deemed to have been adopted in the form of the common position 
thus amended; however, the Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on 
which the Commission has delivered a negative opinion. If the Council does not 
approve all the amendments, the President of the Council, in agreement with the 
President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a meeting of the 
Conciliation Committee. 
4. The Conciliation Committee, which shall be composed of the Members of the 
Council or their representatives and an equal number of representatives of the 
European Parliament, shall have the task of reaching agreement on a joint text, by a 
qualified majority of the Members of the Council or their representatives and by a 
majority of the representatives of the European Parliament. The Commission shall 
take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and shall take all the necessary 
initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the 
Council. In fulfilling this task, the Conciliation Committee shall address the common 
position on the basis of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament. 
5. If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee approves a 
joint text, the European Parliament, acting by an absolute majority of the votes cast, 
and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall each have a period of six weeks 
from that approval in which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint 
text. If either of the two institutions fails to approve the proposed act within that 
period, it shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
6. Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve a joint text, the proposed act 
shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
7. The periods of three months and six weeks referred to in this Article shall be 
extended by a maximum of one month and two weeks respectively at the initiative of 
the European Parliament or the Council. 
However, reading this provision immediately after reading Article 294 TFEU, what strikes 
one the most is their similarity. Not much seems to have changed as far as substance goes. It 
would seem that the draft act which the conciliation committee is to take as the basis has been 
changed. Article 251(5) EC said that the conciliation committee should “address the common 
position on the basis of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament”. Article 
294(10) TFEU says that the conciliation committee is to act “on the basis of the positions of 
13 
 
the European Parliament and the Council at second reading”. That difference is more 
ostensible than real. According to Article 251(2) EC “common position” denoted the text 
adopted by the Council after the first round of the Parliament’s amendments to the proposal; 
the Parliament then got an opportunity to propose (further) amendments to that common 
position. It is the draft containing those further amendments which the conciliation committee 
had to take as its starting point. While Article 294(10) TFEU refers to the position of the 
Council at second reading, Article 294 TFEU itself does not provide for that procedural step. 
However, the procedure remains the same as it was under Article 251 EC: after the first 
round of the Parliament’s amendments to the proposal the Council adopts a text of its own; 
this time it is called a “position”.19 It is only once the Council has informed the Parliament of 
its position that the second reading (to which Article 294(10) TFEU refers) commences.
20
 
The Parliament then gets an opportunity to propose (further) amendments to that position.
21
 
The Council, however, does not get the opportunity to adopt any position after that: just like 
under Article 251(3) EC, if the Council does not accept the amendments proposed by the 
Parliament, the conciliation proceedings are to commence.
22
 Nowhere – aside from Article 
294(10) TFEU – does the TFEU speak of Council’s position adopted during the second 
reading. While the reference to the Council’s position at second reading in Article 294(10) 
TFEU may be understood as a reference to what the Council “thought” of the Parliament’s 
amendments to its initial position when considering those amendments as per Article 294(8) 
TFEU, requirement that the work of the conciliation committee start from that is hardly a 
change worthy of note at all. Under the EC Treaty the Council likewise had, before the 
conciliation stage was reached, the opportunity to consider the Parliament’s amendments 
made at similar stage of the proceedings. Thus even if the conciliation committee officially 
had to take as its starting point a different draft, considering the very nature of conciliation
23
 
and indeed that those considerations of the Council were (under the EC Treaty) and are 
(under the TFEU) the very reason which lead to the conciliation in the first place
24
 it is 
unlikely to make a big – if any – difference in practice. However, it is worth noting here that 
– unless reference to the Council’s position at second hearing is to be read as an example of 
bad draftsmanship – it does clearly show that Article 294 TFEU25 in no way amounts to a 
complete code of even the general rules on how the ordinary legislative procedure functions. 
There thus seems room for “undergrowth” in this respect (just like there always was such 
room for comitology).
26
 
                                                 
19
 Article 294(5) TFEU 
20
 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 294 TFEU 
21
 Article 294(7) TFEU. It is worth noting that up to this point in the procedure the procedure does not differ in 
any way from that mandated by Article 251 EC; only the terminology of the TFEU differs slightly from that of 
EC Treaty. 
22
 Article 294(8) TFEU 
23
 Targeted as it was and is at reaching compromise. See Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (6
th
 ed., 2015 OUP), page 130. 
24
 Under the EC Treaty: if it had not disagreed with the amendments the Parliament made to its common 
position, the act at issue would have been adopted. 
25
 And therefore the constitutive treaties since they do not actually speak of this Council’s position at second 
reading (aside from in Article 294(10) TFEU). 
26
 The expression was used by Robert Schütze in ‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A 
Constitutional Analysis (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 677 
14 
 
The only other respect – or perhaps in light of the discussion in the two foregoing paragraphs 
the only one respect – in which Article 294 TFEU substantively differs from Article 251 EC 
lies in paragraph 15 of the former. That provision deals with what happens if ordinary 
legislative procedure is initiated by someone other than the Commission. Article 251 EC 
contained no similar rules. Yet, for all practical intents and purposes the issue is moot.
27
 
Thus, essentially, not much changed in the field of what is now called ordinary legislative 
procedure with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Just like suggested by Dougan the effect of 
the Lisbon Treaty is in this respect akin to nothing more than “a labelling exercise”.28 
Moving to the current state of EU law, it has been not infrequently opined that there is one 
ordinary legislative procedure and many special legislative procedures.
29
 That much is said to 
be capable of being taken away from the very wording of Article 289 TFEU: its paragraph 2 
refers to “a special legislative procedure”30 while its paragraph 1 speaks of “the ordinary 
legislative procedure”. Furthermore, the ordinary legislative procedure is purported to be set 
forth in one location in the constitutive treaties, specifically in Article 294 TFEU.
31
 There is 
no single provision of the constitutive treaties which would purport to set forth the 
functioning of special legislative procedures in general terms. 
In case of special legislative procedures, details, such as the voting rules, the “dominant” 
institution and the input required of the other main institution, to name but a few, are set forth 
in the legal bases mandating the use of a given special legislative procedure. What is 
important is that it is not only the difference of input of the “other” main institution – consent 
                                                 
27
 The reason why is explained in footnote 44 below. 
28
 Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts (2008) Common Market Law 
Review 647. See to the same effect Bruno de Witte, Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon Treaty, in 
Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional 
Treaty? (2008 SpringerWienNewYork), page 97, and Edward Best in Legislative Procedures after Lisbon: 
Fewer, Simpler, Clearer? (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 90. 
29
 One of the clearest statements of this point has perhaps been made by Jürgen Bast in his New Categories of 
Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law (2012) 49 Common Market Law 
Review 892. The same point has been made by Michael Dougan in The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, 
Not Hearts (2008) Common Market Law Review 617 in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
30
 Jürgen Bast in his New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU 
Law (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 892 
31
 Returning to the point of “undergrowth” taken when dealing with an ostensible difference between Article 
251(4) EC and Article 294(10) TFEU, it must be stated that before ever reaching the Council proper, 
instruments adopted via ordinary legislative procedure first go through the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER). The latter exercises an enormous – some would say close to decisive – influence 
both on the instruments to be adopted via ordinary legislative procedure and on how the ordinary legislative 
procedure proceeds. See Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (3
rd
 ed., 
2014 CUP), pages 148 and 149. Thus even if one discards (the rest of) the Council’s rules of procedure arguing 
that they constitute a code of how the Council works as opposed to an instrument containing rules on the 
adoption of instruments via ordinary legislative procedure, ordinary legislative procedure still involves 
participation of COREPER, a body created by the TFEU (Article 240). Article 294 TFEU omits any reference to 
it. In view of that fact alone the thesis that Article 294 TFEU amounts to a code of ordinary legislative 
procedure is impossible to maintain. Essentially the same could be said of Article 127(4)(1) TFEU which 
mandates consultation of the European Central Bank (ECB) on any proposed EU act falling within the ECB’s 
field of competence. However, since these points in respect of COREPER and ECB hold equally true for special 
legislative procedure, they do not depart from the fact that relatively speaking – compared to special legislative 
procedure – Article 294 TFEU could, unless there are other impediments, be seen as amounting to a code.  
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or merely advice
32
 – which has been seen as a factor distinguishing various special legislative 
procedures; other aspects – such as voting rules – have been considered relevant as well.33 In 
fact the same approach was taken by the Convention on the Future of Europe which drafted 
the Constitutional Treaty which, in turn, served as the basis for the provisions pertaining to 
legislative procedures ultimately introduced into EU law by the Treaty of Lisbon. According 
to the refined mandate of Working Group No IX
34
 of the Convention, the EU (the EC at the 
time) had nearly 30 different decision-making procedures.
35
 Those procedures were listed in 
Working document no 3 of the Working Group No IX.
36
 Among others that document listed 
(in Annexe 1) as separate procedures these six: 
1. co-decision with the Council acting by qualified majority; 
2. co-decision with the Council acting by qualified majority and after consulting the 
Court of Auditors; 
3. co-decision with the Council acting by qualified majority and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee; 
4. co-decision with the Council acting by qualified majority and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; 
5. co-decision with the Council acting unanimously; 
6. co-decision with the Council acting unanimously after consulting the Committee 
of the Regions. 
If that is the measure of difference between procedures, then it becomes very difficult to 
defend the thesis of one – the – ordinary legislative procedure even without going beyond 
Articles 289 and 294 TFEU themselves. While as a rule the Commission is the institution 
which initiates ordinary legislative procedures,
37
 paragraph 4 of article 289 TFEU clearly 
states that there are various bodies which may initiate the adoption of an act via ordinary 
legislative procedure. Paragraph 15(1) of article 294 TFEU confirms it. Thus the bodies 
participating in ordinary legislative procedures may differ. Looking at the aforequoted 
Working document no 3, participation of different institutions could fairly be said to be the 
characteristic which separates procedures 1 through 4. 
Perhaps more importantly Article 294(15)(1) TFEU explicitly states that should the initiative 
for a legislative act come from someone other than the Commission, the ordinary legislative 
procedure for the adoption of such an act shall be different from the one applicable in respect 
of acts the legislative initiative for which has come from the Commission. An ordinary 
legislative procedure, which has reached the stage where the Parliament has proposed 
amendments to the position formulated by the Council at first hearing, may end before going 
to the Conciliation Committee only if the Council accepts all the amendments proposed by 
                                                 
32
 I.e. being consulted 
33
 See, for instance, Michael Dougan in The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts (2008) 
Common Market Law Review 617 in section 5.2.3 or Edward Best in Legislative Procedures after Lisbon: 
Fewer, Simpler, Clearer? (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 93 
34
 On the simplification of legislative procedures and instruments 
35
 CONV 271/02, page 3 
36
 Working document 03 of the Working Group IX (1
st
 October 2002) 
37
 Article 17(2) TEU and Article 294(2) TFEU 
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the Parliament.
38
 Before the Council gets an opportunity to accept or decline the amendments 
proposed by the Parliament the Commission issues an opinion in respect of those 
amendments. If the “usual” ordinary legislative procedure is employed,39 the Council has to 
pay close attention to that opinion of the Commission: while as a rule the Council may accept 
amendments by a qualified majority,
40
 those amendments in relation to which the 
Commission has delivered a negative opinion the Council may accept only unanimously.
41
 If 
no unanimity exists in relation to at least one amendment in respect of which the Commission 
delivered a negative opinion, the ordinary legislative procedure will proceed to the 
conciliation stage. Essentially the “usual” ordinary legislative procedure thus gives the 
Commission the power to determine the voting rule applicable in the Council in relation to 
each and every amendment proposed by the Parliament at the stage in question. 
If the ordinary legislative procedure employed is not the “usual” one,42 the Commission has 
no such power. Nor does anyone else have such a power. The Commission would still seem 
to be under a duty to deliver an opinion in respect of the amendments proposed by the 
Council – that is required by Article 294(7)(c) TFEU which applies regardless of the identity 
of the initiator of the ordinary legislative procedure. However the provision which says that  
[t]he Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission has 
delivered a negative opinion,
43
 
is disapplied in these “unusual” ordinary legislative procedures by Article 294(15)(1) TFEU. 
Thus regardless of the opinion of the Commission, any amendment proposed by the 
Parliament may be accepted by the Council by qualified majority. This essentially changes 
one part of the second reading stage of an ordinary legislative procedure. Two things are 
worth stressing here. First, the effect of Article 294(15)(1) TFEU is not a simple replacement 
of the Commission by the institution which in a given case has the privilege of initiative. 
Article 294(9) TFEU is disapplied altogether; suddenly there are no conditions in which 
unanimity of the Council may become necessary – the power to require it is removed from 
the procedure completely (it is not given to the institution holding the privilege of initiative). 
Second, returning to the aforemade quotation of Working document no 3, we are dealing here 
with the same characteristic which separates procedures 1 through 4 on the one hand, from 
procedures 5 and 6 on the other. As opposed to merely a simple replacement of one 
institution by another (such as that indicated by article 289(4) TFEU), this is a case of change 
of the way procedure proper functions (and ultimately perhaps of the voting requirements).
44
 
                                                 
38
 Article 294(8) TFEU 
39
 I.e. if the ordinary legislative procedure is initiated by the Commission 
40
 Paragraph 8 of Article 294 TFEU 
41
 Paragraph  9 of Article 294 TFEU 
42
 I.e. if the ordinary legislative procedure was initiated by someone other than the Council, e.g. by the European 
Central Bank under Article 129(3) TFEU. 
43
 Article 294(9) TFEU 
44
 This also amounts to a departure from Article 251 EC (the predecessor of Article 294 TFEU). The EC Treaty 
contained no provision similar to Article 294(15)(1) TFEU. Thus the Commission was always in a position to 
require that the Council act unanimously at – what is now – second reading. However in practice the question 
was moot for in no case where the then constitutive treaties granted the privilege of initiative to some entity 
17 
 
There is, in fact one further difference between the “usual” and “unusual” ordinary legislative 
procedures. According to Article 16(4) TEU usually a qualified majority in the Council is  
defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least 15 of them 
and representing the participating Member States comprising at least 65% of the 
population of these States. A blocking minority must include at least four members 
/.../. 
However, according to Article 238(2) TFEU that is so only if ordinary legislative procedure 
is initiated by the Commission.
45
 If ordinary legislative procedure is initiated by someone 
else, i.e. it is an “unusual” ordinary legislative procedure, then the percentage of the members 
of the Council needed for qualified majority rises to 72% (from 55%); there is further no 
special rule on blocking minority in that case. This difference becomes especially important 
in situations where the Commission has a non-exclusive privilege of initiative:
46
 depending 
on the initiator qualified majority referred to in Article 294 TFEU (being the same qualified 
majority as that referred to in Article 289 TFEU) might mean different things. 
Finally, out of 85 legal bases which mandate the use of an ordinary legislative procedure 
some 39 specify – just like the legal bases mandating the use of a special legislative 
procedure do – at least some aspect of how the act is to be adopted which aspect is dealt with 
neither in Article 289 nor in Article 294 TFEU.
47
 
                                                                                                                                                        
other than the Commission (Article 107(3) EC and Article 41.1 of the Protocol (No 18) on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank granted in to the ECB and Article 13(1) of 
the Protocol (No 6) on the Statute of the Court of Justice granted it to the ECJ; no provision akin to current 
Article 76 TFEU existed prior to the Lisbon Treaty) did they mandate the use of the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 EC. 
45
 That provision applies to all procedures initiated by the Commission or the High Representative. There is, 
however, no legal basis mandating the use of an ordinary legislative procedure initiated by the High 
Representative. 
46
 See footnote 61. 
47
 The list behind the number 39 excludes Article 13(1) of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. That provision gives the ECJ the (exclusive) privilege of initiating an ordinary 
legislative procedure with a view to adoption of an act which would provide for appointment of assistant 
rapporteurs and lay down the rules of their service. That aspect is clearly the one dealt with by Articles 289(4) 
and 294(15)(1) TFEU.  
Furthermore, the list behind the number 39 does include two provisions (Article 129(3) TFEU and Article 40.1 
of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank) which provide for a privilege of the ECB to initiate an ordinary legislative provision. The reason for their 
inclusion is that they also and alternatively to the privilege of the ECB grant the privilege of initiation of an 
ordinary legislative procedure to the Commission, and in that case – i.e. if the ordinary legislative procedure is 
initiated by the Commission – they regulate a further aspect of the procedure of adoption of the act (they require 
the ECB to be consulted). For the same reasons – but in respect of the ECJ – the list behind the number 39 
includes Articles 257(1) and 281(2) TFEU. 
Finally, the list behind the number 39 (and indeed 85) excludes Article 7(3) of the Protocol (No 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. That provision sets out a general course of 
action applicable to any ordinary legislative procedure whatever the legal basis employed. It is not a legal basis. 
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 On fifteen occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that both the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions be consulted over the course 
of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure.
48
 
 On nine occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that only the Economic and 
Social Committee be consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary 
legislative procedure.
49
 
 On four occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that “the institutions 
concerned” be consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative 
procedure.
50
 
 On three occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the ECB be consulted 
over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure.
51
 
 On two occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the Commission be 
consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure.
52
 
 On two occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the Court of Auditors be 
consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure.
53
 
 On two occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the ECJ be consulted over 
the course of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure.
54
 
 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that only the Committee of the 
Regions be consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative 
procedure.
55
 
 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that – depending on the subject 
matter – either the Economic and Social Committee or the Committee of the 
Regions be consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative 
procedure.
56
 
 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that the Economic and Social 
Committee be consulted over the course of the applicable ordinary legislative 
                                                 
48
 Articles 91(1), 100(2), 149(1), 153(2)(2), 164, 165(4)(1), 166(4), 168(4), 168(5), 175(3), 177(1), 178(1), 
192(1), 192(3), 194(2) TFEU 
49
 Articles 43(2), 51(2), 59(1), 114(1), 157(3), 169(3), 173(3)(1), 182(1), 182(5) TFEU 
50
 Article 336(1) TFEU and Articles 12(1), 14 and 15(1) of the Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the European Union 
51
 Article 133 TFEU as well as Article 129(3) TFEU and Article 40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank mentioned in footnote 47 – the latter two 
in case the Commission rather than the ECB initiates the procedure. 
52
 Article 129(3) TFEU and Article 40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank mentioned in footnote 47 (in case the ECB rather than the Commission 
initiates the procedure). It should be stressed that Article 294(15) TFEU ensures that the Commission may 
participate in any ordinary legislative procedure, including that conducted on the basis of Article 13(1) of the 
Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union which does not grant the 
Commission any privilege of initiative. Thus the requirement that the Commission be consulted in the articles 
mentioned in the first sentence of the footnote is, in fact, redundant for there is no duty of the consultee to give 
an opinion, and Article 294 TFEU entitles the Commission to give an opinion in any case. 
53
 Articles 322(1) and 325(4) TFEU 
54
 Articles 257(1) and 281(2) TFEU 
55
 Article 167(5)(1) TFEU 
56
 Article 178(2) TFEU 
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procedure and that the member states concerned by the measures at issue agree to 
them.
57
 
 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that both the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions be consulted over the course 
of the applicable ordinary legislative procedure and that the member states to 
whose territory the measures at issue relate approve them.
58
 
This constitutes a total of nine variations based on the identity of the bodies which need to be 
consulted over the course of – i.e. which need to participate in – a given ordinary legislative 
procedure (there are ten variations if one counts the versions of the ordinary legislative 
procedure which mandate no consultations in addition to those set forth in Articles 289 and 
294 TFEU). The characteristics which vary here are precisely of the same type as the 
characteristics which in the aforemade quotation of Working document no 3 distinguish 
procedures 1 through 4 from each other and procedures 5 and 6 from each other. 
Put simply, if the aforemade quotation of Working document no 3 contains six different 
procedures, then the constitutive treaties currently set forth numerous different ordinary 
legislative procedures.
59
 In only 46 cases out of 85 do the constitutive treaties resort to an 
ordinary legislative procedure as set forth in Articles 289 and 294 TFEU tout court. Of these 
46 cases only in 35 cases do the constitutive treaties mandate obligatorily the use of the 
“usual” ordinary legislative procedure;60 of the remaining eleven cases in ten61 the privilege 
of initiation is granted to someone in addition to the Commission and in one it is granted 
exclusively to the ECJ.
62
 
Considering all the possible combinations, there are in total 14 ordinary legislative 
procedures.
63
 
  
                                                 
57
 Article 188(2) TFEU 
58
 Article 172(1) TFEU 
59
 Edward Best comes to a similar conclusion in Legislative Procedures after Lisbon: Fewer, Simpler, Clearer? 
(2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 95; he mentions four variants of ordinary 
legislative procedure. While he does not expressly say what the four variants are, reading his § 3 it would seem 
that they correspond to the four entities having the privilege of initiative (i.e. they are the ordinary legislative 
procedure initiated by the Commission, the ordinary legislative procedure initiated by the ECB, the ordinary 
legislative procedure initiated by the ECJ and the ordinary legislative procedure initiated by ¼ of the member 
states). His reasoning goes no further than pointing out that the holders of the privilege of initiative are different. 
60
 I.e. the one which only the Commission can initiate 
61
 Articles 81(1)(2), 82(2), 83(1), 83(2), 84, 85(1)(2), 87(2) and 88(2) TFEU which grant the privilege of 
initiation to a quarter of the member states (by virtue of article 76 TFEU) and Article 129(3) TFEU and Article 
40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank which grant it to the ECB. 
62
 Article 13(1) of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
63
 Counting in each case as one the procedures listed in the table under nos. 8 and 9. Strictly speaking multiple 
permutations are possible (as many as there are permutations of member states) since each one gives “a special 
veto” only those member states which are concerned by the particular measure being adopted. Multiple 
permutations are likewise possible in respect of procedure listed under no. 14. 
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 Initiating institution
64
 Participants not mentioned by name in Article 294 TFEU
65
 
1 Commission None 
2 Commission Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the 
Regions 
3 Commission Economic and Social Committee 
4 Commission ECB 
5 Commission Court of Auditors 
6 Commission ECJ 
7 Commission Committee of the Regions 
8 Commission Economic and Social Committee and (agreement of) member 
states concerned 
9 Commission Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the 
Regions and (approval) of relevant member states 
10 Commission European Council
66
 
11 Commission CJEU
67
 
12 ECB Commission 
13 ECJ Commission 
14 ¼ of member states Commission 
  
There is, in fact, a further matter pertaining to ordinary legislative procedure, and not 
concerning the substance of the resulting act or the competence of the EU or of the specific 
institutions concerned, which is frequently set forth in the legal bases rather than – or, more 
correctly, in addition to – being set forth in the provisions which purport to regulate the way 
in which ordinary legislative procedure should function.
68
 According to Article 296(3) TFEU 
[w]hen considering draft legislative acts, the European Parliament and the Council 
shall refrain from adopting acts not provided for by the relevant legislative procedure 
in the area in question. 
The ordinary legislative procedure provides generically – in Article 289(1) TFEU – only for 
regulations, directives and decisions. As a general rule it would mean – according to Article 
296(1) TFEU – that the institutions concerned have a discretion which one of these types of 
                                                 
64
 It must not be forgotten that when the initiating institution is not the Commission, (i) qualified majority of the 
members of the Council means a different thing compared to when the initiating institution is the Commission 
and (ii) Article 294(9) TFEU does not apply and hence the Council cannot be made incapable of accepting the 
amendments, which the Parliament has proposed to the position formulated by the Council at first hearing, 
otherwise than unanimously. 
65
 The bodies listed in this column are to be consulted unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
66
 Theoretical possibility under Article 336(1) TFEU and Articles 12(1), 14 and 15(1) of the Protocol (No. 7) on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union 
67
 Article 336(1) TFEU and Articles 12(1), 14 and 15(1) of the Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the European Union would seem to mandate consultation of the CJEU (“Court of Justice of the 
European Union” in the constitutive treaties) as opposed to the ECJ. These provisions speak of “institutions 
concerned”. According to Article 13(1) TEU it is the CJEU which is an institution, not the ECJ: the latter forms 
part of the former (Article 19(1) TEU). At the same time Articles 257(1) and 281(2) TFEU and Article 13(1) of 
the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union speak of the ECJ (“Court of 
Justice” in the constitutive treaties). 
68
 That is Articles 289 and 294 TFEU and Article 7(3) of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
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act to employ. However, on at least 22 occasions a legal basis mandating the use of an 
ordinary legislative procedure prescribes the type of act which must result:  
 on 14 occasions a regulation69  
 on seven occasions a directive70 and  
 one occasion either a directive or a regulation.71 
The common wisdom is that the legal basis (as lex specialis) “trumps” in this respect Article 
289(1) TFEU.
72
 In other words, if a legal basis says that only a directive or a regulation may 
be adopted – as Article 46 TFEU does – then the wider catalogue set forth in Article 289(1) 
TFEU is narrowed down to a directive and a regulation. Another way of putting it would be 
to say that the legal bases either narrow down (in case of Article 46 TFEU) or reduce to nil 
the discretion of the institutions concerned to choose the type from the catalogue set forth in 
Article 289(1) TFEU. In fact, Leidenmuehler has gone even further by suggesting that only 
binding acts may be adopted via ordinary legislative procedure.
73
 Jürgen Bast has likewise 
opined that legislative acts must be binding.
74
 
But what happens when a legal basis which requires the use an ordinary legislative procedure 
is worded as mandating an atypical act? Article 172 TFEU is exactly such a provision. Its 
first paragraph reads in relevant parts as follows. 
The guidelines /.../ shall be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
75
 
Guidelines are an atypical act. They are not listed in Article 288 TFEU – or indeed anywhere 
else in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of Title I of Part Six of the TFEU which section is entitled 
“Legal Acts of the Union”. In addition to regulations, directives and decisions to which 
Article 289(1) TFEU itself refers that section only mentions recommendations and opinions. 
It does not set forth any other type of legal acts. Importantly for present purposes, mandating 
guidelines cannot be seen as either a restriction of the discretion which Article 289(1) TFEU 
grants to the relevant institutions or a restriction of the catalogue there contained. Article 
289(1) TFEU simply refers to no type of instrument which is apt to cover guidelines. Thus 
this situation – unlike the 22 legal bases mentioned above – constitutes a “true” conflict 
                                                 
69
 Articles 14(1), 15(3)(2), 164, 178(1), 207(2), 214(5), 224, 257(1), 291(3), 298(2) and 322(1) TFEU as well as 
Articles 12(1), 14 and 16 of the Protocol (No. 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union. 
70
 Articles 50(1), 52(2), 53(1), 59(1), 82(2), 83(1) and 83(2) TFEU 
71
 Article 46 TFEU 
72
 See, for instance, Franz Leidenmuehler, Is There a Closed System of Legal Acts of the European Union after 
the Lisbon Treaty? The Example of Unspecified Acts in the Union Policy on the Environment (2010) 4 Vienna 
Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 195, 196, 198 and 199 
73
 See the text to footnote 43 in Is There a Closed System of Legal Acts of the European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty? The Example of Unspecified Acts in the Union Policy on the Environment (2010) 4 Vienna Online 
Journal on International Constitutional Law 197 
74
 New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law (2012) 49 
Common Market Law Review at 893 and again at 925 
75
 The guidelines which are to be adopted are to cover the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures 
envisaged in the sphere of trans-European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy 
infrastructures and to identify projects of common interest. See Articles 170 and 171 TFEU. 
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between the legal basis and Article 289(1) TFEU. Furthermore, both as a matter of ordinary 
language and as a matter of usual understanding of EU law
76
 guidelines connote an 
instrument of an advisory rather than obligatory nature, i.e. they are not binding. Finally, it 
has to be mentioned that Article 296 TFEU does not get one further in trying to deal with the 
issue. Its paragraph 1 grants the adopting institutions discretion only to the extent the 
constitutive treaties do not specify the type of act. Thus paragraph 1 is apt to cover both 
Article 289(1) TFEU and the legal basis. Its paragraph 3 excludes the acts which are not 
provided for by the relevant legislative procedure (Article 289(1) TFEU) in the area in 
question (in our example Article 172 TFEU). Thus that paragraph rules out neither Article 
289(1) TFEU nor the legal basis. 
Dealing specifically with ordinary-legislative-procedure legal bases worded as mandating the 
use of atypical acts, Leidenmuehler has opined that since the acts adopted via ordinary 
legislative procedure have to be binding, 
the institution principally has to make use of one of the types enumerated in Article 
288 TFEU. In any case this is inevitable if the respective competence refers to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.
77
 
What is somewhat unclear in his account is the reason why he comes to this conclusion. He 
would, at first glance, seem to contend for something akin to lex generalis derogat legi 
speciali. In fact, Leidenmuehler classifies legal bases worded as mandating the use of 
guidelines as legal bases in which the constitutive treaties fail altogether to specify the type of 
act which must result.
78
 Guidelines are in this context expressly equated with – for instance – 
the generic “measures”.79 However from the point of view of how far one can stretch 
language, it must be noted that “measures” is apt to cover all instruments mentioned in 
Section 1 of Chapter 2 of Title I of Part Six of the TFEU; “guidelines” is apt to cover 
recommendations and possibly opinions at the most. None of the latter two features in Article 
289(1) TFEU. This cardinal difference would seem to make Leidenmuehler’s explanation 
difficult to maintain (he himself does not allude to this difference at all). The only way to 
save it would seem to be to maintain that reference to guidelines is not a reference to the type 
of the resulting act, but rather to its content. An act (a regulation, a directive or a decision) 
might bind its addressee to comply with the guidelines, which – if guidelines are non-binding 
– essentially amounts to a procedural duty to consider them when acting. What is important 
for present purposes is that this approach – seeing words mandating the use of guidelines as 
specifying the content rather than the type of act – does not solve the true conflict. It 
construes it away. 
                                                 
76
 See, for instance, Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6
th
 ed., 2015 OUP), 
page 109. 
77
 Is There a Closed System of Legal Acts of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty? The Example of 
Unspecified Acts in the Union Policy on the Environment (2010) 4 Vienna Online Journal on International 
Constitutional Law 197. Presumably then use has to be made of regulations, directives and decisions since 
neither recommendations nor opinions are said to have binding force. 
78
 Is There a Closed System of Legal Acts of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty? The Example of 
Unspecified Acts in the Union Policy on the Environment (2010) 4 Vienna Online Journal on International 
Constitutional Law 196 
79
 The most famous example of a legal basis using the language of “measures” is probably Article 114 TFEU. 
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Yet for that very reason this saving approach is not available to Leidenmuehler. He opines 
that 
in case of a competence not specifying the form of act or seemingly providing for a 
specified atypical act, the recourse to a type not mentioned in Article 288 TFEU 
solely is permitted if the enactment of an act according to the catalogue is not making 
sense or is even excluded.
80
 
Combined with the preceding quote (suggesting that an act of the form not specified in 
Article 288 TFEU could be employed if the procedure was not an ordinary legislative 
procedure), it means that in case of non-ordinary-legislative-procedure legal bases an act 
could – at least under some circumstances – take the form of guidelines which form is 
different from all three of regulations, directives and decisions. First, that shows that 
“guidelines” is neither a synonym for any of the three nor a name of a class (genus) to which 
any of the three belongs. Second, the strategy of construing away the real conflict consists of 
construing the legal bases, not Article 289 or 294 TFEU. However the difference between 
non-ordinary-legislative-procedure legal bases and an ordinary-legislative-procedure legal 
bases both mandating an atypical act, is to be found not in the legal bases (both mandate an 
atypical act), but in the fact that in one case ordinary legislative procedure applies and in the 
other it does not. With the strategy being about construing the legal bases, it must be equally 
available and must yield the same results in case of ordinary-legislative-procedure legal bases 
and non-ordinary-legislative-procedure legal bases – yet in the latter case Leidenmuehler 
seems to admit that reference to guidelines is a way to prescribe the type of the resulting act, 
not its substance. Therefore his approach is ultimately unable to withstand legal scrutiny. 
An alternative approach to that of Leidenmuehler would be to construe all references to 
atypical acts as referring to the substance rather than the type of the resulting act. However in 
that case the EU would seem to be limited to the acts listed in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of Title 
I of Part Six of the TFEU for all legal bases set forth in the constitutive treaties (whatever 
procedure for adoption they mandate). That can hardly be squared with numerous judgments 
of the CJEU interpreting (rather than annulling) various “soft law” instruments of the 
Commission (notices, guidelines etc.) in the field of competition law. 
A yet further alternative approach to that of Leidenmuehler has been offered by the ECJ in its 
judgment in case C-77/11.
81
 The judgement settled a dispute between the Council and the 
Parliament as to who should sign the act establishing the budget of the EU. The Council 
contended that it should be signed by both its president and the president of the Parliament. 
The Parliament contended that only the president of the Parliament should sign the act. In the 
event only the president of the Parliament did sign the act, and the Council initiated the 
proceedings before the ECJ claiming that the act should be annulled. 
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Adoption of the budget of the EU is regulated by Article 314 TFEU. The first sentence of that 
provision reads as follows. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, shall establish the Union's annual budget in accordance with the 
following provisions. 
The Parliament relied on paragraph 9
82
 of that article which provides that 
[w]hen the procedure provided for in this Article has been completed, the President of 
the European Parliament shall declare that the budget has been definitively adopted. 
The Council relied, inter alia, on Article 297(1)(2) TFEU,
83
 which provides that 
[l]egislative acts adopted under a special legislative procedure shall be signed by the 
President of the institution which adopted them, 
claiming essentially that since Article 314 TFEU says that the Parliament and the Council 
establish the budget, therefore both adopt it and hence the presidents of both must sign the 
act. It should be noticed that the Council conveniently disregarded that Article 297(1)(2) 
clearly refers to an institution, not institutions. Both litigants agreed that a draft budget could 
not produce legal effects.
84
 
The ECJ ultimately ruled for the Parliament. It did so without referring in its reasoning to 
Article 297(1)(2) TFEU which is a provision particular to special legislative procedures. 
Instead it essentially relied on the differences between Article 289(2) TFEU and Article 314 
TFEU, in other words the difference between the provision setting special legislative 
procedure out generically and a legal basis mandating its use in a particular situation. Just like 
Article 289(1) TFEU in case of ordinary legislative procedure, Article 289(2) TFEU clearly 
states that only  
adoption of a regulation, directive or decision /.../ shall constitute a special legislative 
procedure. 
The ECJ held that Article 314 TFEU establishes a procedure (i) appropriate to the specific 
nature of the budget and (ii) concluded by the act referred to in paragraph 9 of that article.
85
 
Thus it was 
the President of the Parliament, in his capacity as organ of that institution, who, by 
adopting the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU, endows the Union’s budget with 
binding force at the conclusion of a procedure characterised by the joint action of the 
Parliament and the Council.
86
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In paragraphs 58 – 60 the ECJ explicitly considered – and dismissed – the argument to the 
effect that the act of the president of the Parliament was unlawful because (i) it was adopted 
via a special legislative procedure, but (ii) – contrary to Article 289(2) TFEU – it was neither 
a regulation nor a directive nor a decision. 
58. The argument should also be rejected.  
59. It should be recalled that Article 314 TFEU lays down a special legislative 
procedure appropriate to the nature of the budget, which is essentially an accounting 
document setting out estimates for the European Union of all income and expenditure 
over a certain period. After the President of the Parliament has verified that the 
procedure complies with the provisions of the FEU Treaty, that document is annexed 
to the act by which the President declares, on the basis of Article 314(9) TFEU, that 
the budget has been definitively adopted.  
60. Even though the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU is the outcome of a special 
legislative procedure, it does not, due to the nature of the budget, take the form of a 
legislative act in the strict sense of the term for the purpose of Articles 288 TFEU and 
289(2) TFEU, and is, in any event, a measure open to challenge for the purpose of 
Article 263 TFEU, since it endows the Union’s budget with binding force. 
In essence, in view of particularities of the legal basis (paragraph 59 of the judgment), the 
resulting act need not be of the type set forth in Article 289(2) TFEU (paragraph 60 of the 
judgment)
87
 – just as the legal basis says. The procedure employed nevertheless constitutes a 
special legislative procedure, although the resulting act is not a legislative act.
88
 Thus it 
would seem that the ECJ is of the opinion that specification of the type of act
89
 in Article 
289(2) TFEU does not go to the issue of the applicable procedure, it goes only to the resulting 
act being legislative or not. In other words: any act may be adopted via a particular special 
legislative procedure, not just one of the type specified in paragraph 2 of Article 289 TFEU; 
the procedure for adoption of such an act will still be a special legislative procedure, however 
only if the act adopted is of the type mentioned in Article 289(2) TFEU is it capable of 
constituting a legislative act (within the meaning of Article 289(3) TFEU).
90
 Considering the 
similarities between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 289 TFEU (both seem to require the acts to 
be either regulations, directives and decisions, and both set forth more than one procedure in 
either case under single generic name), the reasoning of the ECJ would seem equally 
applicable to paragraph 1 of Article 289 TFEU. 
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The situation dealt with by the ECJ in case C-77/11 is strikingly similar to the one which 
arises when adopting an act via ordinary legislative procedure on the basis of Article 172 
TFEU. First, there is a real conflict between the general rules regulating the applicable 
legislative procedure (Article 289(2) TFEU) and the legal basis employed (Article 314 
TFEU, specifically its paragraph 9). Second, the conflict concerns the type of act to be 
employed. Third, the general rules state that only a regulation, directive or decision may be 
adopted, while the legal basis is worded as mandating an atypical act (a declaration made by 
the president of the Parliament). It thus stands to reason that the ECJ’s reasoning should be 
equally applicable to Article 172. Doing so results in a conclusion that when acting on the 
basis of Article 172 TFEU the Parliament and the Council should adopt guidelines, and that 
those guidelines would – in spite of being adopted via ordinary legislative procedure – not 
constitute legislative acts. 
A yet further alternative, perhaps the simplest one of them all, may be offered on the basis of 
the very same judgment of the ECJ. The instrument there in question
91
 was entitled 
“Definitive adoption of the European Union's general budget for the financial year 2011”, 
and its sole article read as follows. 
The procedure under Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union is complete and the European Union's general budget for the financial year 
2011 has been definitively adopted. 
It will be recalled that Article 314(9) TFEU required the president of the Parliament simply to 
declare that the budget was definitively adopted. It is worded as requiring the making of an 
action, rather than as requiring the adoption of an act. National laws of at the very least some 
member states – Estonia, for instance – draw a distinction between acts and actions with only 
the former being normative.
92
 Based on the wording of Article 314(9) TFEU it would seem to 
have been open for the ECJ to have opted for deciding that that provision mandated no act at 
all; that all it did was require an action by the president of the Parliament to conclude the 
procedure. 
Nevertheless it follows from the judgment that the ECJ is of the opinion that Article 314(9) 
TFEU requires the president of the Parliament to adopt an act. 
[I]t is the President of the Parliament, in his capacity as organ of that institution, who, 
by adopting the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU, endows the Union’s budget with 
binding force at the conclusion of a procedure characterised by the joint action of the 
Parliament and the Council /.../
93
 
However, re-reading the aforequoted paragraphs 58 – 60, the ECJ did not actually specify the 
type of the act by which the president of the Parliament declares that the budget has been 
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definitively adopted. The ECJ did not specify the type of that act anywhere else in the 
judgment either. The closest it came to doing so was to reject
94
 that  
[t]he act adopted on the basis of Article 314(9) TFEU is merely a declaratory act, 
adopted by the President of the Parliament.
95
 
Hence it is possible to take away from the judgment that what Article 314(9) TFEU requires 
is an act and that the act has normative force. Looked at this way, it is submitted that one 
would struggle to find arguments why the act is not a decision within the meaning of Articles 
288(4) and 289(2) TFEU. The former reads as follows. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom 
it is addressed shall be binding only on them. 
The act in question was not addressed to anyone. Therefore the second sentence is irrelevant. 
And the act in question was binding: according to the ECJ it was that act which endowed the 
budget with binding force.
96
 If that were so, the aforequoted paragraphs 58 – 60 of the 
judgment would essentially read as nothing more than (i) a refutation of the claim that Article 
314(9) mandates an act not mentioned in Article 289(2) TFEU and (ii) a simple application of 
lex specialis rule to the identity of the adopter (Article 314(9) TFEU simply overruling in this 
respect Article 289(2) TFEU). For present purposes it would offer guidance for the simplest 
solution to the question what happens if a legal basis contradicts the rule on applicable 
legislative procedure which rule is set forth in Article 289 TFEU: the legal basis prevails as 
lex specialis. Hence in case of guidelines being mandated by a legal basis also mandating the 
use of an ordinary legislative procedure, it would mean that the resulting act should be 
guidelines. Presumably this act could then still be legislative within the meaning of Article 
289(3) TFEU (in case of such reading the decision mandated by Article 314(9) TFEU would 
not be a legislative act because of the nature of the budget, not for any reason linked to the 
actual decision of the president of the Parliament). 
The difficulty with that alternative lays in the fact that if that simple solution – the instrument 
bearing number 2011/125/EU was actually a decision – was correct, why did the ECJ not say 
so? It was explicitly confronted with the claim that it was not a decision.
97
 It did not refute 
that suggestion rather offering in reply the argumentation contained in the aforequoted 
paragraphs 58 – 60. It did not touch on the matter elsewhere. 
Case C-77/11 was decided by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ. On the one hand, it could be 
argued to endow the judgment with more weight compared to a judgment of the ECJ handed 
down by a bench of five justices. On the other hand, it could make understanding the 
judgment more difficult: since there are no separate opinions, at least the majority of the 
justices need to agree on the text of any judgment of the ECJ, i.e. both on the disposition and 
the argumentation. Ordinarily the minimum majority is three; case C-77/11 was decided by a 
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Grand Chamber of 15 justices, hence the minimum majority in that case was eight. It is 
submitted that the likely reason for which the ECJ did not opine that Article 314(9) TFEU 
mandated adoption of a decision is because no requisite majority was available to agree to 
such a conclusion. However, that is a point which will likely never be clarified in view of 
secrecy of deliberations.
98
 Therefore while it is possible to argue that the correct ratio 
decedendi of the judgment in case C-77/11 is that Article 314(9) TFEU mandates the 
adoption of a decision, it is submitted that such argument is more difficult to square with the 
actual language of the judgment, and the implications arising from that language, than the 
solution offered in the text to footnote 87 above.
99
 
Furthermore, on the decision-based ratio decedendi the conflict between Articles 289(2) and 
314 TFEU is construed away. It is no longer a real conflict because by mandating a decision 
Article 314 TFEU either restricts the catalogue of acts set forth or the discretion of the 
adopter provided for in Article 289(2) TFEU. As discussed above no such approach is 
possible in case of Article 172 TFEU. Hence the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11 might 
be seen as irrelevant for solving the real conflict. Admittedly it does not need to be seen as 
irrelevant because it could still be seen as mandating a simple application of lex specialis rule 
(with the legal basis trumping Article 289 TFEU). 
Interestingly enough the law enacted on the basis of Article 172 TFEU accords with 
Leidenmuehler’s approach, not with (either construction of) the judgment of the ECJ or the 
possibility of taking “guidelines” to be a reference to substance of acts (in which case the acts 
cannot prescribe any substantive rules to follow). Just as Leidenmuehler suggested that they 
must the Parliament and the Council have enacted only regulations
100
 and decisions
101
 on the 
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basis of Article 172 TFEU, and these instruments contain substantive rules which must be 
followed, i.e. which are obligatory.
102
 It will be recalled that both regulations and decisions 
are listed in Article 289(1) TFEU. Since none of the regulations or decisions so adopted has 
been annulled, it might seem that Leidenmuehler’s approach (lex generalis derogate legi 
speciali) is the correct one, after all. 
A similar situation has arisen in respect of Article 155(2) TFEU. While that provision would 
seem to mandate no legislative procedure at all, it does provide that the act adopted is to be a 
decision. 
Agreements [between management and labour] concluded at Union level shall be 
implemented either in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States or, in matters covered by Article 153, 
at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from 
the Commission. The European Parliament shall be informed. 
Unlike in case of guidelines there would seem to be no way to construe “a decision” as some 
other type of act mentioned in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of Title I of Part Six of the TFEU. 
Furthermore the wording of the provision has remained constant throughout various versions 
of the constitutive treaties ever since the very first time when such power of the Council was 
set forth in the constitutive treaties.
103
 Yet, the instruments adopted on the basis of Article 
155(2) TFEU (and its prior incarnations) have thus far been directives. The directives so 
adopted have been heavily litigated before the ECJ, both in infringement proceedings
104
 and 
in preliminary rulings.
105
 None has ever been annulled. 
More interestingly Jean-Claude Piris, at the time the Director-General of the Council Legal 
Service, said this during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty.
106
 
Sometimes, however, the type of act indicated ("decisions" or "directives") has a 
generic meaning, signifying "act" or "measure" and does not refer to the type of act 
whose name it bears. Thus Article 139(2) (social policy, agreements between 
management and labour) provides that "Agreements concluded at Community level 
shall be implemented (…) by a Council decision", while what is actually intended is a 
directive. 
That explains why the Council has consistently adopted directives. It does not explain why 
those directives have not been annulled (possibly maintaining their validity pending re-
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adoption in proper form) or why, if directive was indeed intended, the mistake was rectified 
neither by the Nice Treaty nor by the Lisbon Treaty.
107
 Piris’ most glaring omission of all is 
the complete lack of any explanation of the basis for his statement that it was not a decision 
(as the treaty said), but a directive (as the Council, including its legal service, seemingly 
thought) which was actually intended. No such explanation was given in spite of the fact that 
the situation would seem to constitute the most glaring of violations of the rule of law 
imaginable: a situation where the highest-ranking instrument of law clearly and explicitly 
says one thing, but the executive of the polity governed by that instrument of law does 
another arguing that the intention – not evidenced in any way – was to have that other thing. 
It is submitted that considering the experience with Article 155(2) TFEU it is impossible to 
take much away from the practice of adopting regulations and decisions on the basis of 
Article 172 TFEU, and hence draw conclusions from that as to what happens when the legal 
basis simultaneously mandates the use of an ordinary legislative procedure and is worded as 
mandating that an atypical act result. In other words, it would seem to be an open question of 
EU law whether Leidenmuehler is correct, or whether such references to atypical acts should 
be construed as references to substance and not type, or whether any solution based on the 
judgement of the ECJ in case C-77/11 should be followed. Or, indeed, that perhaps some yet 
other solution is possible and the correct one. The only thing on this point which seems to be 
capable of being taken away from the constitutive treaties and the practice they have 
generated is that there would seem to be fundamental problems with the way the constitutive 
treaties are drafted. One could only suppose that certain “concessions” might need to be made 
in construing the constitutive treaties in view of the fact that the constitutive treaties are a 
product of give-and-take in international politics when they are negotiated (being not too 
different from any other international treaty with a similar number of participants each 
seeking to further its own agenda). 
2.2.2. Substance 
As has been mentioned some 85 legal bases mandate the use of ordinary legislative 
procedures. On the side of substantive law the two foremost questions related to ordinary 
legislative procedures would seem to be these. What areas of competence (exclusive, shared, 
supporting, coordinating, complementary) do the legal bases requiring the use of ordinary 
legislative procedures belong to? What subject matters do the legal bases requiring the use of 
ordinary legislative procedures regulate? A third, perhaps less evident question, is whether 
there is any pattern behind the use of different ordinary legislative procedures. 
2.2.2.1. Competence 
Title I of the TFEU sets forth the categories and areas of EU competence. Articles 3 – 6 
TFEU list which type of competence a particular field of human activities belongs to. Article 
2 TFEU explains what it is that a particular type of competence enables the EU to do. 
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Article 3 TFEU lists the areas of exclusive competence of the EU.
108
 According to Article 
2(1) TFEU it is only the EU which is competent to legislate and adopt legally binding acts in 
those areas. Article 4(2) TFEU sets forth the areas of “standard” shared competence.109 
According to Article 2(2) TFEU both the EU and member states are competent to legislate 
and adopt legally binding acts in those areas, however member states are competent to do so 
only to the extent that the EU has not done so. In other words, the EU can – and frequently 
does – pre-empt member states from legislating and adopting legally binding acts in those 
areas.  
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 4 TFEU set forth the areas of the other type of shared 
competence.
110
 Both paragraphs contain the following language. 
/.../ the Union shall have competence /.../; however, the exercise of that competence 
shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. 
Thus unlike in case of areas listed in paragraph 2 of Article 4 TFEU, the EU cannot pre-empt 
member states from legislating and adopting legally binding acts in the areas listed in 
paragraphs 3 and 4. In the areas listed in those two paragraphs both the EU and the member 
states may always legislate and adopt legally binding acts. Further, unlike paragraph 2 of 
Article 4 TFEU, its paragraphs 3 and 4 contain language purporting to limit what the EU is 
competent to do in exercise of its competences set forth therein.
111
 Thus in areas of research, 
technological development and space (paragraph 3) the EU may only carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programmes. In areas of development co-operation and 
humanitarian aid (paragraph 4) the EU may only carry out activities and conduct a common 
policy. 
Article 6 TFEU sets forth the areas where the EU is only competent to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the member states.
112
 According to Article 2(5)(1) TFEU the EU 
cannot supersede the competence of member states in these areas, i.e. the EU’s competence is 
truly to support, coordinate and supplement the actions of member states. While the EU is 
competent to adopt legally binding acts relating to these areas, such legally binding acts must 
not entail harmonisation of laws or regulations of member states. 
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The last types of competence of the EU are set forth in Article 5 TFEU. Paragraph 1 of that 
article gives the Council the competence “to adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines 
for” economic policies of member states (which the latter must co-ordinate within the EU). 
Paragraph 2 obliges the EU to 
take measures to ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member 
States, in particular by defining guidelines for these policies, 
and paragraph 3 enables the EU to 
 take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States' social policies. 
Article 2 TFEU, the provision which explicates what it is that a particular type of competence 
enables the EU to do, is silent in respect of paragraph 3 of Article 5 TFEU. In respect of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 it simply says that the EU shall have the competence to provide the 
arrangements determined by the TFEU within which the member states are to coordinate 
their economic and employment policies.
113
  
It has been opined that these Article 5 TFEU areas of competence do not fit particularly well 
the scheme of competences of the EU otherwise established by Title I of the TFEU.
114
 The 
explanation for their existence seems to be a political compromise between those member 
states which would have wished to include them within shared competences and those who 
would have wished to see them among supporting, coordinating and supplementary ones.
115
 
The resulting compromise is problematic because of the difficulties of drawing boundaries 
between Article 5 TFEU fields of competence and those listed elsewhere, and of the lack of 
clarity as what it is exactly that the constitutive treaties enable the EU to do in Article 5 
TFEU fields of competence. 
Thus the constitutive treaties set forth some five types of competences: exclusive 
competence; shared competence with pre-emption (standard shared competence); shared 
competence without pre-emption; competence to support, coordinate and supplement the 
actions of member states; and the “political” competence to coordinate. Looking at Article 2 
TFEU alone it might be tempting to conclude that ordinary (or in fact any) legislative 
procedures should be available only for adoption of acts in the areas where the EU has 
exclusive competence and in the areas where it has some type of shared competence. While 
paragraph 6 of Article 2 TFEU does state that  
[t]he scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union's competences shall be 
determined by the provisions of the Treaties relating to each area, 
only paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 TFEU – dealing respectively with exclusive and shared 
competence – contain language to the effect that the EU is to legislate (in addition to adopting 
legally binding acts). Paragraph 5, dealing with the competence to support, coordinate and 
supplement refers only to adopting legally binding acts, while paragraph 3 on the “political” 
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competence to coordinate omits any reference to either. While every regulation, directive and 
decision is binding, only some – those adopted via a legislative procedure – would seem to 
constitute legislative acts.
116
 Thus only paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 TFEU would seem to 
refer to the activity of adoption of legislative acts. 
With that in mind it is hardly surprising that there are legal bases mandating the use ordinary 
legislative procedure within the areas of exclusive and of standard shared competence. 
Article 114 TFEU – the general, or rather the residual, legal basis for measures intended to 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market
117
 – is 
perhaps the most famous of all legal bases pertaining to internal market (an area of standard 
shared competence). It provides for the use of ordinary legislative procedure. Examples of 
legal bases mandating the use of ordinary legislative procedure in an area of exclusive 
competence could be, for instance, Article 33 TFEU which served as one of the legal bases 
for the recently adopted Customs Code
118
 or Article 207(2) TFEU which is the general legal 
basis for adopting the common commercial policy. 
Moving on to the other type of shared competence, Title XIX of the TFEU – on research and 
technological development and space (and hence falling within the second type of shared 
competence) – contains several legal bases mandating the use of an ordinary legislative 
procedure.
119
 The framework within which the EU is to provide humanitarian aid is likewise 
to be adopted via ordinary legislative procedure,
120
 as are several instruments dealing with 
development cooperation.
121
 
What would seem surprising in the light of paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of Article 2 TFEU is that 
several legal bases in the areas in which the EU is only competent to support, coordinate and 
supplement the actions of member states likewise provide for the use of ordinary legislative 
procedures. Examples could include Article 165(4)(1) TFEU on incentive measures in the 
fields of education, youth and sport, Article 166(4) TFEU on vocational training, Article 
168(4) TFEU on medical, veterinary and phytosanitary measures, Article 167(5)(1) TFEU on 
the flowering of cultures, Article 173(3)(1) TFEU on supporting member states in achieving 
the competitiveness of EU industry, Article 196(2) TFEU on civil protection and Article 
197(2) TFEU on improving administrative capacity for implementation of EU law. The 
foregoing list covers every single area in which the EU is only competent to support, 
coordinate and supplement the actions of member states, and while Article 168(4) TFEU 
specifically states that it constitutes derogation from the general rules contained in Articles 
2(5) and 6 TFEU, the other legal bases do not. Furthermore, in areas where the EU has only 
“political” coordinating competence the constitutive treaties likewise provide for the use of 
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an ordinary legislative procedure: Article 149(1) TFEU is a basis for adoption, via an 
ordinary legislative procedure, of measures (i) incentivising cooperation between member 
states in the field of employment and (ii) otherwise supporting their actions in that field. 
Thus ordinary legislative procedure is employed in areas of every type of competence. The 
foregoing further shows that ordinary legislative procedure is employed both in areas where 
harmonisation is permissible as well as those where it is not.
122
 In this latter respect it needs 
to be added that in some cases harmonisation is excluded even in the area of standard shared 
competence and simultaneously the use of an ordinary legislative procedure is mandated. 
Article 19(2) TFEU on incentive measures to support member states in combating 
discrimination and Article 84 TFEU on supporting member states in the field of crime 
prevention are the two examples. While these legal bases are formulated in a manner similar 
to those which lie in the areas where the EU is only competent to support, coordinate and 
supplement the actions of member states, both legal bases would seem to actually belong to 
the area of freedom, security and justice, which according to Article 4(2)(l) TFEU is an area 
of standard shared competence. Under the general rules set forth in Title I of the TFEU the 
EU may harmonise national laws pertaining to that area. 
The foregoing suggests that there is no link between ordinary legislative procedure and any 
particular type of competence of the EU. That, similarly to what Craig and de Búrca have 
suggested,
123
 Article 2(6) TFEU essentially means that while Title I of the TFEU formulates 
what it is that the EU could do, it says nothing about how it is to do it. Nor, one might add, 
about the extent to which the EU is allowed to act in the areas described in Title I of the 
TFEU. The details – which make all the difference in the world – are set forth in the legal 
bases. Importantly for present purposes it is further possible to conclude that either there is no 
connection whatsoever between references to “legislating” in Article 2 TFEU and any (not 
just ordinary) legislative procedure or that references to legislating in Article 2 TFEU are 
essentially meaningless (that they do not add anything to the remaining language of Article 2 
TFEU). It is possible to make the conclusion formulated in the foregoing sentence because in 
certain situations in respect of which Article 2 TFEU does not state that the EU could 
legislate, the EU is competent to adopt legislative acts (specifically those adopted via 
ordinary legislative procedure).
124
 Thus one possibility is that references to “legislating” in 
Article 2 TFEU are meaningless, because they in no way constrain legislating in areas where 
the EU is not said to be competent to legislate (areas of the competence to support, coordinate 
and supplement the actions of member states and of the “political” coordinating competence). 
Alternatively, if references to “legislating” are seen as constraining some activity 
(“legislating”) in those areas, “legislate” in Article 2 TFEU must mean something else 
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compared to Article 289 TFEU for within that latter meaning the EU does legislate in those 
two areas.
125
 
2.2.2.2. Subject matter 
What subject matters do the legal bases requiring the use of an ordinary legislative procedure 
regulate? The entire list is available in Annexe I to this thesis. What is considered here is 
whether the subject-matters for which it is – or is not – used form some sort of pattern. In 
terms of approach taken in this section 2.2.2.2, one could draw parallels with the 
constitutional principle of parliamentary reservation
126
 recognised in countries belonging to 
the “Germanic” constitutional tradition. That principle can be concisely stated (although it is 
perhaps not always easy to apply): the constitution deems some decisions to be of such great 
importance that only the parliament may be allowed to make them. The closest analogue in 
EU law is probably the rule of essential elements formulated by the ECJ in its Frontex line of 
case law.
127
 There exist some differences between the two, however. The rule of essential 
elements basically states that the adoption of rules essential to the subject-matter envisaged 
by a legislative act is reserved to the EU legislature.
128
 It does not purport – and probably 
could not in its current form be used – to reserve some particular subject matters in their 
entirety to the EU legislator. The principle of parliamentary reservation is capable of serving 
that end: some subject matters might be deemed in their entirety of such importance that they 
must be wholly regulated by the parliament. 
Seen from this perspective it becomes immediately evident upon reading Annexe I that no 
pattern is to be found. If seen from the perspective of the EU, some rules of fundamental 
importance must be adopted via ordinary legislative procedures. It is probably difficult to find 
an issue more central to the EU-project than the four fundamental freedoms; they are the 
irreducible core of the EU. Article 46 TFEU – the legal basis for adopting rules which make 
possible the exercise of freedom of movement of workers – mandates the use of an ordinary 
legislative procedure. Likewise Article 50(1) TFEU – the legal basis for attaining the freedom 
of establishment as far as some particular activities are concerned. At the same time some 
rules just as important for the realisation of the fundamental freedoms are adopted on the 
legal bases which mandate the use of some other rulemaking procedure entirely. Article 31 
TFEU – adoption of the common customs tariff without which there could simply be no 
common market and no free movement of goods – is a good example here. The common 
customs tariff is adopted by the Council upon the proposal of the Commission; the Parliament 
is not involved. Finally, some of the legal bases mandating the use of ordinary legislative 
procedures are at best of secondary importance for the EU. Article 24(1) TFEU could serve 
as an example here. It mandates the use of an ordinary legislative procedure for setting forth 
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the rules on citizens’ initiative. Regardless of its importance for democracy and democratic 
legitimacy, it can hardly be central to the EU-project seeing as no such citizens’ initiative 
existed in EU law prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force. Another example would be 
Article 195(2) TFEU on tourism which likewise mandates the use of an ordinary legislative 
procedure. While not without its significance, promotion of tourism could hardly be given the 
same importance in the EU as the four fundamental freedoms. 
Seen from the perspective of a citizen, the same lack of pattern would seem to be the case. If 
one makes the not unreasonable assumption that a citizen would – if informed – care first and 
foremost about democracy and his own rights, it becomes evident that ordinary legislative 
procedure is well used for both issues of utmost importance – such as the aforementioned 
citizens initiative (Article 24(1) TFEU), the combat of discrimination (Article 19(2) TFEU), 
free movement of workers (Article 46 TFEU) or the rules on recognition of judgements 
handed down in criminal proceedings (Article 82(1)(2)(a) TFEU) – as well as issues of 
considerably lesser importance. The aforementioned measures on tourism (Article 195(2) 
TFEU) could serve as an example here. Article 112 TFEU could serve as example of a non-
ordinary-legislative procedure legal basis the provisions adopted on which are likely to be 
important to an ordinary citizen: that article regulates the introduction of countervailing 
charges on imports from another member state (for a citizen: the price of goods imported 
from another member state). That provision does not mandate the use of any legislative 
procedure; measures are to be adopted by the Council upon proposal of the Commission; the 
Parliament is not involved. 
Finally, yet another perspective could be the depth of EU’s interference in a particular subject 
matter. For instance, Article 169(3) TFEU on consumer protection provides for a minimum 
harmonisation; member states may introduce more stringent measures if they wish. The 
aforementioned Article 19(2) TFEU is an example of an even “shallower” interference with a 
subject matter: it enables the adoption of basic principles of the EU’s incentive measures 
supporting the member states’ actions combating discrimination. Article 52(2) TFEU would 
seem to be a legal basis providing for yet “shallower” interference still: it enables the EU 
merely to coordinate the rules (in respect of special treatment for foreign nationals on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health) which member states might already 
have in place. All three legal bases mandate the use of an ordinary legislative procedure. 
However, some measures adopted via ordinary legislative procedures amount to as detailed a 
regulation of a subject-matter as one could imagine leaving no room for any other rules. The 
aforementioned Customs Code, recently adopted inter alia on the basis of ordinary-
legislative-procedure-mandating Articles 33 and 207(2) TFEU, could serve as an example 
here. Furthermore, provisions serving as legal bases for the creation of institutional rules of 
the EU itself would not seem capable of being classified on a scale of depth of interference at 
all. Article 13(1) of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union enabling the appointment of assistant rapporteurs and creation of rules governing their 
service could serve as an example here. That article provides for the use of an ordinary 
legislative procedure. Finally, it is worth noting that in at least two cases – Articles 178(1) 
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and 182(5) TFEU – the ordinary legislative procedure is mandated for adoption of 
implementing measures. Article 178(1) TFEU reads as follows. 
Implementing regulations relating to the European Regional Development Fund shall 
be taken by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Article 182(5) TFEU reads as follows. 
As a complement to the activities planned in the multiannual framework programme, 
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall 
establish the measures necessary for the implementation of the European research 
area. 
What is worthy of mention here is that these two provisions would seem to refer to measures 
to make, respectively European Regional Development Fund and European research area, 
operational, to put them into practice.
129
 Essentially, the instruments adopted (or to be 
adopted) on those legal bases would not seem to be much different either from 
implementation by member states or from implementing acts referred to in Article 291 
TFEU.
130
 
To sum up, looking at the use of ordinary legislative procedure from the perspective of depth 
of EU’s interference with a subject matter yields no pattern. 
Annexe I to this thesis does however indicate one particularity – one pattern – pertaining to 
the use of ordinary legislative procedures. There is no provision of the TEU which mandates 
its use. Thus, ordinary legislative procedure is never employed for adopting acts in the field 
of common foreign and security policy. If one considers for a moment the political 
significance of common foreign and security policy, another regularity divulges itself. We 
have seen that – considered both from the perspective of the EU and that of an average 
citizen – ordinary legislative procedure is employed for adoption of acts of both high and low 
importance, and further, that other rulemaking procedures are at least sometimes employed 
for adoption of acts of high importance. Conspicuous by their absence from this list are 
situations where completely non-legislative procedures are employed for adoption of 
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measures of lesser importance for either of those constituencies (the EU and average 
citizens). 
2.2.2.3. Different ordinary legislative procedures 
Looking at the use of ordinary legislative procedure the other way around, i.e. starting from 
the type of the ordinary legislative procedure employed rather than from the area of 
competence where or the subject matter in respect of which it is employed, the first thing one 
notices is that all instances where an institution other than the Commission has the privilege 
of initiative are rather technical. There are three such legal bases. Article 129(3) TFEU and 
Article 40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank
131
 require the use of an ordinary legislative procedure for 
amendment of certain provisions of the statute of the ESCB and the ECB. Article 13(1) of the 
Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union requires the use 
of an ordinary legislative procedure in respect of a subject matter of substantially similar 
nature, but concerning the ECJ: the appointment of assistant rapporteurs and creation of rules 
governing their service. All three concern the functioning of non-political institutions of the 
EU. 
The remaining eight legal bases granting privilege of initiative to someone other than the 
Commission while mandating the use of an ordinary legislative procedure all grant that 
privilege to a quarter of member states and are all contained in Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of 
the TFEU. That title is called “Area of freedom, security and justice” and the chapters – 
“Judicial cooperation in criminal matters” and “Police cooperation”. Unlike the three legal 
bases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the matters dealt with here are hardly those the 
importance of which could conveniently be downplayed by labelling them as “technical”.132 
For instance Article 82(1)(2)(a) TFEU enables the adoption of rules and procedures for 
ensuring recognition throughout the EU of all forms of criminal judgments and judicial 
decisions; Article 83(1) TFEU enables formulation of minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in some areas.
133
 These are the very things 
which would seem to concern the everyday functioning of society. 
Looking at these eleven legal bases from the point of view of areas of competence, the legal 
bases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph belong to the area of standard shared competence 
(Article 4(2)(j) TFEU in particular). The legal bases granting the privilege of initiation to the 
ECB would seem to belong simultaneously to several different areas of competence. Article 
129(3) TFEU and Article 40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank enable the amendment of the following 
provisions of the statute of the ESCB and the ECB regulating, respectively, the following 
issues. 
Provision of 
the statute 
Subject matter which the provision regulates 
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Article 5.1 Collection of statistical information by the ECB 
Article 5.2 Collection of statistical information by national central banks
134
 (as proxies 
of the ECB) 
Article 5.3 Harmonisation of rules on collection, compilation and distribution of 
statistical information 
Article 17 Ability of the ECB and national central banks to open accounts and accept 
collateral 
Article 18 Conduct by the ECB and by national central banks of open market and 
credit operations 
Article 19.1 Creation and enforcement of rules on minimum reserves of credit 
institutions 
Article 22 The role of the ECB and national central banks in clearing and payment 
systems 
Article 23 Ability of the ECB and national central banks to establish relations with 
third parties and to engage in transactions usually engaged in by banks 
Article 24 Ability of the ECB and national central banks to engage in administrative 
affairs 
Article 26 Certain accounting rules applicable to the ECB and national central banks 
Article 32.2 Allocation of the income of national central banks in the performance of the 
ESCB's monetary policy function 
Article 32.3 Allocation of the income of national central banks in the performance of the 
ESCB's monetary policy function 
Article 32.4 Allocation of the income of national central banks in the performance of the 
ESCB's monetary policy function 
Article 32.6 Clearing and settlement of the balances arising from allocation of the 
aforementioned income 
Article 33.1(a) Amount of the profit of the ECB to be retained as reserves 
Article 36 Creation of staff regulations 
 
It would thus seem that none of the provisions which can be changed on the basis of Article 
129(3) TFEU and Article 40.1 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank are such that they would exclusively 
belong to an area where the EU has exclusive competence, e.g. the area of monetary policy of 
the member states whose currency is the euro.
135
 Yet, it seems equally clear that some 
measures in that area of exclusive competence could be adopted on the these two legal bases: 
for instance it is not inconceivable that Article 18 or Article 19.1 of the statute are changed in 
a way which both affects directly and has as its object the regulation of monetary policy of 
those member states whose currency is the euro (for instance by regulating the ability of 
national central banks of those member states only to conduct open market and credit 
operations and by requiring credit institutions established in those member states only to hold 
more – or less – capital; both measures would affect the supply of money). At the same time, 
amendments of, for instance, Articles 5.1 – 5.3 of the statute might amount to regulating 
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internal market and thus fall within the area of standard shared competence.
136
 Amendment of 
Article 23 (and some different amendment of Articles 18 or 19) of the statute could easily fall 
within the field of economic policy – where the EU is said to have only the “political” 
coordinating competence.
137
 
Moving onto Article 13(1) of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the legal basis providing for the ECJ’s exclusive privilege of initiative, it 
would not seem to comfortably fall within any area of competence formulated in Title I of the 
TFEU. There is simply no mention in that title of making changes to the institutional 
structure of the EU. Admittedly appointment of an assistant rapporteur is a very minor 
change – essentially creation of a new job. Yet it does change the structure of the ECJ. 
Similar point could be made in respect of some articles of the statute of the ESCB and the 
ECB listed in the table above. Article 36, and possibly Article 32.6, could serve as examples 
here.
138
 
Be it as it may, considering all the eleven legal bases together there would not seem to be any 
pattern to the way they are employed in the constitutive treaties. Adding to the list the other 
39 “modified” legal bases does not result in emergence of any pattern. The same Article 
129(3) TFEU – considering this time the option of the Commission initiating an ordinary 
legislative procedure and the ECB being consulted – could serve as an example of one of 
such modified legal basis capable of falling, in certain circumstances, within the area of 
exclusive competence of the EU. Articles 43(2) TFEU (mandating the consultation of the 
Economic and Social Committee) and Article 192(1) TFEU (mandating the consultation of 
both the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions) could serve as 
other examples.
139
 At the same time Article 114 TFEU – the most famous internal market 
legal basis; it belongs to the area of standard shared competence – mandates the consultation 
of the Economic and Social Committee. Article 182(5) TFEU – the legal basis for adopting 
measures necessary for implementation of the European research area and hence belonging to 
the area of shared competence without pre-emption – mandates the consultation of the 
European Economic and Social Committee. Article 167(5)(1) TFEU – the legal basis for 
adopting measures intended to attain the EU’s objectives in the area of culture where the EU 
only has the competence support, coordinate and supplement the actions of member states – 
mandates the consultation of the Committee of the Regions. Finally, Article 149(1) TFEU on 
incentivising member states’ cooperation in the field of employment is an example of a legal 
basis belonging to the area of “political” coordinating competence which legal basis 
mandates consultation of both the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
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Regions. All the legal bases mentioned in this paragraph mandate the use of ordinary 
legislative procedure. 
The same exercise could be performed backwards: there are areas of all five types of 
competence where an ordinary legislative procedure tout court is employed: 
 area of exclusive competence – Article 33 TFEU (customs cooperation); 
 area of standard shared competence – Article 46 TFEU (free movement of 
workers); 
 area of shared competence without pre-emption – Article 214(3) TFEU 
(framework for humanitarian aid); 
 area where the EU only has competence to support, coordinate and supplement the 
actions of member states – Article 197(2) TFEU (administrative cooperation); 
 area of “political” coordinating competence – Article 189(2) TFEU (European 
space policy). 
Looking at Annexe I to the thesis, it should be evident that the same could be shown 
regarding subject-matters – especially so, considering that the doctrine of parliamentary 
reservation is inherently subjective (different observes might reasonably – and for good 
reasons – affix different importance to the same subject matter). 
Looking back at the questions posed at the beginning of this section 2.2.2,
140
 it is possible to 
say that ordinary legislative procedures are employed in all types of competence areas and in 
respect of subject matters of virtually any level of importance. There seems to be no pattern 
behind how various ordinary legislative procedures are divided between types of competence 
areas or between subject matters. The only other two things which may be taken away are 
that no ordinary legislative procedure is ever mandated by the TEU (and hence none is ever 
used in the field of CFSP) and that it is surprisingly difficult, if not impossible, to find subject 
matters of lesser importance measures in respect of which must be adopted via a non-
legislative procedure. 
2.3. Special legislative procedure 
2.3.1. Procedure 
Academic commentators would seem to agree that there is no one special legislative 
procedure; there are many special legislative procedures.
141
 Indeed Article 289(2) TFEU 
seems to say so itself by referring to a special legislative procedure. Thus, unlike in case of 
ordinary legislative procedures, there would seem to be no purported code of how a special 
legislative procedure is to function, and there would seem to be no special legislative 
procedure tout court. The basic outlines of any special legislative procedure are contained in 
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Article 289(2) TFEU and in Article 17(2) TEU read in conjunction with Article 289(3) 
TFEU. The Commission is, just like in case of ordinary legislative procedures, the default 
holder of the privilege of initiative (except that in case of special legislative procedures 
Article 289 TFEU does not specify the default holder, only Article 17(2) TEU does
142
). The 
reason why there is no special legislative procedure tout court is that unlike in case of 
ordinary legislative procedure there is neither a general rule on who adopts the act – the 
Council or the Parliament – nor a general rule on what the other one of the two is to do in that 
procedure. 
At least some 36 legal bases mandate the use of a special legislative procedure.
143
 32 of these 
36 legal bases mandate that the Council adopt the act.
144
 Of the remaining four three mandate 
that the Parliament adopt the act.
145
 That leaves Article 314 TFEU which deals with the 
adoption of the budget of the EU and was already discussed in section 2.2.1 above (albeit 
from a slightly different perspective). Prior to the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11 it was 
unclear whether the Council or the Parliament was to adopt the budget. Indeed, the chapeau 
of Article 314 TFEU is seemingly worded as mandating that the two adopt the budget 
together. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, shall establish the Union's annual budget in accordance with the 
following provisions. 
Thus, the article could have been read as lex specialis vis-à-vis Articles 289(2) and 297(1)(2) 
TFEU which say that only one institution adopts acts via any single special legislative 
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according to the ECJ an atypical act adopted via a special legislative procedure is not a legislative act within the 
meaning of Article 289(2) TFEU. The only alternative is that “legislative act” means different things in Articles 
17 TEU and 289 TFEU. No problems pertaining to this issue seem to have arisen in practice. 
143
 See Annexe II to this thesis for a list. 
144
 Articles 19(1), 21(3), 22(1), 22(2), 23(2), 64(3), 77(3), 81(3), 83(2), 86(1)(1), 87(3)(1), 89, 113, 115, 118(2), 
126(14)(2), 127(6), 153(2)(3), 182(4), 192(2), 194(3), 203, 223(1)(2), 262, 308(3), 311(3), 311(4), 312(2)(1), 
349(1) and 352(1) TFEU as well as Article 2(1) of the Protocol (No 37) on the financial consequences of the 
expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research fund for Coal and Steel. Special mention should go to Article 
83(2) TFEU. The text of that legal basis mentions neither the Council nor the Parliament. It reads as follows. 
If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure 
the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special 
legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, 
without prejudice to Article 76. 
It is possible to say that only the Council is the adopter of acts on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU when a 
special legislative procedure is to be employed because that legal basis is available only for adopting measures 
in respect of areas which have already been harmonised by EU law, and the procedure to follow is the same as 
that for adoption of those harmonising measures. The constitutive treaties do not contain a single legal basis (i) 
which mandates the use of a special legislative procedure and (ii) which could be used for harmonising laws of 
member states and (iii) where the act is to be adopted by the Parliament. 
145
 Articles 223(2), 226(3) and 228(4) TFEU 
43 
 
procedure. Ultimately the ECJ opted for an even more lex specialis solution: neither 
institution was empowered to adopt the budget. Both have to participate in the adoption, 
indeed consent to it, but 
it is the President of the Parliament, in his capacity as organ of that institution, who, 
by adopting the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU, endows the Union’s budget with 
binding force at the conclusion of a procedure characterised by the joint action of the 
Parliament and the Council.
146
 
While it is true that the resulting act was not legislative within the meaning of Article 289(2) 
TFEU,
147
 the ECJ clearly stated that the procedure employed for its adoption was a special 
legislative procedure.
148
 Thus it follows from that judgment that even to the minimal extent to 
which Article 289(2) TFEU purports to formulate the rules on a special legislative procedure 
(viz., adoption of a regulation, a directive or a decision by one of the Council and the 
Parliament with the participation of the other) that formulation is incomplete. There is at least 
one instance where an organ of one of those institutions (as opposed to that institution as a 
collegiate body) adopts an act via a special legislative procedure with the consent of both 
institutions. 
Moving on to voting rules, despite the fact that as a general rule the Council is to act by 
qualified majority (Article 16(3) TEU), only 6 out of the 32 legal bases which mandate a 
special legislative procedure with the Council being the adopter actually follow that rule 
enabling the Council to act by qualified majority outright.
149
 A further two legal bases – 
Articles 83(2) and 312(2)(1) TFEU do the same thing conditionally. The latter currently 
requires the Council to act unanimously, but Article 312(2)(2) TFEU enables the European 
Council to switch the Council’s decision-making to qualified majority.150 Moving to Article 
83(2) TFEU, it will be recalled that it is a legal basis for approximation of criminal laws of 
member states when such approximation 
proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a[n EU] policy in an area 
which has been subject to harmonisation measures. 
Article 83(2) TFEU does not set out the procedure to be employed for approximating 
criminal laws. Instead it contains a renvoi to the procedure employed for adoption of 
harmonisation measures concerned: the same procedure is to be employed for approximating 
criminal laws on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU. Of the six other legal bases which mandate 
the use of a special legislative procedure with the Council being the adopter and acting by 
qualified majority only Article 349 TFEU could conceivably serve as a legal basis for 
harmonising national laws, albeit only those in force in Guadeloupe, French Guiana, 
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 Paragraph 56 of the judgment in case C-77/11 
147
 Paragraph 60 of the judgment in case C-77/11 
148
 Paragraph 59 of the judgment in case C-77/11 
149
 Articles 23(2), 182(4), 311(4), 314 and 349(1) TFEU and Article 2(1) of the Protocol (No 37) on the 
financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research fund for Coal and Steel 
150
 The European Council has not yet done so. 
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Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands.
151
 
Thus Article 83(2) TFEU is included here on the list of provisions which enable the Council 
to act by qualified majority. 
The remaining 25 (or rather 26
152
) legal bases mandating the use of a special legislative 
procedure with the Council being the adopter require the Council to act unanimously. Of the 
four legal bases mandating the use of a special legislative procedure without the Council 
being the adopter
153
 three always enable the Council to act by qualified majority.
154
 Article 
223(2) TFEU is split in this respect. Article 223(2) TFEU is a legal basis for the Parliament to 
adopt via a special legislative procedure the rules governing the performance of the duties of 
the members of the Parliament. In general, the Council may give its consent to any such rules 
by qualified majority, however when the rules concern taxation of the members or ex-
members of the Parliament, the Council must act unanimously. 
The Parliament too has – like the Council – different voting requirements applied to it in 
different special legislative procedures. Whenever it is the adopter,
155
 it may act by simple 
majority. However, two legal bases mandating the Council to adopt a measure via a special 
legislative procedure with the consent of the Parliament require the latter to give that consent 
by the majority of its component members: Article 223(1)(2) TFEU on election of the 
Parliament and Article 312(2)(1) TFEU on adoption of multiannual financial framework. One 
further provision mandating the use of a special legislative procedure without the Parliament 
being the adopter may require the Parliament to act in a special legislative procedure by the 
majority of its component members: Article 314 TFEU on the adoption of the budget. If the 
Council and the Parliament agree on the budget, no action on the part of the Parliament by 
majority of its component members is required. Such action is required for the Parliament  
 to amend a draft budget (Article 314(4)(c) TFEU), 
 to reject the “compromise” budget agreed by the Conciliation Committee 
(subparagraphs b and c of paragraph 7 of Article 314 TFEU) and 
 to overrule the Council altogether and adopt the budget in such form as it wishes 
(Article 314(7)(d) TFEU). In this latter case in addition to the majority of the 
component members of the Parliament at least three fifths of the members of the 
Parliament who cast their vote need to have voted for overruling. 
                                                 
151
 It is admittedly uncertain whether Article 349 TFEU could serve as a legal basis for harmonisation. Its 
language is similar to that of Article 352 TFEU (the so-called flexibility clause). The latter excludes 
harmonisation only in situations where the constitutive treaties expressly exclude it. Article 349 TFEU does not 
expressly exclude its use as a legal basis for harmonisation at all. The debate of the proper scope of Article 349 
TFEU lies, however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
152
 If one includes Article 83(2) TFEU onto that list. Examples of legal bases which would enable the adoption 
of an act on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU via a special legislative procedure with the Council needing to act 
unanimously would include Articles 64(3) and 77(3) TFEU. 
153
 Articles 223(3), 226(3), 228(4) and 314 TFEU 
154
 Articles 226(3), 228(4) and 314 TFEU 
155
 Acts on the basis of Articles 223(3), 226(3) and 228(4) TFEU 
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Thus in special legislative procedures one of three different voting standards may be 
employed in the Council (unanimity or one of two qualified majorities
156
 depending on 
whether the initiative for the adoption of a given act came from the Commission or not) and 
one of three in the Parliament (simple majority, majority of component members and 
majority of component members simultaneously with a three fifths majority of votes cast). 
Moving on to what the “participating” institution (i.e. the one of the Council and the 
Parliament which does not adopt the act in question)
157
 is to do in a given special legislative 
procedure, there are several possibilities. Of the 33 legal bases mandating the use of a special 
legislative procedure with the Parliament playing the role of the “participating” institution,158 
 23 require the Parliament to give an opinion (to be consulted)159 and 
 11 require the Parliament to give its consent.160 
The four
161
 legal bases
162
 mandating a special legislative procedure with the Council playing 
the role of the “participating” institution all require the Council to give its consent. Article 
314 TFEU deserves special consideration at this point. While Article 314(7)(d) TFEU does 
enable the Parliament to overrule the Council completely and essentially adopt such budget 
as it – the Parliament – desires, the Council can preclude the special legislative procedure of 
adopting the budget ever reaching that stage. There are two points where it may do so. First, 
Article 314(7)(d) TFEU “kicks in” only once a conciliation committee has adopted a so-
called joint text of the proposed budget.
163
 All the members of the Council form part of the 
conciliation committee, and the joint text is only adopted if, inter alia, those members agree 
to it by qualified majority. Hence the Council
164
 can simply preclude the adoption of any joint 
text. Even if the joint text is adopted, Article 314(7)(d) TFEU still does not “kick in” unless 
                                                 
156
 Article 16(4) TEU and Article 238(2) TFEU 
157
 Article 289(2) TFEU 
158
 32 legal bases mandating a special legislative procedure with the Council adopting the resulting act and 
Article 314 TFEU where the act is adopted by the president of the Parliament. 
159
 Articles 22(1), 22(2), 23(2), 64(3), 77(3), 81(3), 83(2), 87(3)(1), 89, 113, 115, 118(2), 126(14)(2), 127(6), 
153(2)(3), 182(4), 192(2), 194(3), 203, 262, 308(3), 311(3) and 349(1) TFEU 
160
 Articles 19(1), 21(3), 25(2), 83(2), 86(1)(1), 223(1)(2), 311(4), 312(2)(1), 314 and 352(1) TFEU as well as 
Article 2(1) of the Protocol (No 37) on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the 
Research fund for Coal and Steel. The reason why the total number of legal bases comes to 34 rather than 33 
lies in the fact that Article 83(2) TFEU, which has been discussed above, occasionally requires an opinion 
(when the renvoi is to an articles listed in footnote 159, for instance Article 64(3) TFEU or Article 77(3) TFEU) 
and occasionally the consent (when the renvoi is to an article listed in the foregoing sentence of this footnote 
160, for instance Article 21(3) TFEU or Article 352(1) TFEU). 
161
 The total number of legal bases (33 for the Parliament and four for the Council) seems to come to 37 rather 
than 36 in this respect, because one legal basis – Article 314 TFEU – gives both the Council and the Parliament 
the “participating” role; neither is the adopter. See the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11 discussed above in 
section 2.2.1 for further details. 
162
 Articles 223(2), 226(3), 228(4) and 314 TFEU 
163
 Article 314(6) TFEU 
164
 Article 314(5)(1) TFEU is, strictly speaking, worded as requiring the consent of the qualified majority of the 
members of the Council or their representatives, but no practical differences would seem to flow from this 
wording. 
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the Council rejects the joint text. As long as it consents to it, all the Parliament can do is force 
the submission of a new budget by the Commission;
165
 it cannot adopt any budget it wishes. 
The first variable to be considered in this section 2.3 which played a role in respect of 
ordinary legislative procedures as well is the privilege of initiative. The list of its holders in 
case of special legislative procedures would seem no wider than in case of ordinary 
legislative procedures; it is however different. Of the 36 legal bases 32 grant a privilege of 
initiative to the Commission. The remaining four legal bases – Articles 223(1)(2), 223(2), 
226(3) and 228(4) TFEU – grant it exclusively to the Parliament. Of the 32 legal bases 
granting the Commission a privilege of initiative  
 on one occasion – Article 308(3) TFEU enabling the Council to amend the statute 
of the EIB – the privilege is shared by the Commission and the EIB, 
 on four occasions – Articles 83(2), 86(1)(1), 87(3)(1) and 89 TFEU – it is shared 
by the Commission and ¼ of member states (by virtue of Article 76 TFEU) and 
 on the remaining 27 occasions it is held exclusively by the Commission. 
It is worth noting in this respect that unlike in case of ordinary legislative procedures the 
participation of the Commission in special legislative procedures is not quite as ubiquitous. 
First, Article 289(2) TFEU purporting to set forth the general meaning of “special legislative 
procedures” does not mandate the Commission’s participation. Second, Article 17(2) TEU 
only mandates the Commission’s participation – consisting of initiation of the proceedings – 
for legislative acts and “except where the Treaties provide otherwise”. In fact, one of the 
aforementioned four legal bases which do provide otherwise (i.e. grant the privilege of 
initiative to the Parliament) in case of a special legislative procedure, makes no mention of 
the Commission at all. That legal basis is Article 223(1)(2) TFEU enabling adoption of the 
rules governing the election of the Parliament; it would seem that the constitutive treaties do 
not grant the Commission any role at all in the special legislative procedure for the adoption 
of those rules.  
The same is true of Articles 83(2), 86(1)(1), 87(3)(1) and 89 TFEU when the procedure is 
initiated by ¼ of member states rather than by the Commission. None of the four provisions 
mentions the Commission, hence its only participation is initiating the procedure with the 
privilege to do so deriving from Article 17(2) TEU and Article 76(a) TFEU. However the 
former article contains a conflict clause disapplying it if some other provision of the 
constitutive treaties provides otherwise, and Article 76 TFEU – in paragraph b – grants the 
privilege concurrently to ¼ of member states. Viz. either the Commission or ¼ of member 
states may initiate the procedure. Since none of these four legal bases mentions the 
Commission, it stands to reason that should the initiative come from ¼ of the member states, 
the Commission would not need to be party to the proceedings at all; no-one would need to 
involve it. It is apposite to recall that in case of ordinary legislative procedures Article 294 
TFEU ensured that even if the Commission did not initiate a given ordinary legislative 
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 Article 314(7)(c) TFEU 
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procedure, the proposal would still be communicated to it,
166
 it would still be able to 
participate in working of the conciliation committee should it so wish
167
 and it would still be 
obliged to opine on the amendments which the Parliament makes at second reading to the 
Council’s position.168 
Another point worthy of being repeated here is that the definition of qualified majority in the 
Council changes depending on whether the special legislative procedure is initiated by the 
Commission
169
 or someone else. In the former case there are rules on blocking minority and 
only 55% of the members of the Council are needed for qualified majority, while in the latter 
this percentage rises to 72% and there are no rules on blocking minority.
170
 Thus the legal 
bases mandating in a seemingly similar manner qualified majority voting in the Council 
might actually require different things. For instance, Articles 223(2) (to the extent it mandates 
qualified majority voting in the Council), 226(3) and 228(4) TFEU which give the privilege 
of initiative to the Parliament, on the one hand, and Articles 19(1), 21(3) and 22(1) TFEU 
(the very first three articles mandating a special legislative procedure), on the other hand, 
actually speak of different majorities in the Council in spite of employing the same language. 
In terms of participation in a special legislative procedure of an entity other than the initiator, 
adopter and that of the Council and the Parliament which is not the adopter, 
 on three occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the Economic and Social 
Committee be consulted over the course of the applicable special legislative 
procedure;
171
 
 on three occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that each member state 
approve in accordance its own constitutional requirements the measures adopted 
via the applicable special legislative procedure;
172
 
 on three occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the Commission be 
consulted over the course of the applicable special legislative procedure;
173
 
 On two occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that both the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions be consulted over the course 
of the applicable special legislative procedure;
174
 
 On two occasions the constitutive treaties mandate that the ECB be consulted over 
the course of the applicable special legislative procedure;
175
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 Article 294(15)(2) TFEU 
167
 Article 294(15)(2) TFEU  
168
 Subparagraph c of paragraph 7 of Article 294 TFEU which is, unlike paragraphs 2 and 9 and the second 
sentence of paragraph 6, not disapplied in situations where the proposal does not come from the Commission. 
169
 Or, hypothetically, the High Representative. See section 2.3.3 below. 
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 Article 16(4) TEU and Article 238(2) TFEU 
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 Articles 113, 115 and 182(4) TFEU 
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 Articles 25(2), 223(1)(2) and 262 TFEU 
173
 Articles 223(2), 228(4) and 308(3) TFEU; the latter in case the EIB rather than the Commission initiates the 
procedure. 
174
 Articles 152(2)(3) and 192(2) TFEU 
175
 Articles 126(14)(2) and 127(6) TFEU 
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 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that the Commission give its 
consent to the measure to be adopted via the applicable special legislative 
procedure;
176
 
 On one occasion the constitutive treaties mandate that the EIB be consulted over 
the course of the applicable special legislative procedure.
177
 
As we saw in section 2.2.1 above there are a total of three classes of variables
178
 
differentiating the different ordinary legislative procedures.
179
 There are seven classes of 
variables differentiating between different special legislative procedures: the identity of the 
adopter; the action required of that one of the Council and the Parliament which is not the 
adopter (“the other institution”); the voting requirement to be followed by the adopter; the 
voting requirement to be followed by “the other institution”; the holder of the privilege of 
initiative; the identity of the participating entities other than the Council, the Parliament and 
the initiator; whether those participating entities may veto the resulting measure; and whether 
the procedure to be followed by the participating entities is dictated by EU law or by national 
law of the member states. 
Just like in case of ordinary legislative procedures legal bases mandating the use of a given 
legislative procedure sometimes mandate the type which the resulting act is to take. Of the 36 
legal bases 
 8 require that a regulation result,180 
 3 require that a directive result181 and 
 one requires that the resulting act be a decision.182 
Thus some 24 legal bases mandating the use of a special legislative procedure do not 
prescribe in any way the type of the act which is to be the outcome of the special legislative 
procedure. There are, however, among the 36 no legal bases which would mandate the use of 
an atypical act.
183
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 Article 226 TFEU 
177
 Article 308(3) TFEU in case the Commission rather than the EIB initiates the procedure. 
178
 The identity of the holder of privilege of initiative, the identity of the participating entities other than those 
mentioned in Article 294 TFEU and whether the participating entities other than those mentioned in Article 294 
TFEU need only be consulted or must consent to the resulting measure. The difference in the voting 
requirements set forth in paragraphs 15(1) and 9 of Article 294 TFEU as well as Article 16(4) TEU and Article 
238(2) TFEU is not a separate class of variables in case of ordinary legislative procedures: it itself depends, 
indirectly, on the identity of the holder of the privilege of the initiative. 
179
 There is obviously a further variable written into Article 294 TFEU, viz. at what reading the measure will be 
adopted, but that is something common to all ordinary legislative procedures. It does not depend on the legal 
basis (to the point that measures adopted on the same legal basis could differ in the respect referred to in the 
foregoing sentence). 
180
 Articles 86(1)(1), 118(2), 127(6), 223(2), 226(3), 228(4), 311(4) and 312(2)(1) TFEU 
181
 Articles 23(2), 83(2) and 115 TFEU 
182
 Article 311(3) TFEU 
183
 It should be mentioned here that the aforediscussed Article 314(9) TFEU does not, strictly speaking, set forth 
any type of act which must result. Further, in respect of Article 223(2) TFEU it should be noted that while it 
does refer to laying down “regulations and general conditions”, in that case it is clear that that reference is to the 
content rather than the type of the act to be adopted: the same provision expressly says that any act adopted on 
the basis of it must be a regulation. Article 223(2) TFEU therefore simply constitutes an example of lax drafting: 
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2.3.2. Commonalities between special and ordinary legislative procedure 
Are there any commonalities between all the ordinary legislative procedures and all the 
special legislative procedures (leaving for the moment aside the areas where they are 
employed)? There would seem to be just two: consent of the Council is always needed for 
adoption of the resulting act and the Parliament always participates in any such procedure. 
The third “suspect” – participation of the Commission – turns out to be a mirage. Article 
223(1) TFEU is a legal basis mandating a special legislative procedure without any 
participation of the Commission whatsoever. Importantly this “exclusion” cannot be casually 
swiped aside: it is simply too important a legal basis. It enables the adoption of the rules 
governing the election of the Parliament. As such it is important both from the perspective of 
the EU (it goes to institutional set up, and ultimately the institutional balance
184
) and from the 
perspective of a citizen (it goes to democracy of the polity). In addition, there are, as 
mentioned, a further four legal bases mandating the use of a special legislative procedure 
which may have the same effect: Articles 83(2), 86(1)(1), 87(3)(1) and 89 TFEU. 
The fourth “suspect” – sufficiency of consent of the Council and the Parliament proves 
likewise a mirage: as mentioned above, there are legal bases mandating special legislative 
procedures which require consent of the Commission (Article 226 TFEU) or of member 
states (Articles 25(2), 223(1)(2) and 262 TFEU). In fact, there are two legal bases mandating 
ordinary legislative procedure which essentially require consent of at least some member 
states – Articles 172(1) and 188(2) TFEU. 
However, what the foregoing treatment of legislative procedures (both the ordinary and the 
special ones) has quietly demonstrated is that Article 289 TFEU sets no substantive criteria 
for the acts resulting from those procedures. While the ECJ’s judgment in case C-77/11 might 
be read as applying at least some substantive criterion to determining whether an act is 
legislative, even if the act fails to meet any such criterion, that does not make the procedure 
itself any less legislative within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU. In paragraph 60 of that 
judgment the ECJ opined that 
[e]ven though the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU is the outcome of a special 
legislative procedure, it does not, due to the nature of the budget, take the form of a 
legislative act in the strict sense of the term for the purpose of Articles 288 TFEU and 
289(2) TFEU, and is, in any event, a measure open to challenge for the purpose of 
Article 263 TFEU, since it endows the Union’s budget with binding force. 
For present purposes it is a moot point whether that passage should be read as saying that the 
substance of an instrument adopted via a legislative procedure is capable of taking it out of 
the group of legislative acts or whether it should be read in some more subtle manner. For 
instance as saying that in view of the particular nature of the instrument the TFEU sets forth a 
                                                                                                                                                        
the term “regulation” is quite clearly used in two different senses in the very same sentence. That is hardly 
conducive to clarity. 
184
 The rules governing election of the Parliament undoubtedly have effect on the political composition of the 
Parliament (as evidenced by examples of gerrymandering in national electoral systems) which in turn affects its 
actual relationships with other institutions. 
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“special” special legislative procedure and it is that procedure (or some aspect of it, such as 
the atypical adopter of the resulting act, or some corollary of it, such as the resulting act being 
a “declaration”) which takes the resulting act out of the group of legislative acts. Indeed 
paragraph 59 of the judgment would seem to point to some variation of the second alternative 
(more subtle reading) in as much as it (i) stresses that because of the nature of the budget a 
particular legislative procedure has been set forth in Article 314 TFEU and (ii) underlines the 
fact that the adopter is an atypical one, i.e. not mentioned in Article 289 TFEU, and (iii) calls 
the instrument which that atypical adopter is to adopt a generic “act” (rather than using one of 
the three “names” referred to in Article 289(2) TFEU).185 
Thus the third commonality of all ordinary and special legislative procedures is that they are 
determined purely by reference to being called a legislative procedure.
186
 There are no 
requirements as to the substance of the resulting acts. That would seem to be in stark contrast 
with the Constitutional Treaty which served, in this respect, as the basis for the Lisbon 
Treaty. According to Articles I-33 and I-34 of the Constitutional Treaty only European laws 
and European framework laws could be legislative acts. While Article I-34 did state that they 
were to be adopted via a particular procedure (either an ordinary or a special legislative 
procedure), sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of paragraph 1 of Article I-33 had the following to say. 
A European law shall be a legislative act of general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
A European framework law shall be a legislative act binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
From that Alexander Türk has concluded that 
this approach corresponds to the rationale on which the characterisation of legislation 
in substance is based: legislation should be adopted in general and abstract terms to 
ensure the equal treatment of those subjected to its rules. It should therefore not be 
drafted with the intention of dealing with the particular situation of, and with 
exclusive application to, specific individuals. European laws therefore combine the 
notion of legislation in form, due to the procedure by which the act is adopted, and 
that of legislation in substance.
187
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  Paragraph 59 reads as follows: “It should be recalled that Article 314 TFEU lays down a special legislative 
procedure appropriate to the nature of the budget, which is essentially an accounting document setting out 
estimates for the European Union of all income and expenditure over a certain period. After the President of the 
Parliament has verified that the procedure complies with the provisions of the FEU Treaty, that document is 
annexed to the act by which the President declares, on the basis of Article 314(9) TFEU, that the budget has 
been definitively adopted.” 
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 Or by complying with the conditions set forth in either Articles 289(1) and 294 TFEU or Article 289(2) 
TFEU. See section 2.3.3 below. There are no words in any of these provisions which would set forth some 
substantive criterion. 
187
 Alexander Türk, The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law 
Journal 1565 
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The TFEU clearly takes a different path in respect of substance. In addition to regulations
188
 
and directives it explicitly includes decisions onto the list of types of potential instruments 
resulting from either an ordinary or a special legislative procedure. According to Article 
288(4) TFEU a decision may be addressed to one particular person; it does not need to be of 
general application. It is further submitted that a budget
189
 might very well be seen as another 
example of an act – adopted via a special legislative procedure – which is not of general 
application. 
However, as regards the procedure the TFEU follows the same path as the Constitutional 
Treaty. The latter was, after all, the source from which the TFEU “borrowed” ordinary and 
special legislative procedures.
190
 As is evidenced by the foregoing quotation for Türk the 
Constitutional Treaty adopted the notion of legislation in form. Since the 
Constitutional Treaty does not produce a constitution corresponding to those of [the] 
Member States,
191
 
but 
[t]he distinction in the Constitutional Treaty between legislative acts as a category of 
legal acts and non-legislative acts sets it apart from the EC Treaty and raises the 
presumption that legislative acts under the Constitutional Treaty correspond to 
legislation in form as employed in the constitutional systems of its Member States,
192
 
Türk concludes that the term “legislation” might legitimately be used in EU law only if it 
 could be used in a functionally equivalent way to that employed in states.
193
 
Dealing then with arguments contending that since none of the EU’s institutions is 
democratically legitimate the way a national parliament is, there cannot be any EU legislation 
in form for that requires an institution akin to a national parliament, he suggests that any such 
argument would do no more than demonstrate an inability to perceive the EU and its 
lawmaking in any other way than by reference to state parameters.
194
 It should instead be 
understood, he argues, that 
[e]ach [EU] institution represents a particular interest in the law-making process that 
allows the Union to form a system of functional representation. Despite its 
distinguishing features, similarities with the national system become apparent when 
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 Which, according to Türk, must unavoidably be of general application. See The Concept of the “Legislative” 
Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1565. 
189
 To the extent that the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11 should not be read as affirming that the Article 
314(9) TFEU act is a decision. See the text to footnote 97 above. 
190
 See Articles I-34 and III-396 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
191
 The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1558 
192
 The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1558 
193
 The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1558 
194
 The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1560 
52 
 
bearing in mind that the legislative process in the nation state also comprises all 
constitutionally relevant institutions in a deliberative process of law-making.
195
 
Thus legislation in form is possible at EU level. Dealing with particular procedures he opines 
that ordinary legislative procedure should properly be considered legislative, because
196
 
 it is a joint effort by the Council and the Parliament (i.e. the adoption of the 
resulting act without agreement of both is impossible),  
 the procedure allows the Parliament to protect minority interests,  
 the procedure necessarily entails an exchange of views between the Parliament 
and the Council: 
o according to the Parliament’s rules of procedure the Council may appear 
before the Parliament’s committees and comment on proposed 
amendments before final votes thereon are taken,
197
 
o the act cannot be adopted before each of the two institutions considers the 
position of the other, which “means that the adopted act reflects the 
discussion in the parliamentary committee and the plenary, where the 
proposals and the amendments are discussed in public”198 and 
o should the Council disagree with the position of the Parliament, it must 
explain its reasons
199
 thus putting the Parliament “in full possession of the 
arguments before the Council” and in a position to serve as “a public 
forum for discussion on the issues before it”, and 
 the proposed act is discussed in public: it is discussed in plenary by the Parliament 
and even if the procedure goes all the way through the conciliation stage – which 
occurs behind closed doors – the joint text adopted by the Conciliation Committee 
will be publicly discussed in the Parliament.
200
 
He concludes by stating that 
[t]he presentation of these arguments in public reflects the spectrum of the discussion 
and justifies the procedure to be considered as legislative. It can therefore be 
concluded that the ordinary legislative procedure should be considered as legislative 
procedure, as it allows an equal representation and consideration of the relevant 
interests in the Union by the respective institutions. The EP is also in an adequate 
position to fulfil its public forum function in this procedure.
201
 
He offers no in-depth analysis of the role of the Commission in an ordinary legislative 
procedure nor does he engage with the fact that there is more than one ordinary legislative 
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procedure. Presumably these aspects are held to be of no consequence when considering 
legislation in form. 
The situation with special legislative procedures Türk seems to find somewhat more 
complex. He divides special legislative procedures into two: those which require consent of 
both the Council and the Parliament for the adoption of an act and those which require only 
the consent of the Council with the Parliament merely offering its opinion.
202
 In respect of the 
former he concludes 
[i]t is /.../ justified to qualify the procedure, in which the consent of the EP is required 
by the Constitutional Treaty, as legislative. Similarly, the procedure in which the 
consent of the Council is mandatory before the EP can adopt the act should be 
regarded as legislative.
203
 
The reason for such a conclusion is that the Parliament’s ability to withhold its consent gives 
the Parliament sufficient influence because its consent may be gained only by 
accommodating its view. While such special legislative procedure entails only one reading in 
the Parliament, that nevertheless 
 seems sufficient to provide a public forum for a discussion on the merits of the act.
204
 
No separate consideration is given to situations where the Council is the one which is merely 
to consent: all the reasoning, which Türk offers, pertains to the position of the Parliament. 
Writing of special legislative procedures requiring mere consultation of the Parliament (there 
are none which would enable the Parliament to adopt an act after merely consulting the 
Council), Türk notes first of all that such procedures are indistinguishable – in terms of 
procedural steps needed to be taken for the adoption of an act – from those leading to the 
adoption of some non-legislative acts, for instance European regulations.
205
 Second, he 
opines that in such special legislative procedures the Parliament has little influence over the 
outcome of the act adopted. Thus 
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it is doubtful that the EP can perform its public forum function in the consultation 
procedure,
206
 
because the Council’s presence in the Parliament is very limited.207 
At the parliamentary committee stage, a representative of the Council's secretariat 
might be present; and at times someone from the Presidency is present. This means 
that the major player in the procedure, the Council, is not involved in the discussions 
at the committee stage. Also, at the plenary stage, though the Presidency is 
represented, it rarely engages in the discussion. Moreover, the fact that the Council 
sometimes de facto decided on the proposal before it has received the EP's opinion, 
reflects the limited influence of the EP and that the discussions in plenary do not 
adequately reflect the legal text to be adopted. The Council is not forced to defend its 
decision and therefore need not to engage in a debate with the EP.
208
 
The crux of the issue is not that the deliberations are not public, but 
that the presentation of the arguments for and against the act is only offered from the 
EP's point of view, which is not even binding on the Council.
209
 
To sum up, since (i) the impact of the Parliament is limited which, in turn, limits public 
display of arguments and (ii) there are said to be some non-legislative procedures which are 
indistinguishable from special legislative procedures mandating a mere consultation of the 
Parliament, Türk comes to the conclusion that special legislative procedures mandating a 
mere consultation of the Parliament are not legislative at all. In doing so the outcome of his 
analysis is essentially to confirm the conclusion which he had reached when analysing EC 
law as it stood after the Nice Treaty: only such procedures which necessitate consent of both 
the Parliament and the Council are legislative in form.
210
 
Türk’s account is problematic for several reasons. First, speaking of point (ii) made in the 
preceding paragraph, the argument is too strong: the point is equally valid in relation to those 
special legislative procedures which necessitate the consent of the Parliament.
211
 Thus if that 
argument matters, it excludes special legislative procedures which necessitate the consent of 
the Parliament from the legislative group as well. Besides, the question could be asked why 
not look at the situation the other way around, i.e. instead of considering special legislative 
procedures mandating a mere consultation of the Parliament as non-legislative because of 
their equivalence to procedures leading to adoption of non-legislative acts, by considering 
those latter procedures as legislative because they mandate the same procedural steps as 
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special legislative procedures? Speaking of point (i) made in the preceding paragraph, first, it 
must be noted that he starts from the premise that the Constitutional Treaty (and hence, for 
present purposes, the Lisbon Treaty which follows the Constitutional Treaty in relevant 
respects) is somehow set apart from the EC Treaty as far ordinary and special legislative 
procedures go. We saw in section 2.2.1 that Article 251 EC procedures are not all that 
different from ordinary legislative procedures. As for special legislative procedures, there has 
been no change in procedure: the legal bases which now mandate a special legislative 
procedure and which existed in the EC Treaty
212
 mandated under the EC Treaty that same 
procedure.
213
 The only difference is that they did not contain words “special legislative 
procedure” with appropriate auxiliaries.214 The point that there have been no major changes 
in what are now called legislative procedures (when compared to the position under the EC 
Treaty as it stood after the Treaty of Nice) has also been made by other commentators, 
Dougan
215
 and Best
216
 for instance. De Witte has gone as far as suggesting that 
[a]s before, there will be no single united procedure for making EU legislation, but 
co-decision procedure (which, in its operation, will not be modified) will henceforth 
be called ordinary legislative procedure (Article 289(1) TFEU). All the remaining 
procedures (including mainly the consultation and assent procedures) will be called 
special legislative procedures.
217
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In fact Working Group No IX itself in its final report dealt with the switch from co-decision 
to ordinary legislative procedure under the heading “Changes of wording”218 where it 
discussed precisely that: changes of the wording and connotations of different wordings, 
nothing more. The modifications of wording were not said to change anything else. 
Thus this premise that distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts somehow sets 
the Constitutional Treaty (and hence the Lisbon Treaty) apart from the EC Treaty is simply 
wrong in law. If anything, that incorrectness is further demonstrated by Türk’s own 
conclusions: as far as legislation in form is concerned he reached basically the same ones 
both under the Constitutional Treaty and under the EC Treaty as it stood after the Treaty of 
Nice.
219
 Thus his own account is proof of no change at all. 
Second, no explanation is given for why the use of the language of “legislation” is legitimate 
only if such use is functionally equivalent to the use made of it in member states. This is 
simply postulated as fact.  
Third, while Türk suggests that the EU and its lawmaking must not be perceived through 
state parameters, he does just that by requiring that the term “legislation” be used in a 
functionally equivalent manner to the way it is used in states. If anything, that is not simply 
perceiving the EU and its lawmaking through state parameters, it is applying those 
parameters to the EU, especially considering that he purports to demonstrate that different 
legal consequences follow in EU law depending on whether a particular EU instrument is or 
is not legislation in form (i.e. whether that instrument is or is not functionally equivalent to 
state legislation).
220
 He says as much himself by claiming that 
[d]espite [the EU’s] distinguishing features, similarities with the national system 
become apparent when bearing in mind that the legislative process in the nation state 
also comprises all constitutionally relevant institutions in a deliberative process of 
law-making.
221
 
A further issue with this third problem is that the use of the language of “legislation” might – 
and does – differ from state to state. It is unclear which states one should use as comparators. 
Fourth, and moving to the specifics of the argumentation, if special legislative procedures 
requiring consent are sufficient for “legislativeness”, then large parts of the argumentation 
regarding ordinary legislative procedures are otiose. It will be recalled that such special 
legislative procedures were “legislative” because the Parliament could block adoption of 
resulting acts hence being in a position to affect their content and because the Parliament did 
serve as a public forum for discussing the merits of the resulting acts. Thus if one reading in 
the Parliament coupled with its ability to block adoption of an act is sufficient for 
“legislativeness”, why speak of exchange of views in the context of ordinary legislative 
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procedures? Clearly that is not a necessary condition for “legislativeness”. Nor is equal 
representation
222
 for in any special legislative procedure one of the two institutions (more 
frequently the Council) is the dominant one, and it is usually only the dominant one which 
adopts the act.
223
 That leaves three other grounds which Türk gives for his conclusions in 
respect of ordinary legislative procedures: joint effort, protection of minority interests by the 
Parliament and discussion of the act in public. 
There is no explanation in Türk’s account as to why an ordinary legislative procedure enables 
the Parliament to protect minority interests nor does he offer any evidence of that. On the one 
hand, looking at the issue from the point of view of institutional bias and the basis from 
which the Parliament has thus far advanced its agenda (claiming to have, unlike any other EU 
institution, direct democratic legitimacy), the Parliament is a majoritarian institution.
224
 
Indeed it has been opined elsewhere that 
Article 10 TEU contains a concise statement of the Union’s dual basis of democratic 
legitimacy: citizens are directly represented at the Union level in the European 
Parliament; Member States are represented in the European Council and the Council, 
those representatives being themselves democratically accountable either to their 
national parliaments or their citizens.
225
 
It thus seems foolhardy to suggest without more that the Parliament is somehow the protector 
of minority interests. It is undoubtedly true that the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission have different biases, i.e. they “take care” of different interest, but none of those 
would necessarily seem minority ones. On the other hand, since this argument was not 
advanced in respect of special legislative procedures mandating consent, this argument too 
seems unnecessary for the conclusion. 
This leaves two grounds both of which are applicable to both ordinary legislative procedures 
and those special legislative procedures which require consent of both the Council and the 
Parliament: joint effort (both the Council and the Parliament being able to block adoption) 
and public discussion. The latter, however, also occurs in case of those special legislative 
procedures which require merely consultation of the Parliament. Türk purports to deal with 
this obstacle by suggesting that 
the assent procedure can be distinguished from the consultation procedure, as [the 
discussion in Parliament in case of the assent procedure] reflects the act in its final 
version.
226
 
Is that a relevant difference? It is submitted that it is not. According to Article 16(8) TEU the 
Council is also to hold its debates in public when it is dealing with a legislative act, and the 
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Council does deal with final version of any legislative act, including those adopted via a 
special legislative procedure mandating consultation of the Parliament. To be fair to Türk it 
should be noted that that was also the case both under the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-
50(2)) and under EC law before that. In the latter case it was admittedly prescribed by the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure227 rather than a constitutive treaty, but for practical purposes it 
would not seem to be a relevant difference. The law was the same, its source differed. 
One could argue that the difference lies in the fact that the Council’s deliberations are 
frequently limited to expression of agreement in respect of legislative proposals on which it 
votes: most of deliberating is done by COREPER and various technical committees, and their 
meetings are not public.
228
 Meetings of the committees of the Parliament, on the other hand, 
mostly are public.
229
 Hence the difference in this respect between the two types of special 
legislative procedure. That seems, however, a very tenuous basis for putting forward a 
conceptual distinction.  
Thus to maintain the argument of public discussion as a separate distinction between different 
types of special legislative procedure (instead of reducing it to lack of joint effort), the crux 
of the argument in respect of public discussion seems to go to the debate in the committees of 
the Parliament. As we saw Türk holds the debates in the committees of the Parliament to be 
insufficient in case of special legislative procedures mandating consultation of the 
Parliament, because the presence of the Council in those committees is said in case of such 
procedures to be insufficient. Yet the rules of procedure of the Parliament would not in this 
respect seem to differ significantly between special legislative procedures requiring consent 
and special legislative procedures requiring an opinion of the Parliament. In any case the 
Council is not bound by the rules of procedure of the Parliament nor is it under any duty to 
participate in the work of any parliamentary committee in any ordinary or special legislative 
procedure. The fact that it might do so in some cases is occasioned by the Parliament’s ability 
to block adoption of acts in those cases, not by the applicable rules of procedure. Thus the 
lack of participation of the Council goes likewise ultimately not to the question of debate, but 
to the issue of joint effort. The same is true of the suggestion that the Council frequently 
disregards opinions of the Parliament. 
Furthermore, what would be the practical consequence of any parliamentary debate in respect 
of the final version of the proposed act? What would change? On Türk’s own argument – to 
the effect that the Council frequently disregards the opinion of the Parliament – nothing at all. 
Thus any parliamentary debate is or would be, just as debates in the Council are, 
essentially “useless” albeit for a different reason. The debates in the Council are useless 
because nothing is actually debated in substance, they are or would be useless in the 
Parliament because they have or would have no more practical consequence than debates in 
the press. 
                                                 
227
 Article 8(1)(b) of the Council Decision of 22 July 2002 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure 
(2002/682/EC, Euratom) and Article 8(1)(b) of the Council Decision of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's 
Rules of Procedure (2004/338/EC, Euratom) 
228
 See Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (3
rd
 ed., 2014 CUP), pages 
148 and 149 
229
 Rule 115(3) of the current Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament 
59 
 
Therefore the argument of lack of public discussion shows itself to be – at the level of legal 
argumentation – misdirected: to the extent that the difference between public discussions held 
over the course of special legislative procedures requiring consent (which for Türk are 
legislative) and those held over the course of special legislative procedures which require 
consultation (which for Türk are not legislative) has practical consequences those 
consequences go to joint effort, not to quality of discussion. As Türk himself admits 
[t]he objection is not so much that the deliberations are not public, but that the 
presentation of the arguments for and against the act is only offered from the EP's 
point of view, which is not even binding on the Council.
230
 
Since the arguments offered from the Council’s point of view (if not the debates in which 
those arguments are offered) are made public and were so at the time,
231
 the part of the 
criticism quoted in italics is essentially a criticism of two chambers of the law-maker being 
located in different places. That seems hardly forceful. As has been shown, it is difficult to 
see what the offering of arguments from the Council’s point of view in the Parliament would 
change. Thus, as may be gleaned from the part of the criticism quoted in bold, lack of public 
debate is ultimately reduced to the fact that in special legislative procedures where no consent 
of the Parliament is needed, the latter cannot “bind” the Council to its position – cannot block 
adoption of the resulting act. 
Therefore Türk’s opinion to the effect that ordinary legislative procedures and those special 
legislative procedures which require consent of both the Council and the Parliament are 
legislative while the other special legislative procedures are not is ultimately based on one 
ground: joint effort. Consent of both the Parliament and the Council is needed for adopting 
acts via the former, while consent of only the Council is needed for adopting acts via the 
latter. 
It has been demonstrated above that currently there are ordinary legislative procedures where 
the role of the Commission is no more than advisory.
232
 The same was true under the 
Constitutional Treaty.
233
 There are currently likewise special legislative procedures where the 
role of the Commission is merely advisory.
234
 The same was likewise true under the 
Constitutional Treaty.
235
 Furthermore there are currently special legislative procedures where 
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the Commission simply does not participate.
236
 The same was again true under the 
Constitutional Treaty.
237
 
It should be recalled at this stage that Türk started his treatment of the issue by stating that 
any formal concept of legislation requires the participation of “all constitutionally relevant 
institutions in a deliberative process of law-making” and that “[e]ach [EU] institution 
represents a particular interest in the law-making process that allows the Union to form a 
system of functional representation”.238 What institutions are constitutionally relevant in the 
EU? 
It is impossible to adopt an act via a legislative procedure within the meaning of Article 289 
TFEU without consent of the Council. That leaves the Parliament and the Commission as the 
two “generalist” institutions which in some cases cannot block the adoption, via a legislative 
procedure within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU, of an act. As we saw, Türk’s treatment 
essentially comes down to a statement that a special legislative procedure where the 
Parliament does not have that blocking ability is not legislative. Thus perhaps a more 
poignant way of putting the question formulated at the end of the last paragraph is to ask 
whether it can properly be said that the Commission is less constitutionally relevant than the 
Parliament. If it cannot, then on Türk’s own assumption there are considerably more ordinary 
and special legislative procedures which are not legislative. 
Article 17(1) TEU tasks the Commission with the promotion of the general interests of the 
EU, including ensuring application of EU law. Tasked with these duties the Commission is 
normally seen as the watchdog in the EU institutional set-up. It is the Commission which 
ensures that the common EU interests (integration in the widest sense) set forth in the 
constitutive treaties are actually if not achieved, then at least pursued, frequently in spite of 
the more fickle political forces dominating the Council and the Parliament.
239
  
The issue of the Commission’s relative importance specifically in ordinary legislative 
procedure has recently been considered by the ECJ in case C-409/13.
240
 The dispute arose 
when the Commission withdrew its proposal for a framework regulation of the Parliament 
and the Council laying down general provisions for macro-financial assistance to third 
countries. The Council, supported by ten member states, challenged that withdrawal before 
the ECJ complaining that it was unlawful because 
in withdrawing the proposal for a framework regulation by the contested decision, the 
Commission exceeded the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties and, in so doing, 
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undermined the institutional balance, as the Treaties do not give it the power to 
withdraw a legislative proposal in circumstances such as those here.
241
 
The Grand Chamber of the ECJ disagreed. It started by opining that it was for the 
Commission to determine the subject-matter, objective and content of any legislative 
proposal it makes.
242
 From a combination of Article 17(2) TEU and Articles 289 and 293 
TFEU it followed – according to the ECJ – that 
[j]ust as it is, as a rule, for the Commission to decide whether or not to submit a 
legislative proposal and, as the case may be, to determine its subject-matter, objective 
and content, the Commission has the power, as long as the Council has not acted, to 
alter its proposal or even, if need be, withdraw it.
243
 
While the ECJ did say – in paragraph 75 – that the power of withdrawal does not confer upon 
the Commission a power of veto in the conduct of the legislative process, the only practical 
consequence of that finding was that the Commission would have to motivate any 
withdrawal, because any such withdrawal was subject to judicial review by the ECJ.
244
 Hence 
the veto of which the ECJ spoke seems to have meant a “political” veto to withdraw a 
proposal without explanation (akin to that held by the Parliament, when its consent is needed, 
and the Council in respect of adoption of an act), not a veto to block adoption of an act if 
suitable reasons are given. Importantly for present purposes any withdrawal motivated by the 
intentions of the Parliament and the Council to 
[distort] proposal for a legislative act in a manner which prevents achievement of the 
objectives pursued by the proposal and which, therefore, deprives it of its raison 
d’être, 
entitles the Commission to withdraw the proposal,
245
 i.e. any such withdrawal will pass the 
ECJ’s judicial review. In a situation where it is the Commission itself which determines the 
subject-matter, objective and content of a legislative proposal as it sees fit, that would not 
seem a high bar to cross. The situation at issue in case C-409/13 demonstrates as much. 
According to the recitals of the proposal its principal objective was to create a framework 
which would enable the EU to make macro-financial assistance available expeditiously and 
put an end to delays which 
result from the taking of decisions, by the Parliament and the Council jointly, in 
respect of each case where [macro-financial assistance] is granted.
246
 
The Commission proposed to do so by obtaining from the Parliament and the Council 
(implementing) power to decide on the grant of macro-financial assistance itself,
247
 however 
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that was by no means the sole content of the proposal. For instance, it included criteria – 
democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights – which a recipient of macro-financial 
assistance would need to meet in order to become eligible for the assistance.
248
 The 
Parliament and the Council, while keeping those criteria, proposed to replace the grant of 
power to the Commission with adoption of each and every decision to grant macro-financial 
assistance on case-by-case basis via ordinary legislative procedure.
249
 The ECJ held that 
the Commission was entitled to consider that the amendment planned by the 
Parliament and the Council so far as concerns [replacement of grant of power to the 
Commission with ordinary legislative procedure] was liable to distort that proposal, 
on the essential issue of the procedure for granting [macro-financial assistance], in a 
way which would have prevented the objectives pursued by the Commission through 
the proposal from being achieved and which, therefore, would have deprived the 
proposal of its raison d’être.250 
That was because the objective of creating an expedited procedure would not be attained. 
From this it follows that the Commission is in a position to withdraw a legislative proposal 
even if the amendments which the Parliament and the Council intend to make precludes the 
achievement of only one of the objectives of the proposal (here: creation of expedited 
procedure; the other objective being the setting forth of eligibility criteria). Furthermore, the 
ECJ will only review whether the Commission was entitled to take the view that the intended 
amendments would preclude the achievement of the objectives of the proposal; the 
Commission need not show that its view is ultimately correct, and the ECJ will not review the 
ultimate correctness of the Commission’s view. That is undoubtedly a light review. 
Finally in response to the claim that enabling the Commission to withdraw a legislative 
proposal which it has submitted would be undemocratic and hence contrary to paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article 10 TEU, the ECJ essentially opined that there was no hierarchy between 
different provisions of the constitutive treaties and hence Article 10 TEU could not overrule 
Article 17(2) TEU read in conjunction with Articles 289 and 293 TFEU. 
[I]t is apparent from Article 17(2) TEU, read in conjunction with Articles 289 TFEU 
and 293 TFEU, that the Commission has the power not only to submit a legislative 
proposal but also, provided that the Council has not yet acted, to alter its proposal or 
even, if need be, withdraw it. Since that power of the Commission to withdraw a 
proposal is inseparable from the right of initiative with which that institution is vested 
and its exercise is circumscribed by the provisions of the abovementioned articles of 
the FEU Treaty, there can be no question, in this instance, of an infringement of [the 
principle of democracy]. Accordingly, this line of argument must be rejected as 
unfounded.
251
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The argument which the ECJ refuted – that it would be undemocratic for the Commission to 
be allowed to withdraw its proposal – would essentially seem to demonstrate an inability to 
perceive the EU and its lawmaking in any other way than by reference to state parameters, 
something Türk himself warned against. 
From the foregoing it would seem clear that the ECJ deems the Commission constitutionally 
very relevant for the EU, not much – if any – less relevant in fact than is the Council or the 
Parliament. The only difference between the blocking abilities (vetoes) of the three 
institutions (when they have them) is that the Commission’s one is at least in part not 
political,
252
 i.e. it cannot “veto” a proposal for any reason whatsoever nor without explaining 
its reasons. Nevertheless the bar which the Commission needs to cross to exercise its “non-
political” veto is, as we saw, not very high. Furthermore the Commission itself controls the 
height of the bar (by setting unilaterally the subject-matter, objective and content of any 
legislative proposal it makes). Thus for practical intents and purposes the “vetoes” of the 
Commission and the Parliament are comparable in ordinary and special legislative 
procedures. And unlike the Council neither of the Commission and the Parliament has them 
in all ordinary and special legislative procedures (although the Parliament has them in all 
ordinary legislative procedures). 
There would seem to be no good reason for the position to have been different under the 
Constitutional Treaty. Current Article 293 TFEU was then Article III-395 and current Article 
17(2) TEU was then Article I-16(2). In neither case did the content change. However, if there 
truly is no reason for considering the Commission constitutionally irrelevant in the EU or 
even simply less relevant than the Parliament, then the criterion of joint effort by the Council 
and the Parliament is itself irrelevant. What is necessary is a joint effort by the Council, the 
Parliament and the Commission.  
It is to be recalled that Türk discarded special legislative procedures requiring the Parliament 
merely to be consulted from constituting joint effort: only those where both the Council and 
the Parliament could block adoption of an act did. Hence it would seem that this blocking 
ability is – according to Türk – a pre-requisite for the effort being joint; merely giving an 
opinion does not suffice for that purpose. Yet none of the three types of legislative procedures 
Türk set out – (i) ordinary legislative procedures, (ii) special legislative procedures requiring 
consent of both the Council and the Parliament and (iii) special legislative procedures 
requiring consent of the Council and consultation of the Parliament – contains exclusively 
procedures where all three institutions have that blocking power.  
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Thus if joint effort is the criterion and what is needed is a joint effort by all constitutionally 
relevant institutions, the conclusion that only ordinary legislative procedures and those 
special legislative procedures which require consent of both the Council and the Parliament 
are legislative simply does not follow. Thus Türk’s argumentation ultimately falls apart. 
The final, and perhaps the largest, problem with Türk’s account is somewhat different. It 
could be very concisely formulated: “Why?” 
What is the purpose of his account? Taking a step back, the conclusion would seem peculiar 
for it essentially seems to read as follows: 
 ordinary legislative procedures are legislative; 
 special legislative procedures requiring consent of the Parliament are legislative; 
 special legislative procedures requiring no more than an opinion of the Parliament 
are not legislative. 
One could be excused for being surprised by a conclusion that some special legislative 
procedures are not legislative. Surely the Constitutional Treaty said that they were, and the 
constitutive treaties say that they are (Article 289 TFEU).  
The meaning Türk assigns to “legislative” when he holds that some special legislative 
procedures are not “legislative” is legislation in form. Leaving for the moment aside the 
problems with his argumentation and assuming its correctness and hence the correctness of 
the conclusion, Türk would seem to endeavour to apply to the EU some concept of legislation 
which – at the very least some parts of – the constitutive treaties (Section 1 of Chapter 2 of 
Title I of Part Six of the TFEU) simply do not support. While that concept might be familiar 
from national laws
253
 and hence easy to understand, it is submitted that attempting to endow 
one term with several meanings within one instrument is undesirable (inter alia as being 
conducive to confusion), and should be avoided if such avoidance is at all possible. The fact 
that the constitutive treaties themselves already contain that undesirability
254
 is, if anything, a 
further reason for abstaining from exacerbating the situation. In this respect it is worth noting 
that Türk’s legislation in form cannot be squared with the use of “legislating” in Article 2 
TFEU (the other concept of legislation which might be employed in the constitutive treaties 
which concept has so far been mentioned). It is easy to see why on the basis of an example. 
Measures adopted on the basis of Article 195(2) TFEU enabling the EU to complement the 
member states’ measures in the area of tourism would fall within the area of competence 
where the EU may only support, supplement and coordinate actions of member states (Article 
6(d) TFEU). Paragraph 5 of Article 2 TFEU does not – unlike paragraphs 1 and 2 of that 
article – say that the EU may legislate in that area. Yet according to Türk’s account measures 
on the basis of Article 195(2) TFEU would be legislative for that provision mandates a usual 
ordinary legislative procedure. It is unclear why Türk’s account is necessary – what problem 
it solves or obviates, or, more generally, what the need that it answers is. 
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To sum up, it is fair to say that there are only three commonalities between all the ordinary 
and all the special legislative procedures: need for consent of the Council for adopting the 
resulting act, participation of the Parliament in the procedure and lack of any substantive 
criteria whatsoever for the acts resulting from those procedures.
255
 What is not common is the 
notion of “legislation” (i) employed in the constitutive treaties, (ii) employed in the 
Constitutional Treaty serving as their basis and (iii) developed on the basis of those 
instruments by commentators. The “legislation” (i) referred to in Article 2 TFEU, (ii) Article 
289 TFEU and (iii) Articles I-33 (specifically sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of its paragraph 1) and 
I-34 of the Constitutional Treaty and (iv) the one developed on the basis of the EC Treaty and 
the Constitutional Treaty by Alexander Türk are all different; they cannot be squared one 
with the other.  
2.3.3. Extent of special legislative procedures 
In section 2.3.1 above it was suggested that the TFEU contains some 36 legal bases 
mandating the use of some special legislative procedure. Article 289(2) TFEU gives the 
following explanation of a special legislative procedure. 
In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure. 
The constitutive treaties contain nothing further directly in point, i.e. dealing generally with 
special legislative procedures. As mentioned in footnote 205, each of the 36 legal bases dealt 
with in section 2.3.1 specifically states that the procedure which it mandates is a special 
legislative procedure. There are, however, some 56 further legal bases which mandate the 
adoption of an instrument by the Council with the participation of the Parliament, and which 
are not called – in the relevant legal basis – either ordinary or special legislative 
procedures.
256
 While some of those legal bases mandate that the resulting act be neither a 
regulation, nor a directive nor a decision,
257
 at least nine of the 56 legal bases mandate that a 
decision must result,
258
 one legal basis mandates that the resulting act should be a regulation 
(Article 109 TFEU) and one that it should be either a regulation or a directive (Article 103(1) 
TFEU). The remaining 42 legal bases do not prescribe the type of act which must result. As 
for the two legal bases mandating neither a regulation, nor a directive nor a decision, we have 
already seen that the ECJ seems to have held in its judgment in case C-77/11 that that of itself 
is not enough to preclude the adoption procedure of such act from being a special legislative 
procedure.
259
 Since all the procedures set forth in these 56 legal bases mandate adoption of an 
act by the Council with the participation of the Parliament, the question whether these 
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procedures amount to special legislative procedures would ultimately seem to come down to 
the question of the meaning of the nine opening words of Article 289(2) TFEU: 
In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties /.../ 
It is undoubted that in none of these 56 cases do the constitutive treaties say that the 
procedure is a special legislative procedure. Hence the question can be put thus. Does a lack 
of a statement in a legal basis to the effect that the procedure which that legal basis mandates 
is a special legislative procedure mean that the procedure is not a special legislative 
procedure even though it complies with all the other requirements set forth in Article 289(2) 
TFEU (as interpreted by the ECJ)? 
First of all, current law clearly excludes Articles 70, 121(2), 126(11), 134(3), 155(2), 215(1), 
218(3), 218(4), 218(5), 218(6)(1), 218(7), 218(9), 219(1)(2) and 329(2) TFEU from the list of 
legal bases which could be seen as mandating a special legislative procedure. All these legal 
bases mandate that the Council adopt the relevant act and that the Parliament be informed. In 
principle it could be argued that informing the Parliament does amount to the Parliament 
participating in the procedure. While, unlike being consulted, being informed does not grant 
the Parliament even an ability to delay adoption of the act, it does enable the Parliament to 
serve as an informed forum for political debate – unlike in cases when the Parliament need 
not be informed where the Parliament might not have all the relevant information. However 
in its judgment in case T-160/13
260
 the GC held that a regulation adopted on the basis of 
Article 215(1) TFEU, which requires that the Council adopt the measure and inform the 
Parliament of that adoption, 
[cannot be regarded as having been adopted under a special legislative procedure 
within the meaning of Article 289(2) TFEU] in view of the lack of any involvement 
of the European Parliament in the adoption of the contested regulation. 
Thus being informed does not constitute participation within the meaning of Article 289(2) 
TFEU. While that judgement has been appealed,
261
 for the time being it is the only authority 
directly in point.
262
 
That leaves 42 legal bases. There are two decisions of the GC directly in point as to whether 
they do or do not mandate special legislative procedures. In the earlier of the two – the order 
in case T-121/10
263
 – the GC held that 
même si le règlement attaqué a été adopté en utilisant une procédure qui correspond à 
la procédure législative spéciale prévue par l’article 289, paragraphe 2, TFUE, cette 
circonstance ‒ en l’absence d’une référence à la procédure législative spéciale que 
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l’article 37 CE ne contient pas ‒ ne suffit pas, à elle seule, pour pouvoir conclure qu’il 
s’agit d’un acte législatif.264 
That was held to be so precisely because Article 289(2) TFEU provides that an act adopted 
by the Council with the participation of the Parliament constitutes a legislative act only “in 
the specific cases provided for by the Treaties”;265 and in the case there at hand the 
constitutive treaties did not so provide (there was no statement to that effect in the legal 
basis). The order of the GC in case T-121/10 was not appealed. 
In a judgment in a more recent case – T-512/12266 – a completely differently constituted GC 
came to the opposite conclusion. 
In the present case, as appears from its preamble, the contested decision was adopted 
following the procedure defined in Article 218(6)(a) TFEU, which provides that the 
Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, in this case the Commission, is to adopt a 
decision concluding the agreement after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. That procedure satisfies the criteria set out in Article 289(2) TFEU and 
therefore constitutes a special legislative procedure. 
The GC did quote Article 289(2) TFEU, including the “specific cases” language in paragraph 
70. No further mention was made of it, however. Thus the GC seems to have held the 
reference to “the specific cases provided for by the Treaties” in Article 289(2) TFEU 
irrelevant for deciding whether a particular legal basis mandates a special legislative 
procedure or not. The judgment in case T-512/12 was appealed. Advocate General Wathelet 
did agree with the GC on this point, although he seems to have considered the issue in a 
slightly different key: not whether the procedure for adoption of the contested act constituted 
a special legislative procedure, but whether the act constituted a legislative act. 
One of the grounds on which the Council challenged the judgment in case T-512/12 was that 
the General Court erred in law by ruling in paragraphs 70 and 71 of the judgment 
under appeal that the contested decision was a legislative act. /.../ [T]he contested 
decision is not a legislative act because its legal basis, namely the first paragraph of 
Article 207(4) in conjunction with Article 218(6)(a) TFEU, does not make explicit 
reference to a legislative procedure.
267
 
Advocate General Wathelet started by noting that the legal bases of the contested decision did 
not – unlike those contained in Articles 203, 349 and 352 TFEU – make any explicit 
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reference to a legislative procedure.
268
 He then opined that the lack of that reference was 
insufficient for concluding that the act was not legislative.
269
 
153. Article 289(3) TFEU defines legislative acts as being ‘[l]egal acts adopted by 
legislative procedure’, that is, the ordinary legislative procedure or the special 
legislative procedure. 
154. Under Article 289(2) TFEU, the special legislative procedure consists in ‘the 
adoption … of a decision … by [the Council] with the participation of the European 
Parliament’. 
155. Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU provides that ‘the Council shall adopt the decision 
concluding the agreement … after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament 
in the [case of] association agreements’. 
156. I cannot see how the requirement of the prior consent of the Parliament cannot be 
regarded as the participation of the Parliament in the procedure. 
Dealing specifically with the lack of reference to “the specific cases provided for by the 
Treaties”, advocate general Wathelet suggested that 
[t]he fact that Article 289(2) TFEU uses the words ‘[i]n the specific cases provided 
for by the Treaties’ does not necessarily mean that every provision of the FEU Treaty 
which envisages the special legislative procedure must indicate it explicitly. It is 
sufficient that the definition given in that provision is respected.
270
 
The ECJ eventually disposed of the case, allowing the appeal, without engaging with the 
issue at all (not even implicitly).
271
 Its disposal of the case throws no light on the correctness 
or incorrectness of the conclusion of the GC. 
It is submitted that the view of the GC in its judgment in case T-512/12 and of advocate 
general Wathelet is clearly the better one. However, that seems to go against the grain of the 
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academic opinion which seems unusually uniform in this respect: the commentators tend to 
treat the procedures mandated by the 42 legal bases as non-legislative.
272
 Much could 
certainly be said for such treatment – that there are only 36 legal bases mandating a special 
legislative procedure – being correct if the question were decided under the Constitutional 
Treaty; the current constitutive treaties are a different matter altogether. That would seem to 
follow from the interaction of Articles I-33, I-34 and I-35 of the Constitutional Treaty with 
the way particular legal bases were drafted in the Constitutional Treaty, and the lack of that 
interaction in the current constitutive treaties. 
Article I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty set forth at least four types of explicitly binding acts: 
European law, European framework law, European regulation and European decision. A 
European law was to be a legislative act of general application binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all member states.
273
 A European framework law was to be a legislative 
act binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, 
but leaving to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
274
 A European 
regulation was to be a non-legislative act either binding in its entirety and directly applicable 
in all member states or binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state to 
which it is addressed, but leaving to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.
275
 A European decision was to be a non-legislative act, binding in its entirety and, 
in case it specified its addressees, only on the addressees.
276
 According to paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article I-34 of the Constitutional Treaty only European laws and European framework 
laws could be adopted via an ordinary or a special legislative procedure. 
1. European laws and framework laws shall be adopted, on the basis of proposals 
from the Commission, jointly by the European Parliament and the Council under the 
ordinary legislative procedure as set out in Article III-396. If the two institutions 
cannot reach agreement on an act, it shall not be adopted. 
2. In the specific cases provided for in the Constitution, European laws and 
framework laws shall be adopted by the European Parliament with the participation of 
the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, in 
accordance with special legislative procedures. 
Neither European regulations nor European decisions could be adopted via such procedures. 
These instruments could be adopted only by the European Council, the Council and the 
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Commission (paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article I-35 of the Constitutional Treaty). The procedure 
for the adoption of a European regulation or a European decision might admittedly be similar 
to some special legislative procedure, however the resulting act would, at the very least 
formally, differ: a European regulation or a European decision as opposed to a European law 
or European framework law. Let us consider, as examples, the first paragraphs of Articles III-
126 and III-163 of the Constitutional Treaty, the former mandating a European law or 
European framework law of the Council (hence a special legislative procedure – Article I-
34(2) of the Constitutional Treaty) and the latter a European regulation of the Council. 
Article III-126(1): A European law or framework law of the Council shall determine 
the detailed arrangements for exercising the right, referred to in Article I-10(2)(b), for 
every citizen of the Union to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections 
and elections to the European Parliament in his or her Member State of residence 
without being a national of that State. The Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament. These arrangements may provide for derogations 
where warranted by problems specific to a Member State. 
Article III-163(1): The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt the 
European regulations to give effect to the principles set out in Articles III-161 and III-
162. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament. 
The procedures are exactly the same: the Council adopts the act on proposal of the 
Commission
277
 and after consulting the Parliament. At this point one might be pardoned for 
thinking that this raises the same issue of “specific cases”278 all over again – just as in case of 
the current constitutive treaties. It could further be argued that the difference of resulting acts 
which exists in the Constitutional Treaty (in our example, European law or European 
framework law in one case and a European regulation in another) is irrelevant: in light of the 
judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11
279
 it could be argued that adopting an act via a special 
legislative procedure which act is seemingly not listed among those which are capable of 
being adopted via special legislative procedure does not mean that the procedure is not a 
special legislative procedure; it goes only to whether the act itself legislative or not. While the 
judgment was delivered on the basis of the TFEU, it could be argued that it and the 
Constitutional Treaty do not display any relevant differences. 
That thinking would however miss the point of the interaction of Articles I-33 – I-35 of the 
Constitutional Treaty with the way the legal bases contained in that treaty were drafted. No 
legal basis contained in the Constitutional Treaty prescribed, in terms, the use of an ordinary 
or a special legislative procedure. Procedure was specified only when the type of resulting act 
was either a European regulation or a European decision. The legal bases which in fact 
required the acts to be adopted via an ordinary or a special legislative procedure only 
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specified that the resulting act be a European law or European framework law. When nothing 
further was specified in the legal basis, that automatically meant that the procedure for the 
adoption would need to be an ordinary legislative procedure, because according to Article I-
34(1) of the Constitutional Treaty it was normally only via that procedure that a European 
law or a European framework law could be adopted. This also explains the first words of 
Article I-34(2) of the Constitutional Treaty, viz. 
[i]n the specific cases provided for in the Constitution, European laws and 
framework laws shall be adopted by the European Parliament with the participation of 
the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, in 
accordance with special legislative procedures. 
Since procedure was irrevocably tied to acts, ordinary legislative procedure normally applied 
whenever the act mandated was a European law or a European framework law. Only when a 
different adopter was specifically mentioned in a legal basis set forth in the Constitutional 
Treaty – as was the case in the aforequoted Article III-126(1) – would a special legislative 
procedure apply. Reference to “specific cases” was thus necessary to distinguish legal bases 
which mandated adoption of European laws or European framework laws via an ordinary 
legislative procedure from those legal bases which mandated adoption of European laws or 
European framework laws via some other procedure which procedure would necessarily 
entail participation of both the Council and the Parliament, i.e. to distinguish between 
different legislative procedures. Reference to “specific cases” was not inserted to distinguish 
between legislative and non-legislative procedures (as the Council submitted in its appeal in 
Case C-104/16P that it did in the TFEU). In the Constitutional Treaty the procedure was 
irrevocably linked to the act with the result that only European laws or European framework 
laws could be adopted via a legislative procedure.  
While it is possible to argue that European regulations or European decisions would in some 
cases – such as that of the aforequoted Article III-163(1) – be essentially adopted via the 
same procedure as European laws and European framework laws and, depending on the 
situation, perhaps even that they would have the same normative content as the latter, in view 
of the wording of Articles I-33 – I-35 of the Constitutional Treaty and their interaction with 
the way the legal bases were drafted there would seem to be no valid argument for saying that 
such European regulations or European decisions were adopted via a special legislative 
procedure.
280
 That is simply because – as used in the Constitutional Treaty – a “special 
legislative procedure” is a term of art denoting, in the words of Article I-35(2) of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the adoption of European laws and European framework laws by any 
procedure whatsoever which is capable of being employed to that end, other than ordinary 
legislative procedure. In a sense “special legislative procedure” is a residual class. 
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Thus the academic commentators’ treatment of the current constitutive treaties would have 
been correct had it applied to the Constitutional Treaty: there the 42 legal bases mostly 
mandated European regulations and European decisions, not European laws or European 
framework laws. 
Looking at the current constitutive treaties, they set forth only three types of explicitly 
binding acts: regulations, directives and decisions.
281
 Each of these may be adopted both via 
an ordinary or a special legislative procedure,
282
 as well as via a procedure which 
undoubtedly is neither.
283
 Furthermore, the current constitutive treaties, unlike the 
Constitutional Treaty, do not tie any procedure to a particular act. Instead each legal basis 
specifically refers to the procedure which is to be employed for the adoption of acts on that 
legal basis. Thus the provisions corresponding to Articles III-126(1) and III-163(1) of the 
Constitutional Treaty currently, respectively, read as follows. 
Article 22(1) TFEU: Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which 
he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal 
elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements 
adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may 
provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State. 
Article 103(1) TFEU: The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
The procedures are again the same: adoption of an act (of a regulation, a directive or a 
decision in case of Article 22(1) TFEU
284
 and of a regulation or directive in case of Article 
103(1) TFEU) by the Council upon proposal of the Commission
285
 and after consulting the 
Parliament. To the extent that academic commentators hold that the former mandates a 
special legislative procedure, while the latter does not because Article 289(2) TFEU says that 
[i]n the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure, 
they employ these words to distinguish between legislative and non-legislative procedures as 
opposed to between different legislative procedures, i.e. for a different purpose altogether 
compared to the one for which it was employed in the Constitutional Treaty from which the 
formulation is borrowed. Furthermore, under their construction a “special legislative 
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procedure” loses its status as the term of art in the constitutive treaties. It cannot denote 
adoption of regulations, directives and decisions by any procedure whatsoever which is 
capable of being employed to that end, other than an ordinary legislative procedure, because 
instruments of each of those types may be adopted via some non-legislative procedure. In the 
constitutive treaties “special legislative procedure” is not a residual class. 
While the reading offered by the GC in its order in case T-121/10 and by the commentators is 
possible, it is submitted that such reading cuts the historic links between the Constitutional 
Treaty and the current constitutive treaties, and disregards the intended structure of the 
constitutive treaties. It is based on giving the phrase “in the specific cases provided for” a 
completely different meaning compared to that which it initially bore, and as a result on 
precluding special legislative procedures from being a residual class. If one were to keep the 
original meaning, it would be difficult to argue against holding that the 42 legal bases 
mandate a special legislative procedure. 
Keeping for the moment a historic perspective, a counter-argument could be devised. If the 
42 legal bases do mandate a special legislative procedure, some other provisions of the 
constitutive treaty rather than Article 289(2) TFEU are given a different meaning compared 
to that which they initially bore (in other words: other historic links between the 
Constitutional Treaty and the current constitutive treaties are cut). Namely, most of these 42 
legal bases originally – in the Constitutional Treaty from which they hail – mandated a non-
legislative act.
286
 Reading them now as mandating a special legislative procedure would 
mean that – in most cases287 – the resulting acts would be legislative. As a consequence 
Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and in Protocol 
(No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality would become 
applicable in relation to the acts adopted on any of the 42 legal bases, and as a result national 
parliaments would attain a modicum of powers to supervise adoption of acts on those legal 
bases. Under the Constitutional Treaty these two protocols would not have applied to the 
corresponding legal bases: the protocols applied only to legislative acts (European laws and 
European framework laws), while the corresponding legal bases mandated that non-
legislative acts result (European regulations and European decisions). 
Thus the construer is presented with two seemingly equally unappealing options: whichever 
choice he makes (that the 42 legal bases do mandate a special legislative procedure or that 
they do not) he may both find support and strong opposition in historic arguments. Thus he 
must inevitably cut one historic tie. 
There are no materials which would explain this “hobbled” transposition of the provisions of 
the Constitutional Treaty into the Treaty of Lisbon. It is submitted that it is likely that no-one 
considered the issue at all with the result that the transposition was inherently flawed. At this 
point it is difficult to disagree with Dougan’s suggestion that 
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[t]he desire to bestow upon the Union a clearer hierarchy of norms, for the sake of 
enhancing the transparency of its activities, has therefore been undermined by a 
combination of shallow conception and poor execution.
288
 
Looking at the drafting history of the Constitutional Treaty does not immediately render the 
picture much clearer, however it would ultimately seem to point towards the position of 
advocate general Wathelet and of the GC in its judgment in case T-512/12.  
The two leading rapporteurs of the Working Group IX – Koen Lenaerts289 and Michel 
Petite
290
 – did not directly engage with the issue of extent of special legislative procedures. 
Instead both Lenaerts and Petite simply opined that the constitutive treaties should be 
implemented via one single procedure – the co-decision (ordinary legislative procedure, using 
the terminology of the TFEU) – which should result in adoption of laws; another legislative 
procedure was not something they deemed desirable.
291
 The same lack of attention to special 
legislative procedure seems to manifest itself in the work of Working Group IX more 
generally. Many of the delegates apparently considered that only what is now known as 
ordinary legislative procedure should be employed seeing no room at all for what is now 
special legislative procedure, other than for ratifying certain international agreements.
292
 
Those who did not share that view sometimes postulated a different approach altogether – 
one under which the issue of extent of special legislative procedure in its current form (a 
procedure determined without any reference to any substantive criteria whatsoever for acts 
resulting from the procedure) could not arise.
293
 Some members of Working Group IX 
avoided mentioning what is now special legislative procedure altogether.
294
 The proposal for 
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a “legislative/executive” delimitation within the institutional system of the EU submitted to 
the members of Working Group IX
295
 suggested that co-decision should be the general 
procedure for adoption of “legislative acts”, but not that it should be the only one. According 
to the summary of the replies to the questionnaire submitted to the members of Working 
Group IX, most members of Working Group IX  
consider that the concept of a legislative act should be defined by its content and not 
by the adoption procedure. Some propose defining a legislative act as one which 
determines the fundamental principles and general guidelines in a given area, 
embodies political choices or establishes the essential elements of implementing 
measures in the field in question. Most of the replies take the view that the codecision 
procedure should be the rule for adoption of legislative acts, with specific provisions 
and exceptions for certain areas. The CFSP, JHA and the common agricultural policy 
were cited as areas in which such exceptions should be established.
296
 
It would thus seem that Working Group IX (its members) had mostly in mind some 
substantive concept of legislation – something which while not wholly impossible to 
reconcile with the Constitutional Treaty,
297
 is impossible to reconcile with Article 289 TFEU. 
Considering the fields to which the members of Working Group IX sought to confine special 
legislative procedure, it is worth noting that international agreements are currently adopted by 
the Council after either consulting the Parliament or receiving its consent, but the legal bases 
– sub-paragraphs a and b of paragraph 6 of Article 218 TFEU – make no mention of special 
legislative procedure. The same is true of CFSP (Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU) which 
could be seen as mandating special legislative procedures, although it does not mention them. 
That would seem to be an argument for concluding that the 42 legal bases do mandate special 
legislative procedures. Common agricultural policy rules are currently exclusively adopted 
either via an ordinary legislative procedure (article 43(2) TFEU) or via a clearly non-
legislative procedure (Article 43(3) TFEU), so no conclusion may be drawn here. The justice 
and home affairs seem to have all three types of legal bases, sometimes within the same 
article: Article 83(1)(1) TFEU mandates an ordinary legislative procedure, Article 83(2) 
TFEU mandates an expressly special legislative procedure and Article 83(1)(3) TFEU 
mandates a procedure which could be seen as a special legislative procedure, but is not called 
that in the legal basis. 
Moving on to the position of the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe, that 
is, if anything, even less clear. 
[T]he Praesidium reached the conclusion in the light of the amendments and the 
debate in plenary that the designation "legislative" for the procedure which constitutes 
the general rule could prove misleading, since it appears to be the determining 
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criterion and not the consequence of the "legislative" nature of the act. The 
Praesidium agreed to clarify its scope as a legislative procedure under ordinary law. It 
refers to it as "ordinary legislative procedure", in order to avoid excluding the 
legislative nature of the very limited number of acts which might be adopted by the 
Parliament or by the Council with varying degrees of participation by the other arm of 
the legislative authority by virtue of procedures which, while undoubtedly legislative, 
are "special". 
The system described in draft Article I-33 implies that legislative acts are always 
adopted by the legislator.
298
 
The Praesidium essentially states that “legislative” is a term of art: it is not employed as a 
characterisation of an instrument, which is the normal use of the term; it is instead employed 
to designate the general procedure – by which the Praesidium seems to mean the co-decision, 
but that is not explicitly spelled out anywhere – via which instruments of EU law are adopted. 
The Praesidium then seems to be essentially saying that “legislative” ended up ultimately 
being used by the Convention as a term of art designating that both the Council and the 
Parliament, whom the Praesidium sees as jointly constituting the legislator,
299
 participated in 
the adoption of an instrument. The Praesidium thought the use of “legislative” to essentially 
mean co-decision to be confusing because “legislativeness” of an act does not, in case of such 
use, follow from the nature of the act; instead it precedes the very adoption of the act. Thus it 
designated the general procedure via which EU law is adopted (co-decision) as “ordinary 
legislative procedure” rather than “legislative procedure” tout court in order to avoid 
excluding legislative nature of the very limited number of acts which might be 
adopted by the Parliament [with some participation of the Council or vice-versa]. 
Thus special legislative procedures were created to be a term of art covering procedure for 
adoption of those acts. What is utterly confusing is what those acts were intended to be – or 
indeed what the Convention meant at all. There are several possibilities.  
First, despite purporting to ground the Constitutional Treaty in a non-substantive concept of 
“legislation”, the Convention meant those acts which are legislative by nature. On the one 
hand, it is difficult to square that with the rules (contained at the time in draft Article I-34) on 
European regulations and European decisions: whoever the adopter of the latter might be, 
their (normative) nature would not seem to be much different from the acts adopted via 
special legislative procedure. This approach would be very difficult (at least without going 
into details of formal logic ordinarily quite alien to EU law) or even impossible to square 
with the statement that “legislative acts are always adopted by the legislator” (the Convention 
seems to have considered “legislator” to mean the Council and the Parliament jointly).300 On 
the other hand, this approach is difficult to square with the beginning of the quotation where 
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the Convention seems to say that ordinary legislative procedure has nothing to do with nature 
of the resulting acts – it is a term meaning “co-decision”. 
Second, the Convention meant all the acts adopted by what it saw as the legislator (the 
Parliament with the participation of the Council or vice versa). That, however, is impossible 
to square with the Constitutional Treaty in as much it mandated that European regulations 
and European decisions be adopted by that same legislator without those acts being 
legislative (with the result that no legislative procedure was employed for their adoption). 
Third, as suggested by Türk,
301
 the Convention meant some combination of the two: those 
acts which are legislative by nature and adopted by the legislator via an undoubtedly 
legislative procedure. This could be squared with the last sentence of the quote: “legislative 
acts are always adopted by the legislator” considering that, strictly logically speaking, it does 
not imply that legislator adopts only legislative acts. However, there is no indication 
anywhere in the quoted document as to how to determine which of the acts adopted by the 
legislator are legislative by nature and which procedures are undoubtedly legislative. 
Presumably the reference to “undoubtedly legislative procedures” must mean something 
other than legislative procedure meant at the beginning of the quote (meaning there co-
decision) for if it meant co-decision there would be no need for any special legislative 
procedure. If it included special legislative procedure, it would be difficult to understand why 
it does not include procedures for adoption of European regulations and European decisions 
by the Council with the participation of the Parliament or vice-versa. 
It would further seem completely unclear how the employment of the term “legislative” as a 
term of art designating a procedure could exclude legislative nature of an act. In this 
connection it is further worth noting that the word “legislative” is employed eight times in 
that quote and seems to bear at least five different meanings: (i) the first, third and fourth use 
seem to refer to co-decision, (ii) the second and the fifth use seem to refer to legislative 
nature of an act without further explanation, (iii) the sixth use (which seems to coincide in 
meaning with “legislator” used in the last sentence of the quote) seems to denote the 
Parliament and the Council together when adopting an act of some sort, (iv) the seventh use 
seems to refer to some procedure other than the one meant by the first, third and fourth use 
and (v) the eight use seems to mean acts adopted by the Parliament and the Council, but it is 
unclear whether all such acts or, if not, which ones. It is submitted that any instrument which 
succeeds in using the same term in at least five different meanings within the space of four 
consecutive sentences is not a reliable guide. Thus the fourth possibility would be that the 
Praesidium simply formulated a text which was acceptable to its 13 members, doing so on the 
basis of documents which already constituted mutually acceptable compromises reached 
within Working Group IX. Clarity was left to play second fiddle to political bargaining. 
Writing about the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and dealing specifically with why 
some legal bases in the Constitutional Treaty mandate a special legislative procedure while 
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others do not,
302
 Liisberg has suggested that the large number of non-legislative procedures in 
the Constitutional Treaty could be explained by the desire of the drafters to keep the use of 
the “special” moniker to a minimum, using it only where deemed absolutely necessary (for 
reasons of transparency and legitimacy, perhaps). 
During the first plenary debate on the report from WG IX, the Chairman promised 
that there would only be a limited number of exceptions to the general rule that 
legislative acts would be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-
decision). Against that background there could well have been a preference with the 
drafters of the initial texts of Part III to characterize a legal basis as non-legislative 
rather than having to add it to the list of exceptional legal bases subject to special 
legislative procedures, notwithstanding the implications this might have for 
transparency in Council procedures and the “early warning mechanism” under the 
subsidiarity protocol.
303
 
Liisberg offers the specific example of the common agricultural policy. 
A plausible explanation [for splitting the main agricultural legal basis, Article 37 EC, 
into a legislative part and a non-legislative part – paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article III-231 
of the Constitutional Treaty
304
] could to be that proponents of more European 
Parliament influence were satisfied with the Parliament finally becoming co-legislator 
on the general agricultural rules, whereas Member States wanted to hold on to 
Council regulatory control of sensitive details such as prices and quotas. Again, the 
reason a special legislative procedure was not prescribed for the legal basis covering 
the sensitive detailed areas of agricultural regulation, instead of classifying it as a non-
legislative legal basis, might also have been political as could have been the case with 
competition and state aid/.../.
305
 
Liisberg’s explanation accords rather well with the difficulties one encounters in trying to 
find guidance in the preparatory materials of the Constitutional Treaty. His account means 
that the division of legal bases of the Constitutional Treaty between those mandating a 
legislative procedure and those mandating a non-legislative procedure was not principled in 
any way; it was the result of political bargaining and compromising as well as (perhaps futile) 
attempts at sticking to initial promises. If that is true, it is difficult to maintain that the 42 
legal bases do not mandate special legislative procedures. The Constitutional Treaty’s 
mandating that those procedures are non-legislative is, on Liisberg’s argument, essentially a 
happenstance. At the same time his argument in no way changes the meaning of the phrase 
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“in the specific cases provided for” in Article I-35(2) of the Constitutional Treaty or shows 
that meaning or conclusion reached in respect of or based on it to amount to a happenstance. 
Nor does it show the role performed by “special legislative procedure” in the Constitutional 
Treaty to be a happenstance. It is submitted that this clearly points to choosing to maintain 
the historic ties with the meaning of the phrase “in the specific cases provided for” rather than 
with whether a particular legal bases mandated a special legislative procedure or a non-
legislative procedure. While it would extend the field of application of the two protocols 
giving a modicum of supervisory powers to national parliaments, it is submitted that, first, it 
is simply a necessary corollary of the choice motivated by other reasons and, second, it would 
hardly be problematic or indeed undesirable.
306
 Thus Liiberg’s account, which gains force 
from an overview of the preparatory materials of the Constitutional Treaty, supports the 
conclusion that the 42 legal bases do mandate special legislative procedures. 
There seems to be one further difficulty with concluding that the GC was correct in Case T-
512/12 rather than in case T-121/10. The difficulty may easily be gleaned from the wording 
of Articles 349(1) and 352(1) TFEU. 
Article 349(1) TFEU: Taking account of the structural social and economic situation 
of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, 
the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is compounded by their 
remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely 
restrain their development, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures aimed, in 
particular, at laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to those 
regions, including common policies. Where the specific measures in question are 
adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also 
act on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
Article 352(1) TFEU: If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set 
out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where 
the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
Each of these provisions seems to mandate two alternative procedures. One is called a special 
legislative procedure, the other one isn’t. In either case the two procedures are identical. In 
either case both procedures fill the requirements set by Article 289(2) TFEU for special 
legislative procedures (if one does not consider reference to “the specific cases provided for” 
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to be such a requirement). In either case the only words which distinguish the two procedures 
are “in accordance with a special legislative procedure”.  
It could be argued that if the first sentences of these two provisions already mandated a 
special legislative procedure, their second sentence would be otiose.
307
 More significantly it 
shows starkly that if the 42 legal bases do mandate special legislative procedures, then  
(i) the mention of a special legislative procedure in any legal bases which contain it is 
otiose because the procedure would have been a special legislative procedure even 
without the mention and  
(ii) the words “In the specific cases provided for in the Treaties” in Article 289(2) 
TFEU are otiose because they do no more than repeat the meaning of the words “the 
adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the 
participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European 
Parliament” in as much as the specific cases are those when the procedures set forth in 
the legal bases mandate “the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the 
European Parliament with the participation of the Council, or by the latter with the 
participation of the European Parliament” regardless of how that requirement is 
formulated or arrived at. 
There is only one authority of the CJEU which mentions this issue: advocate general Wahl in 
his opinion in joined cases C-132-136/14
308
 mentions this point in relation to Article 349(1) 
TFEU. 
Lastly, however, one amendment brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon has 
unfortunately muddied the waters. I refer to the seemingly anodyne reference in the 
first paragraph, second sentence of Article 349 TFEU to the possibility that ‘specific 
measures … [might be] adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure’. For one thing, it seems to me that Article 349 TFEU itself 
constitutes a special legislative procedure under Article 289(2) TFEU. Still, 
commentators disagree on the implications of this sentence, as did the parties and 
interveners during their oral argument. However, in the present cases, it is not 
necessary to settle that point authoritatively. 
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However, in case of Article 203 TFEU there is no risk of the second sentence being otiose because the first one 
does not mandate the same procedure as the second one. The Parliament does not participate in the procedure set 
forth in the first sentence, while it must participate in the procedure set forth in the second sentence. Hence the 
provision would essentially seem to give the Council a choice whether to adopt itself “the rules and the 
procedure for the association of the countries and territories with the Union” or to involve the Parliament in the 
adoption. 
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 European Parliament and European Commission v Council of the European Union, paragraph 52 
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Advocate general Wahl did not seek to settle the point at all. One of the commentators 
(Perrot) he alluded to opined 
that this ‘sibylline’ sentence aims to overrule other special legislative procedures 
which lay down voting requirements stricter than those which follow from 
Article 16(3) TEU (qualified majority), 
although another one (Omarjee) took the contrary view. Yet a third one (Ziller) argued that 
the 
sentence ought to be understood in the light of the wording of Article III-330 of the 
Constitutional Treaty, which referred to certain categories of legislative acts within a 
new hierarchy of norms arguably corresponding, under the Treaty of Lisbon, to the 
triptych consisting of legislative, delegated and executive acts.
309
 
It is unclear how either sentence of Article 349(1) TFEU could overrule any special 
legislative procedure laying down stricter voting majorities: both sentences provide for voting 
by qualified majority which is the voting majority prescribed by Article 16(4) TEU. By virtue 
of Article 16(3) TEU that voting majority applies to any action of the Council (whether it is 
acting via an ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure or a clearly non-
legislative procedure) unless a particular provision provides otherwise.
310
 Thus reference to 
special legislative procedure in Article 349(1) TFEU is simply irrelevant for the purposes of 
voting majorities, be it the applicable ones or the ones which would be applicable bar that 
reference. As for Ziller’s point, it is just as unclear how references to European laws and 
European framework laws in Article III-330 of the Constitutional Treaty could correspond to 
all of legislative, delegated and executive acts under the TFEU. Perhaps even more unclear is 
the relevance of Article III-330 of the Constitutional Treaty: that was the legal basis for 
establishing the rules for the election of the Parliament.
311
 
As for the arguments of the parties which advocate general Wahl alluded to, 
the Council and the Kingdom of Spain submitted, on the basis of the historical 
interpretation of Article 349 TFEU, that the purpose of that sentence is to give the 
Council the possibility of adopting specific measures both in the form of legislative 
and non-legislative acts. The Portuguese Republic took the view that the aim of that 
sentence is to give priority to Article 349 TFEU over other special legislative 
procedures while the French Republic, in contrast, submitted that said aim is to 
cumulate the requirements of those procedures. The Commission disagreed with all 
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 See footnote 18 of the opinion of advocate general Wahl in joined cases C-132-136/14. 
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 Article 238(1) TFEU is such a provision, but it applies only when the Commission does not hold the 
privilege of initiative. The Commission does hold that privilege under both the first and the second sentence of 
Article 349(1) TFEU (the same is true of Article 352(1) TFEU). 
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 Reading Ziller’s essay to which advocate general Wahl referred does not clarify any of these points. See 
Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, in Dimitry Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Wolters Kluwer 2011), pages 69 – 88. It should be 
noted that Ziller does suggest (on page 74) that the intention of both the Convention on the Future of Europe and 
of the Lisbon IGC was to preserve the substance of Article 299(2) EC without making any changes to it. 
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these views, arguing, inter alia, that the distinction between a legislative and a non-
legislative act does not equate to the dichotomy ‘primary/secondary EU law’.312 
It is at best unclear how reference to a special legislative procedure in some paragraph could 
give that procedure priority over other special legislative procedures in other provisions. If 
what Portugal meant was that the aim was to give the particular special legislative procedure 
priority over other possible special legislative procedures in respect of the legal basis in 
question, i.e. to apply that special legislative procedure (rather than some other special 
legislative procedure) to that legal basis, then it still does not explain why the two-sentence 
structure was needed. The question is not why that particular version of special legislative 
procedure was chosen, but why the second sentence providing for that special legislative 
procedure was inserted into Article 349(1) TFEU seeing that the first sentence provided for 
the same procedure albeit without calling it a special legislative procedure. 
A similar lack of clarity obtains in relation to the suggestion of France: the procedures the 
requirements of which were said to have been cumulated are, in terms of requirements, the 
same. If accumulation was nevertheless the aim, why was that set as the aim? The 
Commission’s view that “the distinction between a legislative and a non-legislative act does 
not equate to the dichotomy ‘primary/secondary EU law’” is understandable (both procedures 
provide for adoption of acts directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties), but it does not 
help one much further. It assumes as given that the first sentence mandates a non-legislative 
procedure rather than a special legislative one; it does not seek to explain that assumption. 
The position of the Council and Spain is perhaps the only rationally understandable one. 
Essentially, they argue, Article 349(1) TFEU grants the Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament an option to decide whether to make the resulting act subject to national 
parliaments’ supervision or not. National parliaments’ supervision over EU acts is set forth in 
Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and in Protocol 
(No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality. Such 
supervision exists only in relation to legislative acts. In fact when viewed independently (as 
opposed to considering supervision point as an argument in dealing with the historical 
connection between the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty) this is probably the 
strongest argument of all for suggesting that the 42 legal bases are not legislative: the 
constitutive treaties could be said to not mention special legislative procedure in these legal 
bases precisely to avoid the supervision by national parliaments. The difficulty with this 
argument is that there is simply no evidence of that being the intention: as Liiberg suggested, 
it would seem that the choice between special legislative procedures and substantively similar 
non-legislative procedures in the Constitutional Treaty (where these legal bases mandated a 
non-legislative procedure) was simply not conditioned by this consideration.  
In any case, even if it the argument advanced by the Council and by Spain could be 
ultimately correct in respect of Article 349(1) TFEU, it would still fail to deal with the similar 
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 See footnote 18 of the opinion of advocate general Wahl in joined cases C-132-136/14. The sentence referred 
to in the quotation is the second sentence of Article 349(1) TFEU – see paragraph 52 of the opinion of advocate 
general Wahl in joined cases C-132-136/14. 
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structure of Article 352(1) TFEU. Paragraph 2 of Article 352 TFEU makes Protocol (No 2) 
on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality (which contains the 
bulk of supervisory powers of national parliaments
313
) applicable to any act adopted on the 
basis of paragraph 1 of Article 352 TFEU. 
Looking at the drafting history of Articles 349(1) and 352(1) TFEU, of their predecessors – 
be in the EC Treaty
314
 or in the Constitutional Treaty
315
 – only the Constitutional Treaty 
predecessor of Article 349(1) TFEU contained something similar mandating adoption of 
European laws or European framework laws (in either case by a special legislative procedure) 
or European regulations or European decisions. It may thus be suggested that the “mess” 
which Article 349(1) TFEU finds itself in might result from rewriting that provision into the 
language of the TFEU which does not provide for different instruments – not even by name – 
for acts adopted via a special legislative procedure, on the one hand, and those adopted via a 
non-legislative procedure, on the other. Looking at the preparatory materials of the Lisbon 
Treaty that would not seem to be the case, however. 
In the draft of the Lisbon Treaty dated 23
rd
 July 2007
316
 paragraph 2 of Article 299 EC 
(which would later become Article 349(1) TFEU) which had read as follows: 
[h]owever, taking account of the structural social and economic situation of the 
French overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is 
compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and 
climate, economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain their development, the Council, acting by a qualified majority 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
shall adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of 
application of the present Treaty to those regions, including common policies[,] 
 was to be amended as follows: 
at the beginning of the first paragraph, the word "However," shall be deleted and the 
words "the French overseas departments" shall be replaced by "Guadeloupe, French 
Guiana, Martinique, Réunion"; the following sentence shall be added at the end of the 
paragraph: "Such acts shall take the form of legislative acts where the legal basis for 
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 As far as normative acts of the EU are concerned Protocol No 1 does not contain virtually anything which is 
not already part of Protocol No 2. The only possible exception is the effect of the 8-week period. Article 4 of 
Protocol No 1 explicitly excludes adoption during that period of an act the draft of which has been forwarded to 
national parliaments, other than in urgent cases. Article 6 of Protocol No 2 simply says that national parliaments 
have eight weeks to issue their opinions in respect of such drafts. While Protocol No 2 contains no explicit ban 
on adoption of the act during that 8-week period, the better opinion is that when read as a whole Protocol No 2 
does prohibit such adoption. Otherwise its provisions would become moot, e.g. it would be impossible to 
reconsider the draft should the need to do so arise (Article 7) nor could the further procedural requirement 
contained is sub-paragraphs a and b of paragraph 3 of Article 7 be met if the act could be adopted during the 8 
weeks given to national parliaments to issue their opinions. 
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 Articles 299(2)(1) and 308, respectively 
315
 Articles III-424(1) and I-18(1), respectively 
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 CIG 1/07, see paragraph 289 
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the adoption of Union measures in the area concerned provides for the adoption of 
legislative acts." 
The meaning of “legislative acts” was given in paragraph 239 of that draft. 
1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article [III-396]. 
2. A special legislative procedure shall consist in the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament. 
3. Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts. 
Thus it would seem that the objective of the addition of what became the second sentence of 
Article 349(1) TFEU was not to give the EU institutions a choice as essentially seems to have 
been suggested by the Council and by Spain in joined cases C-132-134/14. The objective was 
that when the application of EU law to the remote areas was being determined (that 
determination is what Article 349 TFEU regulates), the act determining the application 
should be adopted via the same procedure as the act the application of which was being 
extended. 
In the draft of 5
th
 October 2007,
317
 the wording of the second sentence of what became 
Article 349(1) TFEU assumed the form it would ultimately take. The documents available on 
the website of the 2007 IGC contain no explanation of the change. Therefore, without more, 
it is impossible to opine with any certainty whether the change was  
 simply a horribly executed rephrasing without any change of the meaning 
compared to the July draft or  
 intended to simplify the procedure set forth in the July draft by making a 
particular special legislative procedure applicable to all acts which determined the 
application of legislative acts and keep a non-legislative procedure applicable to 
acts determining application of all other acts (with the outcome of Protocols Nos 1 
and 2 applying to the former, but not the latter
318
) or 
 a horribly drafted attempt at bringing the text back in line with Article 299(2) EC 
(as suggested by Ziller
319
) or 
 made for some other reason. 
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 The difference from the position advocated by the Council and by Spain in joined cases C-132-136/14 is that 
it would be predetermined by Article 349(1) TFEU itself whether the protocols would apply to the act of 
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 Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force 
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Subsequent case-law of the ECJ, however, indicates that probably neither the first nor the 
second explanation for the change is correct. One of the instruments challenged (by the 
Commission) in the already mentioned joined cases C-132-136/14 was Council Directive 
2013/62/EU of 17 December 2013 amending Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised 
Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, 
CEEP and ETUC, following the amendment of the status of Mayotte with regard to the 
European Union. According to directive 2013/62 itself it was adopted via special legislative 
procedure. It contained one substantive provision (Article 1). 
In Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/18/EU, the following subparagraph is added: 
‘By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, the additional period referred to 
therein shall be extended to 31 December 2018 as regards Mayotte as an outermost 
region of the Union within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU.’. 
Thus it determined how some other instrument of EU law was to apply to Mayotte. The other 
instrument – directive 2010/18 – was a directive of the Council alone, adopted on the basis of 
Article 155(2) TFEU. Hence it was not a legislative act nor was it adopted via any legislative 
procedure.
320
 If the meaning of Article 349(1) TFEU remained the same as it was in the draft 
of 23
rd
 July 2007 or if the idea remained the same with the change occasioned by the 
aforedescribed desire for simplification, directive 2013/62 should have been annulled: it 
determined the application of an act, which had been adopted via a non-legislative procedure, 
yet directive 2013/62 was adopted on the basis of the second, not the first, sentence of Article 
349(1) TFEU. The Grand Chamber of the ECJ deciding the case dismissed all applications 
holding the acts, including directive 2013/62, valid. Admittedly the case was never put this 
way nor did the ECJ directly engage with the point, but that does not change the final 
outcome. 
As for what became Article 352(1) TFEU, the draft of 23
rd
 July 2007 did not change Article 
308 EC much (aside from prescribing that the Parliament must consent to the adoption of 
measures instead of being consulted as was the case under Article 308 EC).
321
 The wording 
of the provision corresponded verbatim to the wording of the first sentence of Article 349(1) 
TFEU. In the draft of 5
th
 October 2007 the text remained the same – except that a second 
sentence was added. The wording of the second sentence corresponded verbatim to the 
wording of the second sentence of Article 349(1) TFEU.
322
 That was the way the wording of 
Article 352(1) TFEU came about. The documents available on the website of the 2007 IGC 
contain no explanation of the addition. What is clear is that the idea behind it could not have 
been something akin to the ratio of the wording in the July draft of what became Article 
349(1) TFEU. No measure adopted on the basis of Article 352 TFEU has any corresponding 
or related measure adopted on some other legal basis. 
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 See paragraph 291 of the draft. 
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 See paragraph 289 of the draft. 
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The overview of drafting history of Articles 349(1) and 352(2) TFEU and of the case-law of 
the ECJ seems therefore unable to explain the interplay of the first and second sentence of 
either provision, although various arguments are available. At this point it would be tempting 
to conclude that the 42 legal bases should not be considered as mandating a special legislative 
procedure, because (a) doing so would render otiose certain parts of Article 289(2) TFEU as 
well as of the 36 legal bases mentioning explicitly a special legislative procedure, not to 
mention first sentences of Articles 349(1) and 352(1) TFEU, and (b) it could be argued that 
the lack of any mention in them of a special legislative procedure is intended to disapply 
Protocols Nos 1 and 2 in relation to the acts adopted on their basis (to the extent that this is a 
separate point from (a)). Thus the GC was correct in its order in case T-121/10 after all.  
However, that disregards that (i) there is no evidence of any intention to effect such a 
distinction in application of Protocols Nos. 1 and 2, (ii) the tentative conclusion reached 
above in this section 2.3.3 immediately prior to engaging with the issue of Articles 349(1) 
and 352(2) TFEU and (iii) that the correctness of the position proffered in the order in case T-
121/10 in no way explains the drafting of both Article 349(1) TFEU and Article 352(1) 
TFEU (it could conceivably explain only the former). More importantly point (a) made in the 
preceding paragraph is conclusion-neutral and point (b) could be seen as being less weighty 
considering some of the consequences which would flow if the 42 legal bases mandated 
special legislative procedures. 
Point (a) is conclusion-neutral for two reasons. First, there are plenty of provisions of the 
constitutive treaties which are otiose. Both Article 349(1) TFEU and Article 352(1) TFEU 
say that if an act is adopted on their basis via a special legislative procedure, that is to be done 
on a proposal of the Commission. These references to the proposal of the Commission are 
otiose because by virtue of Article 17(2) TEU that is in any case so; if it is not then the 
resulting acts are not legislative.
323
 Article 50(2) TEU could be another example of a 
provision part of which is otiose. It states that the Council is to act by qualified majority. 
Pursuant to Article 16(3) TEU that is so in any case unless the constitutive treaties provide 
otherwise. In fact, in view of Article 16(3) TFEU any provision of the constitutive treaties 
mandating that the Council act by qualified majority is otiose. Thus, a provision of the 
constitutive treaties being otiose is not something extraordinary, let alone significant enough 
to condition construction of some provision of the constitutive treaties. 
Second, if one assumes that a provision of the constitutive treaties being otiose is 
nevertheless important, concluding that the 42 legal bases do not mandate a special legislative 
procedure does not mean that nothing is rendered otiose. That conclusion renders otiose the 
following words of Article 289(2) TFEU: 
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 Under Article 17(2) TEU the Commission holds a privilege of initiating adoption of legislative acts as 
opposed to initiating legislative procedures. In view of the judgement of the ECJ in case C-77/11 (discussed at 
length in section 2.2.1 above) a legislative procedure need to result in a legislative act. However, if the 
legislative procedures mentioned in second sentences of Articles 349(1) and 352(1) TFEU do not result in 
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legislative acts disappear. 
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the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the 
participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European 
Parliament. 
If a legal basis mandates a special legislative procedure only when it expressly mentions a 
special legislative procedure, there is simply no need to specify in general any aspect of that 
procedure. Such specification might have made sense if creation of secondary legal bases 
were lawful (in that case the words could have been read as prescribing what conditions a 
procedure set forth in a legal basis needed to meet to be capable of being lawfully designated 
as a special legislative procedure), but it is not.
324
 
Point (b) is less weighty than might initially seem, because if the 42 legal bases mandated 
special legislative procedures, it would explain the meaning, some would say the existence, 
of the third sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU as well as of Article 31(1)(1) TEU. 
Article 24(1)(2) TFEU: The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific 
rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council 
and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. 
The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security 
policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. 
The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is 
defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to 
monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain 
decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
Article 31(1)(1) TEU: Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European 
Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides 
otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. 
The sentence rendered in bold italics has stumped commentators
325
 because no CFSP legal 
basis expressly says that the adoption of acts is to occur via a legislative procedure, and 
Article 289 TFEU contains no words which would exclude its application to CFSP (which 
would enable the argument that in Articles 24(1)(2) and 31(1)(1) TEU “legislative acts” 
means something other than what is meant by that term in Article 289 TFEU). Two legal 
bases among the 42 deal with CFSP: Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU. Only the 42 legal 
bases’ mandating special legislative procedures explains the meaning of Article 24(1)(2): 
while the acts adopted on the basis of Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU are adopted via 
special legislative procedures and are decisions, no consequences flow from that since the 
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resulting acts are not legislative, viz. Protocols Nos. 1 and 2 nevertheless do not apply to such 
acts. 
A similar argument could be made in respect of Article 5 of Protocol (No 21) on the Position 
of the United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
A Member State which is not bound by a measure adopted pursuant to Title V of Part 
Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall bear no financial 
consequences of that measure other than administrative costs entailed for the 
institutions, unless all members of the Council, acting unanimously after consulting 
the European Parliament, decide otherwise. 
Why does that provision speak of members of the Council rather than the Council? It could 
be argued that this difference in wording is what precludes the procedure from being a special 
legislative procedure with the result that Protocols Nos 1 and 2 (nor Article 16 TEU for that 
matter) would apply. This seems one of the few possible explanations, if not the only one, of 
the difference in wording which explanation actually ascribes any consequences to the 
difference. The same point could be made in respect of Article 332 TFEU which uses the 
same wording (viz. it refers to the decision by members of the Council as opposed to the 
Council). That would, admittedly, mean that there are not 42, but 40 of these “other” special 
legislative procedures (Article 5 of Protocol (No 21) on the Position of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice was included on the list 
of 42). 
Thus the conclusions seemingly reached on the basis of consideration of Articles 349(1) and 
352(2) TFEU are ultimately nullified. 
To sum up, while arguments may be presented for different views, the better view might be 
thought to be that espoused by advocate general Wathelet in his opinion in case C-104/16P 
and by the GC in its judgment in case T-512/12. Any procedure which mandates 
the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the 
participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European 
Parliament, 
is a special legislative procedure. Thus there are in total some 76 legal bases in the 
constitutive treaties which legal bases mandate a special legislative procedure. Four 
consequences flow from this conclusion. First, some 11 legal bases of the 40 (which do not 
use the words “special legislative procedure”) did not mention the holder of the privilege of 
initiative.
326
 If each of these legal bases mandates a special legislative procedure, then – 
under Article 17(2) TEU – by default the holder of the privilege of initiative is the 
Commission (at least when the act being adopted is a regulation, a directive or a decision). 
The second consequence is that the list of entities holding the privilege of initiative of a 
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special legislative procedure is extended: Article 27(3) TEU grants that privilege to the High 
Representative.
327
 The third is that three new entities appear on the list of entities whom it 
might be necessary to consult over a course of a legislative procedure: the Employment 
Committee,
328
 the Economic and Financial Committee
329
 and the European Council.
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Finally, this conclusion “adds” to the list of legal bases mandating a legislative procedure 
which expressly require the consent of an entity other than the Council or the Parliament for 
the resulting act to become adopted: Article 27(3) TEU requires the consent of the 
Commission, Article 81(3)(2) TFEU essentially requires the consent of the national 
parliament of each member state (Article 81(3)(4) grants each of them a veto) and Article 
140(2)(1) TFEU essentially requires the consent of the Article 238(3)(a) majority of the 
member states whose currency is the euro. 
2.3.4. Substance 
Turning to the side of substantive law the questions which were posed in respect of ordinary 
legislative procedures could be rephrased for special legislative procedures thus. 
1. What areas of competence (exclusive, shared, supporting, coordinating, 
complementary) do the legal bases requiring the use of special legislative 
procedures belong to? 
2. What subject matters do the legal bases requiring the use of special legislative 
procedures regulate? 
3. Is there any pattern behind the use of different special legislative procedures? 
As we saw in section 2.2.2.1 every area of competence has legal bases which mandate some 
procedure other than a special legislative one. At least one legal basis mandates a special 
legislative procedure in the following areas of competence: 
 area of exclusive competence – Article 127(6) TFEU (conferral on the ECB of 
tasks regarding policies related to prudential supervision of financial institutions 
other than insurance companies); 
 area of standard shared competence – Article 115 TFEU (approximation of laws 
directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the internal market); 
 area of shared competence with no pre-emption – Article 182(4) TFEU (specific 
R&D programmes) and 
 area of “political” coordinating competence – Article 148(2) TFEU (adoption of 
guidelines for employment policies of member states
331
). 
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Conspicuous by its absence from the list is the area where the EU is only competent to 
support, coordinate and supplement the actions of member states. There are no legal bases 
within that area of competence which would mandate a special legislative procedure. On the 
other hand, two legal bases (Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU
332
) do mandate a special 
legislative procedure within the area of CFSP (Article 2(4) TFEU). That was the only type of 
competence explained in Article 2 TFEU in the area of which there was no legal basis 
mandating ordinary legislative procedure. Finally, it is worth mentioning that there are 
examples of both ordinary and special legislative procedure being mandated not simply 
within the same area of competence, but by the same article. Article 192 TFEU, setting out 
legal bases for adoption of measures for the protection of the environment, is an especially 
good example in this respect for in paragraph 1 it mandates an ordinary legislative procedure, 
in paragraph 2(1) it mandates a special legislative procedure which is called a special 
legislative procedure and in paragraph 2(2) it mandates the very same special legislative 
procedure as in paragraph 2(1), but in paragraph 2(2) it is not called a special legislative 
procedure. 
It is therefore possible to conclude that in every area of competence of the EU there is a legal 
basis mandating what is denoted in Article 289 TFEU as a legislative procedure. 
Moving on to subject matters in respect of which special legislative procedures are employed, 
there seems to be no very good reason for giving much consideration to interaction of 
ordinary and special legislative procedures as far as the subject matters in respect of which 
they are employed are concerned. That is occasion by Article 48(7)(2) TEU. 
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for legislative 
acts to be adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, 
the European Council may adopt a decision allowing for the adoption of such acts in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Thus, as far as European law is concerned, any use of a special legislative procedure vis-à-vis 
an ordinary legislative procedure is at least potentially fleeting: as a matter of law (if not as a 
matter of politics) any special legislative procedure could always be replaced by an ordinary 
legislative procedure. There are further four such switching clauses, commonly known as 
passerelles, in the constitutive treaties: in Article 81(3)(2) TFEU, Article 153(2)(4) TFEU, 
the aforementioned Article 192(2)(2) TFEU and Article 333(2) TFEU.
333
 However, unlike 
Article 48(7)(2) TEU, which empowers the European Council to perform the switch, those 
three passerelles, which admittedly have much more limited extent enabling in each case 
only the change of procedure prescribed by one single legal basis, mandate that the switch be 
made by an instrument which the Council adopts via a special legislative procedure. The 
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flowing relationship between ordinary and special legislative procedure, and as far as 
question 3 is concerned, a lack of pattern resulting from the flowing nature of the 
relationship, is further demonstrated by Article 64 TFEU. Its paragraphs 2 and 3 read as 
follows. 
Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between 
Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and without 
prejudice to the other Chapters of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the 
measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct 
investment – including investment in real estate – establishment, the provision of 
financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets. 
Notwithstanding paragraph 2, only the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European 
Parliament, adopt measures which constitute a step backwards in Union law as 
regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries. 
Thus, essentially a step forward in liberalisation may be made only via an ordinary legislative 
procedure, while a step back from the position reached may be made via a special legislative 
procedure – and the one not granting the Parliament any veto at that.334 
Two more matters may be observed as regards substance. First, certain legal bases which 
mandate a special legislative procedure would not seem to enable adoption of normative acts 
at all. Article 246(2) TFEU could serve as an example here: it is the basis for replacement of 
a member of the Commission. Article 7(1) TEU could be another: it is the basis for deciding 
that there is a risk that a particular member state might gravely violate the values of the EU. 
This further demonstrates the disconnect between what Article 289 TFEU calls a legislative 
procedure and the substance of the resulting act: the act could equally be a one-off, with no 
normative content, or have normative content, yet in both cases still need to be adopted via a 
legislative procedure. 
Second, the same disconnect is even further demonstrated by the passerelles mandating a 
special legislative procedure and by provisions enabling the amendment of statutes of EU 
institutions which statutes are contained in protocols to the constitutive treaties
335
 (as opposed 
to provisions enabling the regulation of some aspect of the structure of an institution without 
amending its statute). If the question was looked at from a perspective of national law whence 
the term “legislative” comes from, such amendments would not substantively be legislative; 
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they would be constitutional. In this sense the acts adopted on the basis of these provisions 
are more akin to those which might be adopted on the basis of paragraphs 2 to 6 of Article 48 
TEU which received so much criticism from the German Constitutional Court.
336
 It further 
shows that there is no substantive criterion for the acts resulting from what Article 289 TFEU 
calls a legislative procedure which criterion would bear upon the procedure being legislative 
or not (within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU); there are situations in which the 
constitutive treaties mandate that a non-normative or what would in a nation state be a 
constitutional act result. 
When considering in general questions 2 and 3 formulated above, it should be noted that it 
has never been suggested that only special legislative procedures should be considered 
“legislative”. The traditional position is that “legislative procedures” is a group made up of 
special legislative procedures and ordinary legislative procedures. Less traditional 
approaches, which do not dispense with the ordinary vs special distinction altogether (as any 
approach mandating a purely substantive notion of legislation does
337
), have been suggested 
by commentators (for instance by Türk) but they have always included ordinary legislative 
procedure in the group of “legislative procedures”; it was always (some part of) special 
legislative procedures which were left out. 
While Türk included some special legislative procedures among his “legislative” group,338 an 
approach which would seem to deem only ordinary legislative procedures to be “legislative” 
has been suggested by Eva Nieto-Garrido and Isaac Martin Delgado.
339
 Writing about the 
Constitutional Treaty, they start by opining that 
there are not one but several basic legislative procedures, and the adoption of a 
particular procedure is not based on any systemic logic but seems to depend on 
diplomatic negotiations during the successive reforms of the Treaties.
340
 
They then divide the normative instruments which the EU could adopt into legislative and 
non-legislative ones.
341
 They opine that primary law (by which they seem to mean European 
laws or European framework laws) 
 will be adopted via the ordinary legislative procedure.
342
 
Thus 
[t]he elimination of the pillar structure and the introduction of the principle of 
hierarchy of norms has the result that in areas where fundamental rights are at stake, 
the relevant matter will be regulated by European law or framework law. According 
to this criterion, norms that may have an impact on fundamental rights will be 
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established through the ordinary legislative procedure in which the Council and the 
Parliament will act as co-legislators. 
The logic behind the Union’s normative system in this field enables us to draw the 
conclusion that the criterion to be used in deciding which normative instrument 
should be used in a particular policy will not only depend on whether the act contains 
a basic policy choice, but also on whether the act may have an impact on fundamental 
rights.
343
 
Essentially they seem to conclude that only European laws and European framework laws 
adopted via an ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) are “legislative”. It is difficult to 
choose where to commence the criticism of such a position: there are so many possibilities. 
First, the statement that primary law will be adopted only via ordinary legislative procedure 
(co-decision) is wrong in law: Article I-34(2) of the Constitutional Treaty enabled its 
adoption via a special legislative procedure. Not all such procedures required consent of the 
Parliament (see the aforequoted Article III-126(1) of the Constitutional Treaty); hence the 
Council and the Parliament are in no way equal. 
Second, even if the position of Nieto-Garrido and Delgado should be understood as positing 
that only those European laws and European framework laws which are adopted via an 
ordinary legislative procedure constitute primary laws, it still does not follow that norms 
affecting fundamental rights are adopted only via ordinary legislative procedure. The 
opposite is true, in fact. In its judgment in case C-501/11P
344
 the ECJ held that competition 
law affects fundamental rights. No instrument of competition law is currently adopted via an 
ordinary legislative procedure or was to be adopted via an ordinary legislative procedure 
under the Constitutional Treaty (see Articles III-161 to III-166, specifically Article III-163). 
Thus the logic which Nieto-Garrido and Delgado allege to exist behind the EU’s normative 
system, simply does not exist. 
Generalising the problem of their approach, it is the same as that of virtually any other 
approach which says that only part of legislative procedures (within the meaning of Article 
289 TFEU) are “legislative” or result in legislative acts. Such approaches assume some 
substantive criterion for the acts resulting from a legislative procedure (here the criterion is 
interference with fundamental rights). However, as we saw Article 289 TFEU lacks any 
substantive criteria whatsoever for the acts resulting from those procedures. Hence all such 
approaches are ultimately destined to fail as a matter of positive law. 
There is only one way in which a similar approach could be constructed without positing 
some substantive criterion for the acts resulting from legislative procedures. Essentially it 
amounts to positing that some procedural aspect is so important that without that aspect the 
procedure cannot be legislative (that would be one possible understanding of the approach 
proposed by Türk
345
). Yet such approaches ultimately fail for at least one of two reasons: (i) 
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the choice of alleged procedural imperative cannot be successfully justified, at least not 
without reference to some substantive criterion (which is ordinarily, if not always, extra-
legal), probably in respect of the acts resulting from the procedure (and Article 289 TFEU 
lacks any such criteria), or (ii) it is unclear what the approach brings to the table, e.g. any 
approach saying that only a procedure where the Parliament does have an ability to veto 
particular provisions of the resulting act is legislative. If one discards substantive criteria and 
substantive explanations of any such approach, any such approach essentially amounts to the 
same one already employed by the constitutive treaties: it ties “legislativeness” to some 
procedural step(s); the difference would lie simply in choosing a different place where to put 
the dividing line between two procedures one of which is called “legislative” and the other 
not. 
For present purposes the lack of approaches advocating that only special legislative 
procedures are actually “legislative” obviates the need to go into a detailed consideration of 
subject matters which are regulated by the legal bases mandating special legislative 
procedures. It would serve no useful purpose here. The objective of the present thesis is to 
analyse legislative acts of the EU. It has already been demonstrated in section 2.2.2.2 that a 
legislative procedure (specifically an ordinary legislative procedure) is employed in respect 
of various subject matters. Any finding in respect of special legislative procedures (whether 
they are or are not employed in respect of various subject matters) will not change the 
conclusion reached there: that legislative procedures within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU 
are employed in respect of various subject matters. A finding specifically in respect of 
employment of special legislative procedure might have been important had there been a 
cogent argument to the effect that only special legislative procedures are “legislative”, but no 
argument to that effect (whether cogent or not) seems to have ever been made, or had the 
analysis of ordinary legislative procedures shown that they are employed only in respect of 
some particular subject matters.  
The same point may be made mutatis mutandis in respect of question 3, viz. whether there is 
a pattern behind the use of different special legislative procedures. In any event, as discussed 
in section 2.3.3 above it is most likely that the choice of legal bases which mandate a special 
legislative procedure was political, not motivated by any systematic argument. 
2.4. Conclusions 
It may be seen that the constitutive treaties currently (probably
346
) contain 161 legal bases 
mandating the use of a procedure which is a legislative procedure within the meaning of 
Article 289 TFEU. 85 of those mandate an ordinary legislative procedure, and 76 – a special 
legislative procedure. Neither “ordinary legislative procedure” nor “special legislative 
procedure” is actually a reference to a procedure; they both denote a class of procedures 
which have the same basic characteristics (in the case of the former set forth in Articles 
289(1) and 294 TFEU and in the case of the latter – in Article 289(2) TFEU). 
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There are only three commonalities between all legislative procedures: 
1. consent of the Council is always needed for adoption of the resulting act; 
2. the Parliament always participates in any such procedure; 
3. there are no substantive criteria whatsoever for the acts resulting from such 
procedures. 
There is no system to the way legal bases mandating different legislative procedures are 
distributed in the treaties – be it among the various areas of competence or among the subject 
matters of different importance or seen from the perspective of different versions of 
legislative procedures. 
The term “legislation” seems to have different meanings in Article 2 TFEU,347 Article 289 
TFEU and Articles I-33 (specifically sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of its paragraph 1) and I-34 of 
the Constitutional Treaty. No commentator has offered an approach capable of bridging the 
differences. 
What may be concluded from the foregoing treatment? It is submitted that four points of 
importance may be taken away. First, “ordinary legislative procedure” and “special 
legislative procedure” are nothing more than terms of art employed as shorthands for 
denoting the procedures described in Articles 289(1) and 294 TFEU (ordinary legislative 
procedure), and 289(2) TFEU (special legislative procedure). Aside from situations where 
some particular legal basis expressly says otherwise, nothing more may be attributed to or 
read into those terms. They bear no connotation at all, and certainly none which could 
somehow, however remotely, be linked with the common understanding of the meaning of 
“legislation” under national laws. There is no requirement as to the content of the acts 
resulting from either ordinary or special legislative procedure. 
The “shorthand” nature of the terms becomes especially clear if one considers the issue in a 
historic perspective. It was shown in section 2.2.1 that as far as what is now called “ordinary 
legislative procedure” is concerned, content-wise essentially nothing changed with the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. In the EC Treaty that procedure was called “procedure 
referred to in article 251”. That term is quite clearly a shorthand. Seeing as content-wise 
nothing changed, the term “ordinary legislative procedure” simply took the place of the term 
“procedure referred to in article 251”. 
Second, there is no system behind the dispersal of various legislative procedures among the 
legal bases. Which legal basis mandated which particular procedure (even whether a 
legislative one or not) seems to have been decided when drafting the Constitutional Treaty 
and later the Lisbon Treaty as a result of political bargaining and/or compromising within 
committees and among people charged with drafting which compromises had the quality of 
not being unacceptable to anyone (rather than being acceptable to all). 
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Third, the one pattern which may be thought to exist in the constitutive treaties is somewhat 
counter-intuitive. The more important the issue is, the likelier it is that a “lighter” procedure 
is mandated by the constitutive treaties;
348
 the less important the issue, the less likely it is that 
a “lighter” procedure is mandated by the constitutive treaties. It is exceedingly difficult, and 
probably impossible altogether, to find a legal basis of lesser importance which mandates a 
non-legislative procedure altogether (whether the importance is considered from the 
perspective of the EU or that of a citizen).
349
 Special legislative procedures, which are 
normally seen as “lighter” ones than ordinary legislative procedures, are not mandated by any 
legal basis in the areas where the EU is only competent to support, coordinate and 
supplement actions of member states, i.e. the area where its competence is the least extensive 
of any it holds. Ordinary legislative procedures are, however, mandated by legal bases in 
those areas of competence. The changes to Article 64 TFEU (compared to Article 57 EC)
350
 
seem inexplicable until one realises that the “lighter” the procedure, the higher the relative 
weight of the Council, and hence of the government of each member state, in that procedure. 
Just like the higher the majority of votes by which the Council is required to adopt an 
instrument, the higher the relative weight of the government of each member state. Seen thus, 
the changes to Article 64 TFEU become easy to understand: both Article 64 TFEU and 
Article 57 EC provide(d) for the step back to be made via a procedure which gave higher 
relative weight to the position of the government of each member state. The same is true of 
the pattern discussed in the beginning of this paragraph. The situation is counter-intuitive, 
because our intuition, based as it is on nation states in this respect, would suggest that the 
more important the issue is, the “heavier” the procedure for the adoption of an instrument 
regulating the issue should be, i.e. the more parties should be involved and the lesser the 
relative weight of those entities which are not seen as directly legitimised (which are not 
directly elected by the citizens). 
Fourth, the introduction into EU law of the language of legislation has sapped what little 
clarity there was in the system in the first place; it has not brought any noticeable benefits. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, to develop any structured argument in respect of “legislative” 
procedures of the EU. When dealing with the issue of legislative procedures, the courts of the 
EU have openly reached expressly contradictory conclusions (with the contradiction not 
capable of being construed away, in the cases T-121/10 and T-512/12, for instance), and 
fudged reasoning (in the case C-77/11).
351
 This very chapter shows that “transparency” is 
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hardly a word which could conscientiously be employed when speaking of legislative 
procedures of the EU (inter alia we have seen that in spite of Article 289(3) TFEU not all 
acts adopted via a legislative procedure within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU are 
legislative). At the same time it is difficult to see what the introduction of the language of 
legislation changed to any considerable extent (let alone to one which could not have been 
achieved without speaking of “legislation”),352 and how its introduction has benefitted 
legitimacy of the EU.  
That is the fifth point to be taken away: comparing EU law as it stands after the Treaty of 
Lisbon with how it stood after the Treaty of Nice, there is no conceptual difference as far as 
substance of EU law on this point is concerned. The use of what are now called ordinary and 
special legislative procedures was extended to more cases and there was some minor 
“tinkering” with (some of) those procedures themselves. However, these are merely 
incremental changes which have been taking place at least since the Treaty of Maastricht 
(long before “the language of legislation” was introduced into the constitutive treaties). They 
are incapable of producing “a revolution”. In essence, however, the acts of the EU adopted 
via what are now ordinary and special legislative procedures continue to be adopted in the 
same way as they were before the Treaty of Lisbon. It truly does seem that, like Dougan 
suggested, 
[t]he desire to bestow upon the Union a clearer hierarchy of norms, for the sake of 
enhancing the transparency of its activities, has therefore been undermined by a 
combination of shallow conception and poor execution.
353
 
If anything, that is an understatement. 
3. Delegated acts and implementing acts 
3.1. Introduction 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were introduced into EU law by the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 
290 TFEU reads as follows. 
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1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act. 
The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be 
reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation 
of power. 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is 
subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its 
component members, and the Council by a qualified majority. 
3. The adjective "delegated" shall be inserted in the title of delegated acts. 
Article 291 TFEU reads as follows. 
1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement 
legally binding Union acts. 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, 
those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified 
specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the Council. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
lay down in advance the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for 
control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers. 
4. The word "implementing" shall be inserted in the title of implementing acts. 
The first evident thing about these two provisions is that delegated act may lawfully be 
adopted only on the basis of a legislative act, while there is no such limitation in case of 
implementing acts. Second, “delegated” power may lawfully be granted only to the 
Commission, while both the Commission and the Council may be grantees of implementing 
power. Third, a delegated act has to be of general application, while there is no such 
requirement in respect of implementing acts. It should next be mentioned that as far as the 
subject-matter of the two articles goes, they essentially replaced – some would argue 
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developed or revolutionised
354
 – the old Article 202 EC which was repealed by the Lisbon 
Treaty. That article read as follows. 
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained the Council shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty: 
- ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States, 
- have power to take decisions, 
- confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. The Council may impose 
certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers. The Council may also 
reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself. 
The procedures referred to above must be consonant with principles and rules to be 
laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament. 
While Article 202 EC did refer only to the Council omitting any reference to the Parliament 
which by the time the provision became Article 202 EC had obtained significant law-making 
powers,
355
 the provision is a relic of olden times. Times when only the Council had any such 
powers. It was called then Article 155 EEC; it was simply never updated when the provisions 
surrounding it were. That did not change much in practice. Under Article 202 EC power was 
conferred on the Commission by acts adopted by the Parliament and Council jointly.
356
 
It should also be mentioned upfront that the acts referred to in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
may be and are juxtaposed with legislative acts referred to in Article 289(3) TFEU.
357
 Thus 
delegated and implementing acts are generically referred to as non-legislative acts. It should, 
however, be stressed that delegated and implementing acts are not the only non-legislative 
acts recognised by the constitutive treaties. By virtue of article 289(3) TFEU – which defines 
legislative acts as acts adopted via a legislative procedure – every single act of the EU which 
is not adopted via a legislative procedure is a non-legislative act. In addition to delegated and 
implementing acts these would include, for instance, acts setting forth common customs tariff 
duties (article 31 TFEU), the acts of the Council referred to in article 43(3) TFEU,
358
 the acts 
of the Council referred to in article 66 TFEU,
359
 directives and decisions which the 
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Commission might adopt under article 106(3) TFEU and decisions establishing data-
protection rules applicable within the ambit of CFSP (article 39 TEU). 
With that out of the way, let us return to the issue which in the context of this thesis arises in 
relation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. How do Articles 290 and 291 TFEU relate to 
legislative acts and legislative power? Are the powers referred to in both of them legislative? 
Or only in one of them? In that case which one? Or might neither article be about a power 
which is legislative? If the power to which set forth is legislative, are the acts adopted on their 
basis likewise legislative? If no, then why not? Consideration of these issues brings one 
squarely to the inter-relationship of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, of delegated and 
implementing acts, of delegated and implementing power. 
3.2. Overview of case law of the ECJ 
3.2.1. Biocides 
The first case in which the ECJ confronted the issue of “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU bore the number C-427/12 and the rather prosaic name of European Commission v 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union. The case concerned certain 
powers which the Parliament and the Council granted
360
 to the Commission in Article 80 of 
the Biocides regulation,
361
 and was decided by a Grand Chamber of the ECJ. The judgment 
came to be known as Biocides. 
The Biocides regulation set up a regime for approval of biocidal products. To obtain an 
approval for a product and to then market it certain fees would need to be paid.
362
 Article 
80(1) of the Biocides regulation tasked the Commission with setting those fees. 
The Commission shall adopt, on the basis of the principles set out in paragraph 3, an 
implementing Regulation specifying: 
(a) the fees payable to the [European Chemicals] Agency, including an annual fee for 
products granted a Union authorisation in accordance with Chapter VIII and a fee for 
applications for mutual recognition in accordance with Chapter VII; 
(b) the rules defining conditions for reduced fees, fee waivers and the reimbursement 
of the member of the Biocidal Products Committee who acts as a rapporteur; and 
(c) conditions of payment. 
The Commission argued that setting those fees required delegated power and should thus 
have been adopted via a delegated act; that those fees could not be set in exercise of 
implementing power in an implementing act. Thus, said the Commission, the Parliament and 
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the Council violated the TFEU by conferring on the Commission an implementing power 
instead of a delegated one.
363
 
The Commission submitted that 
1. unlike implementing power delegated power is quasi-legislative;364 
2. the choice between delegated and implementing power is based on objective and clear 
factors that are amenable to judicial review;
365
 
3. Articles 290 and 291 TFEU have mutually exclusive scope;366 
4. under Article 80(1) of the Biocides regulation the Commission essentially had so 
large a discretion that what it was asked to do went way beyond simple determination 
of a fee corresponding to a particular step in the process of approval.
367
 
On every single of these points the ECJ disagreed with the Commission. The Commission 
lost. 
The ECJ started by taking the obvious point that in the TFEU there is no definition of 
implementing act.
368
 It then decided that the concept of implementing act must be assessed by 
reference to the concept of delegated act.
369
 That was followed by a look back into history: in 
paragraph 36 the ECJ opined that 
the expression ‘implementing powers’ in the third indent of Article 202 EC covered 
the power to implement, at EU level, an EU legislative act or certain EU provisions 
and also, in certain circumstances, the power to adopt normative acts which 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act. The European 
Convention proposed making a distinction between those two types of power, which 
is found in Articles I-35 and I-36 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. That amendment was ultimately incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon in 
Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU. 
What the ECJ did not say is whether either of the two powers – delegated and implementing 
– is “quasi-legislative” as was contended by the Commission.370 The ECJ rather thought that  
the purpose of granting a delegated power is to achieve the adoption of rules coming 
within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act,
371
 
while the purpose of granting an implementing power is 
to provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to 
ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States.
372
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Thus both Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are about making rules. More importantly still the ECJ 
went on to hold – in paragraph 40 – that the EU legislature has a discretion when it decides 
which power to confer, a delegated or an implementing one. As a consequence any judicial 
review of the choice was limited 
to manifest errors of assessment as to whether the EU legislature could reasonably 
have taken the view, first, that, in order to be implemented, the legal framework 
which it laid down regarding the system of fees referred to in Article 80(1) of 
Regulation No 528/2012 needs only the addition of further detail, without its non-
essential elements having to be amended or supplemented and, secondly, that the 
provisions of Regulation No 528/2012 relating to that system require uniform 
conditions for implementation. 
In paragraphs 41 – 53 the ECJ performed that judicial review. In doing so the ECJ held 
 that the Biocides regulation contained a guiding principle of how the fees were to be 
set (paragraph 43); 
 that the fact that the Biocides regulation contained no criteria how various sources of 
financing of the relevant agency were to be reconciled while requiring that the fees 
should be sufficient to cover its costs (without creating any surplus) did not in any 
way indicate that a delegated power was called for (paragraph 44); 
 that asking the Commission to undertake a forward-looking exercise likewise did not 
in any way indicate that a delegated power was called for (paragraph 45); 
 that the legislature could have reasonably taken a view that the Biocides regulation 
provided a complete legal framework to which the ECJ referred in paragraph 40 
(paragraphs 48 and 49) 
 with the result that the Commission would be exercising its powers “within a 
normative framework laid down by the legislative act itself, the non-essential 
elements of which can neither be amended nor supplemented by the implementing 
act” (paragraph 49); 
 that a duty to decide when something (in that case a reduction of fees) is appropriate 
does not mean that a delegated power is called far, at least not when the 
considerations by reference to which the appropriateness is to be determined are set 
out in the basic act (paragraph 51).
373
 
The ECJ summed up by holding that the EU legislature could reasonably have taken the view 
that the power at issue was a power to “to provide further detail in relation to the normative 
content of that act”, thus an implementing power.374 And that its conferral “may be 
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considered reasonable for the purposes of ensuring uniform conditions for the 
implementation” of the biocides’ approval system in the EU.375 
The Commission thus lost on all points it took. The first point the ECJ did not even deem 
relevant enough to engage with; though it did decide that both Article 290 and Article 291 
TFEU are about making rules. The ECJ mentioned no objective and clear factors which 
would serve as the basis for the EU legislature’s choice between delegated and implementing 
power. Reference to complete legal framework and the like is not such a factor: in arguing for 
the choice being based on objective the Commission clearly drew on the case law on 
“essential elements”.376 Thus the Commission lost on the second point. The Commission’s 
third point – that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are mutually exclusive – seems to be 
contradicted by the ECJ’s finding that there is discretion in choosing between the two. 
Discretion can come into it only if at a given moment more than one choice is available.
377
 
Finally the Commission’s fourth point was equally erroneous: the ECJ did consider the extent 
of the discretion left to the Commission,
378
 yet that consideration did not lead it to conclude 
that the power should have been delegated. 
Thus the decision to employ Article 291 TFEU rather than Article 291 TFEU was allowed to 
stand. 
3.2.2. EURES 
The next judgment of the ECJ dealing with the matter was handed down in EURES.
379
 The 
Parliament and the Council had adopted a regulation
380
 on free movement of workers. Article 
38 of the regulation stated that the Commission was to adopt measures for its 
implementation. The Commission adopted EURES decision
381
 as such a measure. The 
Parliament claimed that the decision went beyond the implementing power conferred on the 
Commission.
382
 That was the issue the ECJ purported to deal with.
383
 
The Parliament effectively relied on four points in support of its claim that the Commission 
had exceeded its implementing power. 
1. The Commission was said to have made policy choices in EURES decision: its 
articles 2(b) and 2(d) were said prioritise certain measures promoting workers’ 
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mobility and a certain group (young workers). An implementing power was said not 
to enable the making of policy choices.
384
 
2. Several of the substantive choices in respect of the activities of the EURES network 
made in the EURES decision were said to have gone beyond what was envisaged by 
regulation 492/2011.
385
 
3. Article 8(7) of EURES decision provided that the Commission was to consult with the 
EURES Management Board on certain questions (including on the EURES Charter). 
Regulation 492/2011 contained no such requirement instead limiting the bodies to be 
consulted to a technical and an advisory committee. Introduction of a new player into 
the decision-making process was said to create a new procedural condition. That was 
said to go beyond the Commission’s implementing power386 (at least in the instant 
case).
387
 
4. Article 10 of EURES decision provided that the Commission was to adopt the 
EURES Charter in accordance with articles 12, 13, 19 and 20 of regulation 492/2011 
(such charter was not mentioned anywhere in regulation 492/2011). That was said to 
have gone beyond implementing powers. Rather the Commission was said (by article 
10 of EURES decision) to have arrogated itself the implementing powers to adopt the 
charter and to have decided itself the procedure to be used to that end thus interposing 
EURES decision between the charter and regulation 492/2011.
388
 
As a subsidiary point the Parliament claimed that any implementing power which was 
granted to the Commission was limited to a strict minimum. That was said to follow from the 
formulation of the aforementioned article 38 of regulation 492/2011: “The Commission shall 
adopt measures pursuant to this Regulation for its implementation.”389 
The ECJ ruled for the Commission dismissing the action in its entirety. It started by 
reaffirming – in paragraph 44 – its pre-existing case law to the effect that within the 
framework of the Commission’s implementing power the Commission is authorised to adopt 
all the measures which are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of the act 
conferring on it the implementing power, provided that they are not contrary to it. It should 
not be forgotten here that the pre-existing case law concerned the old Article 202 EC, i.e. the 
old cases were decided when “implementing” still covered both what are now Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU.
390
 Thus in EURES the ECJ effectively stated that the creation of a distinction 
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between delegated and implementing did not in any way narrow down what it was that the 
Commission (and presumably the Council when it is granted implementing power) could do 
in exercise of its “new” implementing power. Admittedly EURES was not about delegated 
power,
391
 but presumably the “things” which the Commission is authorised to do under 
delegated power are the same. “Delegated” is likewise covered by the old case law, and it is 
difficult to see why in relation to “delegated” the scope should be either narrowed down (thus 
making delegated power less extensive than implementing one) or widened. There seems to 
be no case law supporting or academic opinion contending for such narrowing or widening. 
In paragraph 45 the ECJ opined that 
it follows from Article 290(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 291(2) TFEU that in 
exercising an implementing power, the Commission may neither amend nor 
supplement the legislative act, even as to its non-essential elements.
392
 
The ECJ then went on to formulate perhaps the central statement of law to be taken away 
from EURES. 
Having regard to the foregoing, the Commission must be deemed to provide further 
detail in relation to the legislative act /.../, if the provisions of the implementing 
measure adopted by it (i) comply with the essential general aims pursued by the 
legislative act and (ii) are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of that act 
without supplementing or amending it.
393
 
With respect, this statement of principle does not take one much further than Article 291 
TFEU. It begs more questions than it answers. The ECJ had already held in Biocides
394
 that 
when implementing power is conferred on the Commission under Article 291(2) TFEU, it 
means that the Commission is called on to provide further detail in relation to the content of 
the act by which the power is granted. Thus it seems that an act adopted via an exercise of 
power granted in a legislative act is implementing if three conditions are met: 
1. the act complies with the essential general aims of the relevant legislative act; 
2. the act is necessary or appropriate for the implementation of that legislative act; 
3. the act does not amend or supplement the legislative act. 
First, condition two seems to be circular – implementation is ultimately explained by 
implementation. Second, condition three takes its cue from Article 290(1) TFEU, i.e. a 
provision governing delegated acts. Leaving aside the fact that the ECJ had stated in 
paragraph 42 that it would not be dealing with the issues of delimitation of delegated and 
implementing, the ECJ’s statement is nothing more than a reformulation of the TFEU. It is 
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not an explanation. Third, condition one was taken from the pre-existing case law on Article 
202 EC implementing measures (that is demonstrated by the words “having regard to the 
foregoing” – that foregoing includes paragraph 44 which deals with Article 202 EC 
implementing measures). But that case law seems equally applicable to delegated acts which 
makes it difficult to see how condition one would not be applicable to delegated acts. 
While applying the foregoing principles
395
 the ECJ held – in response to Parliament’s points 
1 and 2 – that while the actions of which the Parliament was complaining were not expressly 
provided for in regulation 492/2011, they clearly fell fall within the scope of the essential 
general aim pursued by that regulation (the aim being promotion of cross-border geographical 
mobility of workers).
396
 The same was held in relation to the Parliament’s points 3 and 4. In 
paragraph 57 the ECJ said that the creation of the EURES Management Board and the 
conferral of powers on it as well as adoption of the EURES charter were 
intended to improve the operation of EURES and thereby support the clearance of 
vacancies and applications for employment in the European Union. 
Thus the challenged provisions of EURES decision complied with condition 1. 
Dealing with condition 2, the ECJ made short shrift of the Parliament’s subsidiary argument 
that “pursuant to this regulation for its implementation” somehow limits the implementing 
power to a strict minimum. The words were held not to affect the scope of implementing 
power at all.
397
 Having done that, the ECJ observed that appropriateness of the challenged 
provisions had not been called into question by the Parliament and moved on to condition 
3.
398
 
To deal with it the ECJ held that it was necessary to examine whether by adopting the 
challenged provisions of EURES decision the Commission exceeded its implementing power 
when implementing that regulation.
399
 The Commission was held to have been tasked not 
only with setting up joint action between itself and the member states envisaged by regulation 
492/2011, but also with development of operating rules for that action.
400
 The ECJ then 
considered in turn each group of challenged provisions separately. 
Dealing with the Parliament’s point 1 (articles 2(b) and 2(d) of EURES decision) the ECJ 
held that 
[t]he provisions invoked by the Parliament fall within the scope of the cooperation 
between the Commission and the Member States required by the second subparagraph 
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of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 492/2011 and do not supplement or amend the 
framework established by the legislative act in that regard.
401
 
What the ECJ left ambiguous here was whether the provisions of EURES decision do not 
amend or supplement regulation 492/2011 because they fall within the scope of cooperation 
mandated by the latter or whether these are two independent statements.
402
 
The reference to the framework was taken up in similar terms in paragraph 70 dealing with 
the Parliament’s claim that opening of EURES to private entities amounted to amending or 
supplementing regulation 492/2011 (which did not even mention any private vs public 
distinction in this respect). There the ECJ opined that the relevant provision of EURES 
decision (article 3(c)) 
 does not involve any amendment to the framework established by that regulation. 
With respect, that either does not deal with condition 3 at all – or sets the bar extremely high. 
In condition 3 as formulated in paragraph 46 the ECJ spoke of amending or supplementing 
the legislative act in question. In paragraphs 67 and 70 – when purporting to verify whether 
condition 3 was met in the case at hand – the ECJ checked whether the framework created by 
the legislative act in question was modified. Clearly it is possible to amend or supplement a 
legislative act without modifying the framework created by it. In fact according to the Grand 
Chamber in Biocides that is precisely what a delegated act is intended to do. 
[T]he purpose of granting a delegated power is to achieve the adoption of rules 
coming within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act.
403
 
Thus to fail condition 3 as applied by the ECJ in EURES the act would need to change the 
framework created by the legislative act, i.e. the Commission would have needed to have 
done something which delegated power would not have enabled it to do. On the other hand 
doing what delegated power would have enabled it to do would not have resulted in failing 
condition 3, i.e. would not have made the resulting act not implementing and thus ultra vires 
the grant of power in article 38 of regulation 492/2011. It would thus seem that implementing 
power is at least as extensive as delegated power. 
It should be stressed that it seems to be open to debate whether in paragraph 71 of EURES, in 
which the ECJ purported to explain why article 3(c) of EURES regulation did not involve any 
amendment to the framework established by regulation 492/2011, the ECJ considered matters 
relating to the framework established by regulation 492/2011 or simply certain of the rules of 
that regulation. The ECJ observed there that nothing in regulation 402/2011 reserved the 
cooperation within the EURES network to public entities holding that  
reference to private service providers in the contested decision accordingly constitutes 
the provision of further detail in relation to the framework established by Regulation 
No 492/2011. 
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In dealing with the contention that EURES decision tasked the European Coordination Office 
with the development of “a general approach to mobility” the ECJ held that upon the true 
construction of regulation 492/2011 that fell within the scope of the objectives of that 
regulation. Thus there were no amendments of or supplements to it.
404
 Interestingly in 
paragraph 78 the ECJ said that 
the Commission cannot be deemed to have exceeded the limits of its implementing 
power by conferring on the European Coordination Office, in Article 4(3)(b) of the 
contested decision, the task of developing ‘a general approach to mobility in 
accordance with the European Employment Strategy’, since such a general approach 
may be directed merely at preparing for the adoption of the controlling measures 
envisaged in Article 17 of Regulation No 492/2011 /.../ 
Quite clearly no general approach had been developed at the time when the case was decided: 
article 4(3)(b) of EURES decision simply tasked the European Coordination Office with its 
development. By putting the matter the way it put it the ECJ seems to have said that a 
measure neither amends nor supplements a legislative act if that measure provides for 
something to be undertaken on the basis of the measure as long as that something could be 
undertaken in a way which does not amend or supplement the legislative act. The fact that it 
could be undertaken in a way which does is irrelevant. It might perhaps be thought that this 
flows from the duty of harmonious construction. On a different note, paragraph 78 seems to 
show the ECJ toiling in dealing with condition 3 (no amendments or supplementations): what 
was dealt with in paragraph 73 seems more like condition one (whether the secondary 
measure falls within the scope of objectives of the primary one), not condition 3. 
The claim in respect of complementary services seems to have turned upon construction of 
regulation 492/2011: since they were within its scope, their inclusion into and express 
mentioning in EURES decision did not mean that the Commission took the place of the EU 
legislature.
405
 
In respect of the Parliament’s point 3 the ECJ found that  
[t]he establishment of the EURES Management Board and the conferment of a 
consultative role on it by the provision contested by the Parliament neither 
supplement nor amend the framework established by Regulation No 492/2011 since 
they are intended merely to ensure that the joint action required by that regulation 
operates effectively without encroaching [on the powers of the advisory and the 
technical committee established by regulation 492/2011 itself].
406
 
That means that creation of a new body and its introduction into the decision-making process 
constitutes neither an amendment of nor a supplement to the relevant legislative act. That 
may be done in exercise of implementing powers. 
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Finally adoption of the EURES Charter was likewise neither amending nor supplementing 
regulation 402/2011. What is somewhat unclear is the ECJ’s reasoning. The reasoning is 
contained in paragraphs 91 and 92. The first of them grounds the finding in the fact that the 
Commission would have been able to adopt the Charter directly under the implementing 
powers conferred on it by Article 38 of regulation 492/2011 anyway. Yet in the second of 
them ECJ said that stating in EURES decision that the Commission is to adopt the EURES 
Charter 
neither supplements nor amends the framework established by Regulation 
No 492/2011 since Article 10 and the action stated therein are intended merely to 
facilitate the exchange of information within EURES, as required by Articles 12 and 
13 of that regulation, and to promote its effective operation. 
That seems to be a different basis covering potentially a much wider range of situations 
(which would not amount to amending or supplementing). 
Having thus found that condition 3 was met in respect of every single provision of which the 
Parliament complained the ECJ dismissed the action. 
3.2.3. Visas407 
In this case, once again decided by the Grand Chamber, the Commission claimed that 
delegated power was improperly conferred on it; the Commission thought that implementing 
power should have been conferred instead. 
The case concerned regulation 1289/2013
408
 which inserted a new mechanism into regulation 
539/2001.
409
 The latter governs the EU visa-regime, i.e. the question which are those 
countries whose nationals may enter the EU member states without a visa. Regulation 
539/2001 has two annexes. Nationals of the countries listed in annex II need no visa to enter 
an EU member state. Nationals of the countries listed in annex I do need a visa to enter an EU 
member state. 
Regulation 1289/2013 introduced into regulation 539/2001 a so-called waterfall structure 
which is intended to deal with situations when a country listed in annex II starts applying a 
visa requirement to nationals of a member state of the EU. Once that happens the first steps 
of the EU to remedy the situation are political, economic and commercial,
410
 but should they 
prove fruitless the Commission may – but does not have to – adopt 
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an implementing act temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement 
for certain categories of nationals of the third country concerned for a period of up to 
six months.
411
 
By subsequent implementing acts the Commission may extend the period for further periods 
of up to six months – up until either the third state drops the visa requirement or the 
Commission becomes obliged to adopt a delegated act.
412
 
If the third country has not dropped the visa requirement once 24 months and further 30 days 
have elapsed since the moment of its introduction, the Commission must adopt a delegated 
act 
temporarily suspending the application of Annex II for a period of 12 months for the 
nationals of that third country. The delegated act /.../ shall amend annex II accordingly 
/.../ by inserting into it a footnote to that effect.
413
 
If within six months of the entry into force of that delegated act the visa requirement 
still persists, the Commission may submit a legislative proposal for amending 
[regulation 539/2001] in order to transfer the reference to the third country from 
Annex II to Annex I.
414
 
Leaving aside the political, economic and financial measures the mechanism works as 
follows. As a first step an implementing act introducing a visa requirement in respect of some 
nationals of the third state may be adopted. That may persist for up to two years. If that 
doesn’t work, a delegated act introducing a visa requirement in respect of all nationals of the 
third state is adopted. If still nothing happens, then six to twelve months later the 
Commission could submit to the Parliament and the Council a legislative proposal which if 
adopted would permanently remove the third state from the list of countries whose nationals 
do not require a visa for entering an EU member state. 
In Visas the Commission claimed that the power referred to in article 1(4)(f), i.e. the power to 
make the second step, should not be delegated but implementing. Among other things the 
Commission claimed that since (i) regulation 539/2001 does not contain any list of the third 
countries which are in a situation of suspension and (ii) those countries are to be identified by 
application of the criteria laid down in regulation 539/2001, (iii) the adoption of the delegated 
act referred to in article 1(4)(f) does not have the effect of changing the normative content of 
regulation 539/2001 (it does not lead to the removal of the name of the third country from 
annex II). That 
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a delegated act which, on the basis of those criteria, suspends for a limited time the 
application of the exemption from the visa requirement merely implements the 
legislative act in question without supplementing or amending it.
415
 
The ECJ disagreed seemingly for two main reasons. 
First, it held that article 1(4)(f) act is delegated because for all nationals of the third country 
in question it 
has the effect of amending, if only temporarily, the normative content of the 
legislative act in question. Apart from their temporary nature, the effects of the act 
adopted on the basis of that provision are identical in all respects with those of a 
formal transfer of the reference to the third country concerned from Annex II to 
Annex I of Regulation No 539/2001, as amended.
416
 
Second, according to the ECJ the fact that by means of the delegated act footnote was to be 
inserted into regulation 539/2001 itself showed 
intention of the EU legislature to insert the act adopted on the basis of that provision 
in the actual body of Regulation No 539/2001, as amended.
417
 
The ECJ concluded that 
[i]n those circumstances, the EU legislature conferred power on the Commission to 
amend the normative content of that legislative act within the meaning of 
Article 290(1) TFEU.
418
 
The fact that the first act (the softest measure) takes the form of an implementing act was 
held – without further explanation – not to 
have the consequence that the act adopted in the second stage of the mechanism must 
also be classified as an implementing measure.
419
 
But perhaps the most important statements of law made by the ECJ in Visas were contained 
in paragraphs 32 and 45. They were about what was not relevant in dealing with 
“competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. In paragraph 32 the ECJ opined that 
neither the existence nor the extent of the discretion conferred on [the Commission] 
by the legislative act is relevant for determining whether the act to be adopted by the 
Commission comes under Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU. 
This is different from the discretion considered in Biocides. There the ECJ held that the EU 
legislature (the grantor) had a discretion in deciding which article – 290 or 291 TFEU – to 
employ. Here the ECJ postulated the irrelevance of the extent and indeed the existence of the 
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grantee’s discretion, i.e. in Visas it dealt with something which characterises the power 
granted. This irrelevance was “extended” in paragraph 45 where the ECJ essentially stated 
that 
the characteristics inherent in a delegation of power, such as its limited period, the 
possibility of revocation and the power of objection of the Parliament and the Council 
are irrelevant in dealing with “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Finally a few words should be said about whether the amendments which the Commission 
was empowered to make were essential to the legislation. The ECJ has consistently held that 
making decisions in respect of such essential elements cannot be delegated at all.
420
 One 
could be excused for thinking that the list of countries whose nationals need no visa to enter 
an EU member state is the – or at the very least an – essential element of regulation 
539/2001.
421
 From that perspective Visas could, perhaps, raise eyebrows. In reality the ECJ 
did not have to deal with the point: the Commission conceded that the elements were not 
essential
422
 and the case seems to have proceeded on that basis.
423
 
3.2.4. EUROPOL424 
EUROPOL differed from all the cases discussed so far: the act challenged was an 
implementing decision of the Council, and hence the dispute was between the Parliament and 
the Council. Article 26 of the EUROPOL decision
425
 provided, among other things, that the 
Council was to adopt a list of countries with which EUROPOL was to conclude agreements 
with a view to cooperation. The Council adopted the list by decision 2009/935.
426
 In 2014 it 
amended the list by decision 2014/269.
427
 The Parliament sought the annulment of this latter 
decision. 
In support of its claim the Parliament relied on three grounds.
428
 Only one of them is directly 
relevant for present purposes.
429
 As far as relevant the Parliament submitted that 
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the list is an essential element of the matter in question and must therefore form part 
of the legislative act. At the very least, it should be regarded as a normative element 
which must be the subject of a delegated act within the meaning of Article 290 TFEU 
rather than an implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU.
430
 
The issue of whether, perhaps, the list should have taken the form of a delegated act (thus 
making decision 2014/269 automatically unlawful since only the Commission may adopt 
such acts) was not considered at all. According to the ECJ the 
argument [of the Parliament had to] be understood as criticising the very lawfulness 
of Article 26(1)(a) of the Europol Decision, on the ground that that provision permits 
the adoption of an act relating to an essential element of the matter regulated by 
means of a more flexible procedure than that laid down for that purpose by primary 
law.
431
 
Thus according to the ECJ the ground turned on whether the content adopted by the Council 
in the challenged decision constituted an essential element of the EUROPOL regulation (in 
which case the delegation would not have been lawful).
432
 The judgment could, however, still 
be considered useful for present purposes: it goes to the distinction between a legislative and 
an implementing act and specifically to the extent of power which the grantee of an 
implementing power may lawfully have. 
Being guided by the case law on essential elements
433
 the ECJ started from the premise that 
the adoption of essential elements of basic legislation, which adoption requires political 
choices falling within the responsibilities of the EU legislature, cannot be delegated or appear 
in implementing acts.
434
 However it held that while the decision at issue did involve certain 
technical and political compromises, it nevertheless could not be regarded as requiring the 
making of political choices falling within the responsibilities of the EU legislature.
435
 There 
were two reasons for that. First – as a matter of construction of the EUROPOL decision – the 
main objective of the EUROPOL decision was intra-EU cooperation; the cooperation with 
third countries was merely ancillary to that aim.
436
 Second, according to the ECJ 
the EU legislature [had laid] down the principle of the establishment and maintenance 
of such relations, defined the objective to be pursued by those relations, and defined 
the framework within which those relations are to take place.
437
 
The fact that the challenged decision could have serious consequences for fundamental rights 
of individuals did not change that conclusion.
438
 While the ECJ reiterated that in principle 
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such consequence could change that conclusion,
439
 it thought that the interference with 
fundamental rights was not serious enough in the case at hand. The only relevant fundamental 
rights which the ECJ recognised in the instant case concerned the protection of personal data 
which would have been transmitted to the third countries which were added to the list.
440
 
According to the ECJ the challenged decision did not have serious enough consequences on 
that data protection for two reasons. First, 
the framework within which the transmission must take place [was] laid down by the 
legislature itself, as Article 23(6)(b) of the Europol Decision and Article 5(4) of 
Decision 2009/934 provide in particular for an assessment to be carried out of the 
adequacy of the level of data protection ensured by the third State concerned.
441
 
Second, listing of the country as one with which EUROPOL was to conclude an agreement 
did not of itself enable any transfer of personal data to that third country. Only the subsequent 
agreement would do so. But both the EUROPOL Management Board and the Council itself 
would have the opportunity to block its conclusion were it to contain unsuitable rules on 
transfer of personal data.
442
 Yet, that is nothing to the point. The case law on essential 
elements says that some matters must be reserved for the EU legislature. The point of this 
rule – as formulated in Frontex443 – is that the grantee of implementing power should not be 
able to make decisions which significantly impact on fundamental rights of individuals. In 
EUROPOL the Council was that grantee, and the management board something lower than 
even a grantee. How then could that very Council’s (or the management board’s) subsequent 
control over the consequences of the implementing decision mitigate the concern underlying 
the rule? Especially when the legislature is the Parliament and the Council together. The 
answer is simple: it can’t. 
Finally the Parliament’s submission that the EUROPOL decision did not set any criteria how 
the Council should exercise its implementing power (i.e. which conditions a third state would 
need to meet for the Council to become empowered to add it to the list) was given short 
shrift. The ECJ – without further explanation – held that as a matter of law the conditions set 
in article 23(1) of the EUROPOL decision were sufficiently precise.
444
 
Since the Parliament’s claim fell on other grounds as well, it was dismissed. Implementing 
decision 2014/269 was allowed to stand. 
3.2.5. Connecting Europe Facility445 
The last case dealing with the issues of delimitation pertaining to Articles 290 and/or 291 
TFEU was Connecting Europe Facility. This case differed from all the aforementioned ones 
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in that it concerned neither “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU nor a relation of 
either with legislative acts. Connecting Europe Facility was rather about the differences 
between two types of delegated acts: the ones amending a legislative act and the ones 
supplementing a legislative act. 
Connecting Europe Facility determines the conditions, methods and procedures for providing 
EU financial assistance to trans-European networks.
446
 It was created by regulation 
1316/2013 of the Parliament and of the Council. Article 21(3) of that regulation required the 
Commission to adopt by 22
nd
 December 2014 a delegated act 
detailing the funding priorities to be reflected in the work programmes referred to in 
Article 17 [of regulation 1316/2013] for the duration of the [Connecting Europe 
Facility] for eligible actions under Article 7(2) [of regulation 1316/2013]. 
The Commission adopted the act: delegated regulation 275/2014.
447
 By article 1 of that 
regulation the Commission purported insert the substantive rules it adopted into annex I of 
regulation 1316/2013. The Parliament sought annulment of delegated regulation 275/2014 
claiming that in adopting that regulation the Commission had exceeded the power conferred 
on it: the Commission did not have the power to amend regulation 1316/2013; the funding 
priorities had to remain a separate act.
448
 In other words the Commission was said to have the 
power to supplement regulation 1316/2013, but not to have the power to amend it.
449
 
The ECJ started by stating that Article 290(1) TFEU provides for two delegated powers: 
power to amend and power to supplement. Just like when dealing with “competition” 
between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, it was for the EU legislature to determine which of 
these two powers was conferred on the Commission; the Commission could not be granted 
the power to determine which delegated power was granted to it.
450
 Thus the Commission 
could not be simply granted “delegated power” – it was always granted either power to 
amend or power to supplement. The ECJ did not deal with the question how the EU 
legislature was to determine which power to grant. However in view of the decision in 
Biocides
451
 it seems safe to assume that at the very least the EU legislature has a wide 
discretion in that respect. 
Which delegated power is actually granted by a particular instrument is a question of 
construction of that instrument. According to the ECJ the power to supplement is the power 
to flesh out the basic act, that is 
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to [develop] in detail [the] non-essential elements of the legislation in question that 
the legislature has not specified.
452
  
The power to amend, on the other hand, is the power to modify or repeal non-essential 
elements laid down in the basic act.
453
 When exercising the power to supplement the 
Commission is bound by the entirety of the basic act,
454
 while when exercising the power to 
amend the Commission is bound only by those of the provisions of the basic act which it is 
not empowered to amend.
455
 
Admittedly at least at first glance this distinction might seem somewhat problematic. First, it 
has been argued that it is impossible to flesh out any instrument of law without amending 
it.
456
 This view seems to have merit: speaking purely from the perspective of drafting 
technique, most contracts are amended by separate instruments without those instruments 
containing any language to the effect that some specific provision in them is to be inserted 
into the initial contract. Thus it is easy to see why the point has been taken by commentators.  
Second, while the ECJ was not concerned with the “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU in Connecting Europe Facility, “fleshing out the basic act” does seem to come 
perilously close to provision of “further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act”.457 
Development in “detail of non-essential elements of the legislation in question that the 
legislature has not specified” seems nigh indistinguishable from it for. Connecting Europe 
Facility was decided two years after Biocides, so the justices deciding it could not have been 
unaware of Biocides. True, in Biocides the ECJ said that implementing power is the power to  
provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to ensure 
that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States,
458
 
yet it is difficult to see how that makes much difference. Delegated power was granted to the 
Commission in regulation 1316/2013 so that it could formulate the financing priorities. That 
is to formulate something which must by definition be uniform throughout the EU. 
In paragraphs 43 and 45 of Connecting Europe Facility the ECJ approved paragraphs 34 and 
40 of the Commission’s guidelines on delegated acts.459 Indeed it relied on them as support 
and reasoning for the specific distinction between power to amend and power to supplement 
which it had drawn. According to the ECJ 
the Commission explains, in point 40 [of the guidelines], that, where the legislature 
confers a power to supplement a legislative act on the Commission, it decides not to 
legislate comprehensively and merely establishes the essential elements, while leaving 
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it to the Commission to ‘flesh out’ those elements. By contrast, paragraph 34 of those 
guidelines, in the context of the exercise of the power to amend a legislative act’, 
states that the Commission is to make formal changes to a text by adding new non-
essential elements or by replacing or deleting such elements.
460
 
While this seems to fit quite well with the distinction the ECJ drew in paragraphs 41 and 42 
(discussed above), it would seem to point towards formalistic distinction between the power 
to amend and the power to supplement. The ECJ explained the distinction further in 
paragraph 53 stating there that 
for reasons of regulatory clarity and transparency of the legislative process, the 
Commission may not, in the context of the exercise of a power to ‘supplement’ a 
legislative act, add an element to the actual text of that act. Such an incorporation 
would be liable to create confusion as to the legal basis of that element, given that the 
actual text of a legislative act contains an element arising from the exercise, by the 
Commission, of a delegated power which does not entitle it to amend or repeal that 
act. 
The ECJ went on to say that an integral part of a basic act could be replaced or deleted only 
in exercise of power to amend,
461
 and that the exercise of power to supplement requires the 
Commission to adopt a separate act.
462
 
Applying the distinction to the case at hand the ECJ held that since the funding priorities 
were not formulated in any way in regulation 1316/2013, “the detailing” which Article 21(3) 
of regulation 1316/2013 required the Commission to undertake was a power to supplement, 
not a power to amend.
463
 There simply were no relevant elements in regulation 1316/2013 
which could be amended; the Commission had to flesh out the funding priorities by 
developing details which regulation 1316/2013 did not contain.
464
 Thus the Commission was 
held to have infringed the rule on delegation contained in Article 21(3) of regulation 
1316/2013 by exercising the wrong delegated power. In paragraph 61 the ECJ decided that 
such infringement of Article 290 TFEU (and specifically of a rule of competence contained 
therein) entailed the annulment of the infringing act. The Commission lost, and its 
implementing regulation was annulled. 
As a last point it is perhaps worthy of note that of the five cases in which the ECJ has 
expressly considered the issues of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (and which have been 
discussed above) this was the only one where the challenged act was annulled. 
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3.2.6. Smoke Flavourings465 
Smoke Flavourings concerned the lawfulness of the tobacco directive.
466
 The litigation before 
the ECJ spanned many a question of EU law, but for present purposes two points are of 
importance. In paragraph 63 of its judgment the ECJ suggested that when the constitutive 
treaties empower an EU institution to adopt “measures of approximation”, they confer on that 
institution 
a discretion /…/ as regards the method of approximation most appropriate for 
achieving the desired result, in particular in fields with complex technical features. 
The statement was specifically made when speaking of the power of the Council and the 
Parliament to adopt acts via ordinary legislative procedure under Article 114 TFEU. The 
statement is important for present purposes for two reasons. First, it would seem to confirm 
that something being “technical” in no way takes the matter out of “legislative” ambit. 
Technical rules may still be created by means of legislative acts. As such it casts certain 
doubts on the rationale (if not the conclusions) of ESMA.
467
 Second, the extent of that 
discretion is to be noted. 
The claimant (a tobacco company) complained, inter alia, of the fact that the directive 
banned all characterising flavourings of cigarettes.
468
 Submitting that at least some flavours 
could (and should) be permitted it was argued on behalf of the claimant that the ban failed the 
proportionality test because there was a less restrictive measure available to the EU: 
establishment of lists of prohibited and permitted flavours. Such lists could have been 
established and maintained by means of acts adopted either Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 
TFEU. The ECJ gave short shrift to that contention. 
So far as the adoption of lists of prohibited or permitted flavourings is concerned, 
such a measure could result in the introduction of unjustified differences of treatment 
between the various types of tobacco products with a characterising flavour. 
Moreover, such lists may quickly become out of date because of continuing 
developments in the manufacturers’ commercial strategies and are readily susceptible 
to circumvention. 
The Court therefore finds that the prohibition on the placing on the market of tobacco 
products with a characterising flavour does not go manifestly beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objective sought.
469
 
These statements of the ECJ essentially go to the extent of the discretion of the Council and 
the Parliament mentioned in 63 of Smoke Flavourings. The point which the ECJ made in 
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paragraph 183 of its judgment could essentially be made in respect of any act adopted either 
under Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU. For instance, the list of third countries at issue 
in EUROPOL and discussed in section 3.2.4. Indeed, as discussed in section 3.2.3 above in 
the instrument at issue in Visas there was a mechanism for updating just such a list, a 
mechanism which was already in existence by the time Smoke Flavourings was handed down 
(or indeed the tobacco directive adopted). Against that background the point taken by the ECJ 
in paragraph 183 is too strong – it could be made in respect of virtually any act adopted under 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU which act was adopted to maintain a list of some sort thus 
rendering the act unlawful. The only way to avoid that unlawfulness is by reading paragraph 
183 as saying that not only does “the legislature” have discretion to decide to which of 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU to resort in a given case, it also has a (virtually) unfettered 
discretion whether to resort to any of them at all – even in a case when “the legislature” itself 
has decided not to include into the legislative act the content which could have been adopted 
in a delegated or an implementing act (the content being a list of permitted flavourings).
470
 
Paragraph 184 would then confirm that any discretion of “the legislature” whether to grant 
Article 290 or 291 TFEU power either is not subject to the principle of proportionality at all 
or always passes the test or that the test is not “going beyond what is necessary”, but “going 
manifestly beyond what is necessary” with that latter test having been passed in Smoke 
Flavourings. Admittedly in the latter case it would be very difficult – nigh impossible – to 
imagine a situation where the test would have been failed. 
For present purposes it is important to note that Smoke Flavourings ties in nicely with 
Biocides. Both postulate “a manifestness” test, i.e. a light review by the ECJ of the discretion 
exercised by “the legislature”. More importantly still, Smoke Flavourings is on all fours with 
the way discretion was approached in Biocides. If anything, Smoke Flavourings would seem 
to represent a gradual and indeed wholly coherent development of the approach formulated in 
Biocides and indeed Visas and Connecting Europe Facility. In Biocides the ECJ held that the 
legislature had discretion which article to resort to (290 or 291 TFEU), in Visas it expounded 
this by stating that the extent of discretion of grantee of power was irrelevant for the choice 
between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, in Connecting Europe Facility it moved further stating 
that the grantee could not decide which power was granted to it (that that decision lay in the 
discretion of the grantor) and finally (for now) in Smoke Flavourings it first stated that 
whether to resort to either article (290 or 291 TFEU) or regulate an issue in a legislative act 
lay within the discretion of “the legislature” and then that even if “the legislature” chose not 
to regulate it in the legislative it, it still lay in its unfettered discretion whether to resort to 
either of Article 290 and 291 TFEU at all. 
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3.2.7. Frontex471 
Frontex concerns a different issue from the foregoing cases. It does not deal with Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU as such, but with what determinations are such that they must be made in a 
legislative act. It is the most recent leading judgment in a long line of case law going back at 
least to Köster,
472
 although some commentators have argued that even as far back as 
Meroni.
473
 
In Frontex the ECJ reaffirmed its prior position to the effect that the adoption of rules 
essential to the subject-matter envisaged by a legislative act is reserved to the EU legislature. 
Thus the rules must be laid down in a legislative act; power to adopt them cannot be granted 
to anyone else.
474
 The ECJ then went on to opine that provisions which require for their 
adoption the making of political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European 
Union legislature necessarily constitute such essential elements.
475
 
In general, however, which elements are essential is to be decided on a case-by-case basis by 
construing the relevant provisions of the legislative act at issue.
476
 The decision must be 
based on objective criteria and it is amenable to judicial review by the CJEU.
477
 
In applying those rules to the case at hand the ECJ opined that weighing of conflicting 
interests on the basis of several assessments constitutes a political choice at least if the 
following three conditions are met: 
 depending on the political choices on the basis of which the rules are created, the 
outcome (in Frontex: the powers border guards end up having) could vary 
significantly; 
 the jural relations needed for or stemming from those outcomes could vary 
significantly (in Frontex: the exercise of the powers might or might not be an 
obligation, might or might not require authorisation etc.); 
 those outcomes could interfere with international relations (in Frontex: powers would 
be exercised in relation to ships, including ones sailing under flags of third states).
478
 
If all these conditions are met, the adoption of the relevant rule would constitute a major 
development of the relevant field of law.
479
 Finally the ECJ opined that interference with 
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fundamental rights which exceeds a certain threshold does require the involvement of the EU 
legislature.
480
 No general guidance was provided on the threshold, but border guards’ powers 
to stop apprehended person, to seize vessels and to conduct apprehended persons to a specific 
location were said to exceed it.
481
 Thus the rules granting such powers to the border guards 
would need to be adopted by the EU legislature. 
3.2.8. ESMA482 
In ESMA the UK sought the annulment of Article 28 of regulation 236/2012.
483
 That article 
enabled an EU agency, the European Securities and Markets Authority, under certain 
conditions  
 to require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation to a specific 
financial instrument or class of financial instruments to notify a competent authority 
or to disclose to the public details of any such position and 
 to prohibit or impose conditions on the entry by natural or legal persons into a short 
sale or a transaction which creates, or relates to, a financial instrument (other than 
debt instruments issued by the EU or its member states or derivates referencing such 
debt instruments) where the effect or one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a 
financial advantage on such person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of 
another financial instrument. 
The UK claimed that that amounted to circumvention of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
484
 by 
constituting a grant of power not sanctioned by either of those articles. The ECJ disagreed 
holding that Article 28 of regulation 236/2012 did not undermine Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU.
485
 The reasons for that were the following. 
 Article 28 of regulation 236/2012 granted decision-making powers “in an area which 
requires the deployment of specific technical and professional expertise”486 which 
meant that the conferral did “not correspond to any of the situations defined in 
Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU”487 and 
 the actions which Article 28 of regulation 236/2012 authorises are (in view of the 
integration of international financial markets and the contagion risk of financial 
crises) unavoidably necessary in practice (in order to safeguard the financial stability 
of the EU and market confidence).
488
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Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were thus held not to constitute 
a single legal framework under which certain delegated and executive powers may be 
attributed solely to the Commission
489
 
with the result that 
other systems for the delegation of such powers to [EU] bodies, offices or agencies 
may be contemplated by the [EU] legislature.
490
  
This could be argued to amount to a considerable departure from the pre-existing position of 
law. That position was stated in Romano.
491
  
[I]t follows both from Article 155 of the Treaty and the judicial system created by the 
Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 and 177 thereof, that a body such as the 
Administrative Commission may not be empowered by the Council to adopt acts 
having the force of law. Whilst a decision of the Administrative Commission may 
provide an aid to social security institutions responsible for applying Community law 
in this field, it is not of such a nature as to require those institutions to use certain 
methods or adopt certain interpretations when they come to apply the Community 
rules. 
Thus according to Romano grant of power to adopt acts having the force of law outside the 
ambit expressly foreseen by the constitutive treaties, i.e. to someone other than the 
Commission, was not possible. (Conferral on the Commission was envisaged in article 155 
EEC.) According to ESMA it is possible. 
3.2.9. Köster, Scheer492 and Rey Soda493 
All these cases concern the legality of comitology. Comitology is the system where exercise 
of the powers delegated to the Commission under a constitutive treaty is “supervised” by 
various committees staffed with representatives of member states and initially established by 
the Council.
494
 
In Köster it was held that the old Article 155 EEC by providing that  
the Commission shall exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the 
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter, 
                                                 
489
 Paragraph 78 
490
 Paragraph 87. In fact the TFEU itself provides just such a system in Article 311 TFEU. See footnote 130 
above. 
491
 Judgement of the ECJ in case 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité, 
paragraph 20 
492
 Case 30/70 Otto Scheer v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
493
 Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero 
494
 Robert Schütze in ‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (2011) 
74 Modern Law Review 661, 669 
123 
 
“enabled the Council to determine any detailed rules to which the Commission is subject in 
exercising the power conferred on it”.495 The comitology procedure at issue was held to 
[form] part of the detailed rules to which the Council may legitimately subject a 
delegation of power to the Commission.
496
 
Since the relevant committee did not have the power to actually adopt an act in the stead of 
the Commission,
497
 there was no distortion of the structure of the EEC or of its institutional 
balance.
498
 It enabled the Council to delegate to the Commission “an implementing power of 
considerable scope”.499 Thus comitology was lawful.500 It had the effect,501 and indeed the 
function,
502
 of enabling the Council to substitute its own action for that of the Commission, 
i.e. to override the determination made by the Commission. 
In Scheer, which was handed down on the same day as Köster, it was held that when power 
to implement
503
 a provision of what would now be a legislative act is granted to the 
Commission, it is lawful to grant to the member states the power to implement that same 
provision pending the adoption of the implementing measure by the Commission.
504
 At least 
when the member states are informed – through comitology committees – of the intentions of 
the Commission.
505
  
The ECJ put it thus: 
[i]n view of the experimental nature of the first system of the organization of the 
markets, crystallized in Regulation No 19, and of the shortness of the time which 
elapsed between the entry into force of the basic regulation and that of implementing 
Regulation No 87, it was legitimate, in the interests of a rapid implementation of the 
organization of the markets, to confer temporarily on the Member States functions 
which, at a more advanced stage of development, have been taken over by the 
common institutions.
506
 
Such an intervention by the member states would amount to nothing more than an 
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implementation of the general obligation [of loyal cooperation] expressed in article 
[4(3) TFEU].
507
 
It should be noted that the temporary re-delegation to the member states was contained in 
Regulation No 87 – a regulation adopted by the Commission in exercise of the old Article 
202 EC (or rather Article 155 EEC) style implementing power conferred on it in Regulation 
No 19.
508
 
In Rey Soda it was explicitly spelled out that the part of the old Article 155 EEC quoted in the 
beginning of this section allowed 
the Council to determine any conditions to which it may subject the exercise by the 
Commission of the power granted to it.
509
 
Interestingly in paragraph 26 the ECJ held that  
under the system established by Article 37(2) of the basic regulation
510
 it is for the 
Commission, when it decides after consultation with the Management Committee to 
require certain holders of sugar of a Member State to pay a tax on the stocks, itself to 
determine in a precise manner the essential basic rules.
511
 
The essential basic rules which the Commission was – by virtue of Article 37(2) – 
empowered to adopt were the rules determining the tax base, the tax rate and the persons 
liable.
512
  
The question which the ECJ was dealing with in Rey Soda was, admittedly, whether a 
member state’s determination of those essential basic rules was lawful. Rather than set them 
itself the Commission had – in a regulation adopted in exercise of the power granted to it by 
Article 37(2) of the basic regulation – (re-)delegated the power to do so to a member state 
(Italy).
513
 Thus the Commission set none of the essential basic rules.
514
 The ECJ opined that 
by not specifying the bases of the calculation of the tax in the provision in question 
and leaving Italy to choose them, the Commission discharged itself of its own 
responsibility to adopt the basic rules and to submit them by way of the Management 
Committee procedure to the approval if need be of the Council.
515
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Nevertheless Rey Soda does beg a question as to its relationship with the essential elements 
doctrine discussed above when dealing with Frontex. That is especially so considering that 
the doctrine had already been introduced in Köster, some five years before Rey Soda.
516
 
It cannot therefore be a requirement that all the details of the regulations concerning 
the common agricultural policy be drawn up by the Council according to the 
procedure in Article 43 [EEC]. It is sufficient for the purposes of that provision that 
the basic elements of the matter to be dealt with have been adopted in accordance 
with the procedure laid down by that provision.
517
 
3.3. Other EU instruments 
3.3.1. 2009 Communication 
Chronologically the earliest other instrument dealing with “competition” of Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU is the 2009 Communication of the Commission.
518
 In it the Commission set out its 
understanding of how Articles 290 and 291 TFEU should be applied. It should be noted that 
the date of the 2009 Communication is 9
th
 December 2009, i.e. nine days after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus no practice in relation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU had yet 
come into existence. 
The Commission started by saying that Article 290 TFEU itself does not require any 
secondary legislation for its implementation.
519
 Its text is sufficient and contains all elements 
required for defining, on a case by case basis, the scope, the content and the practical 
arrangements pertaining to delegated power.
520
 Yet two pages later
521
 the Commission 
suggested that it was around Articles 290 and 291 TFEU that a legal framework was to be 
constructed to replace the pre-Lisbon Treaty comitology regime. The statement seems 
understandable as far as it concerns Article 291 TFEU: the latter expressly provides for such 
a legal framework. As far as it refers to Article 290 TFEU it is less comprehensible, not to 
say contradictory of the introductory point taken on page 1 of the 2009 Communication to the 
effect that Article 290 TFEU provided itself the complete code regulating the issue in 
question. 
The Commission went on to draw the evident parallel between Article 290 TFEU and 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny
522
 opining that the similarity does not mean that they will 
be implemented in the same way.
523
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As far as the “competition” between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU is concerned one of the two 
of the Commission’s principal propositions have been overtaken by events. Its opinion that 
the scope of the two articles is mutually exclusive
524
 was, as discussed in section 3.2.1, one of 
its unsuccessful submissions in Biocides.
525
 The ECJ held there that the EU legislature had 
discretion in choosing between the two. That implies that situations where recourse could be 
made to either of them might arise.  
The proposition contained in the 2009 Communication which has not been overtaken by 
events stands is this. 
The concept of the delegated act is defined in terms of its scope and consequences – 
as a general measure that supplements or amends non-essential elements – whereas 
that of the implementing act, although never spelled out, is determined by its rationale 
– the need for uniform conditions for implementation.526 
If anything, this would seem to lead to the same position which was adopted by the ECJ in 
respect of the “exclusivity” contention.527 What the Commission was saying was that the acts 
referred to in Article 290 TFEU and those referred to in Article 291 TFEU do not have the 
same genus (as in genus in genus and differentia definition). According to the Commission 
one speaks of scope and effect, the other of rationale. It is not difficult to imagine an act 
meeting both formulations. Indeed it has been argued that most pre-Lisbon Treaty 
implementing acts meet both definitions.
528
 
The Commission did opine, however, that whether what it is that the Commission does with 
the power granted to it is technical or not has no bearing on whether Article 290 TFEU or 
Article 291 TFEU is engaged.
529
 
On the subject of the meaning of “amend” in Article 290 TFEU the Commission opined that 
by using the verb "amend" the authors of the new Treaty wanted to cover hypothetical 
cases in which the Commission is empowered formally to amend a basic instrument. 
Such a formal amendment might relate to the text of one or more articles in the 
enacting terms or to the text of an annex that legally forms part of the legislative 
instrument.
530
 
Broadly speaking that would seem to correspond with the position ultimately taken by the 
ECJ in Connecting Europe Facility. 
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Finally the Commission noted that neither Article 290 TFEU nor Article 291 TFEU actually 
says anything about the procedure by which the Commission is to adopt the respective 
acts.
531
 
3.3.2. 2011 Guidelines 
Chronologically the next instrument are the 2011 Guidelines.
532
 The 2011 Guidelines are 
basically the instructions the Commission gave to its officials on how to use Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU in everyday work. As was mentioned in section 3.2.5, paragraphs 34 and 40 of the 
2011 Guidelines were approved by the ECJ in Connecting Europe Facility.  
The Commission stated in the 2011 Guidelines that drawing up abstract instructions on the 
distinction between “supplement” and “amend”, on the one hand, and “implement”, on the 
other, would be rather complicated and probably fruitless. It thought that there was no 
scientific or magic formula which would mechanically allocate acts between Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU. It rather advocated a case by case approach.
533
 
Dealing with the “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU the Commission observed that 
Article 291 TFEU contained no actual definition of implementing acts. It only contained a 
reference to “uniform conditions for implementing binding Union acts” which was not a 
definition but constituted rather a trigger for the need to confer implementing powers on the 
Commission.
534
 This seems to have taken up and developed further the idea, expressed 
already in the 2009 Communication, that delegated acts and implementing acts were 
formulated in the TFEU in terms of different things (in case of former – the scope and 
consequences, in case of latter – rationale). 
Developing this idea further yet it could very well be said that Article 290 TFEU is likewise 
trigger-based. Its paragraph 1(1) does not so much attempt to define a delegated act as to set 
forth the situation in which a delegated act could be called for. The situation would be one 
where there is a need to supplement or to amend certain non-essential elements of the 
legislative act. On this view it would be open to discussion whether delegated acts and 
implementing acts are formulated in terms of different things. On the one hand, it could be 
claimed that both Article 290 and Article 291 TFEU take they their cue from rationale. Thus 
the point about different formulation would seem to fall by the wayside. On the other hand, it 
could still be argued that the terms in which delegated and implementing acts are defined are 
different. The difference simply resides at a lower level of abstraction. While both would be 
about rationale, they are about different rationales, and there are great many different 
rationales.
535
 Implementing acts would, on this view, be defined in terms of uniformity of 
application of basic acts, while delegated acts – in terms of ease of amendment of basic acts. 
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Should this view be taken, it would likewise not support the exclusivity contention: one act 
could, quite evidently, have more than one rationale. 
The point made in the 2009 Communication on irrelevance (for deciding whether an act 
comes under Article 290 or 291 TFEU) of whether the Commission does something technical 
or not was likewise further fleshed out in the 2011 Guidelines. In paragraph 33 the 
Commission took the position that 
there is no link between the political importance of a decision and the nature of the 
powers to be given to the Commission for its adoption. 
It all came down to conditions set forth in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
536
 Highly political 
decisions could take the form of an implementing act if the conditions of Article 291 TFEU 
were met, and very technical and non-controversial measures could take the form delegated 
acts if the conditions of Article 290 TFEU were met.
537
 That is supported by the case law of 
the ECJ.
538
 
As far as differentiation between amendments and supplements goes, the 2011 Guidelines 
would seem to be broadly in line with the ECJ subsequent decision in Connecting Europe 
Facility. They too seem to imply that the distinction is a formal one. The Commission though 
that “to amend” 
means to make formal changes to a text by deleting, replacing or adding non-essential 
elements.
539
 
A supplementing act would, by contrast, 
 remain a separate act and will not formally change the basic act.
540
 
Additionally, the Commission tackled head-on the relation of supplementing and 
implementing (something the ECJ has not, thus far, undertaken). This attempt is contained in 
paragraphs 39 – 44. The statement of principle seems to be contained in paragraphs 40 and 
41.
541
 
40. As already acknowledged by the communication the word “supplement” is not 
readily or easily defined. Basically, a delegated act which supplements a legislative 
act takes the form of a separate act imposing new non essential rules, new norms. The 
premise of a delegation is that the legislators have decided not to legislate 
comprehensively: they have established the essential elements and thereafter, by way 
of delegated powers, they leave it to the Commission to “flesh out” these essential 
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elements, to supplement them. A delegated act will always deal with the content, the 
substance of the legislation. 
41. In contrast the verb ‘implement’ envisages the situations in which there is no need 
to establish any new rules or norms; the legislative act is complete and the sole 
purpose of any subsequent implementing act is to give effect to the rules which have 
already been laid down. An implementing act brings into life the legislation without 
changing its contents; it merely gives effect to the rules. 
This attempt at a distinction would seem to be doomed: it amounts to no more than mincing 
words. First, as commentators have observed, it is impossible to make implementing rules 
without changing the content of the rules being implemented.
542
 Second, while the 
Commission postulates that a delegated act is called for when the legislation is not 
comprehensive, and that in case of its comprehensiveness the act must be implementing, that 
distinctions runs into at least four difficulties. On a theoretical level the distinction seems to 
assume that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are mutually exclusive, that no situation may fall 
within the purview of both. The ECJ clearly refuted that in Biocides. Likewise, on a 
theoretical level the distinction seems to assume existence of something “below” non-
essential elements. 
According to Frontex a legislative act must contain all essential elements of the subject-
matter envisaged by a legislative act. Thus – as the Commission says in paragraph 40 of the 
2011 Guidelines – a legislative act need not be comprehensive. Non-essential elements may 
be adopted by the Commission in a secondary act. Since every implementing rule necessarily 
changes the main act, if essential elements are reserved to legislative acts and non-essential 
ones to delegated acts, what would implementing acts contain? It would seem that the 
distinction which the Commission purports to make simply does not fit into a Frontex-
mandated classification. Yet in its judgments dealing with the “competition” of Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU the ECJ has not sought to amend that framework by somehow adding to it.  
The Commission’s attempt to get out of this predicament by postulating that “’implement’ 
envisages the situations in which there is no need to establish any new rules or norms” cannot 
succeed. Surely if that were true, no implementing acts would be called for at all. Or – to the 
extent that that could be countered by a suggestion that the reference “establishing any new 
rules or norms” would not seem to cover an individual decision – at least no in abstracto 
normative implementing acts would be called for. Yet, implementing acts are only adopted if 
there is something in the relevant field which a basic does not deal with. A suggestion that 
“’implement’ envisages the situations in which there is no need to establish any new rules or 
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norms” and the ensuing implication that “implementing” is something which is available only 
when the legislation is comprehensive is simply wrong as a matter of fact.
543
 
The final theoretical difficulty with paragraphs 40 and 41 of the 2011 Guidelines lies in the 
fact that they seem to require making distinctions between two different 
“comprehensivenesses”. The comprehensiveness referred in paragraph 40 seems to be a 
different animal from the one implied in Article 2(2) TFEU. According to the latter provision 
member states may exercise a competence which they share with the EU to the extent that the 
EU has not exercised its corresponding competence. This brings one to the question whether 
the EU regulates comprehensively a particular subject-matter falling within standard shared 
competence. If yes, member states must exercise no own competence in respect of that 
subject matter; if no, they can exercise it. Paragraphs 40 and 41 of the 2011 Guidelines would 
however seem to be looking at comprehensiveness of a legislative act in respect of the things 
which it – somehow – covers comprehensively within the meaning of Article 2(2) TFEU (so 
that member states cannot exercise their own competence) without actually setting forth 
elements pertaining to regulation of some of those things. To put it differently, there seem to 
be two subject-matters (neither of which seems to be defined) the comprehensive regulation 
of which must be looked at: one for Article 2(2) TFEU, another for the purposes of 
distinction between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
544
 
The final difficulty is more practical: even if it is maintained on paper that a delegated act is 
called for when the legislation is not comprehensive, and that in case of its 
comprehensiveness the act must be implementing, such criterion is incapable of application 
in practice for the very reason that making of any rule assumes that there is something which 
either was not regulated (thus no comprehensiveness) or that something is being changed. 
In paragraphs 42 – 44 of the 2011 Guidelines the Commission gives examples of attempts at 
practical application of the principle stated in paragraphs 40 and 41. In paragraph 42 the 
Commission gives the example of authorisation of a chemical product on the basis of pre-
established criteria, and contrasts it with a situation where it is entitled to establish further 
criteria on account of technical and scientific progress. The former is said to be implementing 
while the latter – delegated. What of a criteria such as “adequate level of data protection”?545 
Would its application require an implementing or a delegated power on this analysis?
546
 
Especially considering that the content of the criteria is liable to change because of technical 
and scientific progress. No clear answer would seem to exist. 
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And if that was difficult, what of the following criteria (or rather criterion) which a third 
country must satisfy before the Council, in exercise of its implementing power, may add it to 
the list of countries with which EUROPOL is to conclude an agreement? 
In so far as it is necessary for the performance of its tasks, Europol may also establish 
and maintain cooperative relations with third states.
547
 
In paragraph 56 of EUROPOL the ECJ held that that provision defined the conditions of 
exercise of implementing power sufficiently. 
In paragraph 43 of the 2011 Guidelines the Commission suggests that it could be possible to 
apply the principle by asking whether the power granted to the Commission enables it to 
decide what the addressees are to do or how they are to do it. If “what”, then additional 
substantive rules are said to be established and the power is said to be delegated. Deciding on 
“how”, on the other hand, is said  
in principle not [to] alter [or] modify the core obligations established by the 
legislation.
548
 
Thus, the power is said to be implementing. First, that seems a rather stark departure from 
paragraph 41 which spoke of lack of any need to establish “any new rules” as a precondition 
to the act being implementing. Paragraph 43, by contrast, says only that core obligations are 
to remain unchanged – and even that only “in principle”. Thus “how” admits establishment of 
new rules and therefore seems – in Commission’s own words – to be closer to the acts 
considered in paragraph 40, i.e. delegated acts.  
Second, disregarding this difficulty the distinction between what and how might be clear-cut 
on paper,
549
 but is impossible to maintain in practice. The question depends on the way the 
issue is put and the level of abstraction at which it is approached. Suppose the grantee of 
power is to define firewall requirements to ensure “adequate level of protection”. On the one 
hand, it would seem to be a “how”: how the addressee is to ensure an adequate – say high – 
level of data protection. Yet, isn’t it just as well a “what”? Because determination of the 
requirements for the firewall tells the addressee in detail (as opposed to in a generalised 
manner expressed by “adequate – or high – level of data protection”) what it is to do.550 
Finally, in paragraphs 85 – 123 of the 2011 Guidelines, the Commission discusses the 
preparation of delegated acts. Taking the fact that the TFEU remains silent on the issue as its 
starting point
551
 the Commission concentrates on comitology. In paragraph 86 it postulates 
(without any argumentation) that  
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the legislator cannot impose a mandatory consultation of representatives of the 
Member States. “Comitology procedures” or any other similar systems are clearly 
excluded from the scope of Article 290.
552
 
However in the ensuing paragraphs it mollifies that stance considerably.
553
 It starts by saying 
– in paragraph 87 – that it, the Commission, needs to consult the experts of all the member 
states in preparing a delegated it. Then it purports to limit that statement by saying that 
 these experts have no institutional role in the decision-making process.
554
 
It goes on to say that consultation of experts should be systematic (not just of experts of 
member states), and then stresses again that the consultations must involve experts of all 
member states.
555
 This seems to make its statement in paragraph 86 – to the effect that the EU 
legislature cannot impose on it a duty to consult experts of member states in preparing a 
delegated act – moot. There is no need for such imposition since the Commission believes 
that it is already under such a duty. There is no explanation of its source in the 2011 
Guidelines. 
The Commission then states – further eroding the difference between consultation of experts 
and “classical” comitology – that 
[i]t is not excluded to consult experts who often participate in a given comitology 
committee. An "expert meeting" could be held on the same day and with the same 
composition as a comitology committee meeting. However the services must clearly 
distinguish between these two meetings: different agendas, different documents /.../
556
 
With respect, this is not a difference of note. What the Commission seems to have said is that 
for practical intents and purposes there is no difference, but that one will be shown on paper. 
While the 2011 Guidelines state that the experts are to take no vote and are not to issue any 
formal opinion, they nevertheless seem to require the Commission to obtain from experts of 
member states both technical and political feedback on the text of a proposed delegated act, 
and to inform those experts about the conclusions the Commission draws from the experts’ 
discussions and about the next steps the Commission proposes to take.
557
 The only actual 
differences from the advisory procedure set forth in the comitology regulation
558
 are that in 
case of delegated acts the experts issue no formal opinion and that experts other than those of 
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member states could be involved in addition to experts of member states.
559
 Otherwise the 
two procedures as set forth in the comitology regulation and in the 2011 Guidelines seem to 
be identical. 
3.3.3. Parliament’s 2014 resolution560 
In this instrument the Parliament sought to set out its understanding of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU and of their relationship. It again predated all the relevant judgements of the ECJ – and 
it shows. 
In the 2014 resolution the Parliament opined that the decision whether to confer delegated or 
implementing power must be based on objective factors.
561
 That is a statement which the ECJ 
has steadfastly refused to make in its judgments dealing with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Thus there is – at present – no such obligation. Another point which has been “overruled” by 
the ECJ
562
 is the suggestion that delegated acts should be used where the basic act leaves 
considerable margin of discretion to the Commission, and that an implementing act should 
not leave any significant margin of discretion.
563
 
More interesting is the Parliament’s contention that 
delegated and implementing acts are intended to address different needs and cannot 
therefore be substituted one for another.
564
 
If it stands for mutual exclusivity of delegated and implementing acts, the statement is clearly 
wrong.
565
 Yet, it corresponds nicely to the Commission’s point that Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU have been drafted differently, that – as shown in section 3.3.2 – they have different 
rationale. 
What does tie in nicely with paragraph 40 of Biocides where the ECJ found that the choice 
whether to grant delegated or implementing power was discretionary and postulated only a 
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and thus be a repetition of paragraph 65 of Frontex (which had been already handed down by the time the 
Parliament adopted the resolution). 
564
 Paragraph 4 
565
 Biocides, paragraph 40. Commentators, for instance Bradley (see section 3.4.8 below) have concluded from 
that difference the opposite – that an act could be both delegated and implementing at the same time, or at least 
that it could simultaneously meet the criteria for both. 
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very light review of exercise of that discretion,
566
 is paragraph E of the Parliament’s 
resolution. The Parliament stated there that 
the delegation of power to the Commission is not merely a technical issue but can 
involve questions of considerable political importance for Union citizens and 
consumers, enterprises and entire sectors, on account of their possible socio-
economic, environmental and health impacts. 
While this does contradict the aforementioned paragraph D of the Parliament’s resolution 
(which, as mentioned, was effectively overruled by the ECJ) it seems to provide a possible 
reason
567
 for the ECJ’s decision. The choice is – to a large extent – political, i.e. extra-legal. 
3.3.4. Inter-institutional agreement on better law-making 
The last instrument to be considered here is the most recent one: inter-institutional agreement 
on better law-making.
568
 It is the only relevant EU instrument which post-dates at least some 
of the ECJ’s judgments on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
The first issue which should be taken up in respect of the agreement is its legal force. Is it 
binding? According to Article 295 TFEU it could be binding just as well as not: depends on 
the agreement. Unfortunately the agreement itself is silent on the point. On the basis of the 
wording of article 295 TFEU it could, perhaps, be argued that the agreement is not binding. 
According to Article 295 TFEU the Parliament, the Council and the Commission may 
conclude inter-institutional agreements “which may be of a binding nature”. Thus, it could be 
argued that by default inter-institutional agreements are not binding. 
What seems to be clear is that even if the agreement is not binding, should one of its 
signatories decide to depart from it, it will have to explain its reasons for doing so.
569
 If a 
signatory fails to duly explain the reasons, the relevant act will probably be annulled by the 
ECJ
570
 (should someone apply for annulment). 
Finally, as far as the binding or non-binding character of the agreement is concerned, one 
must not fail to mention the standard recital contained in the annexe to the Common 
Understanding between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
Delegated Acts which itself is the annex of the agreement. The standard recital is proposed to 
be inserted into every legislative act which grants the Commission delegated or implementing 
power. It contains the following language. 
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It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations 
during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be 
conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal 
participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the 
Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their 
experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing 
with the preparation of delegated acts. 
In addition to the standard recital the annexe also contains several standard exercise-of-
delegation-articles. One of the articles
571
 contains the following paragraph. 
Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by 
each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. 
Should such a recital or such an article be inserted into a legislative act, the agreement would 
at least in part
572
 become binding – by virtue of the renvoi to it in the recital or exercise-of-
delegation-article of the legislative act – for the adoption of all delegated acts under that 
legislative act.
573
 
The substance of the agreement is, in many respects, unremarkable. It incorporates the legal 
position as stated by the ECJ in its case law. For instance, in respect of “competition” of 
Article 290 and 291 TFEU the agreement has this to say. 
It is the competence of the legislator to decide whether and to what extent to use 
delegated or implementing acts, within the limits of the Treaties.
574
 
That statement was essentially lifted from paragraph 40 of Biocides. 
In one respect the substance of the agreement is however quite remarkable. The system it 
creates for the adoption of delegated acts has been called “weak comitology”.575 In essence, 
the agreement takes the 2011 Guidelines and makes them a bit more like comitology. 
In the agreement the Commission commits to gathering, prior to the adoption of delegated 
acts, all necessary expertise. That includes consultations with experts of member states and 
with the public at large. That does not differ much from the Commission’s duty in case of 
implementing acts: there too it is to use expert groups and certain stakeholders – whenever 
early expertise is needed in the early preparation of draft implementing acts. The agreement 
further grants the Parliament and the Council access (i) to all documents which experts of 
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member states receive at the same time as they receive them and (ii) to meetings of the 
Commission’s expert groups to which experts of member states are invited as long as they 
deal with preparation of delegated acts.
576
 
In paragraph 30 the agreement purports to somewhat limit the input of comitology 
committees in preparation of delegated acts. Yet all that the agreement says is that those 
committees “should not, in that capacity, be called upon to exercise other functions”. The 
other functions presumably include input in preparation of delegated acts. Thus, this does not 
seem to change much, if at all, what was provided in paragraphs 85 – 102 of the 2011 
Guidelines. The hat on the head of every expert needs to change, that is all. If anything, the 
agreement makes a further step: comitology committees only “should not”, not “shall not” 
participate as comitology committees in preparation of delegated acts. 
The procedure for preparation of delegated acts is set out in more detail in the annexe to the 
agreement.
577
 Its paragraph 4 obliges the Commission to consult the member states’ experts 
in a timely manner and to do so on each draft delegated act. If the material content of the 
draft undergoes any change at all, those experts must be given the opportunity to react to that 
change, and where necessary to do so in writing.
578
 The Commission is further under an 
obligation to explain itself to the experts of member states: it must state the conclusions it has 
drawn from the consultations, how it took the experts’ views into account and how it intends 
to proceed.
579
 The statement, contained in the 2011 Guidelines,
580
 to the effect that the 
member states’ experts are to take no vote and are to issue no opinion, is omitted from the 
agreement. 
At the same time the Parliament and the Council merely may send their experts to the 
meetings of the relevant group of experts of member states.
581
 As such it would seem to 
essentially amount to the reversal of the tendencies of Article 290 TFEU. That provision 
mentions only the Parliament and the Council; it does not mention member states at all. The 
agreement however leaves the distinct impression of putting the member states before the 
Parliament.
582
 
To sum up, the parallel between this procedure and advisory procedure provided for in the 
comitology regulation
583
 is, if anything, even stronger than under the 2011 Guidelines (e.g. 
omission of ban on opinions). Effectively nothing is left of the statement (if that statement 
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ever meant anything) in paragraph 86 of the 2011 Guidelines that comitology procedures are 
excluded in case of delegated acts. To be fair, it was unclear why the Commission took that 
view in the first place. The only relevant difference between Article 290 TFEU and that part 
of Article 155 EEC which was construed in Köster is paragraph 2 of the former. 
Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is 
subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its 
component members, and the Council by a qualified majority.
584
 
Yet that paragraph starts with a saving provision: legislative acts are to lay down conditions 
of delegation. Just like in Article 155 EEC, no limits are placed on the conditions. Article 290 
TFEU merely gives some examples of possible conditions. Thus, it stands to reason that 
Köster, Scheer and Rey Soda discussed above are still good law. The ECJ has not overruled 
them. Article 290 TFEU has not abolished them. Thus, establishment of comitology, whether 
weak or strong, for the adoption of delegated acts would seem to be perfectly lawful even 
now, i.e. post-Lisbon Treaty, under Köster, Scheer and Rey Soda. Except that this time it is 
the Parliament and the Council together which are entitled to establish any conditions to 
which they subject the grant of delegated power. 
Thus there is even no need to refer to Articles 4(3) and 11(3) TEU as possible bases for the 
“weak comitology”. True, they provide for extensive consultations by the Commission, but 
the latter does not differentiate between the consultees. Thus, recourse at least to the latter of 
these two provisions as a basis for such comitology might be more fraught with risks of 
accusation of misuse of power, the more evident it is that the objective is to ensure control by 
the member states rather than broad consultation where member states are just some of the 
parties consulted without being in any sense in a considerably more privileged position. In 
the light of the agreement that inequality is painfully evident. In contrast with the way the 
agreement regulates consultations with experts of member states, as regards others it simply 
says that  
[t]he preparation and drawing-up of delegated acts may also include consultations with 
stakeholders.585 
As a last point it should be mentioned that the agreement provides no criteria, not even 
indicative ones, for deciding whether Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU should be 
chosen in a particular situation. Earlier drafts did contain such criteria, but they were removed 
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from the text which was adopted by the three institutions.
586
 One suspects that Biocides might 
have been the catalyst for that. 
3.4. Academic literature 
After consideration of various “primary sources” it is useful to see what has been made of 
them, and indeed of the issue in general, by academic commentators. The following 
consideration of academic literature shall start with the views expressed in textbooks. These 
are usually more conservative than the views expressed in articles, and give an idea of what is 
understood as capable of being taken for granted (textbooks state the law with their potential 
users, students, in mind). The consideration of the views expressed in textbooks will be 
followed by an overview of opinions expressed elsewhere. That overview shall be 
chronologic. 
3.4.1. Textbooks 
Chalmers, Davies and Monti
587
 term delegated and implementing powers “quasi-legislative”, 
and dedicate a large part of the discussion of them to the doctrine of essential elements, i.e. to 
delimitation of those “quasi-legislative” powers from legislative ones.588 When speaking of 
delegated and implementing powers themselves the book mostly rehashes Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU and the common understanding which has by now become the annexe to the inter-
institutional agreement on better law-making discussed in section 3.3.4.
589
 The authors do, 
however, opine that the distinction between delegated and implementing powers is 
obscure.
590
 More importantly they subscribe to the view that it is left obscure deliberately.
591
 
Nevertheless they think that the distinction does matter: it subjects the Commission to 
different institutional controls which they consider to be less restrictive in case of Article 291 
TFEU and more restrictive in case of Article 291 TFEU (considering comitology).
592
 They 
suggest that the  
obscurity allows the legislature a freedom over the control to which it can subject the 
Commission.
593
 
Thus the authors seem to uncannily “foresee” at least in part the position the ECJ would end 
up taking in paragraph 40 of Biocides.  
In another book pre-dating all the case law on “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, 
Steiner and Woods on EU Law,
594
 the authors place the issue of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
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rd
 ed., 2014 CUP), page 68. 
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into the context of comitology and the way it functioned before the Lisbon Treaty.
595
 After a 
brief explanation of reasons for the existence of comitology
596
 and of problems which were 
said to have plagued pre-Lisbon Treaty comitology,
597
 Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are 
rehashed. The authors then opine that the “power for ‘delegated acts’” introduced by Article 
290 TFEU is new.
598
 That does not seem to fit at all well with the Commission’s view that 
Article 290 TFEU provides for something which is very similar to regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny under decision 2006/512 and the old Article 202 EC.
599
 What does fit well with 
opinions expressed by the Commission
600
 is the authors’ suggestion that Article 290 TFEU 
does not require any implementing rules. Unlike the Commission the authors, however, stop 
short of suggesting that comitology is excluded under Article 290 TFEU. The authors merely 
state in that respect that Article 290 TFEU provides for no duty to consult representatives of 
member states, but that the Commission has indicated that it would.
601
 In respect of 
implementing acts the authors opine that 
Lisbon brought changes to the system, limiting the circumstances in which 
comitology-style procedures will operate in relation to “implementing acts” under 
Article 291 TFEU (see Chapter 3).
602
 
On the “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the authors suggest that delegated and 
implementing acts are mutually exclusive.
603
 This statement is made together with another 
one: that delegated acts and implementing acts are subject to different levels of oversight. Yet 
it is unclear whether that is the reason why the authors think that delegated acts and 
implementing acts are mutually exclusive, or whether the suggestion of mutual exclusivity 
was simply postulated.
604
 
In yet another 2014 book, European Union Law,
605
 Robert Schütze opined that Article 290 
TFEU contains political safeguards of democracy, and that Article 291 TFEU creates a less-
democratic system of “executive law-making”.606 His explanation for that is that the 
constitutional logic of Article 291 TFEU 
is not to protect the powers of the EU legislator but rather to protect the Member 
States within the Union’s system of executive federalism (ie the principle that, in 
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accordance with Article 291 TFEU, the power to implement EU law in principle 
belongs to the Member States).
607
 
Kieran St C Bradley considers, in the same book, delegated and implementing measures both 
to be derived normative acts.
608
 He likewise believes that Article 290 TFEU requires no 
implementing measures.
609
 Speaking of differences between delegated and implementing 
acts, he notes the fact that a delegated act may be adopted only on the basis of a legislative 
act (there are no such limitations in respect of implementing acts)
610
 and that power may be 
granted to the Commission or to the Council under Article 291 TFEU (it may only be granted 
to the Commission under Article 290 TFEU).
611
 He likewise notes the illusory nature of the 
exclusion of the Council and of the Parliament from the control over the Commission’s 
adoption of implementing acts. The former is illusory because Article 291(3) TFEU provides 
for control by member states, the latter – because the Commission remains answerable to the 
Parliament (via the latter’s power to dismiss it612) even when adopting an implementing 
act.
613
 
Speaking of the border between Article 290 TFEU and Article 291 TFEU, he thinks that the 
border is unclear, perhaps intentionally so.
614
 He then goes on to say 
[i]t is impossible to imagine a secondary measure which is a delegated act as to its 
content, but which is required in order to lay down uniform conditions for 
implementing legally binding Union acts.
615
 
Finally he opines that 
the principal parties responsible for classifying such derived measures have 
diametrically opposing interests.
616
 
That suggestion might have been overtaken by events, at least in part. His reasoning for that 
is that the Parliament is largely excluded from the adoption of implementing acts, while the 
Council has considerably less of a power in relation to delegated than to implementing acts. 
Thus the Parliament would favour delegated, while the Council implementing acts. Yet, the 
inter-institutional agreement on better law-making (discussed in section 3.3.4 above) would 
seem to largely erase for all practical intents and purposes part those differences. 
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Marianne Dony, still writing before Biocides,
617
 starts by suggesting that delegated acts are a 
Lisbon Treaty innovation,
618
 yet quickly back-pedals in the same paragraph by discussing 
(quite extensively for a textbook) the origins of delegated acts in comitology: the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny in decision 2006/512. Aside from rehashing Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU, she opines that Article 290 TFEU gives the Commission a wide margin of discretion 
in deciding the procedure for adoption of delegated acts.
619
 If anything, that is an 
understatement: the Lisbon Treaty simply does not deal with that procedure at all. She also 
dedicates some space to the controls existing over the Commission’s delegated acts.620 
Speaking of implementing acts she notes first that their subject matter is something which 
prima facie lies within the competence of member states with the Commission entering into 
the picture only if implementation needs to be uniform.
621
 She explains that to be the basic 
reason for the development of comitology under the old Article 202 EC.
622
 Finally she 
mentions that pre-Lisbon Treaty comitology committees were “emanations” of the Council, 
while under the Lisbon Treaty they are emanations of member states.
623
 Nothing is said on 
“competition” of Article 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Finally let us consider a textbook which was published after Biocides. Paul Craig’s and 
Gráinne de Búrca’s textbook624 also contains what is probably the most extensive treatment 
of the issue in a general textbook on EU law. The authors initiate their discussion by stating 
that both delegated and implementing acts are “below” legislative ones. They then consider 
the rationale for dividing the pre-Lisbon Treaty implementing acts into the two categories: 
delegated and implementing. They see it in the tensions between the Council and the 
Parliament over the prior comitology: the Council wished it to exist because 
it realized that regulatory choices and contentious issues could be resolved through 
[pre-Lisbon Treaty implementing] measures, the devil being in the detail.
625
 
Yet the Parliament was unhappy with that comitology deeming it too dominated by member 
states. Articles 290 and 291 TFEU resulted. In that connection, the authors state that 
[c]omitology in its pre-Lisbon form therefore no longer operates in relation to 
delegated acts, although some “advisory” committees composed of national experts 
continue to exist in relation to delegated acts, and a revised form of Comitology 
operates in relation to implementing acts.”626 
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This seems to be markedly different from any of the foregoing treatments: effectively the 
thing which used to be called “comitology” still exists, even in relation to delegated acts, just 
not in its prior form.
627
 That seems to be in line with the authors’ suggestion628 that the veto 
over delegated acts granted to the Council and the Parliament by Article 290 TFEU might – 
without comitology – be much less useful than it would seem, especially since in their 
opinion neither the Parliament nor the Council has the power to amend a delegated act, only 
to veto it. That lesser usefulness is caused by the simple fact that neither the Council nor the 
Parliament might have the expertise to make sense of the content of a given delegated act. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that the difficulties with controlling the power granted 
to the Commission were precisely one of the reasons why comitology was held lawful in 
Köster. 
The function of the Management Committee is to ensure permanent consultation in 
order to guide the Commission in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by the 
Council and to enable the latter [the Council, that is] to substitute its own action for 
that of the Commission. The Management Committee does not therefore have the 
power to take a decision in place of the Commission or the Council. Consequently, 
without distorting the Community structure and the institutional balance, the 
Management Committee machinery enables the Council to delegate to the 
Commission an implementing power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take 
the decision itself if necessary.
629
 
Thus the explanation given by the authors effectively amounts to a ground – accepted by the 
ECJ – for the legality of comitology under Article 290 TFEU. 
The authors opine that the difficulties with the divide created by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
were however never fully thought through in the deliberations on the Constitutional or 
Lisbon Treaty, and it is doubtful whether the objective has been realized.
630
 
The objective, according to the authors, was to distinguish between secondary measures of 
legislative nature and those which could be regarded more executive.
631
 No reasoning is 
provided as to why the authors believe that to have been the objective. 
Speaking of implementing acts the authors note that the old Article 202 EC implementing 
acts covered both the current implementing acts and the current delegated acts, as well as the 
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fact that an implementing act could, in theory, be adopted under a delegated act.
632
 They then 
state that implementing acts are normally of general application
633
 (according to Article 290 
TFEU delegated acts must be of general application), and consider the key to distinguishing 
delegated and implementing acts to lie in the fact 
that implementing acts execute the legislative acts without amendment or 
supplementation.
634
 
Yet they consider that there are three difficulties with this “key”. First, all secondary 
measures necessarily involve some addition to the primary one.
635
 According to the authors 
that means that an assessment of the extent of discretion is called for: lots of discretion means 
a delegated act, little discretion – an implementing act.636 While it should be stressed that the 
authors do not actually opine that the extent of discretion is a relevant criteria here, merely 
that it necessarily must be if that “key” is used, it should be stated that by now this contention 
has been shown to be wrong.
637
 The authors actually regard that distinction as unsatisfactory, 
one which is certain to create numerous inter-institutional disputes and  
calls into question the normative foundation of the differential controls that operate in 
relation to delegated and implementing acts.
638
 
Second, the first difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that it might often not be possible to 
decide whether an act is delegated or implementing before it has been adopted.
639
 That seems 
eminently reasonable considering that the criteria, however it is formulated, seems to 
ultimately turn on the content of the act.
640
 Yet the decision which one it is – delegated or 
implementing – must be taken at the beginning of the adoption procedure. That is dictated by 
the fact that the procedure for the adoption of delegated acts differs (at least formally) so 
much from that for the adoption of implementing acts that if the wrong procedure were used, 
the act would be annulled for infringement of essential procedural requirements.
641
 
The authors see the ECJ’s unwillingness to become embroiled in such disputes as the third 
difficulty. For the authors Biocides demonstrates that unwillingness.
642
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In spite of that and indeed of Biocides the authors still consider that the categories of 
delegated and implementing acts should be exclusive.
643
 When considering Biocides the 
authors are fairly critical. They suggest that in saying that the EU legislature has discretion in 
choosing whether to use delegated or implementing acts the ECJ 
elides two distinct issues, these being the legislature’s power to use both delegated 
and implementing acts, and whether the conditions for the application of the 
respective types of act have been met.
644
 
The authors claim that while the EU legislature does have discretion, albeit in a 
“reductionist” sense, as to the former, there is none as to the latter.645 They go on to suggest 
that the ECJ’s decision in Biocides was a pragmatic choice: that it held that discretion to 
exist, because any other solution would have opened the floodgates of litigation. The authors 
end with formulating what they see as a paradox: the distinction between delegated and 
implementing was adopted because it was felt to be constitutionally and pragmatically 
important,
646
 yet the very nature of the distinction lead the ECJ to sidestep it altogether by 
applying the standard of manifest error.
647
 The authors conclude that the distinction between 
delegated and implementing remains fragile.
648
 
With respect, on the one hand, the criticism of Biocides seems to miss a crucial point made 
earlier by the authors themselves. One could speculate that this miss might be caused by the 
belief that the categories of delegated and implementing acts are mutually exclusive. The 
point is this: “all secondary measures involve some addition to the primary act.”649 If that 
point is understood, it is easy to see that the distinction which is said to have elided the ECJ is 
not a distinction at all. In other words: if that point the authors made on page 118 is 
understood, the discretion would arise when the conditions set forth in both Article 290 and 
291 TFEU are met at the same time. Admittedly it is possible to criticise the ECJ for its slack 
review of when that is the case, but, respectfully, that is a different point entirely. On the 
other hand, the criticism seems to start from a premise that the judgment of the ECJ could 
somehow be overruled. It can’t. Thus there is the discretion – in actual sense – simply 
because the ECJ said so and declined to perform any howsoever stringent review.
650
 
What conclusions could be drawn from this overview of textbooks? – First, every textbook 
mentions Articles 290 and 291 TFEU being about controls over the power granted (usually to 
the Commission). That is hardly surprising. Second, every textbook admits that the 
distinction between delegated power and implementing power, or delegated acts and 
implementing acts (depending on how the issue is approached) is unclear. Some do so 
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expressly, some tacitly by treating the two in similar terms and failing to say anything about 
the distinction. Third, although several textbooks suggest that the creation of the distinction 
was desired, none explain why that is so nor who desired it, rather discussing comitology 
instead.
651
 The bottom line is that no workable explanation of how to distinguish delegated 
acts from implementing acts or delegated power from implementing power is provided. 
3.4.2. Justus Lipsius 
It has been suggested
652
 that the proposal to make in EU law the distinction along the lines of 
the one currently engendered by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU was first made by a member of 
the legal service of the Council in an article published under a pseudonym of Justus Lipsius 
in 1995.
653
  
On page 256 of the article it is suggested that the Parliament 
is even trying to get a role in the conduct of diplomatic and external relations and the 
adoption of implementing and regulatory measures under legislative Community acts. 
In conjunction with saying that the Amsterdam IGC might have to deal with the issue of 
hierarchy of norms in the EU, the author opines, just like Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca,
654
 
and Thomas Cottier
655
 some twenty years later, that 
it is not easy to distinguish clearly where is the border between a principle and its 
implementation, or between the law and its implementing regulations. It might be 
more simple to reserve certain important subjects to the highest degree of norms, as is 
the case in the 1958 French Constitution (Arts. 34 and 37). Such a division would 
make it possible to reserve the heaviest procedure (co-decision) for the adoption of 
these last norms.
656
 
While this might be seen as suggesting some distinction akin to the one between legislative 
acts on the one hand, and delegated and implementing acts together, on the other, this is 
hardly a suggestion to distinguish delegated acts from implementing ones. 
Dealing with comitology Justus Lipsius had this to say. 
On the comitology problem, the Treaty should state clearly that the implementing 
procedures of legislative acts come within Commission powers and cannot be 
reserved to the Council; the “Comitology” Decision of July 13, 1987, should be 
simplified, in particular by deleting procedure III, and should be transformed in a 
protocol annexed to the Treaty; the European Parliament should be informed of any 
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implementing rules adopted on this basis, but should not be involved at all in the 
process of adoption of implementing measures. 
Again, hardly a distinction between delegated and implementing acts. The three quoted 
passages are the closest the article comes to suggesting the distinction. The proposition that 
the distinction stems from it is thus clearly erroneous. What would seem to be capable of 
stemming from that article is the inclusion of “delegated acts” and of “implementing acts” 
into the TFEU. Justus Lipsius essentially suggested that grant of power to the Commission 
and comitology be dealt with in the treaties. 
As noted by the Commission and several commentators delegated acts are essentially “a 
spiritual successor” to acts adopted via a comitological procedure, regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny. Article 291 TFEU, dealing with implementing acts, expressly provides for 
establishment of comitology. Both Article 290 TFEU on delegated acts and Article 291 
TFEU on implementing acts deal with the power granted to the Commission. Thus today 
these suggestions of Justus Lipsius are – to some extent at least – lex lata. However, it should 
be stressed this does not mean that the distinction between delegated and implementing acts 
may likewise find its source in Justus Lipsius’s article: no suggestion to split what were then 
Article 202 EC implementing acts into several categories was made in the article. 
3.4.3. Robert Schütze 
Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the relationship between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
has been offered by Robert Schütze in his 2011 article “‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) 
European Union: A Constitutional Analysis”.657 Unfortunately the article predates all the case 
law in point. In spite of this disadvantage, the points taken therein make it worth considering 
it in some detail. 
The conclusion which the author reaches is stated in the abstract on the very first page. 
Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU 
establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power. 
Schütze starts by considering the question of delegation of power in the US constitutional 
law, and then moves on to the EU. Consideration of the position in EU law starts with Köster 
and the doctrine of essential elements. Schütze then deals with the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
hierarchy of norms coming to the conclusion that secondary legislation was hierarchically 
subordinate to the enabling act on which it was based, but that 
this relative subordination would be suspended where the enabling act expressly 
envisaged the subsequent amendment of the basic act. There was hence no clear 
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distinction between delegated “legislative” and delegated “executive” power within 
the Community legal order.
658
 
The treatment of the Lisbon Treaty is started by the following statement. 
The Lisbon Treaty revolutionises the constitutional principles governing executive 
legislation.
659
 
What prompted this statement? How does the Lisbon Treaty revolutionise executive 
legislation? Before dealing with that it is necessary to explain what Schütze means by 
“executive legislation”. According to Schütze delegated acts are said to concern a delegation 
of legislative power to the Commission, while implementing acts are intended to regulate the 
delegation of executive power to the Commission or the Council.
660
 Thus executive 
legislation essentially means delegated acts. If that is simply a choice of terminology, it is 
hardly reprehensible. However, if the reader is asked to read more into it – if the terminology 
implies somehow that Article 290 TFEU acts are legislative while Article 291 TFEU acts are 
executive – questions arise. Particularly since Schütze does not explain why it is that 
delegated acts are said to concern delegation of legislative power and that implementing acts 
are intended to regulate the delegation of executive power.
661
 Or indeed who it is that says so 
or intends that. Let alone what evidence there is of such intention. 
Turning back to how the Lisbon Treaty revolutionises executive legislation, Schütze argues 
that Article 290 TFEU sets out 
[t]he novel constitutional regime for delegation of power to the Commission to amend 
primary legislation.
662
 
Article 290 TFEU is then said to both continue and discontinue the constitutional status 
quo.
663
 On the side of the continuance Article 290 TFEU is said to 
 confirm the hierarchical position of delegated legislation: the latter will be able to 
amend primary legislation and must therefore enjoy at least relative and limited 
hierarchical parity; 
 codify the non-delegation doctrine: the EU legislature cannot delegate the power to 
adopt essential elements of the legislative act; and 
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 codify the specificity principle in that the objectives, content, scope and duration of 
the delegation of power must be explicitly defined in the legislative act.
664
 
On the side of discontinuance Article 290 TFEU is said to restrict the constitutional options 
previously available under Article 202 EC. Schütze puts it thus: 
Article 290 TFEU also restricts the constitutional options previously available under 
Article 202 EC. Henceforth only the Commission, and no longer the Council, may 
adopt delegated acts. And these Commission acts must be of “general application” 
that is constitute material legislation.
665
 
Since continuance cannot be revolutionary, it is this discontinuance which must constitute the 
novelty. Schütze makes two arguments for the contention that Article 290 TFEU 
revolutionises EU law: a historical one and one based on the language of the TFEU. Starting 
with the historical one, according to Schütze the revolution began with the Commission’s 
white paper on European governance
666
 and the suggestion there that 
[t]he Commission should remain the principal agent for executive legislation, whose 
powers should be checked by “a simple legal mechanism allow[ing] Council and 
European Parliament as the legislator to monitor and control the actions of the 
Commission against the principles and political guidelines adopted in the 
legislation”.667 
This is said to mean that the need to maintain existing comitology committees, notably 
regulatory and management committees, would be put into question. Thus the issue would 
touch on the balance of power between the EU institutions.
668
 Schütze then argues that these 
ideas were taken up by Working Group IX on Simplification of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe which proposed “delegated acts” since at the time there was 
no mechanism which enable[d] the legislator to delegate the technical aspects or 
details of legislation whilst retaining control over such legislation.
669
 
At the time it was only possible to 
entrust to the Commission the more technical or detailed aspects of the legislation as 
if they were implementing measures.
670
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According to Schtze the distinction between delegated and implementing was constructed on 
the basis of views of Koen Lenaerts. Schütze puts it thus. 
The view of [Koen Lenaerts] had the greatest impact on the Working Group. Lenaerts 
had advocated “a clear distinction between the legislative and executive acts of the 
Union” according to the type of procedure followed. Within the category of 
“executive acts”, a distinction was made between “delegated legislation” and 
“executive acts sensu stricto”. The former allowed the Commission to modify a 
legislative act and it was therefore “necessary to provide for a ‘heavy’ comitology 
(intervention of a regulatory committee or of a management committee comprising 
representatives of the Member States) and of strict control by the European 
Parliament, which could include a right of call back for the legislator in certain cases”. 
For executive acts sensu stricto “a ‘light’ comitology will suffice (assistance of a 
consultative committee, for instance) leaving the final word to the Commission, under 
the control of the European Parliament”.671 
This view was, according to Schütze, taken up by the Constitutional Treaty and retained by 
the Lisbon Treaty
672
 where it resulted in the following novelty. 
Under the old regime, the wide concept of “implementing power” had comprised acts 
that amended and acts that merely implemented primary legislation. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union now distinguishes between a delegation of 
“legislative” power – that is the power to amend primary legislation – and a 
delegation of “executive” power – that is the power to implement primary 
legislation.
673
 
Moving to the argument based on the language of the TFEU Schütze compares the scope of 
Article 290 TFEU with the scope of decision 2006/512, i.e. with the scope of the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny. Since the scope of Article 290 TFEU is confined to situations where 
an act of the Commission amends or supplements primary legislation, he asks whether that 
was 
a conscious departure from the formulation within the 2006 regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny; or should “supplementation” continue to be seen as a species of 
“amendment”.674 
Along with the Commission, he opts for the second alternative. 
Supplementation /…/ ought to mean amendment through the inclusion of additional 
rules having the same status as primary legislation.
675
 
                                                                                                                                                        
670
 Page 682 
671
 Footnote 135. Notes omitted from the text quoted. 
672
 The Lisbon Treaty had, according to Schütze, as one of its principal aims the encouragement of delegation of 
more “legislative” power to the Commission. See footnote 154.  
673
 Page 682. Footnote omitted from the text quoted. 
674
 Page 684 
150 
 
Considering that Article 290 TFEU grants some control to the Parliament, Schütze comes to 
the conclusion that Article 290 TFEU represents a constitutional revolution from a 
democratic point of view. 
The Rome Treaty had never acknowledged Parliament’s constitutional right to control 
executive legislation; and even if the 2006 Comitology Decision had provided for 
parliamentary involvement, this had been a legislative concession by the Council. 
/.../ 
Moreover, unlike the 2006 Comitology Decision, parliamentary objection is now left 
in the institution’s political discretion: Parliament no longer needs to point to special 
legal grounds to veto the Commission measure.
676
 
He concludes his discussion of delegated acts by opining that Article 290 TFEU contains, 
unlike Article 202 EC, no legal basis for comitology. Schütze thinks that this absence is 
deliberate; that the “may” in Article 290(2) TFEU does not amount to a carte blanche of the 
EU legislature to determine the conditions of delegation in each legislative act separately.
677
 
In a footnote Schütze argues that such a case-by-case approach would be a clear retrogression 
compared to the SEA, which in the amendment it made to article 145 EEC required the 
conditions imposed on delegated legislation to be set in advance. Carte blanche without a 
case-by-case approach is said to be impossible because there is simply no legal basis for an 
Article 290 TFEU comitology regulation.
678
 Thus Article 290(2) TFEU is a numerus clausus 
of permitted political safeguards.
679
 In this respect he stresses the Commission’s point, made 
in its 2009 Communication, that the experts consulted will have a consultative rather than an 
institutional role in the decision-making process.
680
 
Schütze starts his treatment of implementing acts from a premise that they are about conferral 
of executive power, and then wonders why it is that Article 291 TFEU fails to mention any 
substantive limits of the conferral of that executive power.
681
 Schütze concludes that Article 
291 TFEU is not based on 
the traditional logic of the past according to which the Union legislator was entitled to 
control implementing legislation because it delegated “its” power to the executive. 
Now, its new rationale – inspired by the philosophy of executive federalism – is that 
the responsibility for implementing of European law lies principally with the Member 
States. Not only are the Commission’s powers thus subsidiary to those of the Member 
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States; it is the Member States, not the European legislator, that will control the 
exercise of these powers.
682
 
This is said to be borne out by the comitology regulation which abandons management 
committees and regulatory committees in favour of advisory committees and examination 
committees. The novelty of the latter is said to be that it is the committee itself (i.e. the 
member states) which may veto an implementing act – meaning that the member states take 
direct part in the decision-making process. 
On distinguishing delegated and implementing acts, Schütze starts by opining that the authors 
of the TFEU clearly wanted them to be mutually exclusive.
683
 Starting from the same premise 
as the Commission
684
 that delegated and implementing acts are defined in different terms (the 
former – in terms of scope and consequences, the latter – in terms of rationale), he wonders 
whether Articles 290 and 291 TFEU could nevertheless overlap, whether the EU legislature 
has a free choice which one to employ.
685
 After all, while delegated acts and implementing 
acts 
are, from the formal perspective of the hierarchy of norms, different acts; they are, 
from the substantive perspective of the morphology of norms, identical.
686
 
He thus admits the risk of overlap of the two in practice. The key to avoiding it lies in 
insisting 
that it is not in the discretion of the European Union automatically to exercise its 
implementing power under Article 291. The exercise of implementing power under 
Article 291 must depend on something “outside” the will of the EU executive; and 
that “outside” is/has to be – nothing other than the Member States. Only where the 
Member States fail to execute European law in a sufficiently uniform manner will the 
Commission (or the Council) be entitled to exercise the Union’s own executive 
power.
687
 
Thus, argues Schütze, avoidance of the overlap is only possible if Article 290 TFEU and 
Article 291 TFEU are seen from a different institutional perspective: Article 290 TFEU is 
first and foremost a safeguard of democracy, while Article 291 TFEU – of federalism.688 
Therein lies the difference between the two. 
The European legislator can freely “delegate” power to the Commission under both 
provisions. However, while the Commission has the right to use its delegated powers 
under Article 290 immediately as the principle of legislative subsidiarity will have 
been satisfied by the basic legislative act, it would not be automatically able to act 
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under Article 291 as every exercise of “delegated” implementing power under Article 
291(2) will be subject to the principle of executive subsidiarity.
689
 
While the Schütze’s argument that Article 290 and 291 TFEU are about acts which must be 
seen from different institutional perspectives (democracy in case of Article 290 TFEU and 
federalism in case of Article 291 TFEU) is interesting, it would seem to run into several 
difficulties. 
First, it doesn’t explain why nothing akin to the reverse pre-emption690 he contends for has 
been applied in respect of implementing acts. The ECJ has by now dealt with the issue of 
delegated and implementing acts or power in four judgments: Biocides, EURES, Visas and 
EUROPOL. In none did it check whether member states had unsuccessfully attempted to 
implement the basic act at issue before the Commission adopted its act. Such contention was 
not pleaded in any of those cases (if that is thought relevant), but then neither was the very 
wide discretion – which the ECJ held the EU legislature to have in choosing between 
delegated and implementing acts – pleaded in Biocides.691 And the reverse pre-emption is 
central to Schütze’s argument: that is how one avoids the overlap between delegated and 
implementing acts which are otherwise “morphologically identical”. If there is no distinction 
between the acts, the acts overlap and they thus form part of one group. Then there would 
seem to be no reason for seeing some acts of that one group from one, and others from 
another institutional perspective. Avoidance of overlap would not be possible. 
Second, if the reverse pre-emption did apply, how would it help, for instance, to decide what 
the listing of a third country at issue in Visas was? Was it implementing or delegated? The 
means of avoiding an overlap are not necessary in situations which are clear and where 
everyone acts lawfully. They are needed when someone challenges the choice made. Schütze 
does not offer any test for applying of his theory.
692
 And it is difficult to imagine what that 
test might be. For instance feasibility, i.e. whether something is at all feasible if member 
states were asked to do it, would not work: virtually everything can, theoretically, be done via 
international cooperation. That would be impractical, but not unfeasible. Thus it would seem 
that Schütze’s theory offers no test to decide whether the act at issue in Visas should have 
been implementing instead of delegated. Let alone to provide the decision which the ECJ 
ultimately held correct: that the act is lawfully delegated in spite of the fact that a similar 
earlier act in the waterfall structure was implementing. Thus – even after reading all 33 pages 
of the article – there is still no way to avoid an overlap between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Third, the Schütze’s argumentation seems occasionally less than sound. The contention that 
Article 290 TFEU brought about a constitutional revolution was based on a historical and a 
textual argument. One part of the historical argument was that the TFEU took up the 
proposals Koen Lenaerts made in the working group of the Convention on the Future of 
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Europe. With respect, that is simply not true. What – on Schütze’s own account – Lenaerts 
proposed was a division of Article 202 EC implementing acts into two: delegated legislation 
and executive acts stricto sensu. The former would allow modification of legislation and 
entail “heavy” comitology, the latter would entail only “light” comitology. Yet under the 
TFEU on Schütze’s own argument – that there is no basis for Article 290 TFEU comitology – 
the delegated legislation entails no comitology at all,
693
 while executive acts stricto sensu 
entail heavy comitology. That is not simply not being based on Lenaerts’s proposal; that is 
adopting something which is the exact opposite of that proposal. 
In addition to that Lenaerts envisaged that both acts would remain under the control of the 
Parliament. Only Article 290 TFEU mentions that control; Article 291 TFEU does not.
694
 
Finally, according to the proposal only delegated legislation should enable modification of 
legislative acts. On Schütze’s own argument that is not the case: he opines that from the 
substantive perspective of morphology of norms delegated acts and implementing acts are 
identical. Combined with his opinion that delegated acts must constitute material legislation, 
it follows that so must implementing acts. Thus both modify legislative acts.
695
 
The other part of the historic argument is made up of tracing the alleged revolution back from 
the Lisbon Treaty through the Constitutional Treaty through the working group of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe to the statement of the Commission in 2001. The latter 
was a statement of intention. Why would it matter in construing the TFEU? It was an 
intention of someone who had no control over what ultimately happened (was adopted) – the 
Commission played no role in the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The same could be said of 
the working group, as for the Constitutional Treaty, that was explicitly rejected by those who 
adopted the Lisbon Treaty. Is it not a stretch too far to try and impute the intention of the 
Commission or the working group, for instance, to the participants in the Irish referendum? 
How many of those participants had any knowledge of the content of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU at all? 
Thus the historical argument falls by the wayside. 
The first difficulty with the textual argument is that it seems to assume that the TFEU 
distinguishes between delegation of legislative power and delegation of executive power.
696
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There is no explanation why that is so. Such an explanation would seem to be particularly 
called for in the light of the contention that from the substantive perspective of morphology 
of norms delegated acts and implementing acts are identical. In effect that could be the end of 
the criticism: by assuming the distinction, one assumes the conclusion reached by Schütze.
697
 
If one doesn’t assume the distinction, one does not reach the conclusion reached by Schütze. 
However, the problem would seem to run deeper. What is the difference between the Articles 
290 and 291 TFEU on the one hand, and the 1999 comitology decision as it stood after the 
2006 amendment one the other? What is the difference between Article 290 TFEU and the  
regulatory procedure with scrutiny? On Schütze’s own argument the 1999 comitology 
decision as it stood after the 2006 amendment provided for a veto of the Parliament, but only 
in respect of those measures which are “quasi-legislative”.698 That seems to be still the case 
under Article 290 and 291 TFEU – at least if one adopts Schütze’s own position that only 
Article 290 TFEU acts are “delegated legislation”. Thus, there is no difference between pre-
Lisbon Treaty comitology and the TFEU – at least if the TFEU is looked at in its entirety, i.e. 
one considers both Article 290 TFEU and Article 291 TFEU. 
TFEU was said to discontinue the pre-existing status quo. 
Article 290 TFEU also restricts the constitutional options previously available under 
Article 202 EC. Henceforth only the Commission, and no longer the Council, may 
adopt delegated acts. And these Commission acts must be of “general application” 
that is constitute material legislation.
699
 
What is it that Article 290 TFEU discontinues? The Council’s ability to adopt delegated acts? 
Even if that were the case, it would seem more of an evolutionary than a revolutionary step. 
The old regulatory procedure with scrutiny which Article 290 TFEU essentially replaces did 
foresee the possibility that it would be the Council to adopt the measures.
700
 But the 
Parliament had the power of veto over the Council’s measures in such a case. Thus, the 
change – were it to exist – would in practice be minor. However, according to Biocides the 
EU legislature has discretion in deciding whether to use Article 290 or 291 TFEU. The latter 
permits grants of power to the Council. The constitutional options are not restricted.
701
 The 
requirement of general application in Article 290 TFEU is likewise not novel: regulatory 
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procedure with scrutiny was also available for measures of general scope only.
702
 And just 
like Article 290 TFEU, regulatory procedure with scrutiny was available only for acts 
adopted under what are now legislative acts and were then acts adopted under Article 251 
EC.
703
 
That is not to say that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce some innovations. Under the 2006 
version of the 1999 comitology decision the Parliament would have to justify vetoing an act 
being adopted via regulatory procedure with scrutiny by indicating that the proposed 
measures exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic instrument or are not 
compatible with the aim or the content of the basic instrument or do not respect the principles 
of subsidiarity or proportionality.
704
 But surely “concocting” some reasoning on those 
grounds is not all that taxing?
705
 
The statement that the EC Treaty did not acknowledge the Parliament’s control over 
executive legislation with that control being based on the Council’s concession in a 
comitology decision
706
 is correct, but that argument goes only so far. Nothing actually 
changed. 
Finally, the suggestion that Article 290 TFEU is not subject to comitology is, with respect, 
simply wrong in fact. The inter-institutional agreement on better law-making institutes 
comitology in relation to Article 290 TFEU (and the Commission’s 2009 Communication and 
its 2011 Guidelines did that before Schütze’s article was published). That also answers 
Schütze’s contention that there is no legal basis for such comitology in the treaties: Article 
295 TFEU would seem such a basis, not to mention articles 4(3) and 11(3) TEU and indeed 
Article 290 TFEU itself. First and second paragraphs of the latter read as follows. 
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act. 
The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be 
reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation 
of power. 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is 
subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
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(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its 
component members, and the Council by a qualified majority. 
Article 155 EEC read in relevant parts as follows. 
With a view to ensuring the functioning and development of the Common Market, the 
Commission shall exercise the competence conferred on it by the Council for the 
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter. 
The latter was – according to Köster, Scheer and Rey Soda – a sufficient legal basis for 
comitology. Why isn’t the former? Schütze argues that that cannot be the case because it 
specifies some controls and hence “may” in the first sentence of the second paragraph does 
not actually mean “may” but “must”.707 He offers three reasons: comitology was not 
mentioned in Article 290 TFEU was a deliberate choice, the lack of legal basis for Article 
290 TFEU comitology and illegality of a case-by-case determination of conditions of grant of 
power. 
The first does not fit at all with Schütze’s own suggestion that Article 290 TFEU should trace 
its roots to the Lenaerts’s proposal: he did propose comitology. In any event an argument that 
long standing case law (on permissibility of comitology without a need for an express 
permission in the constitutive treaties) could be overruled by omission would seem to be 
rather far-fetched. 
The second is clearly erroneous in the light of the inter-institutional agreement and indeed the 
Commission’s 2009 Communication which Schütze himself quotes: it mustn’t be forgotten 
that comitology developed once “in the undergrowth of EU law”. That communication in 
committing the Commission to consultations with national experts could do so again. In any 
event the lack of a(n express) legal basis seems to assume that Köster, Scheer and Rey Soda 
are no longer good law. No argument to that effect has been presented. If anything, Schütze 
treats Köster as still good law in some respects at least.
708
 Thus the point of the legality of 
case-by-case choice simply does not arise. 
Therefore the textual argument for revolution seems to likewise fall by the wayside. Articles 
290 and 291 TFEU are simply not revolutionary. They did amend to a certain limited extent 
the pre-existing status quo,
709
 but by and large the position in law as interpreted by the ECJ 
and as applied did not change. Looked at as a whole, the TFEU (its Articles 290 and 291) 
does not seem to discontinue anything. 
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As for implementing acts the basic problem with Schütze’s account – aside from the glaring 
one of the reverse per-emption – is that it assumes that the Parliament and the Council can in 
law confer on the Commission (or the Council) the power which they do not hold. He 
suggests that under the TFEU the member states have controls under Article 291 TFEU 
because the power to implement is theirs and not the Parliament and the Council’s.710 How is 
it possible then that the power is granted to the Commission (or the Council) by the 
Parliament and the Council? As to the “novelty” that under Article 291 TFEU the comitology 
committees themselves may veto Commission’s implementing acts, what changed? Those 
committees are made up, vote and operate just like the Council does. Finally, perhaps the 
most evident point of all: if implementing power under Article 291 TFEU is somehow purely 
executive and that is the power member states have, then the the member states’ power to 
transpose and implement EU law is also always purely executive. There is no provision in the 
constitutive treaties which would grant them any different power; not unless one breaks 
coherence with Schütze’s account. Yet this latter propositon is probably something 
considerably more experts would have difficulty subscribing to even without a deeper 
analysis. 
Thus it would seem that Schütze’s article is incapable of providing either an answer to the 
question about “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU or a solid understanding of 
either of those articles. The contention that TFEU introduced in this respect some novel 
system does not withstand scrutiny and neither does the suggestion that there is no legal basis 
for comitology under Article 290 TFEU. 
3.4.4. Thomas Christiansen and Mathias Dobbels711 
The article of Christainsen and Dobbels is interesting in that unusually for a pre-Biocides 
article its authors contend that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are not mutually exclusive.
712
 
They start by stating that the Lisbon Treaty 
created an entirely new instrument of ‘delegated acts’ that are directly scrutinised by 
the legislative institutions, without any use of comitology (Article 290 TFEU).
713
 
They then purport to grapple briefly with the distinction between delegated and implementing 
acts merely succeeding in restating the TFEU without offering anything further. 
The focus to make the distinction, therefore, lies in the verbs ‘amend’, ie making 
formal changes to a text (deleting, replacing or adding non-essential elements), and 
‘supplement’, ie adding new non-essential rules or norms, as opposed to ‘implement’, 
where no new rules or norms are established and the act is supposed to give effect to 
the rules that have been laid down in the basic legislative act. In other words, the main 
difference is whether there is simply a need to adopt acts to give effect to the rules set 
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by the legislator or whether it is necessary that the Commission has the power to 
change (amend) or add (supplement) some of the rules of the legislation that are of a 
non-essential nature.
714
 
The authors base the contention of non-exclusivity on the suggestion – repeated several times 
above in this thesis – that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are formulated by reference to different 
things (allegedly scope vs rationale, although the better opinion would seem to suggest that 
by reference to different rationales
715
). In such a situation they conclude that 
decisions on whether a basic act is to be implemented through delegated or 
implementing acts are made on a case-by-case basis in the context of legislative 
bargaining.
716
 
Thus there are no criteria for choosing between Article 290 and 291 TFEU.
717
 They see that 
as a step back compared to the pre-Lisbon Treaty position. Before the Lisbon Treaty the 
comitology decision contained criteria for deciding which procedure should apply. They 
stress that those procedures included the regulatory procedure with scrutiny – “the forerunner 
to the delegated acts”.718 
In spite of that the authors support the contention that 
delegated acts are fundamentally different as they ‘will be subject to more inter-
institutional discussions much earlier in the legislative process given that the 
objectives, scope, duration and conditions to which the delegation is subject can 
change in every legislative act’.719 
Comparing the way delegated and implementing acts are adopted the authors conclude that 
while adoption of the latter is much proceduralised (especially in view of the comitology 
regulation), there still was no system in relation to the adoption of the former.
720
 It might 
perhaps be argued that by now such a system has been put in place – or at least that the EU 
has started moving towards it: see the inter-institutional agreement on better law-making.
721
 
That however would only further support their contention that the actual implementation of 
Article 290 TFEU relies very much on soft law and informal procedures.
722
 At the time when 
the article was written these were the ones set out by the Commission in its 2009 
Communication and in the 2011 Guidelines as well as those contained in the Common 
Understating which has by now become an annex to the inter-institutional agreement on 
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better law-making. We may now add that agreement itself to the list.
723
 In other words Article 
290 TFEU does not provide the entire picture; to understand the situation one has to look 
behind the law. They thus opine that 
[t]he Common Understanding is, therefore, a prime example of non-legislative rule 
making, in that it constitutes a non-legally binding political agreement on common 
practices, such as the procedure during recess or the use of a standard recital, model 
articles to be used by the institutions for the preparation of delegated acts, and 
modalities to exercise the rights of revocation and objection, which were not defined 
by the treaty. 
The conclusion which the authors make is that their 
analysis not only demonstrates the need to go beyond the treaty provisions in 
understanding the nature of non-legislative rule making in the EU, but also 
emphasises the importance of informal procedures and non-binding agreements in 
fully assessing the nature of non-legislative rule making in this area.
724
 
Thus, while Christiansen and Dobbels make some interesting points – the need to go beyond 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU themselves to understand their meaning, for instance – they are 
ultimately unable to explain how Articles 290 and 291 TFEU differ. 
3.4.5. Dominique Ritleng725 
Ritleng’s article takes the form of an extended case note on Biocides, a judgment which he 
clearly does not approve of. Ritleng starts his criticism by making some postulations (without 
explaining or substantiating them):
726
 
 the distinction between delegated and implementing acts refers to the division of 
powers between EU institutions and to the institutional balance; 
 the distinction between delegated and implementing acts also refers to the distinction 
between legislative and executive functions; 
 the distinction between delegated and implementing acts finally refers to different 
mechanisms of control; 
 the constitutional significance of the new system introduced by Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU depends on the criterion for their distinction and on the ECJ’s judicial review 
of its application. 
In view of those postulations Ritleng is disappointed with Biocides: the ECJ is said to have 
backed away from addressing the critical issue of the criterion for distinction. What the ECJ 
did say
727
 is said to be 
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of very little help if one goes no further than the wording, for a measure which 
provides further detail to the content of a legislative act sets up rules completing the 
regulatory framework defined by the legislative act.
728
 
That is said to be all the more so since implementation is a normative activity, which makes it 
very difficult to imagine an implementing act which does not entail some addition to the 
legislative framework and hence does not supplement the basic act.
729
 
While he criticises the ECJ for not opting expressly for the extent of discretion as the 
criterion for choosing between delegated and implementing acts, Ritleng sets out to show that 
the ECJ nevertheless applied that criterion. 
After having examined the enabling provision, viz. Article 80(1) of Regulation 
528/2012 in its legal context, the Court indeed came to the conclusion that the 
Regulation had established a complete legal framework as regards waivers and 
reimbursements of fees, payment conditions, and possible reductions in favour of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, which is tantamount to acknowledging that it did 
not leave the Commission such a margin of discretion that would mandate recourse to 
delegated acts. One might therefore have expected that, for the sake of clarity, the 
Court would identify explicitly the measure of discretion as the dividing criterion.
730
 
He performs a similar exercise in relation to the leeway which the ECJ is said to have given 
to the EU legislature (the leeway to decide whether to resort to Article 290 TFEU or Article 
291 TFEU) and the standard of review chosen by the ECJ (manifest error).
731
 He holds both 
propositions undesirable. The latter in particular because there is no such limitation of 
judicial review either when the chosen legal basis of a measure is contested or when it is 
contended that determination of essential elements has been delegated. In both cases the 
review is more extensive and by reference to objective factors.
732
 Nevertheless, just like when 
dealing with the criterion of discretion, Ritleng argues that 
the criticism should be mitigated since in the present case the Court of Justice did 
actually, under the veil of a control limited to manifest errors of assessment, exercise 
full review of the question as to whether the EU legislature could lawfully opt for 
implementing acts, as is shown by the fact that twelve paragraphs of the ruling were 
dedicated to assessing whether Regulation 528/2012 had laid down a complete legal 
framework leaving only room for further details (paras. 41–52).733 
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Ritleng concludes by wondering how much Biocides will end up contributing to the 
disruption of what he sees as the logic of Article 290 and 291 TFEU. Like Schütze he thinks 
that 
[t]he control mechanisms of legislative and executive delegation set out respectively 
in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU have been designed to fit [theoretical narratives of 
executive federalism], by ensuring that the body which normally holds the power in 
question will be the only body that exercises control over its delegation.
734
 
He adds that 
[i]t is this constitutional significance and meaning that the self-restraint displayed by 
the Court in the instant case calls into question, since it allows the choice between 
delegated and implementing acts to be largely determined by political considerations 
and inter-institutional struggles.
735
 
Based on subsequent experience (and even on Biocides itself) it would seem that those 
theoretical narratives have been quite significantly disrupted. And subsequent developments 
would not seem so easy to fit into one’s pre-existing notion of what Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU are – which is, with respect, what Ritleng seems to have sought to do with Biocides in 
his article.  
The contention that the ECJ nevertheless applied a criterion of discretion of the grantee of 
power has been shown to be wrong by Visas. The ECJ there stated that neither discretion
736
 
nor any other characteristic of similar kind
737
 matters at all for determining whether a power 
is delegated or implementing. Speaking in terms of Biocides itself if the ECJ did apply the 
criterion of discretion, one could be pardoned for wondering how wide would the discretion 
have to be for the act to be held delegated? Presumably – on Ritleng’s assumptions – 
delegated act mandates wider discretion than an implementing one. In Biocides the following 
provision was deemed a complete legal framework not leaving “the Commission such a 
margin of discretion that would mandate recourse to delegated acts”.738 
The Commission shall adopt, on the basis of the principles set out in paragraph 3, an 
implementing Regulation specifying: 
(a) the fees payable to the Agency, including an annual fee for products granted a 
Union authorisation in accordance with Chapter VIII and a fee for applications for 
mutual recognition in accordance with Chapter VII; 
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(b) the rules defining conditions for reduced fees, fee waivers and the reimbursement 
of the member of the Biocidal Products Committee who acts as a rapporteur; and 
(c) conditions of payment. 
That implementing Regulation shall be adopted in accordance with the examination 
procedure referred to in Article 82(3). It shall apply only with respect to fees paid to 
the Agency. 
The Agency may collect charges for other services it provides. 
The fees payable to the Agency shall be set at such a level as to ensure that the 
revenue derived from the fees, when combined with other sources of the Agency’s 
revenue pursuant to this Regulation, is sufficient to cover the cost of the services 
delivered. The fees payable shall be published by the Agency.
739
 
Thus statements in the basic act to the effect that 
 there is to be partial reimbursement of a fee if the applicant fails to submit the 
information requested within the specified time-limit; 
 the specific needs of SMEs are to be taken into account, as appropriate, including the 
possibility of splitting payments into several instalments and phases; 
 the structure and size of fees are to take into account whether information has been 
submitted jointly or separately; 
 in duly justified circumstances, and where it is accepted by the [European Chemicals] 
Agency, the whole fee or a part of it may be waived and 
 the deadlines for the payment of fees are to be fixed taking due account of the 
deadlines of the procedures provided for in the regulation, 
were sufficient to constitute that complete legal framework. That leaves quite a lot to be 
decided; so much in fact that it would not seem to support the contention that the discretion 
of the Commission was narrowed down in any considerable sense. 
The contention that the ECJ did in Biocides something more than look for a manifest error 
has been criticised in these terms. 
The suggestion that in Biocides the Court concluded that ‘the more specific the 
“criteria and conditions” established by the EU legislature … the more reasonable a 
delegation of implementing powers’ appears to be predicated on the notion that the 
legality of a choice of secondary act is in some way a matter of degree. To succeed 
under the ‘manifest error’ test, however, the party challenging the choice of secondary 
act must demonstrate that the error or abuse is obvious; here the Commission had not 
been able to establish that the legislative framework was manifestly incomplete. The 
suggestion that ‘the Court did actually, under the veil of a control limited to manifest 
errors of assessment, exercise full review’ of the legality of the choice of an 
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implementing act is also unconvincing. The number of paragraphs the Court required 
to establish the absence of any such errors reflects the completeness of the 
Commission’s arguments and the thoroughness of the Court’s reasoning, rather than 
the putative soundness of the arguments in question. Thus, to take the Commission’s 
submissions concerning its duty to take account of the specific needs of SMEs as an 
example, the mere fact that the basic regulation provided that the fees must be set at a 
level which ensures that the Agency’s costs are covered and takes account of the 
specific features of SMEs, and that SMEs may pay by instalments, was adjudged to 
comprise a ‘complete legal framework’ in this regard. This appears to fall some way 
short of ‘full review’.740 
In fact one could go further in the criticism of Ritleng’s attempt to fix the review in Biocides 
up as “full review of the question as to whether the EU legislature could lawfully opt for 
implementing acts”.741 Let us start by reminding ourselves what it is that the ECJ said about 
the review in Biocides. 
[J]udicial review is limited to manifest errors of assessment as to whether the EU 
legislature could reasonably have taken the view, first, that, in order to be 
implemented, the legal framework which it laid down regarding the system of fees 
referred to in Article 80(1) of Regulation No 528/2012 needs only the addition of 
further detail, without its non-essential elements having to be amended or 
supplemented and, secondly, that the provisions of Regulation No 528/2012 relating 
to that system require uniform conditions for implementation.
742
 
It seems curious that the object of review has generated little if any comment. Yet, the ECJ is 
clearly saying that it is not reviewing whether the legal framework laid down by the basic act 
needs only further detail without its non-essential elements having to be amended or 
supplemented. It is reviewing whether the EU legislature could reasonably have taken the 
view that the legal framework laid down by the basic act needs only further detail without its 
non-essential elements having to be amended or supplemented. That this was no slip in 
formulating the test in paragraph 40 seems to be shown by the conclusion being formulated in 
the same terms.
743
 And when the test was being applied the ECJ likewise spoke specifically 
of the EU legislature having been able to take the view that implementing power was called 
for.
744
 The ECJ did not actually say anywhere that the power called for was implementing. It 
is simply too consistent a use to disregard it. Thus we are speaking of a doubly loosened 
judicial review: manifest error of whether the EU legislature could reasonably have thought 
that Article 290 or 291 TFEU, as the case may be, should be employed. 
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The practical implications are evident: there might be situations where the power called for 
would be, for instance, delegated, but the entire situation was such that it was not 
unreasonable for the EU legislature to have taken the view that the power should have been 
implementing. The fact that the standard is of manifest error of assessment does not change 
that. For instance, it could be manifest in view of an ECJ’s judgment in year X that, say, 
delegated power was called for in instrument Y. Yet if that Y had been adopted at a moment 
of X-1, there would have been no “unreasonableness” about the EU legislature’s opinion at 
the time of adoption to the effect that an implementing power was called for nor would it then 
have been “manifest”. It could be submitted that the more “precise” an object, the easier it is 
for an error in respect of that object to be manifest. Here reasonableness of opinion of the 
majority of two collegial bodies (most of whose members are not lawyers) is probably a more 
imprecise an object than whether a particular legal framework is complete or not. Finally, the 
question about completeness of a framework is a question of law while the question of 
reasonableness of opinion is – at least in part – a question of fact. 
Thus, even if one could call the review performed in paragraphs 41 – 52 of Biocides a full 
one (a very doubtful proposition in the light of Bradley’s able argument), it would have been 
a review not of whether the EU legislature could lawfully opt for an implementing act, but of 
whether it could reasonably have thought that it could have lawfully opted for it.
745
 
Therefore the review in Biocides really was not searching at all, and the discretion of the 
grantee of power was not used in Biocides as a criterion for determining whether the power is 
delegated or implementing. To this one could add that reference to objective criteria has been 
consistently omitted by the ECJ from all cases dealing with competition of Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU, including Biocides. From this it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
choice between Article 290 TFEU and Article 291 TFEU is not based on objective criteria. 
All that together would seem to indicate that, perhaps, in the opinion of the ECJ
746
 the logic 
behind Articles 290 and 291 TFEU is not at all that for which Ritleng contends. To sum up, 
Ritleng seems unable to offer either a workable distinction between or explanation of Articles 
290 and 291 TFEU, or even a(n unworkable) distinction which would comply with the 
judgments of the ECJ (or even the one which he critiques – Biocides). 
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3.4.6. Jean Paul Jacqué 
According to Jacqué the difficulty with the “competition” between Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU lies in distinguishing supplementing from implementing.
747
 Like many other 
commentators he goes on to say
748
  
 that Article 290 TFEU sets a complete legal framework for delegated acts – no 
implementing measures being required; 
 that regulatory procedure with scrutiny essentially established the same conditions as 
Article 290 TFEU; and 
 that every implementing act supplements the act which it implements. 
The latter, in his view, creates a risk that a wide interpretation of “supplementing” will 
suppress the recourse to “implementing”.749 He thinks that the criterion for making the 
distinction between the two could only be a material one.
750
 Like Ritleng he considers that the 
distinction should lie in the extent of discretion: if the Commission as the grantee of power 
has a wide of discretion, the power is delegated; if it has a narrow(er) discretion, the power is 
implementing.
751
 Unlike Ritleng he does not purport to show that his position agrees with 
Biocides. He simply contends himself with saying that it does.
752
 
 The ruling of the Court in Biocides does not depart fundamentally from that vision.
753
 
He does not discuss Visas where the ECJ expressly stated that discretion of the grantee of 
power was irrelevant and which was decided some nine months before the volume in which 
Jacqué gave his opinion was published. The only thing which he does add to Ritleng’s 
account is the suggestion that the institutions had agreed that under the regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny (the precursor of Article 290 TFEU) the extent of discretion was the criterion. 
If the Commission was left a very large margin that was not limited by precise criteria 
set in the legislative act, it was agreed that supplementation of the legislative act was 
at stake.
754
 
If anything, that statement would seem to be ill-conceived for at least two reasons. First, no 
argument or evidence was presented to support it. Second, even if it had been correct, its 
relevance would have been overtaken by events – specifically, Visas – by the time it was 
published. 
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Unlike the distinction between supplementing and implementing, the distinction between 
amendment and supplement Jacqué considers to be clear without further explanation. That is 
so, because the notion of amendment is clear.
755
 While it is possible to agree with that, the 
clarity would assume that the distinction is purely formalistic, not material in any way.
756
 
Admittedly that formalism would seem to be supported by both the judgment in Connecting 
Europe Facility and the Commission’s 2011 Guidelines. 
It should be recalled that in Connecting Europe Facility the ECJ held that amending (as used 
in Article 290 TFEU) means tweaking the actual text of the legislative act.
757
 In doing so it 
expressly approved the Commission’s 2011 Guidelines which stated that amending means 
making “formal changes to a text by deleting, replacing or adding non-essential elements.”758 
Thus “amend” essentially covers orthographical changes in the legislative act. They may or 
may not bring about a material change; that simply plays no part in the meaning of “amend”. 
Whether desirable or not, this construction does have the merit of making the distinction 
between “amend” and “supplement” easy to determine – just like Jacqué suggested. 
Furthermore, it would seem to be coherent with the way “legislative act” is defined Article 
289 TFEU: that definition is likewise formalistic. Hence a formalistic meaning of a term 
employed in the context of EU law-lawmaking is nothing uncommon to current EU law. 
Jacqué is ultimately unable to offer a distinction between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. In 
addition to attempting to do so he also deals directly with the question of who holds 
implementing power in the EU coming – like Schütze – to the conclusion that the Lisbon 
Treaty made fundamental changes to EU law in this respect. According to Jacqué 
implementing power was initially to be held by the Council.
759
 He draws this conclusion from 
Article 155 EEC suggesting that the amendment made to Article 145 EEC by the SEA did not 
change anything in this respect.
760
 Thus the Commission had no implementing power of its 
own – it could exercise it only when it had the power granted to it by its holder; the 
Commission was not the holder of the implementing power.
761
 According to Jacqué 
[t]he Lisbon Treaty confirmed this situation by bestowing on the Commission the 
power to adopt implementing acts on the sole basis of delegation from the legislator. 
In principle, the Commission has implementing power, but only where a ‘legislative 
act’ so provides. The Council could only wield it, according to Article 291 TFEU, on 
the basis of legislative authorization and solely in specific instances for special 
reasons. There is little chance, politically, that such a state of affairs should occur in 
cases other than those for which the Council is the sole lawmaker. The Lisbon Treaty 
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therefore fundamentally alters the situation by making the Commission the holder of 
implementing power whenever it benefits from legislative delegation.
762
 
This raises a question: how is it possible that the Lisbon Treaty at the same time confirms the 
pre-existing status quo
763
 and fundamentally changes it?
764
 Trying to solve this conundrum, it 
would seem that the claim for fundamental change is based on a subtle modification of 
object. The status quo was expressed in relation to direct holding of implementing power, 
while the fundamental change was formulated in terms of holding delegated (not direct) 
implementing power (“making the Commission the holder of implementing power whenever 
it benefits from legislative delegation”). Yet how does the position under the Lisbon Treaty 
differ from prior status quo? Jacqué himself argued that before the Lisbon Treaty the 
Commission had no implementing power of its own, that the Council held the implementing 
power and that the Commission had it only when the Council delegated it to the Commission. 
The situation persists under the Lisbon Treaty: “the Commission has implementing power, 
but only where a ‘legislative act’ so provides”. 
Looking at things practically, rather than strictly legally, in that it is said that post-Lisbon 
Treaty there is little chance of grant of implementing power to the Council, the ECJ had 
already in 2005 made the point that it in the normal course of events it would be the 
Commission which would have implementing powers. The normal rule 
under the system established by the Treaty, [was that] when measures implementing a 
basic instrument need to be taken at Community level, it is the Commission which, in 
the normal course of events, is responsible for exercising that power.
765
 
Thus there was no change in respect of practice either. It used to be the case that what is now 
Article 291 TFEU implementing power was not held by the Commission, that it could be – 
but strictly legally speaking did not have to be – granted to it and that it normally was granted 
to it. That is still the position. The only difference is that we now speak of grant of that power 
by the Parliament and the Council jointly. That is occasioned by changes elsewhere in the 
Lisbon Treaty: the power which is granted is no longer held by the Council alone (in which 
case it might seem absurd to speak of grant to the Council – grant to itself?), but by the 
Parliament and the Council jointly. 
Concurrently with the foregoing Jacqué’s has claimed that the Lisbon Treaty modified the 
pre-existing status quo 
by indicating that the control of the implementation, when it is entrusted to the 
Commission, should be performed by the Member States, meaning that the Council, 
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as an institution, is excluded from a process where it could earlier be called upon to 
play a major role.
766
 
The reason why this was done was said to lie in the fact that the power to implement (within 
the meaning of Article 291) normally belongs to member states, and that this amendment 
would permit member states to actually participate in its exercise when it is exercised at the 
level of the EU.
767
 With respect, that seems to contradict Jacqué’s other opinion that the 
power to implement (within the meaning of Articles 155 EEC and 202 EC, which would 
encompass the power to implement within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU) belonged to the 
Council, not the member states. The reasoning Jacqué offers as to why the power to 
implement (within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU) normally belongs to the member states 
does not seem to shed any light on this conundrum: 
execution at the Union level is only subsidiary in case of specific circumstances that 
have to be motivated in the legislative act.
768
 
It would seem to be possible to solve this conundrum by implying that when Jacqué speaks of 
the Council’s own power to implement under Article 155 EC he means only that part of what 
is now the power to implement within the meaning of article 291 TFEU where “execution at 
the Union level” is justified under the principle of subsidiarity. Yet that would seem to make 
the explanation of why Article 291 TFEU grants the control over implementation to member 
states not an explanation for that change at all. The explanation was that member states were 
granted that control because the control was essentially over the exercise of their own power. 
Yet such solution of the conundrum tells us that – by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity – 
it was not a power of member states after all; it was a power of the EU all along.
769
 
Thus one is left with either a contradiction in Jacqué’s accounts of who holds the original 
implementing power (within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU) or with an incorrectness of 
his account as to why it was that the change of the controller occurred in Article 291 
TFEU.
770
 The only other solution would seem to be that the change was not in any way 
principled at all. In any event Jacqué would seem ultimately to be able neither to determine 
the holder of implementing neither power nor explain why that determination is important. 
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3.4.7. Paolo Ponzano771 
Ponzano, seemingly unlike Jacqué, considers that for the purposes of the distinction 
introduced by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU it is 
futile and useless to refer to the situation before Lisbon Treaty (in which the measures 
of implementation adopted through comitology procedure had covered a very large 
spectrum of provisions) or to the old case law (which took a broad view of the term 
‘implementation’ with the aim to legitimate delegation of power to the 
Commission).
772
 
He starts with considering what the distinction is in substance. In a nutshell, he suggests that 
the Lisbon Treaty for the first time introduced the distinction between legislative 
delegation and executive delegation. In this way, the Lisbon Treaty aligned the 
European Union’s primary legislation with the practices of the national legal systems, 
which recognize three different legal situations: a) cases where the legislator acts in 
its own sphere of competence (legislative acts); b) cases where the executive acts in 
its own sphere of competence (ministerial decrees); c) cases where the executive acts 
in the legislator’s sphere of competence (either by virtue of an explicit delegation of 
powers, or on its own initiative in urgent cases): in the French legal system, these acts 
are called ‘ordonnances’ (in Italian decreti legislativi or decreti-legge). The Lisbon 
Treaty recognizes therefore that it is inappropriate to equate the executive amending 
the existing legal framework with that same executive simply implementing EU 
legislation. For this reason, the Treaty introduced a category of delegated acts that the 
Commission is responsible for adopting under the direct scrutiny of the EU legislator 
(Council and European Parliament) without any comitology procedure.
773
 
He does not use the terms “legislative delegation” and “executive delegation” elsewhere, but 
it would seem justified to conclude that the former stands for Article 290 TFEU delegation, 
and the latter – for Article 291 TFEU delegation. With that being the case, let us attempt to 
align the system created by the TFEU with the national legal systems as presented by 
Ponzano. Group (a) would seem to include legislative acts within the meaning of Article 289 
TFEU.  
What about delegated acts? – Their adoption requires explicit grant of power to that effect in 
a legislative act. In addition they expressly include acts “tinkering” with the text of a 
legislative act, i.e. an act created by the legislature. It stands to reason that they thus 
constitute action in the sphere of competence of the legislature. Paragraphs 20 – 23 of the 
common understanding set out in the annex to the inter-institutional agreement on better law-
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making even sets out an urgency procedure
774
 – just like Ponzano mentioned in respect of 
group (c). Therefore they would seem to belong to group (c). 
That leaves group (b) for implementing acts. To belong to that group they would need to 
comprise “cases where the executive acts in its own sphere of competence”. Is that so? 
Jacqué’s answer would clearly be “no”. He attributes implementing power either to the 
Council
775
 (acting as the legislature within the meaning of Ponzano’s classification) or to the 
member states (which cannot have implementing power under Article 291 TFEU), never to 
the Commission which is the body which mostly exercises implementing power within the 
meaning of Article 291 TFEU. Even if Jacqué’s account is left aside, it is still unclear how 
one could get around the explicit wording of Article 291 TFEU to the effect that the 
Commission or the Council – the executive for the purposes of this group (b) – may only 
implement a basic act when so expressly empowered by a basic act.
776
 First, they may do 
nothing aside from implementing a basic act. So the extent of their actions is limited by the 
basic act. Second, in implementing a basic act they may not act on their own motion. To be 
fair, it is true that once there is a mandate in a basic act, what they may do is very wide 
indeed. It goes beyond simple execution of the mandate. As long as they take 
such actions [which] clearly fall within the scope of the essential general aim pursued 
by [the basic act],
777
 
they are deemed to be implementing the basic act, i.e. they have not exceeded the limits of 
their mandate. Yet, this is nothing to the point. That statement of the ECJ goes to the extent 
of a mandate granted under Article 291 TFEU, it does carve out “an own sphere” for the 
grantees of a mandate where they would need no mandate to act. The Commission cannot 
adopt an implementing act unless a basic act expressly permits it to do so. 
In fact, it could be argued that implementing acts likewise fit group (c). A mandate is 
required for an implementing act. Its recipient would seem to always act in what is normally 
somebody else’s sphere of competence: either the sphere of competence of the author of the 
basic act (there is nothing stopping the author from regulating an issue to the fullest extent 
which EU’s conferred competence permits) or of the member states (if one subscribes to the 
idea that implementation lies naturally with member states or deals with a situation where the 
principle of subsidiary has been violated).
778
 The Frontex doctrine of essential elements 
applies both to Article 290 TFEU and to Article 291 TFEU acts – in neither case may the 
grantee of power adopt essential elements of the rules regulating a particular field of activity. 
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And, finally, most all of academic commentators agree on the point that implementation does 
in fact amend the basic act
779
 – it thus amounts to interference with the sphere of competence 
of the authors of the basic act. 
Furthermore Ponzano seems to forget sui generis non-legislative acts. Let us take articles 
105(3) and 106(3) TFEU as an example. Both deal with competition law. 
Article 105(3): The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of 
agreement in respect of which the Council has adopted a regulation or a directive 
pursuant to Article 103(2)(b). 
Article 106(3): The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this 
Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to 
Member States. 
Where would these provisions fit Ponzano’s account of national systems with which the 
Lisbon Treaty aligned the EU law-making? It would either require accepting that under those 
articles the Commission was acting as the legislature – in which case the Commission acting 
under article 105(3) TFEU or article 106(3) TFEU would fall within group (a) – or, especially 
if we are to maintain Ponzano’s further contention that the Lisbon Treaty is about separation 
of powers,
780
 they would have to fit within group (b). The conditions would seem to be met: 
Articles 105(3) and 106(3) TFEU do give the Commission its own sphere of competence, no 
mandate is required and no other institution may interfere with that sphere. Furthermore, even 
if it could be argued that article 106(3) TFEU should fit into group (a) as primary legislation, 
group (a) would not seem available – at least not without making quite convoluted an 
argument – for Article 105(3) TFEU. For Article 105(3) TFEU to be engaged, there must be a 
prior act of the Council.
781
 Surely that would be the group (a) act. Yet that act need not grant 
any power to the Commission for the latter to act under Article 105(3) TFEU; that article 
itself permits it to do so once the prior act has been adopted. 
Both these provisions – Articles 105(3) and 106(3) TFEU – have been part of EU law for a 
while – long before the Lisbon Treaty. 
Thus it would seem that the system of EU law might well be capable of being aligned with 
national legal systems as presented by Ponzano. However, it was not the Lisbon Treaty which 
“for the first time” resulted in that alignment. The alignment, if any, pre-existed the Lisbon 
Treaty. What seems impossible is to align the system created by the Lisbon Treaty – 
legislative, delegated and implementing acts – with national legal systems as presented by 
Ponzano. Both delegated and implementing acts fall within group (c) and group (b) remains 
empty (if we consider only legislative, delegated and implementing acts). Thus Ponzano’s 
conclusion – based on the alleged alignment – that 
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[t]he Lisbon Treaty recognizes therefore that it is inappropriate to equate the 
executive amending the existing legal framework with that same executive simply 
implementing EU legislation,
782
 
simply does not follow.
783
 Thus Ponzano seems to fail to establish the distinction which he 
alleges Articles 290 and 291 TFEU to make. 
After considering the substance of the distinction Ponzano moves on to the question how to 
determine whether an act is delegated or implementing. In spite of writing after Biocides he 
initially maintains that the categories are mutually exclusive.
784
 He sees Biocides as 
supporting that contention. 
The Court does not appear to question that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU each have 
their own scope with no overlap between them. This can be deduced in particular 
from paragraph 35 of the judgment, according to which ‘the concept of an 
implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU must be assessed in 
relation to the concept of a delegated act, as derived from Article 290 TFEU’.785 
Despite this he admits that 
[t]the delimitation between delegated and implementing does become to a certain 
extent—that is, within the limits of the manifest error of assessment—a matter of 
political choice.
786
 
With respect, that would seem to fly in the face of contention of mutual exclusivity. If 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are mutually exclusive, political desire or choice simply does not 
matter. Admittedly political choice is easier to reconcile with paragraph 40 of Biocides where 
the ECJ held that the EU legislature had discretion in choosing between Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU. Conspicuously, Ponzano fails to explain how that paragraph is reconcilable with the 
contention of mutual exclusivity. Let alone with the fact that the judicial review which the 
ECJ performs permits situations where something which should – as a matter of law – be an 
implementing act, but takes the form of a delegated act, is nevertheless allowed to stand.
787
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On the other hand, paragraph 35 of Biocides on which Ponzano relies would hardly seem 
difficult to reconcile with the contention of lack of mutual exclusivity. Even if Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU are not mutually exclusive, (i) delegated and implementing acts would seem 
to occupy the same space,
788
 (ii) each of Article 290 and 291 TFEU formulates certain hard 
limits
789
 and (iii) especially if they are not mutually exclusive, the choice between the two is 
a question of looking at both provision and deciding which to apply. Thus assessment of a 
concept of implementing act in relation to the concept of delegated act would be called for if 
they were not mutually exclusive. 
Dealing with how to distinguish implementing acts from the delegated ones Ponzano opines 
that Biocides 
does not provide for clear and easily applicable criteria for the delimitation between 
delegated and implementing acts.
790
 
Nevertheless he thinks that 
[f]rom a theoretical point of view, it should be quite easy to distinguish between 
measures which change the legal framework of a legislative act (by amending 
formally one or several provisions of the act or by supplementing it with other 
provisions that the legislator could have adopted at the same time) and measures 
aiming only to implement the same act.
791
 
He gives the example of a genetically modified product: 
if a legislative act were to grant the Commission the power to establish or amend the 
criteria according to which a genetically modified product could be authorized or 
prohibited on the market, this would clearly be a delegated act. If, on the other hand, 
the Commission were to receive the power to authorize or prohibit a genetically 
modified product on the basis of the criteria contained in the delegated act, this would 
be an implementing act.
792
 
These statements fail grasp the practical problems: that ultimately the question often turns on 
the level of abstraction of criteria. If the Commission is granted power to adopt an act with 
“adequate level of protection”793 serving as the criterion set forth in the legislative act, would 
                                                 
788
 In that they both add something to a basic act. Bast has argued that they are in a horizontal relationship. See 
footnote 658. 
789
 For instance amendment of actual wording of a legislative act lies within the ambit of Article 290 TFEU. 
Thus the claim that the concept of implementing act must be assessed in relation to the concept of delegated act 
would mean that since Article 290 TFEU (on delegated acts) deals with amendment of the actual wording, an 
implementing act cannot do so (despite Article 291 TFEU being silent on the manner, i.e. not containing an 
express prohibition to do so). Without this assessing of one in relation to the other, there would be no basis for 
claiming that an implementing act cannot be used to amend the wording of a legislative act. After all, Article 
291 TFEU does not deal with that issue, and there is no express ban on a implementing act doing so in Article 
290 TFEU either. 
790
 Page 49 
791
 Page 47 
792
 Page 43 
793
 The more detailed of the two criteria at issue in EUROPOL. See footnote 545. 
174 
 
the Commission’s act be delegated or implementing? How could one distinguish between 
different steps of the waterfall structure at issue in Visas where the criteria seem to have been 
highly similar if not identical, yet the first act in the structure was held to be implementing 
and the next delegated? 
Thus Ponzano’s approach fails both to rationalise Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and to explain 
how to deal with their “competition”. 
3.4.8. Kieran St C Bradley794 
Unlike the commentators considered above Bradley does not adhere to the thesis of mutual 
exclusivity of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. He argues that it is at least possible 
to imagine a secondary measure which is a delegated act as to its content, but an 
implementing act as to its raison d’être.795 
Furthermore, according to Bradley using the discretion of the Commission as the criterion for 
deciding whether a power is delegated or implementing could prove unworkable in practice. 
It is difficult to imagine any act, delegated or implementing, which would leave the 
Commission with no margin of discretion, so then the question is what margin of 
discretion would tip the balance in favour of a delegated act as opposed to an 
implementing act? Would a ‘considerable amount of discretion’ do the job? Is this the 
same as a ‘significant amount’, or would the Commission only be able to adopt 
implementing measures where its discretion was ‘insignificant’ in extent?796 
Admittedly these are exactly the sort of difficulties which the commentators clamouring for 
discretion of the grantee of power as the criterion seem to completely disregard. 
Unlike most commentators Bradley has also defended the ECJ’s decision in Biocides to look 
only for manifest errors in the choice between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Moreover, the Court’s holding in this regard reflects the absence of Treaty rules 
constraining the legislature’s choice. In effect, the Court held that the assessment of 
which type of act is appropriate for a particular secondary normative measure is a 
policy choice; in line with the established case law on judicial review of policy 
decisions, the Court will only interfere with such legislative assessments in very 
limited circumstances, such as a manifest error or abuse of power or procedure.
797
 The 
Court did not take up the Commission’s invitation to focus on ‘the nature and the 
purpose of the powers conferred on the Commission’,798 preferring instead to exercise 
marginal review of whether the legislature had laid down a complete legal framework. 
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Having carried out a prima facie examination of the different elements on which the 
Commission relied to demonstrate its powers were delegated rather than 
implementing, the Court concluded that the legislature had not committed any 
manifest error of appreciation or other abuse, in considering the basic regulation 
complied with this standard. 
/.../ 
The suggestion that in Biocides the Court concluded that ‘the more specific the 
“criteria and conditions” established by the EU legislature … the more reasonable a 
delegation of implementing powers’ appears to be predicated on the notion that the 
legality of a choice of secondary act is in some way a matter of degree. To succeed 
under the ‘manifest error’ test, however, the party challenging the choice of secondary 
act must demonstrate that the error or abuse is obvious; here the Commission had not 
been able to establish that the legislative framework was manifestly incomplete.
799
 
In the light of the case law discussed in section 3.2 above it is difficult to disagree with 
Bradley’s opinion or indeed improve on his very clear formulation of the point. 
3.4.9. Jürgen Bast800 
Like Bradley, Bast “falls out of line” compared to other academic commentators: he does not 
subscribe to the thesis of mutual exclusivity of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU nor does he 
adhere to the idea that discretion of the grantee of power could be used as a criterion to 
determine whether the power is delegated or implementing. If anything, Bast goes further 
than Bradley. What Bast seems to suggest is that there is no cardinal difference between 
Article 291 TFEU and the old Article 202 EC. 
Bast starts by recalling that “implementation” within the meaning of Article 202 EC was a 
very wide concept indeed – covering anything and everything from individual decisions to 
(orthographical) amendments of texts of basic acts.
801
 Comparing Article 202 EC with Article 
291 TFEU he opines that 
[t]he new functional definition [in Article 291 TFEU] is broad enough to cover the 
whole range of implementing acts adopted under the previous regime [Article 202 
EC].
802
 
Looking at the wording of the two provisions it is hard to disagree. It seems difficult to 
improve on the way Bast demonstrates the force of the point. 
Establishing uniform conditions for applying Union law may in some cases require 
regulations of a rather technical nature, such as designing a form to be applied by the 
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competent authorities, specifying data to be reported to the Commission, keeping a 
register of certified laboratories, and so forth. In other cases, ensuring uniformity may 
require making substantive determinations, either in the form of individual decisions 
addressed to a Member State or through acts of general application. In some cases, 
ensuring uniform implementation of a binding Union act may even require conferral 
on the Commission of the power to adopt individual measures addressed to private 
parties, thus replacing the Member States’ implementing authorities (so-called direct 
implementation of EU law). However, there is nothing in Article 291 TFEU that 
limits the procedural or substantive regulations made by the Commission (or 
exceptionally, the Council) to matters of a mere technical character.
803
 Any 
regulations that complement the provisions of the basic act will, by definition, further 
constrain the scope of implementing action left to the Member States and therefore 
contribute to enhancing uniformity in the application of the basic act. As a result, the 
scope of application of Article 291 TFEU does not fall short of what Article 202 EC 
had termed ‘implementation of rules’.804 
Bast’s conclusion is that the new language employed in the Lisbon Treaty does not make any 
real changes in respect of implementing acts.
805
 That would seem to direct one towards 
Article 290 TFEU as the “source” of changes in “implementing” within the meaning of 
Article 291 TFEU as compared to Article 202 EC. That brings Bast to the differences 
between Article 290 and 291 TFEU. After noting the two clear differences between them
806
 
Bast moves onto the most “popular” criterion for distinction between the two: the extent of 
discretion of the grantee of power. He is unimpressed, and argues that “legislation, 
supplementation, and implementation should not constitute a scale (and, by implication, a 
hierarchy) of highly, medium, and less essential rules.”807 
[S]uch essentialist understanding seems rather naïve in view of the complexities of a 
modern legal system. Attempts at deriving a formal hierarchy of norms from the 
substantive contents of the law are as old as the doctrine of the separation of powers 
itself. For example, the German constitutional lawyer Paul Laband invented in the 
1870s the distinction between executive laws in the substantive sense and mere 
implementation of laws in order to justify the Prussian King’s power to make 
autonomous regulations. However, the theoretical basis and empirical validity of the 
distinction between substantial Ergänzung (supplementation of laws) and mere 
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Ausführung (implementation of laws) have repeatedly been demystified and 
deconstructed. Even a norm that intends only to provide further detail or give effect to 
existing norms adds to the present normative framework. The extent to which the 
latter is changed is a matter of degree rather than of categorical distinction. Hence, a 
loaded concept of supplementation does not provide a solid ground for distinguishing 
delegated and implementing acts, with the effect of preventing the EU legislature 
from making political judgements, on a case-by-case basis, as to which control regime 
it considers proper for the conferred power at hand.
808
 
This accords rather well with the position taken by the ECJ in Visas: both with the express 
statement of irrelevance of discretion of the grantee of power as a criterion and with the fact 
that of two very similar acts of the Commission one could be implementing and the other – 
delegated. Bast’s point is that there is no reason to force upon the Parliament and the Council 
some pre-established (substantive) criterion which would classify grants of power into 
delegated and implementing; it should be their choice.
809
 He argues that  
[e]liminating the overlap area between delegated and implementing acts would thus 
deprive the EU legislature (and thus, the European Parliament) of its command over 
its own resources.
810
 
This is consistent with paragraph 40 of Biocides: not only with the ECJ’s decision that the EU 
legislature should have discretion in deciding whether to resort to Article 290 or to Article 
291 TFEU, but also with doubly loosened judicial review. It is likewise consistent with 
Bradley’s point on why the judicial review was loosened (policy choice811). 
Thus, according to Bast virtually any act could be adopted both as an implementing and as a 
delegated one; the only limitations are the clear differences to which he refers. 
3.4.10. Paul Craig812 
Craig’s views on the Article 290 and 291 TFEU issue have been set out above – in section 
3.4.1 when detailing the position expressed in the textbook he co-authored. However, unlike 
many other academic commentators dealing with the “competition” of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU Craig has considered the issue from the perspective of the position in which drafters of 
EU acts are placed in their everyday practice. He has concluded that the standard practice for 
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primary legislation is to make provision for both delegated and implementing acts, and that 
implementing acts are the principle vehicle for secondary measures.
813
 
On the level of individual acts Craig finds that ordinarily the recitals of a basic act contain 
some explanation why delegated acts were chosen for some grants of power, while 
implementing acts were chosen for others, i.e. why it is thought that some changes to an 
article of a basic act amend or supplement it, while in other situations there is no amendment 
or supplement. He has found that both the volume of such explanations as well as their 
adequacy varies considerably. 
The reality is that in most instances the preamble will simply state that a delegated act 
is needed or not as the case may be, without providing any indication as to why this 
should be so.
814
 
According to Craig this leads to the conclusion that 
the way in which the divide between delegated and implementing acts is applied does 
not immediately strike one as principled. What it also means is that it is very difficult 
to test the soundness of that divide, given the fragility of the definitional distinction 
between the two species of act, and given also that it would take a lifetime to test that 
fragile divide in the many circumstances in which it has been applied.
815
 
3.5. Discussion 
We have seen that all the commentators (bar, perhaps, Ponzano) share one point as common 
ground: an implementing act – at least to an extent – does change the act it is implementing 
(by modifying or adding to the normative content of that latter act). At the same time no 
commentator has been able to offer a workable distinction between implementing and 
delegated acts (or powers, if the commentator has approached the issue in such key).
816
 The 
ECJ has with perhaps uncharacteristic clarity held that the discretion of the grantee of power 
– the criterion proposed as the instrument for the distinction by most, if not all, commentators 
who have sought to draw the distinction – is irrelevant for determining whether an act comes 
under Article 290 or 291 TFEU.
817
 It has equally held irrelevant in this respect any other 
characteristic of grant of power.
818
 This seems to give credence to the position of the 
Commission that attempts to formulate the distinction will probably remain fruitless,
819
 and 
to the suggestion of Bast that adoption of any substantive criterion for drawing the distinction 
would be unworkable.
820
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Indeed the one clear distinction which has been drawn is formalistic, not substantive. As 
suggested by Jacqué the distinction between amending and supplementing is (by now) clear. 
Approving the Commission’s 2011 Guidelines the ECJ held in Connecting Europe Facility 
that that distinction is – like the notion of legislative act under Article 289 TFEU – 
formalistic. “Amending” means making orthographical changes to the text of the legislative 
act, whether those changes are substantive or not. Yet that is an intra-Article 290 TFEU
821
 
distinction. It simply seems to “sharpen” the point where the difficulty of dealing with 
“competition” of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU lies: the distinction between supplementing and 
implementing. 
By the time of handing down the judgment in Connecting Europe Facility the ECJ had 
already held that the grantor of power (“the EU legislature”) has a discretion in choosing 
which article to resort to – Article 290 or 291 TFEU – and that the ECJ would review that 
choice only for manifest error in the reasonableness of the grantor’s opinion that the grantor 
could have resorted to the article to which it did resort.
822
 Existence of discretion in respect of 
the choice between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU necessarily means that they are not mutually 
exclusive: that there are situations where either of them may be lawfully resorted to.
823
 If they 
were mutually exclusive in the sense that in any given situation only a particular one of them 
could lawfully be chosen, there could simply have been no discretion in deciding which to 
choose; the choice would have been conditioned by strict application of some rule of law. 
Combined with the ECJ’s – by now steadfast824 – refusal to postulate that that choice is based 
on objective criteria it gives considerable support to Bradley’s argument that the choice is one 
of policy, i.e. extra-legal.
825
 When dealing with the choice between Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU it should be further added that it is clear from ESMA that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
do not constitute the complete framework for grant of (normative) power by the Parliament 
and the Council. According to the ECJ nothing precludes the grant of (normative) power to 
EU agencies in spite of them not being mentioned in either of those articles. 
Speaking of objective criteria, it is clear that the doctrine of essential elements applies in 
respect of both Article 290 TFEU and Article 291 TFEU. While only the former contains a 
reference to it, in Frontex (both initiated and decided after the Lisbon Treaty came into force) 
the ECJ formulated the doctrine by reference to (as applying to) legislative acts, not by 
reference to acts which are adopted under legislative acts. Applying to all legislative acts, it 
equally limits what may remain undecided in a legislative act, whether that legislative act 
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resorts to acts mentioned in Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU or indeed an ESMA-style 
grant of power.
826
 
It should be further noted that none of the academic commentators has managed to present a 
tenable overall approach to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Several have attempted to do so – 
Schütze, Jacqué, Ponzano (usually by suggesting something along the lines of legislative 
Article 290 TFEU vs executive Article 291 TFEU) – but all such accounts ultimately fail. 
That is not to say that they would be untenable within the realm of political science,
827
 simply 
that the legal argumentation presented therein is incoherent. In this respect it should be 
mentioned that all the narratives purporting to show that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU made 
substantial changes to the pre-existing system of grant of power are either affected by that 
incoherence or ultimately come down to unsubstantiated postulations by their authors.
828
 No 
legally viable argument showing that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU substantially affected the 
pre-existing system has been made. 
Now that there is case law on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU the fundamental issue seems to be 
capable of being put thus: what single legal explanation can be given for all the decisions of 
the ECJ in point? If a non-complete legal explanation is to be preferred,
829
 then (i) which 
decision(s) of the ECJ is (are) wrong, (ii) how are they wrong and (iii) what suggests that the 
ECJ will fix its error?
830
 More simply still, how does one decide whether recourse to Article 
290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU is lawful? 
What is it that needs to be explained? In Biocides the ECJ stated that  
the purpose of granting a delegated power is to achieve the adoption of rules coming 
within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act,
831
 
while in case of conferral of implementing power the grantee 
is called on to provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in 
order to ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member 
States.
832
 
To that should be added that supplementing (within the meaning of Article 290 TFEU) means 
“fleshing out [legislative] act”, that is the 
development in detail of non-essential elements of the legislation in question that the 
legislature has not specified,
833
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and that in EUROPOL the measure was held implementing because there was a defined 
framework.
834
 One could be pardoned for seeing no difference between the latter two quotes, 
despite the fact that the former of these two is about Article 291 TFEU, while the latter – 
about Article 290 TFEU. Looking at what the ECJ actually decided in its judgments, in 
Biocides the ECJ held that 
the mere fact that the basic regulation provided that the fees must be set at a level 
which ensures that the [European Chemicals] Agency’s costs are covered and takes 
account of the specific features of SMEs, and that SMEs may pay by instalments, /.../ 
comprise[d] a ‘complete legal framework’ [regarding the system of fees].835 
It is important to note the text in the square brackets: the framework of fees was held to be 
complete, not just the framework for placing biocides on the market.
836
 
In EURES recourse to Article 291 TFEU was held lawful as long as what was decided in the 
act adopted on the basis of a grant of power in a legislative act fell “within the scope of the 
essential general aim pursued by that” legislative act.837 Hence, for instance, (i) creation of a 
completely new body and (ii) requiring that body to be consulted by the Commission before 
the latter further exercises the power granted to it by the legislative act
838
 did not require an 
Article 290 TFEU act; an Article 291 TFEU act was perfectly sufficient. 
In EUROPOL the following two provisions were held to constitute complete legal 
frameworks, the first setting out which countries the Council may add onto the list of 
countries with which EUROPOL was to conclude cooperation agreements, the second in 
respect of data protection requirements.
839
 
In so far as it is necessary for the performance of its tasks, Europol may also establish 
and maintain cooperative relations with third states.
840
 
Europol may, under the conditions laid down in Article 24(1), transmit to the entities 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article personal data, where Europol has concluded 
with the entity concerned an agreement as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article 
which permits the transmission of such data on the basis of an assessment of the 
existence of an adequate level of data protection ensured by that entity.
841
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With respect, the first of these sets no conditions at all. In effect in EUROPOL it seems to 
have been decided that a determination of a task amounts to a framework, and a complete one 
at that, within the meaning of paragraph 39 of Biocides.
842
 And that when there is a complete 
framework, the act which is adopted on the basis of a legislative act may be implementing; it 
does not have to be delegated (despite the fact that in Biocides the ECJ referred to a 
framework when speaking of delegated acts
843
). As to the second, a lot could be said about its 
(in)completeness. As to the framework at issue in Biocides something has been said about its 
incompleteness.
844
 
If determination of a task amounts to a framework, and one is needed and sufficient for both 
delegated and implementing acts, then not only the purported statements of law in paragraphs 
39 of Biocides and 41 of Connecting Europe Facility seem indistinguishable. The statements 
made in paragraphs 38 and 39 of Biocides are likewise indistinguishable. This latter point is 
brought home by Visas. There it was held that an act essentially establishing a temporary visa 
requirement for all citizens of a third state could lawfully be adopted “as a delegated act” – in 
spite of the fact that an act essentially establishing a temporary visa requirement for some 
citizens only of that same third state was adopted “as an implementing act” and the 
lawfulness of that latter act was not put into question.
845
 It is submitted that there simply is no 
difference from this perspective between the two acts considered in Visas.
846
 
In fact, in the light of Visas, one could question the reason for referring to a regulatory 
framework at all. What does postulating a regulatory framework do? It sets out some legal 
rules regulating an area without necessarily thrashing out all of them. Why is having a 
framework necessary? Because in a situation where somebody else is asked to thrash out all 
the rules required to actually apply the law, the framework sets some bridges which that 
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someone else cannot cross. Why does it do so? There would seem to be two possible answers. 
First, because the rules formulated in a framework must be formulated by whomever 
formulated the framework. Second, to limit what the somebody else might decide.  
As a matter of EU law the first cannot be the answer to the question “Why does case law on 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU refer to a regulatory framework?” The first basically corresponds 
to the doctrine of essential elements. That is a distinct doctrine which (according to 
Frontex
847
) has a much wider application than Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. It certainly 
applies to all legislative acts. Thus it would, for instance, apply in situations where the grant 
of power is in the style of ESMA, i.e. to an EU agency in which case Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU simply do not apply. 
The second explanation is likewise unavailable as a matter of EU law. The second 
explanation essentially says that the framework limits discretion of the grantee of power. Yet, 
in Visas the Grand Chamber of the ECJ very clearly stated that any such discretion is simply 
irrelevant for deciding whether recourse should be had to Article 290 TFEU or to Article 291 
TFEU. It thus stands to reason that the “framework” does not go to the issue of how to 
distinguish fields of application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
848
 
Looking at Biocides, EURES, Visas, EUROPOL and Connecting Europe Facility – both at 
was said and at what was ultimately decided – there does not seem to be much between 
delegated and implementing acts at all.
849
 The tests for engagement of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU are stated in indistinguishable terms. Looking at ultimate rulings (rather than tests 
postulated in the main body of the judgments), of indistinguishable acts some were held 
delegated and some implementing.  
It is true that (aside from in Connecting Europe Facility, which turned on a different issue – 
amending vs supplementing) the applicant failed in all cases. Thus it might be argued that the 
decisions came down not so much to substantive law as to the doubly-loosened standard of 
review which the ECJ opted for. With respect, that would be missing the point. It does not 
matter why a particular recourse to Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU is allowed to 
stand: because it is substantively correct or because it is not so wrong as to cause the ECJ to 
intervene. The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial here: in 
practice – as a result of application of totality of EU law – the consequence is that there is not 
much in it between implementing and delegated acts. 
The distinction between the two has never been starkly put by the ECJ. The academic 
commentators were the ones who have engaged in making it. Yet by doing so they would 
seem to be trying to draw a distinction where there is none on their own argument. They all 
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(bar, perhaps, Ponzano) accept that an implementing act – at least to an extent – changes the 
act it is implementing. In other words that Article 290 TFEU and Article 291 TFEU acts are 
indistinguishable (at least as far as supplementing and implementing go). If that is the 
premise, how could a distinction be drawn? 
This would suggest that Bast is ultimately correct: virtually any act could be adopted both as 
an implementing and as a delegated one.
850
 So are Bradley and the Parliament: the choice 
between the two is political.
851
 These opinions would seem to be supported by that expressed 
in all the textbooks to the effect that the distinction is unclear and further specifically by that 
of Chalmers, Davies and Monti to the effect that it is intentionally unclear.
852
 More 
importantly the ECJ has held – in EURES853 – that its prior case law on implementing power, 
the old Article 202 EC implementing power, was still relevant and applicable in respect 
implementing power when Article 291 TFEU is the relevant provision. That would seem to 
confirm Bast’s contention that language of the TFEU does not support the suggestion that the 
TFEU departed in any significant sense from the EC Treaty in this respect. Indeed it would 
support the contention that not much changed in general. 
This brings one back to Jacqué’s854 contention that the source of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
should be looked for in the article of Justus Lipsius. The latter did suggest that comitology be 
“treatified”, i.e. set forth in the treaties. Looking at Article 290 TFEU and at the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny created by decision 2006/512 – they are basically the same thing (as 
admitted by the Commission and several commentators). Thus it would seem fair to say that 
that was what the Lisbon Treaty actually did. It “treatified” the comitology – to an extent. 
Regulatory procedure with scrutiny became Article 290 TFEU and reference to controls by 
member states was inserted in Article 291 TFEU. 
“Controls” seems to be actually pretty much the only common thread running through all the 
sources considered above: the judgments of the ECJ, the other EU instruments and opinions 
of every single commentator. Why? It would seem fair to suggest that because that is what 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU deal with.  Let us take a step back and just consider the two 
provisions. Article 290 TFEU reads as follows. 
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act. 
The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be 
reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation 
of power. 
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2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is 
subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its 
component members, and the Council by a qualified majority. 
3. The adjective "delegated" shall be inserted in the title of delegated acts. 
Article 291 TFEU reads as follows. 
1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement 
legally binding Union acts. 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, 
those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified 
specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the Council. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
lay down in advance the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for 
control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers. 
4. The word "implementing" shall be inserted in the title of implementing acts. 
They deal with controls. Who controls the exercise of granted power and how he controls it. 
What is it that they do not deal with? What is conspicuous by its absence? – Rules on acts 
and on power. Neither article says anything about how delegated or implementing acts, as the 
case may be, are to be adopted.
855
 What the grantee of power, adopter of delegated and 
implementing acts, is to do. Nor does either article deal exhaustively with the question of 
who might the grantee of power be or when the grantor (the EU legislature) may grant power 
to a grantee: the ECJ is ESMA has said that entities not mentioned in either of the two articles 
may just as well be granted just as normative a power as the Commission which is mentioned 
in both articles.
856
 There is no other provision in the constitutive treaties which deals with 
these issues. This is in stark contrast with legislative acts: Articles 289 and 294 TFEU deal 
with who is to adopt legislative acts and how he is to adopt them. They do not deal with how 
that adopter is to be controlled. 
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section. 
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Looking back, the 1999 comitology decision and the decision which amended it in 2006 
explain that they are about the conditions under which the Commission is to exercise the 
power granted to it. Not about grant of the power or what the Commission is to do with it or 
how the Commission is to draft and then adopt the act. Decision 2006/512 – which is the 
spiritual ancestor of Article 290 TFEU
857
 – contains, for instance, the following recital. 
[1999 comitology decision] should be amended in order to introduce a new type of 
procedure for the exercise of implementing powers, the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny, which allows the legislator to oppose the adoption of draft measures where it 
indicates that the draft exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the basic 
instrument, or that the draft is incompatible with the aim or the content of that 
instrument or fails to respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality.
858
 
It also inserted the following recital into the 1999 comitology decision as recital 7a. 
It is necessary to follow the regulatory procedure with scrutiny as regards measures of 
general scope which seek to amend non-essential elements of a basic instrument 
adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty, 
inter alia by deleting some of those elements or by supplementing the instrument by 
the addition of new nonessential elements. This procedure should enable the two arms 
of the legislative authority to scrutinise such measures before they are adopted. The 
essential elements of a legislative act may only be amended by the legislator on the 
basis of the Treaty. 
These passages speak not of power of the grantee, but of controls over its exercise. 
Thus Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are not actually about grant of power or about acts at all. 
They are mechanisms for control over the exercise of the power granted.
859
 “Delegated act” 
and “implementing act” are not types of acts, they are simply shorthands for different types of 
controls prescribed by the TFEU over the activities of the grantee of a power and the 
situations in which those controls are to apply. Consequently to speak of “delegated power” 
or “implementing power”, or “delegated act” or “implementing act” in any sense aside from a 
shorthand reference makes no sense. There are no two different types of power of the grantee 
or two different types of acts, simply because Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are not about types 
of power of the grantee or about types of acts. They do mention power which might be 
granted, but they do not specify it (its extent, for instance). Same is true in respect of acts. 
What they do specify is the controls. 
Looking at whether that fits with the judgments of the ECJ, it would seem to. It explains the 
existence of discretion of the EU legislature and the lightness of the ECJ’s review of exercise 
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of that discretion. Since neither Article 290 nor Article 291 TFEU formulates any (type of) 
power of the grantee (the Commission), the power is the constant: the choice is simply which 
controls this power should be subjected to. Just like it was the case under 1999 comitology 
decision as amended in 2006. Hence discretion of the legislature. That discretion – as pointed 
out by Bradley and the Parliament – is a political question, not a legal one. Hence the light 
review and no reference to objective criteria. That discretion – to choose between controls – 
also explains why in indistinguishable situations the ECJ deemed perfectly lawful recourse to 
Article 290 TFEU in some of them, and to Article 291 TFEU in others. That is because it was 
for the EU legislature to choose on the basis of political considerations which controls to opt 
for: Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU ones. As long as the triggers for an article (be it 
Article 290 or 291 TFEU) have been pulled, recourse to that article is lawful. That triggers of 
the other one have been pulled simultaneously and thus recourse to it is also lawful does not 
change that. 
One could object that this approach contradicts Connecting Europe Facility. That there the 
ECJ clearly held that the power was a power to amend.
860
 Furthermore why did it hold that in 
amending the basic act while it could only supplement it, the Commission infringed 
the rules of competence laid down in Article 290 TFEU[?]
861
 
Why would this matter at all if the same controls would apply in both “amending” and 
“supplementing” situations of Article 290 TFEU? In choosing to annul a delegated act 
because it amended rather than supplemented a legislative act, the ECJ might be argued to 
have shown that amending and supplementing are types of acts after all.  
The problem is merely ostensible. The objective attained is the same regardless of whether a 
legislative act is amended or supplemented (within the meaning of Connecting Europe 
Facility). That is amply demonstrated by the fact that the Commission’s act there at issue was 
annulled pending adoption of the same act as a supplementing one. Thus the result does not 
change whether we are dealing with amending or supplementing: the normative content of 
the legislative act is amended in equal measure in both cases.
862
 Nor do the actions of the 
Commission in adopting it change. What does change is the accessibility of the result 
(whether the amending act will need to be separately found on Eur-lex or whether the change 
will be consolidated into the legislative act). While that seems not to be about controls, it is in 
reality about the form which the exercise of power granted to the Commission should take. 
Specifically, not tinkering with the wording of the legislative act. Thus the amending vs 
supplementing distinction is simply a particular specification of the form of exercise of 
power. In other words it is the grantor (the EU legislature) controlling an aspect of exercise of 
the power. Thus it is, in reality, about controls. It does not go to (the substance of) the power 
itself. 
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What that distinction does bring us to is the question why any review at all was postulated in 
paragraph 40 of Biocides and why a review of manifest errors is actually good enough. It will 
be recalled that Christiansen and Dobbels bewailed the step back which they alleged the 
Lisbon Treaty to have made compared to the immediately preceding position of EU law in 
that the Lisbon Treaty was said to provide no criteria for deciding whether to have recourse to 
Article 290 TFEU or to Article 291 TFEU.
863
 Being both trigger-based,
864
 Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU actually contain such criteria. Bast calls them hard limits.
865
 The controls set forth 
in Article 290 TFEU are obligatorily mandated if the Commission is given power to tinker 
with the wording of a legislative act. Article 291 TFEU controls must not be used in such a 
situation. Thus the discretion of the EU legislature is wide, but not absolute: there are 
situations where it is legally constrained to choose recourse to one article over the other. But 
– in part because of the distinction between amending and supplementing being formalistic866 
– it is normally abundantly clear simply by looking at the situation if those constraints have 
been breached. Thus even the doubly-loosened review is perfectly sufficient to determine 
whether in a given situation the limits of that discretion were breached. On the other hand, as 
long as the legislature stays within those limits, the ECJ does not interfere, and the doubly-
loosened review ensures that; when both articles are triggered, the question whether to opt for 
Article 290 TFEU or for Article 291 TFEU controls is – as Bradley and the Parliament put it 
– political. Thus the reason why in none of Biocides, EURES and Visas the acts at issue were 
annulled (and why in Smoke Flavourings the failure to adopt an act was not held 
disproportional) lies in the fact that in none of those cases were the limits breached, that both 
articles were triggered in all those cases; in other words they were cases of (uniform) 
supplementing vs implementing where the EU legislature has a political choice whether to 
opt for Article 290 TFEU or for Article 291 TFEU or for none at all (in case of Smoke 
Flavourings). Smoke Flavourings further demonstrates that even the decision whether to 
resort to any grant of power is political. Finally, this explains why Craig and de Búrca’s 
criticism of the discretion of the grantor is ill-conceived.
867
 Speaking of Craig, this approach 
also explains why 
the way in which the divide between delegated and implementing acts is applied does 
not immediately strike one as principled.
868
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It does not strike one as principled, because outside the (hard) limits it isn’t nor does it need 
to be. 
References to delegated or amending or supplementing or implementing power or acts in the 
ECJ’s judgments should thus be read as shorthands: the ECJ employs the same language as 
the constitutive treaties do. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that not all judges agree on 
these things (this actually seems likely) and that at least initially the ECJ toiled somewhat 
trying to make sense of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU resulting in some – initial – 
inconsistencies.
869
 As for references to “framework” which appeared in Biocides and have 
been repeated since, it could be argued that they constitute exactly such an inconsistency. 
Admittedly the better opinion would be – especially in the light of the similarity of ways in 
which references to “framework” have been put in relation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in 
Biocides and EUROPOL – that the existence of a framework is required for either of those 
articles to be engaged (the EU legislature has to decide something; it cannot leave the 
grantees of power even the formulation of the questions to be decided). As long as there is 
some framework (even as “thin” as the one contained in article 23(1) of the EUROPOL 
decision) Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are engaged (although resort to them is by no means 
obligatory). When they are not engaged, their controls do not apply. That would, in turn, 
mean that the grant of power would have its lawfulness judged under Meroni and, perhaps, 
ESMA.
870
 
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this section 3, viz. “How do Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU relate to legislative acts and legislative power? Are the powers referred to in 
both of them legislative? Or only in one of them? In that case which one? Or might neither 
article be about a power which is legislative? If the power to which set forth is legislative, are 
the acts adopted on their basis likewise legislative? If no, then why not?, it is possible to 
answer the first by saying “they do not”. Neither article is about acts or power of the grantee; 
both use “acts” as a shorthand and both assume existence of granted power and at least two 
level of acts: the granting one and the one adopted in exercise of granted power. They don’t 
even necessarily regulate powers of control of the grantor: they are merely default catalogues 
of mechanisms of control which the grantor of power (ordinarily the Council and the 
Parliament acting jointly) may employ. After that answer to the first question, there is no 
need to answer the others. 
Thus, the question whether Article 290 and 291 TFEU power or acts are legislative cannot 
arise. Posing it is a category error. 
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4. Legislative acts and non-legislative acts 
4.1. Introduction 
Article 289(3) TFEU says that legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute 
legislative acts. Article 288 TFEU mentions the following legal acts: regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions. Article 289(1) TFEU mentions ordinary legislative 
procedure; Article 289(2) TFEU mentions special legislative procedure. They read as 
follows. 
Article 289(1) TFEU: The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint 
adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or 
decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 
294. 
Article 289(2) TFEU: In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption 
of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the 
participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European 
Parliament, shall constitute a special legislative procedure. 
It thus stands to reason that legislative acts are regulations, directives and decisions adopted 
via ordinary or special legislative procedure. It has been shown in section 2 of this thesis that 
there is no requirement flowing from Article 289 TFEU (or Article 294 TFEU in case of 
ordinary legislative procedure) in respect of content of an act adopted via legislative 
procedure. The ECJ in its judgment in case C-77/11 seems furthermore to have held (as 
likewise discussed in section 2 of this thesis) that an act, which is neither a regulation nor a 
directive nor a decision, adopted via special legislative procedure does not constitute a 
legislative act for the purposes of Article 289 TFEU.
871
 
Based on the analysis contained in section 2 of this thesis it would thus seem that legislative 
act is quite a clear concept of EU law: a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via 
ordinary or special legislative procedure. All other acts are not legislative. 
4.2. Academic commentators 
4.2.1. Consistent views 
It is surprising, however, that far from all academic commentators subscribe to such a view. 
One of the few examples of an explicit acceptance of such a concept of legislative act comes 
from Nicola Lupo and Giovanni Piccirilli. They have simply stated as a fact that 
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in short, a ‘legislative act’ is no more than a binding legal act based on a Treaty 
provision that is explicitly providing a legislative competence,
872
 
as well as that 
the features of the legal [system] of the EU /.../ did not encourage the /.../ European 
[Court] to adopt a concept of legislation similar to the one prevailing in most of [its] 
member states, nor to verify whether the minimum procedural requirements needed in 
order to have a ‘law’ were respected.873 
This is confirmed by their acceptance that 
according to the Treaties, there is no difference whatsoever between a Regulation 
approved under the ordinary legislative procedure (in which the participation of the 
European Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council) and that approved under 
a special legislative procedure (in which the European Parliament plays a minor 
role).
874
 
Another acceptance of such a concept of legislative act may be found in the textbook by Paul 
Craig and Gráinne De Búrca who state that 
the definition of legislative act is purely formal. This follows from the wording of 
Article 289(3) TFEU: any legal act, whether in the form of regulation, a directive, or a 
decision, which is enacted in accordance with the ordinary or special legislative 
procedure is a legislative act for the purposes of the Treaty of Lisbon.
875
 
They further state that the content of the act is irrelevant for determining whether it is 
legislative or not.
876
 They do however raise the issue of legislative nature of such acts which 
under the Lisbon Treaty would not be legislative.
877
 It would therefore seem that while they 
accept the position akin to the one formulated in section 4.1 as positive EU law, that 
acceptance does not amount to an endorsement: they do consider it problematic. 
Michael Dougan seems to accept that the Lisbon Treaty “settles on” a concept of legislative 
act akin to the one formulated in section 4.1.
878
 What is less clear is whether he considers that 
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such a concept exhausts the meaning of “legislative act” in EU law, viz. whether some other 
acts are legislative in addition to those which constitute a regulation, a directive or a decision 
adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure. In any case he offers a fierce criticism 
of the concept formulated in the introduction to this section.
879
 
Finally Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast might be read as at least supporting this 
concept (although a different reading is possible). They accept that 
it is hardly possible to normatively distinguish the legislative and executive functions 
at the abstract Verbandskompetenz level with sufficient precision.
880
 
The concept formulated in section 4.1 (on the basis of the analysis of legislative procedures 
contained in section 2 of this thesis) would obviate the problem to which they allude. None of 
those discussed in section 4.2.2 (bar that of Konstadinides) would. 
4.2.2. Inconsistent views 
Section 2.3.1 contained a detailed discussion of the view promoted by Alexander Türk: acts 
adopted via ordinary legislative procedure and via such special legislative procedures where 
consent of both the Council and the Parliament is required for their adoption are legislative; 
no other acts are.
881
 This coincides substantially with his view regarding the position under 
the EC Treaty.
882
 Türk was writing about the Constitutional Treaty rather than the Treaty of 
Lisbon, but the procedural side of the issue is the same in the Constitutional Treaty and in the 
Lisbon Treaty.
883
 What his contention does not seemingly coincide with is the language of 
Article 289 TFEU and the language of paragraph 60 of the ECJ’s judgment in case C-77/11. 
For instance, according to the understanding formulated in section 4.1, measures adopted on 
the basis of Article 126(14)(2) TFEU
884
 would be legislative. According to Türk, they would 
not. The opposite is the case with the budget of the EU: according to the ECJ the act of the 
president of the Parliament adopted on the basis of Article 314(9) TFEU and endowing the 
budget of the EU with binding force is not legislative,
885
 while according to Türk it would 
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seem to be legislative because the consent of both the Parliament and the Council is needed 
before the president of the Parliament may lawfully adopt said act.
886
 
A different view from Türk’s but equally inconsistent with the law as formulated in section 
4.1 has been advocated by Eva Nieto-Garrido and Isaac Martin Delgado.
887
 
The elimination of the pillar structure and the introduction of the principle of 
hierarchy of norms has the result that in areas where fundamental rights are at stake, 
the relevant matter will be regulated by European law or framework law [for the 
purposes of Lisbon Treaty: acts adopted via ordinary or special legislative 
procedure]. According to this criterion, norms that may have an impact on 
fundamental rights will be established through the ordinary legislative procedure in 
which the Council and the Parliament will act as co-legislators. 
The logic of the Union’s normative system in this field enables us to draw the 
conclusion that the criterion to be used in deciding which normative instrument 
should be used in a particular policy will not only depend on whether the act contains 
basic policy choice, but also on whether the act may have an impact on fundamental 
rights.
888
 
They go on to say that 
[t]he principle of hierarchy of norms introduced into the Union’s legal system by the 
Constitutional Treaty will divide normative instruments into legislative and non-
legislative instruments,
889
 
and that 
[p]rimary law (European laws and framework laws) will be adopted via the ordinary 
legislative procedure.
890
 
Leaving aside the incorrect contention that European laws and framework laws were to be 
adopted via ordinary legislative procedure (under Article I-34(2) of the Constitutional Treaty 
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they could be adopted via special legislative procedure), Nieto-Garrido and Delgado seem to 
contend that instruments containing a basic policy choice as well as those impacting on 
fundamental rights must be legislative ones: according to sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
paragraph 1 of Article I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty European laws and framework laws 
could only be legislative acts. The point about policy choices seems to be essentially 
equivalent to the requirement that 
the adoption of rules essential to the subject-matter envisaged is reserved to the 
legislature of the European Union/.../ The essential rules governing the matter in 
question must be laid down in the basic legislation and may not be delegated/.../
891
 
While no such rule is expressly contained in Article 289 TFEU, the proposition that any 
instrument containing a basic policy choice must necessarily be a legislative one would seem 
tempting, especially considering that Frontex was handed down after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty and that the issue in dispute was the validity of an instrument likewise 
adopted after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. There can therefore be no doubt about 
Frontex being good law under the Lisbon Treaty. It should be stressed that the proposition 
advocated by Nieto-Garrido and Delgado does not seem to go so far as suggesting that 
legislative acts could not contain anything other than basic policy choices. A basic policy 
choice is seen as a sufficient condition for something being a legislative act, not a necessary 
one.
892
 Thus at first glance the position of Nieto-Garrido and Delgado would not, strictly 
speaking, seem to contradict the position formulated in section 4.1. It could be understood as 
saying that an instrument containing a basic policy choice would need to be a regulation, a 
directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure. Article 289 
TFEU would simply be supplemented by the rule on essential elements. 
On a closer look, however, such reconciliation shows itself to be untenable. In Frontex the 
ECJ followed its aforequoted statement (see the text to footnote 891) with the following one. 
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Thus, provisions which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling within 
the responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be delegated.
893
 
This statement is not new. It echoes back to a statement of law which the ECJ had made in 
the early 1980s. 
[T]he limits of the powers conferred on the Commission by a specific provision of the 
Treaty are to be inferred not from a general principle, but from an interpretation of the 
particular wording of the provision in question, in this case Article 90, analysed in the 
light of its purpose and its place in the scheme of the Treaty.
894
 
Thus the fact that most provisions of the constitutive treaties confer a particular power (in 
joined cases 188-190/80: the power to adopt general measures) on one institution (the 
Council) in no way indicates that in some particular instance a similar power could not have 
been conferred by those same constitutive treaties on another institution (the Commission).
895
 
Returning to Frontex, the issue in dispute there was whether a particular provision could have 
been adopted by the Council alone acting in exercise of the power granted to it by a 
regulation of the Parliament and the Council or whether that provision could only be adopted 
by the Parliament and the Council acting together directly on the basis of the constitutive 
treaties – in other words whether the adoption of the provision was within or without the 
power granted to the Council. The ECJ held that since the provision amounted to a basic 
policy choice, it was without that power. 
That was so, however, not by virtue of some general principle requiring all political choices 
of the EU to be made by “the legislature”,896 but because the provision amounted to a 
“political [choice] within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature”. By “the 
European Union legislature” the ECJ meant the Council and the Parliament acting jointly. 
The rule on essential elements does not postulate a general principle overruling explicit rules 
of constitutive treaties on conferral of powers. Each institution must still act within the limits 
of its powers as required by Article 13(2) TFEU. What the rule on essential elements does 
say is that (i) it is a privilege of each institution to adopt essential rules in respect of issues 
falling – according to the constitutive treaties – within that institution’s competence and (ii) 
that all other institutions are permanently disabled from adopting such essential rules (bar a 
change of the constitutive treaties).
897
 Put bluntly, the rule on essential elements cannot 
repartition the explicit allocation of powers contained in the constitutive treaties. 
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 Judgement of the ECJ in joined cases 188-190/80 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of 
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 188-190/88, paragraph 7 
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 At least if “the legislature” is seen as something other than a shorthand referring to the entity empowered by 
the constitutive treaties to adopt a given rule. 
897
 This seems to have been decided and relied on as long ago as in Rey Soda (see the end of section 3.2.9 
above), although the point was not then formulated by the ECJ in so explicit terms. Importantly, however, Rey 
Soda was decided after Köster which is one of the early cases in the Frontex line of case law. 
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Article 112 TFEU (which reproduces Article III-170(3) of the Constitutive Treaty verbatim) 
would seem an example of a provision of the constitutive treaties which provision allocates 
the power of making a (basic) political choice to the Council alone.
898
 It reads as follows. 
In the case of charges other than turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of 
indirect taxation, remissions and repayments in respect of exports to other Member 
States may not be granted and countervailing charges in respect of imports from 
Member States may not be imposed unless the measures contemplated have been 
previously approved for a limited period by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
Considering that the EU functions as a single market with free movement of goods it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to imagine a more basic policy choice for the EU than 
reintroduction of countervailing charges on imports from one member state to another. Yet 
the constitutive treaties have reserved that choice to the Council.
899
 The Parliament is not 
involved at all in making that choice. It is submitted that that provision alone makes it 
impossible to reconcile the position advocated by Nieto-Garrido and Delgado and the 
position as it stands under Article 289 TFEU. According to Nieto-Garrido and Delgado acts 
adopted on the basis of Article 112 TFEU would be legislative for they would contain a 
(basic) policy choice. It may be pointed out that Article 112 TFEU is not wholly exception in 
this respect; there are other provisions of the constitutive treaties, for instance Article 66 
TFEU, in respect of which the same argument could be made. 
According to the position formulated in section 4.1 acts adopted on the basis of Article 112 
TFEU (or Article 66 TFEU) would not constitute legislative acts for they would not be 
adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure. Acts containing policy choices, even 
basic ones, need not be legislative acts within the meaning explained in section 4.1. Nieto-
Garrido and Delgado advocate some other concept of legislative act compared to the one 
formulated in section 4.1; reconciliation is impossible. 
The same is true of their second contention: that instruments impacting on fundamental rights 
are legislative (they contend further that such instruments would need to be adopted via 
ordinary legislative procedure). In the broad sense any instrument of law which has any effect 
vis-à-vis a private party impacts on that party’s fundamental rights. Assuming that what was 
meant was an impact of a certain magnitude and not just any impact, it is still easy to see that 
that concept of legislation is different from the one formulated in section 4.1. First, it would 
seem reasonable to assume that Nieto-Garrido and Delgado imply some criterion of 
generality into their statement: if they did not, it would be arguable that the single most 
impactful instrument on the fundamental rights of a private party which the EU has ever 
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 To the extent that the Council cannot act without the Commission’s proposal it could be argued that the 
power is held jointly by the Commission and the Council. The Parliament is, in any event, not involved at all. 
899
 To the extent that the Council cannot act without the Commission’s proposal it could be argued that the 
power is held jointly by the Commission and the Council. The Parliament is, in any event, not involved at all. 
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adopted would be a fining decision of the Commission.
900
 Thus either such fining decisions 
are legislative for Nieto-Garrido and Delgado or one must imply some test of nature 
(presumably of generality) into their statement. Both these possibilities postulate some other 
concept of legislation compared to the one formulated in section 4.1: one possibility assumes 
that the Commission may adopt legislative acts, the other possibility prescribes certain nature 
for legislative acts. Neither is compatible with the concept formulated in section 4.1. Second, 
even dealing with “general” instruments it is submitted that the Commission’s regulations in 
the field of competition law or, for instance, the instruments which the regulation at issue in 
Visas
901
 empowered the Commission to adopt could have a considerable impact on 
fundamental rights of the private persons concerned.
902
 Moreover, in paragraph 52 of 
EUROPOL the ECJ expressly accepted the legality of Article 291 TFEU acts (“implementing 
acts”) which have serious consequences for fundamental rights of citizens. Thus in EU law 
there are in any case instruments which would be legislative according to Nieto-Garrido and 
Delgado but would not be legislative according to the understanding formulated section 4.1. 
A similar position to that of Nieto-Garrido and Delgado in respect of policy choices has also 
been advocated by Paolo Stancanelli who, writing about the Constitutional Treaty, has opined 
that 
les politiques prévues par la Constitution sont d’abord mises en œuvre par des actes 
législatifs puis, si nécessaire, sont mieux détaillées par des actes executifs.
903
 
His position seems irreconcilable with the one formulated in section 4.1 for the same reasons 
as that of Nieto-Garrido and Delgado. Writing in the same volume as Stancanelli, Paolo 
Ponzano seems to have advocated what seems a yet further concept of legislation. 
[L]e Conseil maintiendra un pouvoir legislative autonome dans des manières 
politiquement sensible (par example, la politique fiscal et sociale), 
/.../ 
La Convention avait eu la tendence à octroyer un pouvoir législatif autonome au 
Conseil dans les matières politiquement sensible ou la règle de l’unanimité a était 
maintenu, mais ce critère n’a pas été appliqué systematiquement.904 
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 At the time of writing possibly the one imposing a fine of some € 2.93 billion on certain manufacturers of 
lorries. The decision itself has not been published, but the information about it is available at 
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 See section 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
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 Such impact of competition law was expressly recognised by the ECJ in its judgment in case C-501/11P 
Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v European Commission. 
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 Le système décisionnel de l’Union, in Giuliano Amato, Herve Bribosia and Bruno De Witte (eds.), Genèse et 
destinée de la Constitution européenne: commentaire du traité étabilissant une Constitution pour l'Europe à la 
lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d'avenir (2007 Bruylant), pages 515 and 516. Paolo Stancanelli 
is a Principal Legal Adviser in the Legal Service of the Commission in the field of state aids and dumping. 
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 Les institutions de l’Union in Giuliano Amato, Herve Bribosia and Bruno De Witte (eds.), Genèse et destinée 
de la Constitution européenne: commentaire du traité étabilissant une Constitution pour l'Europe à la lumière 
des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d'avenir (2007 Bruylant), page 481 
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It is clear that no act adopted by the Council alone could be legislative within the meaning of 
Article 289 TFEU as commonly understood. According to that statement of Ponzano, 
however, at least some of them
905
 would be legislative. Hence the concept suggested by 
Ponzano differs from the one formulated in the introduction to this section. It is worth noting, 
further, that the concept proposed by Ponzano shares some similarities with those of Nieto-
Garrido and Delgado, and of Stancanelli. All three essentially rely (i) on legislation being 
concerned with political choices and (ii) hence there being substantive requirements in 
respect of content of legislative acts.  
It is further important to note that Ponzano does not suggest that only the Council’s acts could 
be legislative: on pages 481 and 482 he lists both the Council and the Parliament as having 
legislative power. That would, however, seem to create some difficulties for his own 
approach on its own terms. The problems could be gleaned when his approach is compared to 
the judgment of the ECJ in case C-133/06.
906
 
In that judgment, which is best known for containing an explicit statement to the effect that 
creation of secondary legal bases is unlawful in EU law, the ECJ had to decide whether 
Articles 29(1), 29(2) and 36(3) of directive 2005/85
907
 were lawful. The directive regulated 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status and was adopted under the then 
Article 63(1)(d) EC via what would now (probably) be a special legislative procedure (i.e. by 
the Council acting unanimously upon proposal of the Commission and after receiving the 
opinion of the European Parliament). By the provisions in dispute the Council purported to 
reserve to itself the power to decide by qualified majority which third countries would be 
considered “safe”. The Parliament challenged that reservation of power contending that the 
EC Treaty required any such determination to be made according to the rules prescribed by 
the legal basis (Article 63 EC), viz. by the Council acting unanimously. Before the ECJ ruled 
that those three articles of the directive amounted a creation of secondary legal bases and 
were thus unlawful, it had to deal with the argument of the Council to the effect that what it 
had done was nothing more than to reserve to itself the Article 202 EC implementing power, 
i.e. that when establishing the list of safe countries the Council wouldn’t be acting on the 
basis of the EC Treaty in exercise of the power granted to it by Article 63 EC (in which case 
the issue of secondary legal basis would arise since the procedure which the Council would 
follow under the challenged articles of the directive would differ from that prescribed by 
Article 63 EC), but on the basis of the directive in exercise of the power reserved to it under 
Article 202(3) EC. Thus no question of creating new legal bases could arise. The ECJ 
dismissed that argument. 
46. Thus, on the assumption that the lists of safe countries are non-essential and relate 
to a specific case, the Council could have decided to reserve the right to exercise 
implementing powers, provided that it stated in detail the grounds for its decision /.../. 
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 Article 66 TFEU could serve as an example here. 
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 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
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47. The Council must properly explain, by reference to the nature and content of the 
basic instrument to be implemented, why exception is being made to the rule that, 
under the system established by the Treaty, when measures implementing a basic 
instrument need to be taken at Community level, it is the Commission which, in the 
normal course of events, is responsible for exercising that power /.../. 
48. In the present case, the Council expressly referred, in recital 19 in the preamble to 
Directive 2005/85, to the political importance of the designation of safe countries of 
origin and, in recital 24, to the potential consequences for asylum applicants of the 
safe third country concept. 
49. However, as the Advocate General stated at point 21 of his Opinion, the grounds 
set out in those recitals are conducive to justifying the consultation of the Parliament 
in respect of the establishment of the lists of safe countries and the amendments to be 
made to them, but not to justifying sufficiently a reservation of implementing powers 
which is specific to the Council. 
50. In addition, in the present dispute – which concerns a directive the contested 
provisions of which reserve to the Council a power which is not limited in time – the 
Council has not advanced any argument as to why those provisions should be 
reclassified as provisions on the basis of which the Council has reserved the right to 
exercise directly specific implementing powers itself. On the contrary, the Council 
confirmed at the hearing that those provisions confer upon it a secondary legislative 
power.  
51. In those circumstances, no possibility arises of a reclassification of the contested 
provisions to enable the view to be taken that the Council applied the third indent of 
Article 202 EC. 
In paragraph 49 the Grand Chamber of the ECJ essentially states that political importance of 
an issue even combined with considerable impact which the rules regulating that issue might 
have on fundamental rights of individuals is not sufficient to preclude the Council (together 
with the Parliament) from granting the Commission the power to adopt those rules. For 
present purposes it has two-fold significance. First, the meaning of “essential elements” in the 
Frontex line of case law becomes somewhat unclear; it becomes arguable that essential 
elements need not be political at all and that political issues need not be essential elements.
908
 
Second, however, it becomes difficult to understand why Ponzano’s approach excludes acts 
of the Commission from the catalogue of legislative acts. In case C-133/06, despite the fact 
that it was accepted that the issue was politically sensitive,
909
 the challenged provisions were 
not saved by reliance on Article 202(3) EC precisely because – according to the ECJ – (i) 
there were no reasons not to grant Article 202(3) EC power to deal with those issues to the 
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Commission (paragraph 49), and (ii) that Article 202(3) EC power could be reserved for the 
Council only if there were such good reasons not to grant it to the Commission (paragraph 
47). 
Article 106(3) TFEU
910
 could serve an example of a legal basis contained in the constitutive 
treaties which enables the Commission to adopt directives dealing with politically sensitive 
issues. If Council’s acts dealing with politically sensitive issues and some (other) acts of the 
Parliament and of the Council are legislative, then why are acts of the Commission dealing 
with politically sensitive issues not? 
It is submitted that the inconsistency in Ponzano’s approach could be explained by the 
combined effect of three factors: (i) calling (in the Constitutional Treaty) only European laws 
and European framework laws legislative acts, (ii) empowering only the Council and the 
Parliament to adopt them with the result that the Commission could not adopt any legislative 
acts and (iii) disregarding the weight which the connotations (developed under national laws) 
of the term “legislative” would acquire (even on the minds of the representatives of the legal 
profession) the moment the term was employed in EU law. Thus Commission would not be 
listed in Ponzano’s approach as having power to adopt legislative acts, because the 
Constitutional Treaty said that it did not have that power. While the Council on its own did 
not have the complete power to adopt legislative acts either,
911
 it was listed among the entities 
which could do so. In essence what one is dealing with here is a conflation of two distinct 
approaches into one: one based on certain formalities and the other on certain elements of the 
content of the acts (viz. EU law saying that legislative acts are those named in a particular 
way when adopted on a particular legal basis by particular entities and national-law 
experience adding that acts having certain content must be legislative). 
A clear example of connotations of the term “legislative” leading to such conflation (and 
confusion) may be found in the opinion of advocate general Cruz Villalon in case C-
280/11P.
912
 He opines (in footnote 5 of his opinion) that 
it could be said that, by referring to concepts as significant as ‘legislative procedure’ 
(Article 289 TFEU), the Lisbon Treaty intends to encompass the entire range of 
meanings evoked by this type of term. Where the Council draws up or participates in 
drawing up legislation that is of general application, binding and directly applicable 
(Article 288 TFEU), it is creating in European Union law the equivalent of a national 
statute. As the Treaties provide that this type of measure is drawn up using a 
procedure that is referred to as ‘legislative’ (Article 289 TFEU), it must be concluded 
that this procedure must be based on the principles that are typical of this type of 
procedure in national legal orders. 
He then asserts (in paragraphs 42 and 43 of his opinion) that 
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it is not hard to conclude that, despite the differences that may exist between national 
legislation and EU ‘legislation’, or between Member State legislatures and the EU 
‘legislature’, the ‘legislative procedure’ by which the Council is bound under Article 
289 TFEU in relation to the adoption of regulations (and that followed by the Council 
when acting in its ‘legislative capacity’ pursuant to Article 207 EC) is conceptually 
very close to the national ‘legislative procedure’, speaking from the point of view of 
its underlying purpose and thus the principles on which it must be based. 
Thus, the law-making procedure that lies at the heart of this appeal should be regarded 
as ‘legislative’ within the true and proper meaning of the term under the public law of 
individual States. In this regard, the important thing is that the result of the procedure 
is a measure that, owing to its characteristics (general application, binding nature, 
ability to override national laws – which are created by truly democratic authorities –
), requires a certain level of democratic legitimacy and this can only be bestowed by a 
procedure based on the principles that have traditionally governed the workings of 
national legislatures that are representative in nature. 
By equating legislative acts within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU with legislative acts 
within the meaning of national laws of member states and by explicitly stating that a 
legislative act within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU must be of general application, 
advocate general Cruz Villalon does not simply assert that some content-based concept of 
legislation is part of positive EU law, he assert that Article 289 TFEU itself mandates a 
content-based concept of legislation. It has been demonstrated in section 2 of this thesis that 
the term “legislative” as employed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 289 TFEU is a term of 
art, and that Article 289 TFEU sets no criteria in respect of the content of regulations, 
directives or decisions adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure (viz. in respect of 
the content of legislative acts).
913
 The assertion made by advocate general Cruz Villalon is 
simply wrong. 
That is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the evolution of the Council’s rules of 
procedure. Subparagraph 2 of paragraph 3 of Article 207 EC,
914
 to which advocate general 
Cruz Villalon himself refers, tasked the Council with defining in its rules of procedure 
 the cases in which it is to be regarded as acting in its legislative capacity. 
That “definition” contained in the various versions of the Council’s pre-Lisbon Treaty (but 
post-Amsterdam Treaty
915
) rules of procedure was exactly the same. 
The Council acts in its legislative capacity within the meaning of the second 
subparagraph of Article 207(3) of the EC Treaty when it adopts rules which are 
legally binding in or for the Member States, by means of regulations, directives, 
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Cases and Materials (6
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 ed., 2015 OUP), page 114. 
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 Both in its Amsterdam and Nice Treaty versions. There was no corresponding provision in the EC Treaty as 
it stood after the Maastricht Treaty. 
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 There was no provision akin to Article 207(3)(2) EC in the constitutive treaties prior to the entry into force of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. 
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framework decisions or decisions, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties, with the exception of discussions leading to the adoption of internal 
measures, administrative or budgetary acts, acts concerning inter-institutional or 
international relations or non-binding acts (such as conclusions, recommendations or 
resolutions).
916
 
The formulation of legislative capacity might be thought to cover all instruments (but do no 
more) which, had they been adopted by an abstract national parliament, would be deemed “a 
law”.917 Advocate general Cruz Villalon goes further than positing that parallel, however: he 
suggests that legislative acts within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU are the same thing yet 
again. It is useful to compare the formulation of legislative capacity in the foregoing quote 
with Article 289 TFEU which reads in relevant part as follows. 
1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294. 
2. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure. 
3. Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts. 
Even a cursory reading of Article 289 TFEU would show that the formulation of legislative 
capacity in the Council’s rules of procedure adopted under Article 207(3) EC is much wider 
than formulation of legislative act in Article 289 TFEU.
918
 
What was the consequence of the Council acting in legislative capacity? First, there was 
enhanced public access to those documents of the Council which pertained to its actions in 
legislative capacity.
919
 Second, debates of the Council when it was acting in legislative 
capacity were progressively “opened up”920 – to the point that under the Council’s 2006 rules 
of procedure (i) essentially all debates concerning acts to be adopted via Article 251 EC 
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 Article 6 of Council Decision 1999/385/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 31 May 1999 adopting the Council's Rules of 
Procedure; Article 7(1) of Council Decision 2000/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 5 June 2000 adopting the 
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references to principles typical in national law at the end of footnote 5 of his opinion and to the differences 
obtaining between member states at the beginning of paragraph 42 of his opinion. 
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procedure
921
 and (ii) first deliberations of new legislative proposals adopted via any other 
procedure
922
 were to be held in public. 
Article 7 of the Council’s current (i.e. post-Lisbon Treaty) rules of procedure923 is entitled 
“Legislative procedure and openness”. Its first paragraph reads as follows. 
The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative 
act. To that end, its agenda shall include a part entitled “Legislative deliberations”. 
That provision gives effect to Article 16(8) TEU and Article 15(2) TFEU which read as 
follows. 
Article 16(8) TEU: The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on 
a draft legislative act. To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two 
parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on Union legislative acts and non-
legislative activities. 
Article 15(2) TFEU: The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the 
Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. 
Regulation 1049/2001 still provides that there is to be enhanced access to documents of the 
Council pertaining to legislative procedures.
924
 The same is further provided in Article 7(2) of 
the Council’s current rules of procedure. 
Importantly the Council’s current rules of procedure contain no definition of legislative 
capacity. The constitutive treaties no longer include a provision akin to Article 207(3) EC 
which required the Council to define when it was acting in legislative capacity. There is no 
need for that: the rules of procedure are based on the distinction between legislative and non-
legislative acts contained in the constitutive treaties themselves. That is acknowledged in 
recital 1 of the decision adopting the current rules of procedure. 
The Treaty of Lisbon brings several modifications /.../ to the different types of Union 
legal acts and to the process for adopting acts, notably by distinguishing between 
legislative and non-legislative acts. 
Thus if advocate general Cruz Villalon’s thesis that (i) legislation within its national-law 
meaning and (ii) legislative capacity defined in the Council’s rules of procedure adopted 
under Article 207(3) EC and (iii) legislative acts within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU 
and therefore the Council’s current rules of procedure had by and large the same meaning, 
Article 7 of the current rules of procedure would be the provision therein governing the 
making public of debates and information (unless there it was contended that with the Lisbon 
Treaty the Council became more secretive; no such contention seems to have been made). 
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Article 7 of the current rule of procedure would cover all situations covered by the old 
formulation of legislative capacity, and there would be no need for an additional provision. 
Interestingly there is such an additional provision: Article 8(1) of the current rules of 
procedure. 
Where a non-legislative proposal is submitted to the Council relating to the adoption 
of rules which are legally binding in or for the Member States, by means of 
regulations, directives or decisions, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties, with the exception of internal measures, administrative or budgetary acts, 
acts concerning interinstitutional or international relations or non-binding acts (such 
as conclusions, recommendations or resolutions), the Council's first deliberation on 
important new proposals shall be open to the public. The Presidency shall identify 
which new proposals are important and the Council or Coreper may decide otherwise, 
whenever appropriate. 
The content of this provision is strikingly similar to parts of the definition of legislative 
capacity in the pre-Lisbon Treaty rules of procedure, and – more importantly – to that of 
Article 8(2) of the Council’s 2006 rules of procedure. 
The Council's first deliberation on important new legislative proposals other than 
those to be adopted in accordance with the [Article 251 EC] procedure shall be open 
to the public. The Presidency shall identify which new legislative proposals are 
important and the Council or Coreper may decide otherwise, whenever appropriate. 
The Presidency may decide, on a case by case basis, that the subsequent Council 
deliberations on a particular legislative act shall be open to the public, unless the 
Council or Coreper decides otherwise. 
If legislation within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU and within the meaning of the 
Council’s rules of procedure adopted under Article 207(3) EC had been coextensive, there 
would have been no need for Article 8(1) in the current rules of procedure. The only other 
explanation of Article 8(1) of the Council’s current rules of procedure would be to suggest 
that it makes public some debates which under the previous rules of procedure were not 
public. In view of the parallels between current Article 8(1) and the 2006 Article 8(2) that 
proposition is simply not tenable.
925
 Nor has it even been put forward. 
Put bluntly, part of legislative capacity within the meaning of rules of procedure adopted 
under Article 207(3) EC was “off-loaded” into Article 8 of the current rules of procedure 
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which article is entitled “Other cases of Council deliberations open to the public and public 
debates”.926 Since the current rules of procedure are based on formulations of “legislative act” 
and “legislative procedure” in Article 289 TFEU, it stands to reason that Article 289 TFEU 
and legislative capacity within the meaning of the Council’s rules of procedure adopted under 
Article 207(3) EC are not coextensive. Therefore in equating all three of national legislation, 
Article 207(3) EC legislative capacity and Article 289 TFEU legislative acts and/or 
procedures advocate general Cruz Villalon fell into error. 
Why did he fall into error? It is submitted that the answer to that is easy to find in the 
aforequoted passages of his opinion. Of particular importance in this respect is the following 
statement in footnote 5 of his opinion: 
by referring to concepts as significant as ‘legislative procedure’ (Article 289 TFEU), 
the Lisbon Treaty intends to encompass the entire range of meanings evoked by this 
type of term. 
There is no explanation or argumentation showing that that was the intention. The veracity of 
the statement seems to be simply taken as given. When all three quoted passages of his 
opinion are read together
927
 it becomes evident that it essentially truly was taken as given – 
the conclusion (if the quoted statement could be called the conclusion) was reached by 
drawing a parallel between EU law and national law in a situation where they both employ 
the same term, taking the meaning of that term in national law and transplanting it to the 
same term in EU law. The meaning of that term under EU law was not analysed at all. If 
anything, that is further confirmed by advocate general Cruz Villalon’s desire to see 
legislation as satisfying the needs of democratic legitimacy.
928
 Again, that is what legislation 
ordinarily does in national legal systems, but there is no argumentation whatsoever as to why 
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 Footnote 5 and paragraphs 41 and 42. They read as follows. 
Footnote 5: [I]t could be said that, by referring to concepts as significant as ‘legislative procedure’ 
(Article 289 TFEU), the Lisbon Treaty intends to encompass the entire range of meanings evoked by 
this type of term. Where the Council draws up or participates in drawing up legislation that is of 
general application, binding and directly applicable (Article 288 TFEU), it is creating in European 
Union law the equivalent of a national statute. As the Treaties provide that this type of measure is 
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legislation and EU ‘legislation’, or between Member State legislatures and the EU ‘legislature’, the 
‘legislative procedure’ by which the Council is bound under Article 289 TFEU in relation to the 
adoption of regulations (and that followed by the Council when acting in its ‘legislative capacity’ 
pursuant to Article 207 EC) is conceptually very close to the national ‘legislative procedure’, speaking 
from the point of view of its underlying purpose and thus the principles on which it must be based. 
Paragraph 42: Thus, the law-making procedure that lies at the heart of this appeal should be regarded as 
‘legislative’ within the true and proper meaning of the term under the public law of individual States. 
In this regard, the important thing is that the result of the procedure is a measure that, owing to its 
characteristics (general application, binding nature, ability to override national laws – which are created 
by truly democratic authorities –), requires a certain level of democratic legitimacy and this can only be 
bestowed by a procedure based on the principles that have traditionally governed the workings of 
national legislatures that are representative in nature. 
928
 Paragraph 42 of his opinion where he states that EU legislative acts do so. 
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that is the case in EU law
929
 – advocate general Cruz Villalon simply concludes from the 
parallel with legislation in national legal systems that that is the case in EU law. 
Rather than consider what it is that the term “legislative” denotes in EU law, advocate general 
Cruz Villalon did the opposite: he implied a legal position and legal consequences into EU 
law from the use of a term. The error would seem especially flagrant in a situation, such as 
the one at hand, where the term is expressly given a particular formulation by the constitutive 
instrument of the EU (as “legislative act” and “legislative procedure” are in Article 289 
TFEU). 
A common thread of the four last approaches (those of Niedo-Garrido and Delgado, of 
Stancanelli and of Ponzano as well as that of Cruz Villalon) is that unlike the position 
formulated in section 4.1, they all postulate content-related requirements for legislative acts. 
Türk’s approach actually does likewise, however in view of where he sources the requirement 
in respect of content (in the reference to generality in Article I-33(1)(2) of the Constitutional 
Treaty) and what that requirement is (generality, not particular relation with policy or impact 
on fundamental rights) it might be unfair to Türk and, more importantly, incorrect in law to 
transpose that requirement to the Lisbon Treaty which contains no corresponding reference. 
The slight caveat (that it only might be incorrect in law and unfair to Türk) derives from the 
fact that he would seem to make his point (about the concept of legislation in the 
Constitutional Treaty being partially a concept of legislation in substance) in relation to both 
European laws and European framework laws.
930
 However, the Constitutional Treaty 
required only European laws to be of general application (see Article I-33(1)(2)); it contained 
no such requirement in respect of European framework laws (see Article I-33(1)(3)). Thus it 
is at least arguable that that part of Türk’s approach which may be transposed to the Lisbon 
Treaty likewise postulates (at least in part) some requirement of substance for legislation. 
This time the requirement would be generality. 
Be that as it may, the issue of legislative nature of acts is tackled head on by Dougan. Dealing 
with the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts he opines that the Treaty of 
Lisbon settles on 
a purely formal criterion for distinguishing between legislative and non-legislative 
acts, i.e. based on the applicable decision-making procedures for their adoption, as 
they are identified in specific legal provisions and on an ad hoc basis under the 
Treaties. But could such a criterion ever hope to reflect any coherent underlying 
constitutional principle? It seems instead to emerge as a labelling exercise with an 
essentially pragmatic basis and some rather arbitrary consequences.
931
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 In view of “legislative” being a term of art in the constitutive treaties (see section 2 of this thesis) such 
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 See Türk, The Concept of the “Legislative” Act in the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 6 German Law Journal 
1565. 
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This view would not seem inconsistent with the position formulated in section 4.1. However, 
Dougan thinks that 
as regards their substance, many measures identified as “non-legislative” in nature 
will seem indistinguishable from “legislative” ones in terms of their scope of 
application (in general terms across the entire Union territory) and subject matter 
(regulating the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons).
932
 
Thus he applies to EU instruments some concept of legislation in substance, i.e. some 
concept of legislation which would not seem to be prescribed by Article 289 TFEU. While he 
admits that 
the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts drawn in the [Treaty of 
Lisbon] is clearly not based on the sort of institutional criterion familiar to national 
legal systems which are organized according to a traditional separation of powers: 
with an institutional structure as complex as that of the EU, patently lacking a clear 
and stable legislature such as the UK’s “Queen in Parliament”, it would have been 
difficult to state (for example) that only acts of the Council and the European 
Parliament, or all acts of the Council and / or the European Parliament, are to be 
considered legislative in nature,
933
 
he prefers nevertheless to pointedly ask whether some acts, which according to an 
understanding akin to the one which is formulated in section 4.1 would be non-legislative, 
can really be 
best categorized as “non-legislative” in character.934 
He specifically mentions instruments regulating competition law in this respect. It is difficult 
to disagree with his point having considerable force. As to the consequences of eschewing 
legislation in substance he suggest that such eschewing might work, although not without 
anomalies or controversies concluding that 
the lack of a coherent distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts will 
produce similarly arbitrary knock-on effects for other provisions premised on exactly 
the same distinction.
935
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Thus on the one hand Dougan seems to accept that a concept of legislation in EU law after 
the Lisbon Treaty is similar to the one formulated in section 4.1. However, whether that is so, 
remains ultimately unclear for in the quote to footnote 934 above he seems to necessarily 
imply that some concept of legislation applicable in positive EU law says something about 
legislative character of acts. As has been stated elsewhere,
936
 the concept akin to the one 
formulated section 4.1 patently does not.  
On the other hand, Dougan seems to argue for a substantive concept of legislation (based on 
generality of application and subject matter of an act), and more importantly he implicitly 
applies some such concept (which he does not explicate, however). Presumably Dougan 
thinks that such substantive concept is either valid as positive EU law (at least for some 
purposes) or if not, then useful in some other way. Otherwise there would be no need to apply 
it. Unfortunately he does not make explicit how or why such approach might be useful. 
Importantly for present purposes his discussion of legislation in substance explains where he 
sources his concept, viz. why it is that instruments of general application and of certain 
subject matter are legislative. As he states in the quote made to footnote 933 above, the 
source lies in national law and/or some doctrine of separation of powers. The bottom line 
would, however, seem to be that Dougan does not agree with the approach formulated in 
section 4.1 – at most he agrees that it is an approach mandated by EU law. 
Aside from the issue of its applicability in positive EU law, there are two main problems with 
Dougan’s substantive approach. First, its correctness would mean that acts adopted not 
directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties, but on the basis of other acts of EU law, 
could be legislative for they certainly could be general. The second problem lies in the 
difficulties which would or do arise upon adoption of such an approach. They have been 
concisely stated by Jürgen Bast. 
Attempts at deriving a formal hierarchy of norms from the substantive contents of the 
law are as old as the doctrine of the separation of powers itself. For example, the 
German constitutional lawyer Paul Laband invented in the 1870s the distinction 
between executive laws in the substantive sense and mere implementation of laws in 
order to justify the Prussian King’s power to make autonomous regulations. However, 
the theoretical basis and empirical validity of the distinction between substantial 
Ergänzung (supplementation of laws) and mere Ausführung (implementation of laws) 
have repeatedly been demystified and deconstructed. Even a norm that intends only to 
provide further detail or give effect to existing norms adds to the present normative 
framework.
937
 
The same point has been made by Thomas Cottier. 
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The formulation of norms always includes delegation of powers to a greater or lesser 
degree to those implementing the rules. In reality there is no fundamental 
methodological distinction between rule-making and rule-applying.
938
 
It simply would not clear which act would be legislative and which act would not be 
legislative under Dougan’s approach – or indeed that of any other commentator (possibly 
aside from Türk) considered above in this section 4.2.2. Bar some other reasoning (which no 
commentator whose position has been considered in this section 4.2.2 has offered), no such 
approach could be useful. Considering that it is common ground that the main thrust behind 
the Constitutional Treaty, at least indirectly and certainly as far as the issues pertaining to 
legislative acts are concerned, was democratic legitimacy of the EU and well as transparency 
of its functioning and simplification of its instruments,
939
 Bast’s and Cottier’s would seem to 
be very mighty criticisms indeed. 
Bast has based his own approach to legislative acts in EU law on three aspects: (i) both the 
Parliament and the Council deliberate in public when adopting legislative acts (Article 16(8) 
TEU and Article 15(2) TFEU), (iii) the Commission must consult “widely” before proposing 
a draft legislative acts (Article 2 of Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiary and Proportionality) and (iii) draft legislative acts are forwarded to national 
parliaments with the latter being able to object to their adoption (Protocol (No 1) on the Role 
of National Parliaments in the European Union and Articles 6 and 7 Protocol (No 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality).
940
 Thus Bast suggest that 
[t]aking this set of rules as the defining characteristic, a legislative act under the 
Lisbon Treaty is an act which is subject to enhanced public scrutiny.
941
 
This approach would not seem to impose any criteria in respect of substance of legislative 
acts. Is Bast’s approach compatible with the approach formulated in section 4.1? If one looks 
at his reasoning, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative. All the provisions of the 
constitutive treaties to which he refers in his argumentation on this point speak of legislative 
acts which could be argued to have the meaning given to them by Article 289 TFEU, and 
none further. Therefore Bast’s approach would not only be compatible with that formulated 
in section 4.1, it would be its equivalent. However, that would seem to drain his definition of 
legislative act of any significance, and hence does beg the question why he proposes his 
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definition of legislative act at all. If the reader is to assign any meaning to the definition, the 
position becomes less clear. 
Bast defines legislative act as an act subject to enhanced scrutiny. It is thus reasonable to ask 
compared to what is the scrutiny of legislative acts enhanced. There are two dimensions in 
which the issue could be analysed: a historic one (i.e. compared to the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
position) and an instrumental one (i.e. compared to other instruments adopted on the basis of 
the Lisbon Treaty). Starting with the historic one it is clear that the Lisbon Treaty resulted in 
widening of the use of ordinary and special legislative procedures.
942
 But that has been done 
by every new set of constitutive treaties since the SEA. Postulating such a change as the 
enhancement is just as unclear as any substantive criterion which Bast himself so ably 
criticises: when are ordinary or special legislative procedures sufficiently widely used for the 
public scrutiny to be sufficiently enhanced? Bast offers no argument why specifically the 
widening of employment of such procedures which occurred as a result of the Lisbon Treaty 
was sufficient. Besides, that begs the question why should the “legislativeness” of an act 
depend on how diffuse the criterion on which that “legislativeness” hinges is in the polity. No 
consideration is given to that issue in Bast’s article. 
Moving on to the ordinary and special legislative procedures themselves, in section 2 of this 
thesis it has been shown that as far as those procedures go, nothing of relevance changed with 
the Lisbon Treaty. The Parliament did deliberate in public under the Nice Treaty. Indeed 
there would seem no provision in any version of the constitutive treaties for the plenary of the 
Parliament (which is the relevant formation for adoption of an act via procedures currently 
called ordinary and special legislative procedure) to deliberate in camera. As for Council, the 
only change would seem to consist of “treatifying” the Council’s duty to deliberate in public 
when dealing with legislative acts. Before the Lisbon Treaty the Council was already under a 
duty to do so with the duty flowing from its own rules of procedure.
943
 Of Basts’s three 
aspects that leaves the Commission’s duty of wide consultation and the role to be played by 
national parliaments. With respect, considering 
 that the Commission’s duty of wide consultation would seem to do no more than 
“treatify” paragraph 26 of the pre-Lisbon Treaty Interinstitutional agreement on 
better law-making,
944
 
 that national parliaments – even if all of them consider that a draft legislative act 
is flagrantly contrary to both the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity – 
cannot halt the adoption of that draft legislative act and 
 that already before the Lisbon Treaty the draft legislative acts were to be 
forwarded to national parliaments,
945
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it is difficult to argue that Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union or Articles 2, 6 and 7 of Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles 
of Subsidiary and Proportionality actually changed anything. There would seem to be only 
three changes of any note. First, under the 1997 protocol the period after the forwarding of a 
draft act to national parliaments during which period EU institutions could not adopt the act 
was six weeks; the Lisbon Treaty raised it to eight weeks. Second, the Lisbon Treaty 
protocols require that all draft legislative acts be forwarded to national parliaments while the 
1997 protocol required the forwarding only of Commission’s own proposals. Third, if 
“legislative act” in the Lisbon Treaty Protocols Nos 1 and 2 has the same meaning as 
explained in section 4.1, then if anything the Lisbon Treaty has in some respects narrowed 
down the group of acts which must be forwarded to national parliaments.
946
 
It is difficult to see any relevant differences (let alone enhancements of public scrutiny of acts 
adopted via what are now ordinary or special legislative procedure) between the EC Treaty as 
it stood after the Nice Treaty (or indeed the Amsterdam Treaty) and the Lisbon Treaty. 
Similar opinions have been expressed by both Bruno De Witte
947
 and Dougan
948
 as well as 
Lupo and Piccirilli.
949
 Thus if what was intended was an enhancement by comparison to 
status quo ante, then Bast’s suggestion is simply wrong. 
To analyse the issue from an instrumental dimension it is apposite to ask which instruments 
currently available to the EU are subject to more public scrutiny than others? To clarify the 
question let us take the acts adopted via ordinary or via special legislative procedure as 
benchmarks. Are any other instruments adopted by the EU subject to comparable public 
scrutiny? It is submitted that any act containing 
rules which are legally binding in or for the Member States, by means of regulations, 
directives or decisions, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Treaties, with the 
exception of internal measures, administrative or budgetary acts, acts concerning 
interinstitutional or international relations or non-binding acts (such as conclusions, 
recommendations or resolutions),
950
 
would constitute such an instrument. Pursuant to the Council’s current rules of procedure the 
Council’s first deliberation of such acts must, and subsequent deliberations may, take place in 
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public.
951
 For example, instruments adopted on the basis of Articles 31 (common customs 
tariff) or 66 (restriction of capital flows to or from third countries) or 112 (intra-EU export 
subsidies and import countervailing duties) would likely fall into that category. A specific 
example could be recommendation 2015/1184
952
 which, although not adopted via ordinary or 
special legislative procedure, was in fact adopted at the 3403
rd
 meeting of the (Economic and 
Financial Affairs) Council of the European Union held in Brussels on 14 July 2015 in 
public.
953
 
It is true that the Council must hold all debates on “legislative acts” in public,954 while only 
the first one on the other acts mentioned in the foregoing quote must necessarily be held in 
public. However it must likewise not be forgotten that in practice very little actual debate 
takes place in the Council at all. 
[A] majority of legal acts are de facto adopted by bureaucrats in the various working 
groups and committees of the Council without any direct involvement of ministers.
955
 
Thus any considerable difference in scrutiny would have to lie in the fact that neither 
Parliament’s opinion nor its consent is required for adopting such acts. The aforementioned 
recommendation 2015/1184 was adopted on the basis of Article 121(2) TFEU. That article
956
 
requires the Council to inform the Parliament of the acts the Council adopts on the basis of 
that article. According to the GC such a procedure does not constitute a special legislative 
procedure.
957
 However that would not seem to preclude the Parliament from considering such 
acts.
958
 Essentially the only difference of the Parliament being informed from the 
Parliament’s opinion being required lies in the fact that in the former case the Parliament 
cannot delay the adoption of the act, while in the latter it can. Information about the act is 
transmitted to the Parliament in both cases (admittedly those transmissions could take place 
at different times in the procedures leading to adoption of acts), and in neither case would the 
Parliament be in a position to halt the adoption of the act altogether. Indeed that inability in 
cases where the Parliament must only be consulted lead Türk to conclude that the acts 
resulting from procedures where the Parliament is only consulted are not legislative precisely 
because the influence of the Parliament over such acts is not sufficient.
959
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It thus stands to reason that there are legal bases in the constitutive treaties which mandate a 
procedure for adoption of acts which is neither ordinary nor special legislative procedure, but 
which nevertheless enables public scrutiny which is comparable (although not equivalent) to 
that obtaining in case of ordinary or special legislative procedure. Furthermore, by virtue of 
Article 8(1) of the 2009 Council’s rules of procedure, even in case of acts adopted by the 
Council under Article 31 TFEU or Article 66 TFEU or Article 112 TFEU (in which cases 
there is even no duty to inform the Parliament) the public scrutiny would nevertheless seem 
to be enhanced compared to, for instance, instruments adopted by the Commission. 
Furthermore, when something is determined by reference to being “enhanced” it is inherently 
an issue of degree, and thus suffers from the same criticism which Bast formulates in respect 
of substance-based concepts of legislation.
960
 Bast does not even purport to formulate from 
what point onwards the enhancement of public scrutiny over an act is sufficient for it to be 
deemed legislative.  
Finally, the concept of public scrutiny itself is somewhat ambiguous. Above it has been 
considered in the strictest (and probably somewhat incorrect) sense: that of consideration of 
an issue by some majoritarian institution. That sense is probably incorrect because the act is 
nevertheless not scrutinised by the public, but by an institution of the EU which institution 
will have its particular biases and agendas.
961
 
Thus, seen from an instrumental perspective Bast’s definition of legislative acts differs from 
the approach set forth in section 4.1: there are acts, other than regulations, directives and 
decisions adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure, which are during their 
adoption subject to public scrutiny at least comparable to that obtaining in respect of 
regulations, directives and decisions adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure; on 
Bast’s approach these other acts would be legislative. To sum up, either Bast’s definition of 
legislative acts is irrelevant (if he does no more than restate Article 289 TFEU) or, if it is to 
be of some relevance, it would seem to proffer an approach to legislative acts which differs 
from the one formulated in section 4.1.  
A more simplistic and easy to apply concept of legislation has been proffered by Theodore 
Konstadinides who writing in 2008 (thus after the Constitutional Treaty and even after the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty
962
) suggested that in Köster the ECJ 
established a distinction between measures directly based on the Treaty itself 
(considered as legislative acts) and derived law intended to ensure their 
implementation (executive acts).
963
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While Konstadinides does not refer to any particular passage of Köster where that is alleged 
to have been established, the closest the ECJ seems to have come to his suggestion in Köster 
was to opine in paragraph 6 that 
[b]oth the legislative scheme of the Treaty, reflected in particular by the last indent of 
Article 155, and the consistent practice of the Community institutions establish a 
distinction, according to the legal concepts recognized in all the Member States, 
between the measures directly based on the Treaty itself and derived law intended to 
ensure their implementation.
964
 
It is submitted that that falls short of establishing a distinction between legislative and 
executive acts, although it does establish a distinction between acts adopted directly on the 
basis of the constitutive treaties and acts adopted otherwise than directly on the basis of the 
constitutive treaties. Be that as it may, it is clear that the concept of legislation proffered by 
Konstadinides is something quite alien to Article 289 TFEU. For instance, on 
Konstadinides’s concept Commission’s regulations adopted on the basis of Article 106(3) 
TFEU or the Common Customs Tariff fixed by the Council (without any participation of the 
Parliament) on the basis of Article 31 TFEU or a decision setting out restrictive measure 
adopted by the Council under Article 215(1) TFEU (with the Parliament merely being 
informed) would be legislative acts. None of these would be legislative acts in accordance 
with the understanding formulated in section 4.1. More importantly in its judgment in case T-
160/13 the GC expressly held (in paragraph 50) that acts adopted under Article 215(1) TFEU 
are not legislative.
965
 
Finally let us consider the position of Koen Lenaerts which is thought to have influenced the 
drafters of the Constitutional Treaty.
966
 In a paper submitted to Working Group IX of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe Lenaerts advocated the making of a cardinal distinction 
between legislative and executive acts. 
This distinction, based not on the identity of the author of the act, but on the type of 
procedure followed for its adoption, is not so much inspired by the principle of 
separation of powers in a Union based on the rule of law, as it is concerned with the 
necessity to identify, in a transparent way, the procedure which is best suited – in 
terms of legitimacy and efficiency – for the exercise of the legislative and executive 
functions of the institutions of the Union.
967
 
He thus seems to have argued strongly for a procedural concept of legislative act: whether an 
act is legislative depends on procedure used for its adoption, not on the identity of the 
adopter. However, Lenaerts then postulated that acts adopted via co-decision which acts 
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contain a basic policy choice should be regarded as legislative acts.
968
 Why specifically those 
acts were to be considered legislative was not explained. For present purposes, however, it is 
important to note that the concept is no longer procedural: it is based on a combination of a 
procedural and a content-based approach. 
While Lenaerts thought that all acts entailing a basic policy choice should be subject to co-
decision and hence constitute legislative acts, he was mindful of the fact that a number of acts 
adopted otherwise than via co-decision were based directly on the constitutive treaties and 
contained a basic policy choice.
969
 He opined that 
[a]s a result it seems to be necessary to identify, on the one hand, the autonomous 
regulations which imply basic policy choices. These acts, which need to enjoy 
representative democratic legitimacy, should be adopted by the legislative power in its 
entirety (European Parliament and Council) and belong, as such, to the first category. 
On the other hand, the autonomous regulations of a more technical nature do not 
justify a direct intervention of the legislator (otherwise the co-decision procedure 
would become completely “congested”). These acts, which should also be identified, 
would correctly fall within the second category, and take the form either of “delegated 
legislation”, or of executive acts sensu stricto.970 
It is submitted that the quoted passage is somewhat unclear. According to a procedural 
concept of legislative acts a particular procedure is a condition for the act being legislative: if 
the relevant procedure is employed, the act is legislative. Lenaerts, it will be remembered, 
started with suggesting a procedural concept. However, in the last quoted passage the 
procedure (co-decision) is no longer a condition. It has become a consequence: it is to be 
applied if the act contains a basic policy choice. Thus in the last quoted passage Lenaerts 
essentially abandons a procedural concept in favour of a substantive one. 
At the same time the quoted passage further seems to suggest that there are two types of 
autonomous regulations: those which imply a basic policy choice and those which are of a 
more technical nature.
971
 Lenaerts then argues that only the former ones should be adopted by 
the Parliament and the Council. Yet, if that is so, there was no problem to begin with: all acts 
implying a basic policy choice are adopted via co-decision. Thus the group of acts of which 
Lenaerts was mindful simply does not exist. If that group does exist, then the quoted passage 
simply fails to deal with the issue, viz. what about acts which do entail a basic policy choice 
and are adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties, but not via co-decision? The 
passage does not say whether they are be legislative or not; it ignores them. 
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Admittedly one could suggest that the passages which came in his paper before the last 
quoted passage concerned lex lata. Since the paper was prepared for submission to the 
drafters of the Constitutional Treaty, it could be argued that the last quoted passage was de 
lege ferenda. Hence the contradiction. The passage is a suggestion how to deal with the 
problem: divide all acts into those entailing a basic policy choice and those not entailing it; 
make co-decision applicable to all acts in the first group; the first group would be legislative 
acts. If so, then it is clear that that suggestion was not followed: the Constitutional Treaty 
provided for adoption of legislative acts otherwise than via what was, according to the EC 
Treaty, the co-decision procedure. No basic-policy-choice approach to identifying legislative 
acts ultimately found its way into the Constitutional Treaty.
972
 Furthermore, that 
reconciliation does not sit well with the structure of the paper. With its paragraphs 9 and 10 
reading as follows: 
9. These acts form the core of the problem. Indeed, it cannot be denied that various 
acts adopted by the Council alone or after consulting the European Parliament, or by 
the Commission alone, include basic policy choices. Normally, such acts should be 
subject to the co-decision procedure and belong to the first category. 
10. As a result, it seems to be necessary to identify, on the one hand, the autonomous 
regulations which imply basic policy choices. These acts, which need to enjoy 
representative democratic legitimacy, should be adopted by the legislative power in its 
entirety (European Parliament and Council) and belong, as such, to the first category. 
On the other hand, the autonomous regulations of a more technical nature do not 
justify a direct intervention of the legislator (otherwise the co-decision procedure 
would become completely “congested”). These acts, which should also be identified, 
would correctly fall within the second category, and take the form either of “delegated 
legislation”, or of executive acts sensu stricto, 
it is submitted that the natural reading would be that both paragraphs speak of the legal 
position as it stands at the same time, i.e. not that paragraph 9 speaks of lex lata while 
paragraph 10 of de lege ferenda. 
Finally that passage (paragraph 10) would seem to contradict Lenaerts’s own premise to the 
effect that the concept of legislative act should not be based on the identity of EU’s legislator. 
In fact the other rapporteur to Working Group IX, Jean Claude-Piris, 
noted first that it would be very difficult to transpose to the Union the customary 
clear distinction between legislative and executive authority, i.e. between some 
institutions empowered only to pass laws and others merely implementing legislation 
or issuing regulations. It is certainly open to the Treaty's authors, should they see fit, 
to undertake such a project, but the powers conferred on the institutions by the 
Treaties are so convoluted that such a distinction between legislative and executive 
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authority could not be made without upsetting the existing balance. The present 
institutional system of the Union is not modelled on that of a State.
973
 
Nevertheless in paragraph 10 Lenaerts implies the identity of the legislator. 
These acts, which need to enjoy representative democratic legitimacy, should be 
adopted by the legislative power in its entirety (European Parliament and Council)/.../ 
It is submitted that Lenaerts’s approach is ultimately based on a hidden assumption – that the 
Parliament and the Council are the legislator. There is no explanation why that is so. 
However, if one does not assume that they are, it becomes exceedingly unclear why matters 
of basic policy choice should be decided by them acting together. Considering that there were 
and are acts which contain a basic policy choice, but are not adopted by the Parliament and 
the Council,
974
 and that these acts were not held to be legislative despite containing a basic 
policy choice,
975
 it would seem that ultimately Lenaerts postulates some combination of 
content-based and identity-based approach to legislation.
976
 
That his approach is based on such dual grounds would seem to be demonstrated by footnote 
8 of his paper. There he opines that what would now be an Article 103 TFEU act enabling the 
Commission to exercise its Article 105(3) TFEU power 
could either be considered as "legislative" and be adopted in compliance with the co-
decision procedure, or be regarded still as "autonomous" since it "only" puts into 
effect the "legislative" options expressed in the Treaty itself. 
It is clear that one’s consideration of the content of an act does not change that content, viz. 
whether it does or does not contain a basic policy choice is a fact (however difficult 
establishing it might be). That being understood, Lenaerts would seem to be suggesting that 
the same act, ex hypotesi containing a basic policy choice, could be seen as legislative or non-
legislative. If one agrees to admit a basic policy choice, then the legislator must adopt it and 
the act is legislative. If one decides not to see the basic policy choice, no intervention of the 
legislator is needed and the act is not legislative. It is submitted that three conclusions follow.  
First, paragraph 10 of his submission should be understood as a construction technique which 
avoids the hard question: what is an act which has not been adopted by the Council and the 
Parliament jointly, but has been adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties and 
which contains a basic policy choice. Is it legislative? The question is construed away by 
assigning the act – like in the aforequoted footnote 8 – to the suitable category.  
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Second, that category is ultimately based on the identity of the adopter. If it is the Parliament 
and the Council, then the act is legislative. If it is someone else (or only one of the Parliament 
and the Council), the act is not legislative. That conclusion is reached either via a 
reconsideration of the earlier conclusion about the existence of a basic policy choice or via 
taking the identity of the adopter into account in the initial consideration of the existence of a 
basic policy choice. Thus the concept is ultimately always based at least in part on the 
identity of the adopter. 
Third, there is no legal certainty. Reasonable people could disagree as to whether a given 
instrument is legislative or not. 
Lenaerts further suggested that national sensitivities be taken into account in determining 
whether a particular act is legislative: in some member states a field of action may fall within 
the competence of the national legislator, while in some others the same field would be 
within the competence of the executive.
977
 There is no elaboration of the point, but it could be 
understood as some further criterion. What remained unclear was how that criterion would be 
applied.
978
 
To conclude, Lenaerts’s contribution seems somewhat unclear and capable of different 
constructions. It starts with postulating a procedural concept of legislation and expressly 
dismissing an identity-based one, but gradually moves away from it: first towards some 
content-based concept and ultimately to a combination of a content-based and an identity-
based concept with the latter seemingly being the dominant one in the combination.  
To sum up, regardless of the fact that based on an analysis of legislative procedures (akin to 
the one conducted in section 2 of this thesis) it is possible to formulate quite a clear concept 
of legislative act in EU law (a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or 
special legislative procedure), many commentators have either resisted accepting that such a 
concept is part of EU law or have expressed their disagreement with it. In all such cases they 
have developed some alternative concept of legislative act. Leaving aside their political 
merits, all such concepts ultimately contradict the clear one mentioned in the first sentence of 
this paragraph by either deeming to be legislative those acts which according to the clear 
concept are not legislative or by excluding from the group of legislative acts some which 
according to the clear concept are legislative or by doing both simultaneously. 
All the concepts of legislation considered above have been developed in the context of EU 
law and by reference to the constitutive treaties. It is perhaps useful briefly to consider here 
an understanding of legislation obtaining in jurisprudence. By comparing the approaches 
described and analysed above with a jurisprudential analysis of legislation it might be 
possible to glean if not the correctness of a particular approach (for that would be ultimately 
determined by positive EU law), then at least its suitability for purpose and viability as well 
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as the reasons for postulating it. Considering that the language of legislation was introduced 
into the constitutive treaties essentially due to a desire to increase democratic legitimacy of 
the EU, while having an eye on ensuring the rule of law,
979
 it is useful to consider the 
jurisprudential position developed by Jeremy Waldron who has dealt specifically with the 
relationship between legislation and the rule of law. 
Jeremy Waldron thinks that while legislation is not the only source of law and legal change 
(the courts have law-making role as well), the legislature does occupy a pre-eminent role in 
this respect for it is an institution set up explicitly to make and change law.
980
 Explaining why 
Locke (the forefather of “legislatures”) had given the legislature such importance, 
predominance even, Waldron has contended that 
[w]ith the establishment and operation of a legislature, the law begins to exist in a 
new sense. It exists now as “ours”, as something almost tangible, something each of 
us can count on as a common point of reference. Adapting words that Hannah Arendt 
used to describe the virtue of a written constitution, law exists now as “an endurable 
objective thing, which, to be sure, one could approach from many different angles and 
upon which one could impose many different interpretations, which one could change 
or amend with circumstances, but which nevertheless was never [merely] a subjective 
state of mind.” It has become part of the in-between of our world, something we can 
make common reference to, each understanding what the other is getting at. Whatever 
its provenance, natural law never existed in this sense in the state of nature.
981
 
Relying on Dicey Waldron suggests that legislation operates in the context of separation of 
powers. 
[Legislation] establishes a framework of legality for executive action and it is 
enforced by judges who – if things are working well – are insulated not just from 
executive interference, but from legislative interference as well. The legislature in 
England may be subject to a large degree of executive control, but once a bill is 
enacted and leaves the legislature, it passes out of the control of either of those 
agencies and into the hands of the courts. So even if the initiation of legislation is a 
governmental measure, it is a measure which subsequently becomes subject to the 
institutional controls of an articulated system, with important points of decision 
clearly separated from the initiation of a bill.
982
 
More immediately relevant for the purposes of the various approaches to legislation in EU 
law advocated by commentators is Waldron’s contention that legislation must be of general 
application. 
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[T]he rule of law accords great significance to the generality of legislation and to the 
distinction between a statute and a bill of attainder; this is important because if 
legislation is general in character then legislators and their dependents will [be] 
subject to the rules they enact along with everyone else; and there is thus less 
potential for oppression.
983
 
Of itself, however, Waldron holds that insufficient. General form of law decreases potential 
for oppression 
only if there is a prophylactic against cahoots between legislators and prosecutors or 
between legislators and judges; the separation of powers that Dicey emphasizes 
provides that prophylactic.
984
 
According to Waldron that is the reason for the importance of procedural and institutional 
features pertaining to legislation.
985
 What are those features? In addition to those already 
mentioned above (separation of powers, set-up of the legislature, generality of acts) Waldron 
stresses that legislating must be laborious; passing legislation must not be simple or quick. 
That is what distinguishes a polity which is ruled by legislation from a polity which is ruled 
by decree. 
Legislating is not the same as passing a resolution or issuing of a decree; it is a 
formally defined act consisting of a laborious process; in a well-structured legislature 
that process involves successive stages of deliberation and voting in each of [several] 
institutions, in two of which the legislative proposal is subject to scrutiny at the hands 
of myriad representatives of various social interests. 
/.../ 
Bicameralism, checks and balances (such as executive veto), the production of a text 
as the focus of deliberation, clause-by-clause consideration, the formality and 
solemnity of the treatment of bills in the chamber, the publicity of legislative debates, 
successive layers of deliberation, and the sheer time for consideration – formal and 
informal, internal and external to the legislature – that is allowed to pass between the 
initiation and the final enactment of a bill: these are all features of legislative due 
process that are salient to an enactment’s eventual status as law (for the purposes of 
our thinking about the rule of law).
986
 
Thus in the last quote Waldron would essentially seem to be postulating substantively 
procedural concept of legislation: procedural because the matters which of he writes there 
pertain to the way legislation is adopted; substantively because he sets substantive criteria for 
those ways of adopting legislation. Considering its extensive criticism by academic 
commentators, how does the concept of legislative act formulated in section 4.1 and based on 
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the analysis of legislative procedure contained in section 2 of this thesis fare by Waldron’s 
standards? 
We have seen that general applicability of acts simply does not come into it as far as the 
concept of legislative act formulated in section 4.1 is concerned. Nothing in Article 289 or 
294 TFEU precludes the adoption via ordinary or special legislative procedure of an act 
which is in no way general. Adoption of the WTO Agreements could serve as an actual 
example here.
987
 They were adopted on the basis of, inter alia, what is now Article 207 
TFEU. That provision mandates the use of an ordinary legislative procedure.
988
 Yet the WTO 
Agreements have ordinarily no direct effect in EU law,
989
 i.e. they do not apply generally to 
individuals within the EU. Furthermore, if it is accepted that an express use of the words 
“special legislative procedure” in a legal basis is not needed for the procedure mandated by 
that legal basis to constitute a special legislative procedure,
990
 current Article 7(1) TEU could 
be an even starker example of such a legal basis: it would be difficult to argue that a 
determination that a member state was risking a breach of values set forth in Article 2 TEU 
did not concern a truly singular situation.
991
 
Moving on to the question of how laborious the adoption of acts via ordinary and special 
legislative procedure is, it is submitted that Article 294 TFEU prescribes quite an arduous 
procedure. All the more so considering that in addition to that procedure it must go through 
the various technical committees and COREPER.
992
 The special legislative procedures 
mandating the consent of the “other institution” are less laborious, however, and the special 
legislative procedures merely mandating that the Parliament be consulted before the Council 
adopts the resulting act may be thought to be even less laborious (considering that the 
Council could, and sometimes does, simply disregard the Parliament’s opinion to the point of 
having essentially agreed on the resulting act before asking for the Parliament’s opinion with 
the consultation of the Parliament amounting to no more than going through the motions
993
). 
This seems to correspond nicely with the position of Türk in holding acts adopted via 
ordinary legislative procedure to be legislative, those adopted via special legislative 
procedure mandating consent of the other institution to be likewise legislative (albeit doing so 
after some further argumentation) and those adopted via special legislative procedure 
mandating mere consultation of the Parliament not to be legislative at all. 
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A cynic would, however, suggest that Türk’s portrayal of the situation994 is unrealistic. The 
reason why that is so stems from the fact that 
in practice, or de facto, Coreper has evolved into a veritable decision-making 
factory.
995
 
All items which reach the Council for adoption be it via ordinary or via special legislative 
procedure will have been prepared by COREPER. As a result 70-80% of all such items 
reaching the Council will require no discussion in the Council itself
996
 having been decided 
by COREPER.
997
 Furthermore, COREPER together with its “underworld” of committees998 is 
the “first port of call”999 of any draft instrument reaching the Council: be it a proposal 
submitted by the Commission or a proposal already amended by the Parliament. In spite of 
that 
[m]eetings of the COREPER are not public. Its minutes are not published and it is not 
accountable to any parliamentary assembly.
1000
 
While the ECJ has stated that COREPER cannot take acts binding third parties (only the 
Council can),
1001
 in view of the foregoing it is difficult to argue that most of the time the 
Council is doing something other than rubber-stamping decisions of COREPER. Finally, it is 
the members of COREPER who participate in the so-called trilogues.
1002
 A trilogue is an 
informal meeting or negotiation of the representatives of the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission with a view of adopting instruments via ordinary or special legislative 
procedures. It is not provided for in the constitutive treaties. It may take place at any stage of 
procedure for adoption of an act.
1003
 The objective is to reach agreement on the text of the 
draft act so that the draft sails through the Council and the Parliament without difficulty or 
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delay. According to the Parliament’s statistics during the 7th parliamentary term some 90% of 
all legislative procedures were ordinary legislative procedures,
1004
 and some 85% of all 
ordinary legislative procedures (and hence some 77% of all legislative procedures) ended in 
adoption of the proposed act at first reading.
1005
 It has been opined that some 76% of the 
instruments adopted via ordinary legislative procedure are actually agreed via trilogues.
1006
 
That has prompted Chalmers, Davies and Monti as far as suggesting that 
[i]n instances where the trilogue is successful, Parliament and COREPER are acting 
as genuine co-legislators.
1007
 
For the purposes of Waldron’s analysis this means three things. First, the process of adopting 
any act via ordinary or special legislative procedure is most of the time not as laborious as 
might seem from the constitutive treaties (or at least differently laborious). Most of the 
instruments adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure are negotiated behind the 
scenes by the institutions concerned. Any public debate (in any of the three institutions) is 
unlikely to be what Waldron means by public legislative debates: substantive discussion of 
the content of the proposed act will take place at trilogues or otherwise away from public 
scrutiny. The distinctions which Türk purports to make simply do not represent real life.
1008
  
Second, if adoption of acts via ordinary or special legislative procedures is deemed suitably 
laborious, it is difficult to see how adoption of acts by the Commission under a power granted 
to it by the Council and/or the Parliament is any less or indeed much differently laborious. If 
Article 291 TFEU applies, then according to the comitology regulation
1009
 the Commission’s 
draft acts will be scrutinised prior to their adoption by committees staffed by the same people 
staffing the technical committees existing under COREPER. Furthermore all information 
pertaining to such draft acts will be provided – at the same time as to those committees – to 
the Council and the Parliament.
1010
 If Article 290 TFEU applies, the information will again be 
provided to the Council and the Parliament prior to adoption of a proposed act by the 
Commission; the Commission shall furthermore consult experts of member states
1011
 – 
essentially again the same people as those staffing the technical committees existing under 
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COREPER.
1012
 Finally, the Council or the Parliament might essentially have a veto over the 
Commission’s acts to which Article 290 TFEU applies. 
Third, it is difficult to see much scrutiny “at the hands of myriad representatives of various 
social interests”1013 in any ordinary or special legislative procedure: for the most part those 
procedures take place behind closed doors. To the extent that there is scrutiny of some acts 
adopted via such procedures, it is submitted that the existence or lack of such scrutiny 
depends in practice on the subject matter of the act and its perceived importance rather than 
on the procedure taken for its adoption. 
On that view while a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special 
legislative procedure could be a legislative act according to Waldron’s understanding of 
legislation, it certainly need not be: the regulations, the directives and the decisions need not 
be of general application and most of the time the procedure for their adoption either might 
be thought be not sufficiently or suitably laborious or, to the extent that it is, it is not a well 
structured process involving different steps (e.g. as evidenced by trilogues which have no 
basis in the constitutive treaties) or it does not involve public legislative debates (neither 
trilogues nor meetings of COREPER or of technical committees take place in public or are 
given any ex post facto publicity, e.g. publication of minutes etc.) or there is no scrutiny by 
representatives of different social interests. The most that can be said is that ordinary 
legislative procedure is usually lengthy
1014
 and involves negotiations. Ultimately, in deciding 
whether such procedures are laborious or not much would seem to depend on  
 whether one looks at what the law says or at how it is applied and  
 whether one thinks laboriousness within the administration as opposed to 
laboriousness by the actual people who are appointed to the public-facing 
positions of the institutions concerned (viz. by the commissioners, the ministers 
meeting in the Council and the MEPs themselves) is enough to satisfy Waldron’s 
formulation. 
Waldron has this to say about such a position of the cynic. 
Cynics will respond that much of what we call legislation is not in fact enacted 
scrupulously according to these forms and procedures; much legislation is enacted in 
a way that makes a mockery of the procedural principles I have been emphasizing. 
This is certainly true of some legislation, and it is deplorably true as a matter of the 
general practice of some legislatures. 
/.../ 
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 See, in general, section 3.3.4 of this thesis. 
1013
 Understanding “social interests” here as representatives of civil society, not representatives of different 
political parties in a parliament. 
1014
 Activity report on codecision and conciliation: 14 July 2009 – 30 June 2014 (7th parliamentary term), page 
10. According to the statistics during the 7
th
 parliamentary term the average length of ordinary legislative 
procedure was 19 months; for those ordinary legislative procedures where “agreement” between institutions was 
reached early and an act adopted at first reading it was 17 months. 
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This is legislation in opposition to the rule of law; it flouts the notion of legislative 
due process; it sits unsatisfactorily with the separation of powers (though mercifully 
the judiciary remains active and independent in New Zealand); and it really does elide 
the idea of the rule of law and rule by the state.
1015
 
It is submitted that, in view of the arguments presented above, of legislation within the 
meaning of the concept formulated in section 4.1 (on the basis of analysis contained in 
section 2 of this thesis) the position of the cynic as presented by Waldron and Waldron’s 
assessment of that position are true. Admittedly it need not necessarily be true of every 
legislative act within the meaning of the concept formulated in section 4.1, but the concept is 
conducive to such criticism as Waldron sketches out, and very frequently the criticism hits 
the mark. That concept of legislative act should not, jurisprudentially speaking, be deemed a 
concept of legislation at all (in spite of it being able to cover some legislative acts). 
It is submitted that that is the probable reason why so many academic commentators have 
found themselves unable to subscribe to the clear view of legislative acts formulated in 
section 4.1. All the commentators whose positions have been considered above and who have 
somehow disagreed with the concept of legislative act formulated in section 4.1 implicitly 
view legislation as something either needed for legitimacy of a polity or, even if not needed, 
nevertheless furthering that legitimacy.
1016
 The concept formulated in section 4.1 offers no 
additional legitimacy, however. It cannot do so because the terms of Article 289 TFEU on 
which it is based are terms of art:
1017
 they mean nothing more and nothing less than what that 
provision says. Unlike similar terms in national law, they would not – as a matter of positive 
EU law – seem to bear any connotations (let alone denotations) pertaining to separation of 
powers or rule of law. As has been noted elsewhere, 
[e]ven after the overall revision of the categories of legislative, delegated and 
implementing acts, the Treaties do not embrace a procedural concept of legislation 
based on parliamentary participation.
1018
 
Thus, put bluntly, while the positions of academic commentators considered above would 
seem not to be good law, the reasons for developing such positions are at least 
understandable. 
4.3. Constitutive treaties 
The concept formulated in section 4.1 would, however, seem to face a challenge not only 
from academic commentators, but from within the constitutive treaties themselves. Article 2 
TFEU has been considered at some length in section 2.2.2.1 above. It is useful to set it out in 
full. 
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 Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the rule of law, (2007) 1 Legisprudence 108 
1016
 Advocate general Cruz Villalon actually makes that explicit in paragraph 42 of this opinion in case C-
280/11P. 
1017
 See section 2.4 of this thesis. 
1018
 Nicola Lupo and Giovanni Piccirilli, The Relocation of the Legality Principle by the European Courts’ Case 
Law: An Italian Perspective, (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 55, 63 
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1.   When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, 
only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being 
able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of Union acts. 
2.   When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member 
States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence 
to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States 
shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease 
exercising its competence. 
3.   The Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies 
within arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have 
competence to provide. 
4.   The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty 
on European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. 
5.   In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall 
have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions 
of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas. 
Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the 
Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws 
or regulations. 
6.   The scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union's competences shall be 
determined by the provisions of the Treaties relating to each area. 
Article 2 TFEU makes a distinction between legislating and adopting legally binding acts. It 
mentions legislating as a possibility in the areas falling within either exclusive competence of 
the EU or one of the shared competences of the EU. By contrast, legislating is not mentioned 
as a possibility in areas where the EU (i) is only competent to support, coordinate and 
supplement the actions of member states or (ii) has only what was termed in section 2.2.2.1 
above ‘“political” coordinating competence’. It is likewise not mentioned as a possibility in 
the field of CFSP. It would thus stand to reason that in the first two areas of competence the 
EU may adopt legislative acts, while in the latter three it may not. 
However, as has been demonstrated in section 2.2.2.1 above, in fact, even on a narrow 
construction of special legislative procedure
1019
 the EU may adopt what are legislative acts 
within the clear meaning formulated in the introduction to this section in all areas of 
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 I.e. if procedures complying with all the requirements set forth in Article 289(2) TFEU bar a statement in 
the legal basis to the effect that the procedure is a special legislative procedure are excluded from among special 
legislative procedures. 
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competence bar CFSP. On a wide construction of special legislative procedure
1020
 the EU 
would have been able to adopt legislative acts even in the field of CFSP had it not been for 
the specific carve-out in Articles 24(1)(2) and 31(1) TEU. Thus the concept of legislation 
employed in Article 2 TFEU and the concept of legislation developed on the basis of Article 
289 TFEU would seem to be different. 
At this stage one would seem to be left with two options. First, disregard the reference to 
“legislating” in Article 2 TFEU, and stick to the concept formulated in section 4.1. That could 
perhaps find some support in paragraph 6 of Article 2 TFEU to the extent that that provision 
suggests that the way the EU’s competences are to be exercised is determined by particular 
legal bases.
1021
 Paragraph 6 of Article 2 TFEU could thus mean that a general rule set out in 
Article 2 TFEU could not preclude adoption of a legislative act if a particular legal basis 
mandates such adoption (regardless of the field of competence in which that legal basis lies). 
That would, however, empty references to “legislating” in Article 2 TFEU of much (if not 
all) of their meaning. As has been demonstrated in section 2.3.3 above such a consequence is 
sometimes inevitable, but it nevertheless demonstrates internal inconsistency. In any case, it 
is submitted that such emptying of words of their meaning is hardly desirable.
1022
 
The second option would be to accept the internal inconsistency of the constitutive treaties: 
that they truly do rely on several different meanings of legislation without making any single 
one of them explicit (it must not be forgotten that the concept formulated in section 4.1 is, 
after all, a construction). That does not help one much further. It begs the question what other 
concepts of legislation in addition to the one formulated in section 4.1 the constitutive treaties 
rely on, and which concept is relevant in which situation. Furthermore, if there are other 
concepts of legislation in EU law, why was it necessary to expressly provide that regulations, 
directives and decisions adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure are legislative 
acts? There would seem to be no good answer.
1023
 
Whichever option one chooses, it would seem evident that there is more to legislation in EU 
law than the concept of legislation formulated in section 4.1. Additionally, one should note 
the wording the first sentence of Article 2(2) TFEU. 
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States 
in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in that area. 
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 I.e. if procedures complying with all the requirements set forth in Article 289(2) TFEU bar a statement in 
the legal basis to the effect that the procedure is a special legislative procedure are not excluded from among 
special legislative procedures. 
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 That echoes the statement made by the ECJ in its judgment in joined cases 188-190/80 at paragraphs 6 and 
7. See the text to footnotes 894 and 895 above. 
1022
 It could be thought of as contrary to effet utile of constitutive treaties, especially when such consequence 
(loss of meaning) is not an inevitable corollary of every possible approach. 
1023
 The best answer one could come up with would seem to run along the lines of the constitutive treaties being 
instruments of public international law, negotiated by politicians, and hence expecting consistency being simply 
too much. That would, however, mean that any attempt of trying to find some internal consistency (in respect of 
legislative acts, for instance) is bound to be futile. 
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The words in bold italics alone would seem to preclude the correctness of the concept 
formulated in section 4.1 altogether: the words would seem to indicate that the concept of 
legislating must be capable of being applied both to the EU and to the member states. The 
concept formulated in section 4.1 on the basis of Article 289 TFEU is clearly incapable of 
applying to member states. Thus one is presented with the third option: to accept that the 
concept formulated in section 4.1 is neither the whole, nor a part of the story; that it, in fact, 
forms no part of the story at all. Furthermore, considering the differences in institutional 
make-ups of the EU and of member states (let alone those between different member states), 
it is submitted that it might be nigh on impossible to formulate a procedural approach to 
legislative acts which would be applicable to both the EU and the member states. 
A more subtle inconsistency with the concept formulated in section 4.1 could be found in the 
third sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU. That provision expressly excludes adoption of 
legislative acts in the field of CFSP. It will be recalled that in section 2.3.3 it was suggested 
that if the wide construction of special legislative procedure
1024
 were adopted, that provision 
could be read as excluding the consequences, which ordinarily follow in EU law if something 
is a legislative act, from applying to any act adopted within the field of CFSP. The main such 
consequence would arguably be the scrutiny of draft CFSP acts by national parliaments – 
which, were CFSP acts considered legislative acts, would be mandated by Protocol (No 1) on 
the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality. 
It is, however, worthy of remembering that the existing authorities (judgments of the GC) are 
inconsistent on the issue of whether the wide construction of special legislative procedure is 
ultimately the correct one. If it is not, then should clear concept of legislation formulated in 
section 4.1 be the correct one in EU law, it would be difficult to find any meaning for the 
third sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TFEU.
1025
 Furthermore, even if the wide concept is correct, 
one cannot but notice that stating that 
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 I.e. if procedures complying with all the requirements set forth in Article 289(2) TFEU bar a statement in 
the legal basis to the effect that the procedure is a special legislative procedure are not excluded from among 
special legislative procedures. 
1025
 Admittedly, if the narrow construction of special legislative procedure is correct, some meaning could 
seemingly be ascribed to Article 24(1)(2) TEU by reference to the judgment of the ECJ in case C-91/05 
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (ECOWAS). The ECJ there held 
that the EU could adopt an instrument simultaneously on multiple legal bases provided that the procedural 
requirements for adoption of instruments mandated by the relevant legal bases are compatible. The procedural 
requirements set forth in Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU are certainly compatible with any TFEU legal basis 
mandating a special legislative procedure where the Parliament is merely consulted. Thus Article 24(1)(2) TEU 
could be read as banning the use of dual legal bases where (i) one of the legal bases is a CFSP one and (ii) the 
other one mandates the use of special legislative procedure thus resulting in a legislative act within the meaning 
of Article 289(3) TFEU. The difficulty with such an approach is that squaring it with Article 40 TEU might be 
complicated (although based on the wording of that article and paragraphs 76 and 77 of ECOWAS it might very 
well be possible). What would be even more difficult is squaring such a possibility with Article 275 TFEU 
which, should such hybrid CFSP/non-CFSP acts be possible (and this approach assumes their possibility), 
would grant the CJEU jurisdiction over non-CFSP parts, but deny it in respect of CFSP parts of such hybrid 
acts. The difficulty here is that according to paragraph 75 of ECOWAS multiple legal bases are only possible if a 
measure pursues equally objectives set forth in all legal bases on the basis of which it has been adopted. Thus it 
would seem highly doubtful that such a measure could be reviewed only as far as the non-CFSP legal basis goes 
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 [t]he adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded, 
is a strange way of positing that the consequences which ordinarily follow in EU law from 
something being a legislative act do not apply. Surely, if the concept formulated in section 
4.1 were correct, whether the resulting act is or is not legislative would depend on whether it 
is a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure 
(should the clear concept be correct). What consequences are drawn from that in a particular 
situation is a separate issue entirely. 
A more direct inconsistency manifests itself if one considers Article 31(1)(1) TEU. 
Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council 
acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of 
legislative acts shall be excluded. 
While the second sentence could be read as referring to decisions of the Council alone 
(specifically those mandated by Article 27(3) or 41(3)(1) TEU
1026
) and hence amounting to 
nothing more than a repetition of Article 24(1)(2) TFEU, it is hardly the natural reading of 
the provision. First of all, as stated above, that would hardly be the expected way of saying 
that consequences attaching to something being a legislative act do not attach to decisions 
adopted on two particular legal bases. If those exclusions apply only to two legal bases, it 
would have been much easier to simply say so in those bases themselves (especially seeing as 
that “exclusion” is repeated in the TEU twice in any event). In any case it is submitted that 
there is no ground in Article 31 TEU – or anywhere else in the TEU for that matter – for 
saying that the second sentence of Article 31(1)(1) TEU does not refer to decisions of the 
European Council or to all CFSP decisions of the Council. If it does refer to the acts of the 
European Council and to all CFSP acts of the Council, it must be based on some other 
understanding of legislation, not the one formulated on the basis of Article 289 TFEU in 
section 4.1. The European Council can simply never adopt legislative acts within the meaning 
of the latter concept. 
It must be noted that the first three sentences of Article 24(1)(2) TEU read as follows. 
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It 
shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative 
acts shall be excluded. 
Thus both Article 24 TEU and Article 31 TEU refer to acts of both the European Council and 
the Council immediately before proscribing adoption of legislative acts. It is submitted that 
the use of such a formulation is consistent enough not to be dismissed out of hand. Especially 
considering that according to Article 24 TEU, CFSP is subject to its own specific rules and 
                                                                                                                                                        
without any effect on the CFSP legal basis. Those interrelationships lie, however, outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
1026
 The decisions adopted on the basis of either of those provisions require consultation of the Parliament and 
would thus amount to a legislative procedure under the wide concept of special legislative procedure with the 
resulting act being legislative according to the concept formulated in section 4.1. 
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procedures. Together that might be thought sufficient to raise a question whether “legislative 
act” might have some meaning peculiar to the field of CFSP; a meaning which includes at 
least some acts adopted by the European Council.
1027
 
Furthermore, the TEU as it stood prior to the Lisbon Treaty did not contain provisions akin to 
the third sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU and the second sentence of Article 31(1) TEU. It 
could thus be credibly suggested that those provisions were inserted either for political fears 
(of expanding EU’s competences) or for other political reasons (e.g. to enable the member 
states to at least claim to “national audiences” that the EU would not be legislating in the 
field of CFSP). If so, however, it is submitted that the interrelation of references to 
“legislative acts” in those two provisions with the TFEU was simply not thought through.1028 
In addition, should such political motivation prove correct, the references to “legislative acts” 
in those two provisions were in all likelihood understood within their national law meaning 
(and different meanings at that – representative of each member state is likely to have 
considered his or her own national law meaning). As we have seen, however, the concept 
formulated in section 4.1 is purely formal, being based on the terms of art defined by the 
constitutive treaties. The concept formulated in section 4.1 in no way corresponds with 
ordinary national law meaning of legislation (for instance, no member state has a 
Commission, a Council and a Parliament in its institutional make-up; the concept, however, 
relies on their existence). 
It is worth noting one further provision of the constitutive treaties here: paragraph 15(1) of 
Article 294 TFEU, which deals with ordinary legislative procedure and reads as follows. 
Where, in the cases provided for in the Treaties, a legislative act is submitted to the 
ordinary legislative procedure on the initiative of a group of Member States, on a 
recommendation by the European Central Bank, or at the request of the Court of 
Justice, paragraph 2, the second sentence of paragraph 6, and paragraph 9 shall not 
apply. 
It might be thought strange that it refers to cases “where a legislative act is submitted to the 
ordinary legislative procedure” if using ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of an 
instrument is what makes the act legislative (and automatically so). It is submitted that 
according to a natural reading Article 294(15)(1) TFEU would apply if what was submitted to 
the ordinary legislative procedure were a legislative act. That would imply that something 
other than a legislative act might be submitted to ordinary legislative procedure.
1029
 As 
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 There would seem to be no case law in point. 
1028
 That those references truly were not thought through would seem to gain support from interrelationship of 
the third sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU and the second sentence of Article 31(1) TEU. They form part of the 
same chapter of the TEU entitled “Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy”. The 
former essentially says that no legislative acts are possible at all within the field of CFSP. Yet the latter then 
says, when speaking of decisions of the Council and of the European Council in the field of CFSP, that adoption 
of legislative acts shall be excluded. Why have the latter provision at all? There is no field of application for it 
which field would not already be covered by the former provision. 
1029
 Admittedly this provision is the easiest of all so far considered in this section 4.3 to explain by means of bad 
drafting: surely no instrument submitted to ordinary legislative procedure could be any sort of act. At the time of 
submission the instrument would simply not yet have been adopted. 
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suggested by the ECJ in case C-77/11
1030
 such a situation might admittedly occur if the 
resulting act is an atypical one. There is however no legal basis in the constitutive treaties 
which mandates adoption of an atypical act via ordinary legislative procedure initiated by a 
group of member states, the ECB or the ECJ, which are the only situations when Article 
294(15)(1) TFEU applies.
1031
 
Finally the interaction between legislative acts within the meaning of the concept formulated 
in section 4.1 and regulatory acts needs to be briefly considered. Regulatory acts are a Lisbon 
Treaty addition to the constitutive treaties. They are mentioned only once in the constitutive 
treaties – in Article 263(4) TFEU. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and 
second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or 
which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which 
is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty there were only two tests for determination of 
standing of private parties to challenge acts of the EU before the CJEU. There was standing 
only if the act was addressed to the private party seeking to mount a challenge or if the act 
was of direct and individual concern to that party. The Lisbon Treaty introduced the third 
(alternative) test: a private party has standing to challenge an act if that act (i) is a regulatory 
one, (ii) does not entail implementing measures and (iii) directly concerns that private party. 
The relevant issue for present purposes is determining which acts are regulatory. 
The first authority in point was the judgment of the GC in Inuit.
1032
 The GC held in paragraph 
56 that 
the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from 
legislative acts. Consequently, a legislative act may form the subject-matter of an 
action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person only if it is of direct and 
individual concern to them. 
To avoid doubts as to the meaning of “legislative act” in that quote, it is useful to repeat GC’s 
own words on this matter (paragraphs 60 and 61 of the judgment). 
In that regard, it is apparent from Article 289(1) and (3) TFEU that legal acts adopted 
according to the procedure defined in Article 294 TFEU, referred to as ‘the ordinary 
legislative procedure’, constitute legislative acts. 
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 Discussed at length in section 2.2.1 above. 
1031
 It might be argued that adoption of atypical acts is possible in every situation where the legal basis does not 
expressly specify that the resulting act be a regulation, a directive or decision, but grants the privilege of 
initiative to either a group of member states, the ECB or the ECJ (Article 129(3) TFEU could be an example of 
such a legal basis). Then the resulting act need not to be a regulation or a directive or a decision. That would 
however seem to empty Article 289(1) TFEU of much of its meaning. 
1032
 GC’s order of 6th September 2011 in case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union 
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As the procedure defined in Article 294 TFEU reproduces, in essence, that defined in 
Article 251 EC, it must be concluded that, within the categories of legal acts provided 
for by the FEU Treaty, the contested regulation must be categorised as a legislative 
act. 
Thus the GC adopted the concept formulated in section 4.1 (the reference to ordinary 
legislative procedure only is explained by the fact that the act at issue was adopted via that 
procedure). On appeal the ECJ, at first glance, seems to have confirmed the construction 
placed upon “regulatory act” by the GC. 
The General Court was therefore correct to conclude that the concept of ‘regulatory 
act’ provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU does not encompass 
legislative acts.
1033
 
This position seems to have been confirmed, for instance, by the order of the GC in case T-
596/11
1034
 where it was held that a Council’s implementing regulation,1035 i.e. an instrument 
adopted on the basis of another instrument itself adopted on the basis of the constitutive 
treaties, rather than on the basis of the constitutive treaties directly, was a regulatory act. Thus 
Article 263(4) TFEU would seem to be in perfect accord with the concept formulated in 
section 4.1. 
Indeed, whatever the correct concept of legislation is, Article 263(4) TFEU relies on it. In this 
respect it is worthy of note that according to the ECJ a regulatory act must be of general 
application; an act which is not of general application cannot be regulatory.
1036
 That means, 
however, that Article 263(4) TFEU is incompatible with any concept of legislation based 
(solely) on generality of application. Should the issue whether an act is legislative or not be 
determined (only) by reference to generality of application of that act, it would simply be 
impossible to distinguish between regulatory and legislative acts. Yet that distinction would 
need to be made in order to decide which test for determination of standing to apply. 
Two more points may be taken in respect of Article 263(4) TFEU. First, in view of the way 
the ECJ in paragraph 61 of its judgment in Inuit approved the ruling of the GC, it remains 
unclear whether such non-legislative acts within the meaning of the concept formulated in 
section 4.1 which acts are adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties are 
regulatory or not. The ECJ simply stated that legislative acts within the meaning of Article 
289(3) TFEU are not regulatory. It said nothing about other acts adopted directly on the basis 
of constitutive treaties. The issue has not yet been clarified in case law. 
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 Judgment of the ECJ in case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, paragraph 61. In paragraph 45 the ECJ made clear that it was relying on the 
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 GC’s order of 21st January 2014 in case T-596/11 Bricmate AB v Council of the European Union, paragraph 
65. The order was handed down three and a half months after the ECJ’s judgment in Inuit. 
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 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September 2011 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in 
the People’s Republic of China 
1036
 See the judgment of the ECJ in case C-33/14P Mory SA and Others v European Commission, paragraph 92. 
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Second, the position as formulated by the CJEU would seem to lead to the consequence that 
an instrument of, for instance, the Commission, by which it exercises the power granted to it 
to amend an element (admittedly a non-essential one) of a legislative act,
1037
 is regulatory.
1038
 
It is submitted that this consequence likewise shows that any concept of legislation based on 
general application of acts is untenable in EU law. More interestingly, it was demonstrated in 
section 3 of this thesis that a grant of power to adopt rules (subject to Article 290 TFEU 
controls over the exercise of such granted power) is lawful as long as the grantor has 
determined which questions the grantee must decide (that was essentially the totality of the 
framework which was prescribed for the grantee in EUROPOL
1039
). Thus the grantee may be 
tasked with adopting any rules, possibly aside from essential rules in respect of issues falling 
– according to the constitutive treaties – within the competence of another institution (as 
stated in Frontex). 
It thus stands to reason that any content-based concept of legislation possibly aside from such 
which squarely relies on essential elements as formulated in Frontex is likewise incompatible 
with Article 263(4) TFEU. Such content-based approaches would suggest that the act is 
legislative, while within the meaning of Article 263(4) TFEU it could (depending on the 
case) be regulatory, because it was adopted by the Commission on the basis of a power 
granted to it (subject to, for instance, Article 290 TFEU controls). According to the Inuit line 
of case law, being so adopted precludes such an act from being legislative. The fact that it 
could be regulatory suffices to show the contradiction between Article 263(4) TFEU and such 
content-based concepts: if content is the criterion, all such acts would have to be legislative; 
Article 263(4) TFEU would however seem to mean that some of them must be classified as 
regulatory and hence not legislative. 
In view of these last two points – on which it must be remembered the ECJ has not yet 
explicitly ruled – it is perhaps better to modify the earlier suggestion, and say that the concept 
formulated in section 4.1 accords well with a part of the regulatory-rule contained in Article 
263(4) TFEU; in part the issue has not yet come up for decision by the CJEU. 
To sum up, not all provisions of the constitutive treaties would seem reconcilable with the 
concept of legislative acts formulated in section 4.1 and based on the analysis of legislative 
procedures. Nevertheless, some provisions – for instance Article 263(4) TFEU – are 
reconcilable with that concept. However, Article 263(4) TFEU is reconcilable with neither 
concepts of legislation which suggest that legislative are those acts which are of general 
application nor with most content-based concepts of legislation. Article 2(2) TFEU would, on 
the other hand, seem to exclude all procedural concepts of legislation. Might this conundrum 
have already been solved in the case law of the CJEU? 
                                                 
1037
 The possibility of the Commission having such a power is expressly mentioned in Article 290 TFEU. See 
section 3 of this thesis. 
1038
 No explicit statement regarding this issue has been made in the decisions of the ECJ or the GC. 
1039
 That grant of power was held lawful. See sections 3.2.4 and 3.5 above. 
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4.4. Case law 
4.4.1. Legislative acts 
In its judgment in Gibraltar v Council
1040
 the ECJ tackled head-on the issue of which acts are 
legislative and which are not. 
15. It should be noted, first, that the Court has held /.../ that the term 'decision' used in 
the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty has the technical meaning employed 
in Article 189, and that the criterion for distinguishing between a measure of a 
legislative nature and a decision within the meaning of that latter article must be 
sought in the general 'application' or otherwise of the measure in question. 
16. It should also be noted that even though a directive is in principle binding only on 
the parties to whom it is addressed, namely the Member States, it is normally a form 
of indirect regulatory or legislative measure. Moreover, the Court has already had 
occasion to classify a directive as a measure of general application /.../. 
17. Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that the general application, and thus 
the legislative nature, of a measure is not called in question by the fact that it is 
possible to determine more or less precisely the number or even the identity of the 
persons to whom it applies at any given time, as long as it is established that such 
application takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by 
the measure in question in relation to its purpose /.../. 
The act at issue in Gibraltar v Council was a directive
1041
 which was adopted by the Council 
(after consulting the Parliament) on the basis of Article 84(2) EEC as it stood after the SEA. 
While the corresponding legal basis in the TFEU – Article 100(2) – provides for an ordinary 
legislative procedure, the procedure actually employed for adoption of the directive was 
analogous to either a special legislative procedure or a non-legislative procedure 
altogether.
1042
 However as is clear from the quoted paragraphs of the judgment the ECJ did 
not link the “legislativeness” of an act with the procedure employed for its adoption. Instead 
“legislativeness” followed from the generality of an act:1043 if an act was of general 
application, then it was of legislative nature. 
                                                 
1040
 Judgment of the ECJ in case C-298/89 Government of Gibraltar v Council of the European Communities 
1041
 Council Directive 89/463/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 83/416/EEC concerning the 
authorization of scheduled inter-regional air services for the transport of passengers, mail and cargo between 
Member States 
1042
 Unless one subscribes to the view formulated in section 2.3.3 above to the effect that any procedure leading 
to adoption of an act by the Council which procedure entails participation of the Parliament constitutes a special 
legislative procedure (even if the legal basis does not call the procedure “a special legislative procedure”), it is 
ultimately impossible to say whether the procedure would under the TFEU be a special legislative procedure or 
not: some legal bases of the TFEU call such a procedure “a special legislative procedure”, while others do not. 
1043
 It should perhaps be noted that generality does not mean an abstract class of addressees. All addressees 
might be identifiable without the act losing its generality. See paragraph 17 of the quote. A detailed 
consideration of generality in CJEU’s case law lies, however, outside the scope of this thesis. As will be seen 
below in this section 4.4 it is not necessary for conclusions regarding legislative acts; it rather pertains to issues 
of standing of private parties to bring direct actions before the CJEU. 
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Clearly this does not fit well at all with the position formulated in section 4.1: that 
regulations, directives and decisions adopted via a legislative procedure constitute legislative 
acts. Article 289 TFEU does not require such regulations, directives or decisions to be of 
general application. Furthermore, some instruments other than regulations, directives and 
decision adopted pursuant to ordinary or special legislative procedure could very well be of 
general application. Nor does it fit well at all with Article 263(4) TFEU and the case law 
developed on the basis of it in respect of the regulatory-alternative; in fact, it is all but 
impossible to reconcile with Article 263(4) TFEU as currently construed by the CJEU. The 
concept of legislative acts which equates “legislativeness” with generality of application 
would, however, seem to fit well with content-based concepts of legislation: especially the 
one the absence of which was lamented by Dougan.
1044
 
There are potentially three ways to reconcile this seeming inconsistency with the concept 
formulated in section 4.1. First, Gibraltar v Council was handed down more than fifteen 
years before the TFEU entered into force. Hence it could be argued that the judgment, while 
good law at the time, has been overtaken by events; that the concept of legislation was simply 
changed, perhaps precisely by the Lisbon Treaty. That would, however, fail to explain the 
following statement of law made by the ECJ in Puma
1045
 well after the entry into force of the 
TFEU. 
[I]t should be noted that regulations such as the regulations in dispute are of a 
legislative character inasmuch as they apply generally to the traders concerned. 
The instruments in dispute were two anti-dumping regulations of the Council: one an 
implementing regulation
1046
 adopted after the entry into force of the TFEU and the other a 
pre-TFEU anti-dumping regulation
1047
 which would have been an implementing regulation 
had it been adopted under the TFEU. Since the Parliament was not involved in their adoption, 
the procedure employed for their adoption was not a legislative procedure referred to in 
paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 289 TFEU. Both cases stemmed from applications for repayment 
of anti-dumping duties which the applicant importers had paid. In both cases at least some of 
the duties were paid after the entry into force of the TFEU.
1048
 Thus Puma seems to expressly 
confirm Gibraltar v Council as good law under the TFEU, i.e. post-Lisbon Treaty.
1049
 
                                                 
1044
 See section 4.2.2 above. However, it would still not explain Article 2 TFEU and Articles 24(1)(2) and 31(1) 
TEU: there are EU acts of general application in the fields where they seem to exclude legislation. 
1045
 Judgment of the ECJ in joined cases C-659/13&34/14 C & J Clark International Ltd v The Commissioners 
for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs and Puma SE v Hauptzollamt Nürnberg, paragraph 58 
1046
 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2009 of 22 December 2009 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in Vietnam and originating in 
the People's Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather consigned 
from the Macao SAR, whether declared as originating in the Macao SAR or not, following an expiry review 
pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
1047
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and 
collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather 
originating in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam 
1048
 Paragraphs 41 and 47 of the judgment 
1049
 Furthermore, Puma seems to demonstrate an inconsistency between paragraphs 16 and 17 of Gibraltar v 
Council. In the former the ECJ opined that directives are of general application and either regulatory or 
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The second way would take as its basis the different language versions of the two judgments. 
Where the English version of Gibraltar v Council speaks of “legislative” in paragraphs 15 
and 17, the French and the Italian versions of refer to “normative”. The German version of 
Gibraltar v Council refers to “normative” in paragraph 17 and to “Rechtsetzung” in 
paragraph 15.
1050
 In Puma the French, the Italian, the German and the Estonian versions all 
refer “normative” rather than legislative. 
Based on these differences it could be argued that in both Gibraltar v Council and in Puma 
the ECJ actually linked generality of application of an act with its “normativity”, not with its 
“legislativeness”. This could seemingly find some supports in the opinions of advocates 
general. To the extent that he engaged with the issue, advocate general Lenz in the original 
German of his opinion in Gibraltar v Council (in paragraph 91 and in footnote 62) wrote of 
“normative”. Advocate general Bot in the original French in his opinion (in paragraph 38) 
likewise wrote of “normative”. 
Further support could be found in academic opinion. It has been suggested that 
[t]he drafters of the original Treaty deliberately failed to accord [the Council and the 
Commission
1051] a “legislative power”,1052 
according them decision-making power instead.
1053
 
This solution faces several problems. First, Gibraltar v Council was argued in English, and 
Puma was argued in English and in German. That should mean that none of the arguments 
made by the parties and by reference to which the ECJ had to rule were presented in either 
French or Italian (or German in case of Gibraltar v Council). Assuming (not unreasonably) 
that a judgment must engage with the points made by the parties, it seems more likely that the 
English (and in case of Puma, German) versions should better reflect the actual 
argumentation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
legislative. In the latter the ECJ stated that a directive was legislative because it was of general application. 
Hence one could enquire how a directive could be regulatory if that is an alternative to it being legislative, a 
directive is of general application and “legislativeness” follows from that general application. No clarification 
seems to have been provided by the case law other than dropping the reference to “regulatory” in Puma. It could 
perhaps be argued that in view of introduction of the concept of regulatory act in Article 263(4) TFEU the 
position changed, but that would seem too strong an argument. The change would mean that the instruments at 
issue in Puma were precisely regulatory within the meaning given to that term in the Inuit line of case law (Inuit 
judgments referred to in section 4.3 above pre-date Puma). The ECJ, nevertheless opined that they were 
legislative. There would seem to be no way to resolve the inconsistency. 
1050
 Rechtsetzung means “law creating” thus potentially perhaps differing from both legislative and normative. 
At least in Estonian law normative would likely cover a general order (üldkorraldus) which is a type of 
administrative act set forth in section 51(1) of the Act on Administrative Procedure, while law creating would 
probably not. 
1051
 There was no Parliament as we know it at the time. 
1052
 Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts After the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law, 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 891 
1053
 Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts After the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law, 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 891. He further opines that the language was the same as recently as in 
the EC Treaty. 
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Second, at least some commentators seem to have accepted the English version as the correct 
one.
1054
 
Third, both relevant passages in advocate general Lenz’s opinion in Gibraltar v Council 
actually referred to an order the ECJ had made in another case where in German the language 
of “normative” was employed.1055 It is thus at best questionable whether any independent 
value should be attributed to his use of “normative”. 
Fourth, that order of the ECJ in case 160/88R displays exactly the same characteristics. 
Paragraph 27 of its English version reads as follows. 
[The ECJ] has also consistently stated that the criterion for distinguishing between a 
measure of a legislative nature and a decision is whether or not the measure at issue is 
of general application. 
Its French, Italian and German version again use “normative” in place of “legislative”. Thus 
such use is consistent: it spans at least three different cases, decided by different benches 
under differently worded constitutive treaties and dealing with different instruments. 
Furthermore, they span nearly 30 years meaning that there has been ample opportunity to 
rectify this discrepancy. It is submitted that in such a situation such a linguistic inconsistency 
is more likely to disclose either confusion within the ECJ about the normative vs legislative 
issue or alternatively a settled understanding that as far as EU law is concerned they are one 
and the same.  
These two alternatives are, fifth, given further credence by the fact that the German version 
of Gibraltar v Council uses in one place, but in one place only, yet another term 
(Rechtsetzung). Considering that in all of English, French and Italian versions the use of 
terminology within a given language version is consistent as between paragraphs 15 and 17, 
the German “discrepancy” would suggest either confusion as to meaning of terms or an 
understanding that they have one and the same meaning (i.e. that they don’t matter). That 
would seem to be further supported by the fact that “Rechtsetzung” appeared in the judgment 
in spite of not having been employed by (the German speaking) advocate general Lenz in his 
opinion in German. If neither proposition (confusion or settled understanding of equivalence) 
is correct and the English version (as the version in the language in which the case was 
argued) is not given precedence, one would need to further explain why in paragraph 15 the 
ECJ referred to Rechtsetzung rather than normativity as it did in paragraph 17. It is submitted 
                                                 
1054
 See Jonas Bering Liisberg, The EU Constitutional Treaty and Its Distinction between Legislative and Non-
legislative Acts – Oranges into Apples?, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/06 (NYU School of Law 2006), page 
6, and Jean-Claude Piris, Speaking Note to Working Group IX "Simplification of legislative procedures and 
instruments" of the Convention on the future of the Union (17
th
 October 2002), Working document 06 of the 
Working Group IX (6
th
 November 2002), page 21. Piris was speaking about the judgment in case C-202/88, 
discussed below in section 4.4.2. However it will be seen there that the different language versions of that 
judgment display the same differences as those of Gibraltar v Council. It is worth noting that Piris contends that 
the judgment speaks of legislative power (as it does in English) and not of normative power (as it does in 
French) in spite of being a French native speaker. 
1055
 Order of the ECJ in case 160/88R Fédération européenne de la santé animale and others v Council of the 
European Communities, paragraph 27. It is assumed for present purposes that advocate general Lenz was 
referring to that order in “his” language version, i.e. in German. 
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that it is both difficult to find an explanation, and that any potential explanation would be out 
of place in the EU’s multilingual environment – it would rely on distinctions which might be 
thought to be too fine to be made. 
The thesis that the ECJ was referring to normativity alone (and that hence the English 
versions of the judgments are simply wrong) might be sought to be saved by reliance on 
paragraph 16 of Gibraltar v Council. There the French and Italian versions employ the term 
“legislative” just like the English does. 
It should also be noted that even though a directive is in principle binding only on the 
parties to whom it is addressed, namely the Member States, it is normally a form of 
indirect regulatory or legislative measure. Moreover, the Court has already had 
occasion to classify a directive as a measure of general application /.../. 
II y a lieu de rappeler également que même si elle ne lie en principe que ses 
destinataires, qui sont les États membres, la directive constitue normalement un mode 
de législation ou de réglementation indirecte. La Cour a d'ailleurs déjà eu l'occasion 
de qualifier une directive d'acte ayant une portée générale /.../. 
Va del pari ricordato che, benché in linea di principio essa vincoli unicamente i propri 
destinatari, i quali sono gli Stati membri, la direttiva costituisce normalmente un 
modo di legislazione o di regolamentazione indiretta. La Corte ha del resto già avuto 
occasione di qualificare una direttiva come un atto che ha portata generale /.../. 
One could therefore present the following argument in support of normative and not 
legislative acts having been held to be connected with general application. In paragraphs 15 
and 17 the ECJ speaks of normativity which is connected with general application (being at 
the very least its corollary). In paragraph 15 the ECJ says that a directive is an act of general 
application. It hence follows that a directive is a normative act. Fortunately in that very same 
paragraph 15 the ECJ further states that a directive is normally either legislative or 
regulatory. Hence it stands to reason that “normative” is a generic term which covers 
legislative, regulatory and possibly something else (in paragraph 15 the ECJ suggested that a 
directive, which constitutes an act of general application, is only ordinarily legislative or 
regulatory; there is room for something else). This “saving” explanation runs into several 
difficulties. 
First, it is contradicted not only by the English version, but also by the German version (i.e. 
both the language versions of the arguments and of the advocate general). 
Es ist auch darauf hinzuweisen, daß Richtlinien zwar grundsätzlich nur ihre 
Adressaten, d. h. die Mitgliedstaaten, binden, daß sie aber normalerweise ein Mittel 
der indirekten Rechtsetzung sind. Im übrigen hat der Gerichtshof Richtlinien bereits 
als Maßnahmen mit allgemeiner Geltung qualifiziert. 
Thus the German version speaks only of “Rechtsetzung” – law-making. This would not seem 
to lend itself to any argument about classification akin to the one made in respect of the 
French and Italian versions, because paragraph 15, which in the French and Italian versions 
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refers to the generic term of normativity covering both terms used in paragraph 16, in the 
German version uses exactly the same term as in paragraph 16. Furthermore, this “saving” 
approach hinges on two terms being used in paragraph 16 (which could then be types of the 
generic term employed in paragraphs 15 and 17). Only one term is used in the German 
version of paragraph 16. It is submitted that the best reading of the German version of 
paragraph 16 of Gibraltar v Council is to the effect that directives are ordinarily employed to 
regulate (someone’s) activities. Thus, on the “saving” approach there would seem to be 
contradictions between English, and French and Italian versions on the one hand, and 
German, and French and Italian versions on the other – and the contradictions would be 
different. 
Second, if the “saving” explanation is to be correct, it is clear that there must be a third type 
of normative acts (in addition to legislative and regulatory ones) into which directives are 
capable of falling – and that type must comprise acts of general application (for the ECJ held 
in paragraph 15 directives to be of general application). It is submitted that there simply is no 
such category. 
Third, the “saving” explanation does not ultimately answer why the French and Italian 
versions are to be preferred to the English one. The force of the “saving” explanation was 
based on it being the only one which is internally consistent. The foregoing paragraphs have 
shown that it is not. 
It is therefore submitted that there is either confusion within the ECJ about the normative vs 
legislative issue or alternatively a settled understanding that as far as EU law is concerned 
they are one and the same (i.e. that the terms don’t matter). In any event the foregoing 
discussion of linguistic discrepancies manifested in the Gibraltar v Council line of case law 
shows two things. First, that the legislative vs normative distinction is ample ground for 
difficulties and inconsistencies. Second, that the language-based attempts at explaining 
Gibraltar v Council in no way help one further as far as concept of legislation in EU law is 
concerned.  
Even assuming the correctness of the French and Italian versions, that leaves one with two 
concepts (legislative act and normative act) which need to be somehow related. Furthermore, 
it has been accepted that “language of legislation” was introduced into the constitutive 
treaties to augment legitimacy of the EU and to enhance the rule of law.
1056
 If the French and 
Italian versions of Gibraltar v Council are to be given precedence, then arguably the wrong 
language was introduced into the constitutive treaties. It has been noted above
1057
 that use of 
terms of art cannot enhance legitimacy or rule of law; only actual substantive changes could 
do so. It thus stands to reason that language of normativity rather than of legislation should 
have been introduced into the constitutive treaties. Thus either all legislation-related changes 
in the constitutive treaties were doomed to be futile from before they were conjured up by the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, or the French and Italian version of Gibraltar v Council 
                                                 
1056
 See the text to footnote 939 above. 
1057
 See the text to footnote 1017. 
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cannot be the correct ones on their own terms.
1058
 Finally, academic commentators who 
disagree with the concept formulated in section 4.1 and whose views were discussed in 
section 4.2.2 above would actually be wrong for another reason: on the French and Italian 
versions of Gibraltar v Council what they were writing about under the guise of legislative 
acts were actually normative acts. It is submitted that, put bluntly, the entire legislative vs 
normative debate is more trouble than it is worth. 
The third way of overcoming the inconsistency between the (English language) authorities 
and the TFEU is by construing the TFEU. Article 289(3) TFEU says that legal acts adopted 
by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts. From the perspective of formal logic 
that provision in no way means that no other acts could be legislative; all it does is say that 
the acts adopted via legislative procedure are. Admittedly this would result in a certain 
duality of “legislative acts”: some would be determined by reference to the criteria set forth 
in Article 289 TFEU, while some by reference to something else. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the Grand Chamber of the ECJ might be thought to have already introduced a 
similar duality into EU law by contending in paragraph 60 of its judgment in case C-77/11 
that 
[e]ven though the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU is the outcome of a special 
legislative procedure, it does not, due to the nature of the budget, take the form of a 
legislative act in the strict sense of the term for the purpose of Articles 288 TFEU and 
289(2) TFEU. 
Article 289(2) TFEU reads as follows. 
In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure. 
Article 314 TFEU is undoubtedly such a specific case – it explicitly mentions special 
legislative procedure. Thus what the ECJ seems to have done in its judgment in case C-77/11 
is said that since Article 314(9) TFEU mentions neither a regulation, nor a directive nor a 
decision, then the resulting instrument is not a legislative act. From the perspective of formal 
logic the step which the ECJ made in paragraph 60 of its judgment in case C-77/11 and the 
step on which the third way of overcoming the inconsistency being explained here hinges are 
exactly the same. Both paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 289 TFEU could be formalised as “All S 
are P”. Both solutions are based on the obvious corollary that it does not follow from “All S 
are P” that “All P are S”, i.e. that if “All S are P” is true, it is also true that “Some P might not 
be S”. 
                                                 
1058
 This is not to say anything about the whole normativity vs legislativeness debate. That falls outside the 
scope of this section. The important issue for present purposes is that whatever their relationship with each other 
and with general application, if it is exactly as postulated in Gibraltar v Council and confirmed post-Lisbon 
Treaty in Puma the Convention on the Future of Europe could never have achieved, by means of using language 
of legislation, the objectives set in the Laeken declaration. 
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However, on this third option an instrument not being a regulation, a directive or a decision 
adopted via legislative procedure would not be sufficient for concluding that the instrument is 
not a legislative act. This third option is based on something else being legislative acts as 
well. This is where the words quoted above in bold italics come into play. What the ECJ 
seems to say there is that it is because of the nature of the budget that Article 314 TFEU did 
not require the instrument by which it was adopted to take the form of one of the instruments 
listed in Article 289(2) TFEU. Hence ultimately the nature of the act could be a reason for a 
particular instrument constituting or not constituting a legislative act. Following that 
implication it could be suggested that the dual concept of legislative act in EU law is this: 
legislative are (i) regulations, directives or decisions adopted via ordinary or special 
legislative procedure and (ii) other acts of some particular nature. The most one could take 
away from the judgment in case C-77/11 in respect of the nature of the budget there at issue 
is that it was 
an accounting document setting out estimates for the European Union of all income 
and expenditure over a certain period.
1059
 
One could hypothesise that the nature thus referred to the fact that the budget dealt with a 
singular situation, but, on the one hand it would be no more than a hypothesis, and on the 
other it would lead one straight back into the matter of generality of application (and the 
legislativeness vs normativity debate) without offering any additional criteria. That would, 
however, run into immediate difficulties with Article 263(4) TFEU discussed at the end of 
section 4.3. 
This third option, however, does no more than bring one back to the initial issue. Which other 
acts are legislative, and how does one determine that? Lest we forget almost all substance-
based concepts of legislation are incompatible with EU law.
1060
 Furthermore, why was it in 
that case necessary to postulate in Article 289 TFEU that a regulation, a directive or a 
decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure is a legislative act? Surely, for 
instance the subsidiarity and proportionality controls by national parliaments (to the extent 
they could be taken seriously) would be more needed where EU acts are adopted via 
procedures where fewer EU institutions are involved than in those where more of them are 
involved? Ordinary and special legislative procedures involve the largest number of EU 
institutions of any act-adoption-procedures which the constitutive treaties provide for. 
Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and Protocol (No 
2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality mandate those 
controls for legislative acts. On this explanation they would necessarily apply to the acts the 
adoption of which always involves both the Council and the Parliament (and mostly involve 
the Commission), but their application to acts where fewer (or more minoritarian) institutions 
have decisive role would hinge on those acts being legislative by some unclear criterion. A 
manner of overcoming inconsistencies which has such consequences would hardly seem 
acceptable. 
                                                 
1059
 Paragraph 59 of C-77/11 
1060
 Aside possibly from those relying squarely on the doctrine of essential elements. See section 4.3 above. 
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To sum up, there is case law of the ECJ directly in point (i.e. dealing specifically with 
legislative acts) which displays inconsistencies with the concept of legislative act formulated 
in section 4.1. While there are several ways of attempting to overcome those inconsistencies, 
such solutions ultimately fail (in case of the first one and to an extent the second one 
considered) or their consequences are, if anything, more problematic than the inconsistencies 
themselves (in case of the second and the third one). Furthermore there would seem to exist a 
contradiction between the line of case law discussed in this section 4.4.1 (legislative acts as 
acts of general application) with certain implications flowing from Article 263(4) TFEU 
discussed at the end of section 4.3 (legislative acts as acts of general application being 
virtually impossible to square with some implications of the case law on Article 263(4) 
TFEU). The only thing which could potentially be taken away from the case law discussed in 
this section 4.4.1 is that a directive must be of general application.
1061
 Leaving aside the issue 
of the vagueness of that suggestion, it would not seem to help one much further: even if a 
directive must be of general application, Article 289 TFEU explicitly calls legislative an act 
(a decision) in respect of which there is no – and cannot be any – such requirement: a 
decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them (Article 
288(4) TFEU). Furthermore it is difficult to see how adding such a requirement of generality 
would help to square the concept formulated in section 4.1 with the provisions of constitutive 
treaties discussed in section 4.3 above. 
4.4.2. Legislative power 
The second line of case law of the ECJ pertinent to the issue under consideration deals with 
the institutions which have legislative power. Admittedly, all the authorities in this line 
predate the Lisbon Treaty. The ECJ has in no less than four judgments explicitly spoken 
about the legislative power or competence of the Commission when adopting acts
1062
 (as 
opposed to the Commission’s power or competence to initiate a procedure for adoption of 
acts by some other institution). In the judgments in cases C-202/88 and C-314/93 the power 
of the Commission deriving from what is now Article 106(3) TFEU was said to be 
legislative. In the judgment in case C-234/89 the Commission’s power to adopt block 
exemption regulations was considered legislative by the ECJ.
1063
 Currently this power is 
conferred on the Commission by the constitutive treaties, specifically Article 105(3) TFEU. 
The EEC Treaty as it stood at the time of adoption of the block exemption regulation at issue 
contained no such provision. The power to adopt the block exemption regulation was granted 
to the Commission by the Council. The power so granted was considered legislative by the 
ECJ. The same was true of the power at issue in joined cases C-246-249/94. The regulation 
                                                 
1061
 Paragraph 16 of Gibraltar v Council. This follows from all language versions of the judgment. 
1062
 Judgment of the ECJ in case C-202/88 French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, 
paragraph 15; judgment of the ECJ in case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG, paragraphs 43-
46; judgment of the ECJ in case C-314/93 Criminal proceedings against François Rouffeteau and Robert Badia, 
paragraph 7; judgment of the ECJ in joined cases C-246-249/94 Cooperativa Agricola Zootecnica S. Antonio 
and Others v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, paragraph 31 
1063
 The regulation at issue was Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements. 
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there at issue
1064
 had been adopted by the Commission in exercise of the Article 155 EEC 
power granted to it by the Council. In this respect it is interesting to note that the ECJ called 
that power of the Commission “a delegated legislative power”.1065 
Like with the case law on legislative acts the different language versions of these four 
judgments again differ. The situation is relatively straightforward with English, French and 
Italian versions of the judgments in cases C-202/88 and C-314/93, i.e. those dealing with the 
Commission’s power under Article 106(3) TFEU. Like with the case law on legislative acts 
the English version refers to legislative power, while the French and Italian ones refer to 
normative power. The situation is, however, complicated by the German versions of those 
judgments. In the case C-202/83 the judgement refers to “Regelungsbefugnis” the closest 
analogue of which would seem to be “regulatory authority”. That is, however, a term never 
employed either in Gibraltar v Council or in Puma. Furthermore, the German version of the 
judgment in case C-314/93 eschews all characterisations of the Commission’s power there at 
issue. 
Die Richtlinie 88/301 wurde von der Kommission in Ausübung ihrer Befugnis nach 
Artikel 90 Absatz 3 EWG-Vertrag erlassen /.../
1066
 
Thus the judgment simply speaks of Article 90(3) EEC power of the Commission. 
In case C-234/89 (dealing with the powers of the Commission granted to it by the Council 
and hence – constitutive treaty-wise – founded on Article 155 EEC) both the French and the 
Italian judgments call the Commission’s power legislative, while the German one refers to 
Rechtsetzungsbefugnis. Finally, the French version of the judgment in joined cases C-246-
249/94 (dealing likewise with the powers of the Commission granted to it by the Council and 
hence – constitutive treaty-wise – founded on Article 155 EEC) refers to the regulation at 
issue there having been adopted  
sur le fondement d'une délégation legislative,
1067
 
while the German version of that judgement refers to the regulation having been adopted on 
the basis of an empowering provision (“aufgrund einer Ermächtigungsnorm”).1068 There is no 
Italian version of that judgment. 
There is thus no pattern in these statements of law made by the ECJ. If one gives preference 
to the French and the Italian versions, one ends up in a somewhat unexpected situation: the 
power granted to the Commission directly by the constitutive treaties is not legislative, while 
the power granted to the Commission by the Council is. Surely in any analysis of normative 
power, it is the former which is more likely to be legislative? Moreover, German 
“Regelungsbefugnis” is employed to describe the power which in French and in Italian is 
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called normative (in Gibraltar v Council in paragraph 17 all three spoke of normative, while 
in paragraph 15 the German spoke of Rechtsetzung and the French and Italian of normative), 
and “Rechtsetzungsbefugnis” – legislative. It is submitted that this case law is sufficient to 
finally and conclusively put to rest any doubts concerning the viability of the “saving” 
explanation formulated in section 4.4.1 above when considering and trying to determine the 
meaning of the statements of law made in Gibraltar v Council and in Puma. In view of these 
further four judgment it may be said with considerable certainty that the best explanation of 
the authorities is that there is either confusion within the ECJ about the normative vs 
legislative issue or alternatively a settled understanding that as far as EU law is concerned 
they (and all other similar terms) mean one and the same thing (i.e. that the terms don’t 
matter). 
The same inconsistencies present themselves in two judgments where someone other than the 
Commission, the Council or the Parliament were held to have legislative power. In its 
judgment in case C-301/02P
1069
 the ECJ held that Articles 12.3 and 36.1 of the Protocol on 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
annexed to the EC Treaty granted the Governing Council of the ECB 
legislative power to adopt, on the one hand, rules of procedure to determine the 
internal organisation of the ECB and its decision-making bodies and, on the other, the 
conditions of employment of the staff of the ECB.
1070
 
The French and Italian versions of the judgment again refer to normative power, while the 
German one – to Rechtsetzungsbefugnis (which in the judgment in case C-234/89 was 
employed as a counterpart of the French and Italian “legislative”). Curiously, the later 
translated Estonian version of the judgment avoids any characterisation of the power which 
the Governing Council has under Articles 12.1 and 36.1 simply stating that it is sufficient to 
adopt the rules at issue. In this respect it would seem similar to the German version of the 
judgment in joined cases C-246-249/94. 
Finally, in its judgment in case T-28/89
1071
 the GC in paragraph 46 essentially held that when 
a general meeting of staff of an EU institution was adopting rules it did so in exercise of 
legislative power. Interestingly enough both the French and Italian versions of the judgment 
refer to that power as “legislative or regulatory” (without specifying which one), while the 
German employs Rechtsetzungsbefugnis, which, while more neutral, might still be thought a 
surprising way of referring to the power of a general meeting of staff. 
It is submitted that not much could be taken away regarding which acts are legislative and 
which are not from the case law considered in this section 4.4.2. No useful generalisation of 
the judgments would seem possible: the one thing which they have in common is that they all 
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 Paragraph 38. The provisions read as follows.  
Article 12.3: The Governing Council shall adopt Rules of Procedure which determine the internal organisation 
of the ECB and its decision-making bodies. 
Article 36.1: The Governing Council, on a proposal from the Executive Board, shall lay down the conditions of 
employment of the staff of the ECB. 
1071
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concerned rules which applied to an undetermined group of persons (i.e. the persons to whom 
they applied would not meet the Plaumann test for standing
1072
). The only other commonality 
would seem to be characterisation of the power as “legislative” in the English versions of the 
judgments. 
4.4.3. Access to information 
There have been several cases about access to information which have ultimately turned on 
“legislativeness” of an instrument. There are two strands to the case law.  
4.4.3.1. First strand of case law 
The cases of the first strand have been decided on the basis of regulation 1049/2001
1073
 which 
in Article 12(2) contains the following formulation of legislative documents: 
documents drawn up or received in the course of procedures for the adoption of acts 
which are legally binding in or for the Member States. 
It should further be noted that according to that regulation legislative power includes both 
power deriving from the constitutive treaties as well as power granted by an institution acting 
on the basis of the constitutive treaties (i.e. the so-called “delegated power” is legislative – 
see recital 6). That seems to be so equally for all fields of EU law, including the CFSP (recital 
7). More interesting is the way one determines under the regulation whether some procedure 
is legislative.
1074
 One would need to start with Article 2(4). 
Without prejudice to Articles 4 and 9, documents shall be made accessible to the 
public either following a written application or directly in electronic form or through a 
register. In particular, documents drawn up or received in the course of a legislative 
procedure shall be made directly accessible in accordance with Article 12. 
The regulation does not contain a separate definition-like formulation of legislative 
procedure, however Article 12 reads as follows. 
Direct access in electronic form or through a register 
1. The institutions shall as far as possible make documents directly accessible to the 
public in electronic form or through a register in accordance with the rules of the 
institution concerned. 
2. In particular, legislative documents, that is to say, documents drawn up or received 
in the course of procedures for the adoption of acts which are legally binding in or for 
the Member States, should, subject to Articles 4 and 9, be made directly accessible. 
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3. Where possible, other documents, notably documents relating to the development 
of policy or strategy, should be made directly accessible. 
4. Where direct access is not given through the register, the register shall as far as 
possible indicate where the document is located. 
It thus stands to reason that by virtue of Articles 2(4) and 12 – and especially of paragraph 2 
of Article 12 – any procedure resulting in adoption by the EU of acts which are binding 
within or for member states is a legislative procedure. In its judgment in joined cases C-
39&52/05P
1075
 the ECJ came close to saying as much. 
Article 12(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 acknowledges the specific nature of the 
legislative process by providing that documents drawn up or received in the course of 
procedures for the adoption of acts which are legally binding in or for the Member 
States should be made directly accessible.
1076
 
That is a very wide formulation of legislative process. It would seem to essentially cover 
adoption of any binding act whatsoever.
1077
 Thus it should not be surprising that the ECJ 
opined that the process leading to the adoption of what became Council Directive 2003/9/EC 
of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers was 
legislative.
1078
 Reading the judgment it seems, however, somewhat unclear why the ECJ held 
that directive to be legislative. The aforementioned Article 12(2) of regulation 1049/2001 
could have been one reason. Another view is that that was so because the Council’s (who was 
the respondent in that case) rules of procedures classified that directive as a legislative act. 
It is also worth noting that, under the second subparagraph of Article 207(3) EC, the 
Council is required to define the cases in which it is to be regarded as acting in its 
legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to documents in such 
cases.
1079
 
Article 207(3) EC read as follows. 
 The Council shall adopt its Rules of Procedure. 
For the purpose of applying Article 255(3), the Council shall elaborate in these Rules 
the conditions under which the public shall have access to Council documents. For the 
purpose of this paragraph, the Council shall define the cases in which it is to be 
regarded as acting in its legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to 
documents in those cases, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of its 
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decision-making process. In any event, when the Council acts in its legislative 
capacity, the results of votes and explanations of vote as well as statements in the 
minutes shall be made public. 
Article 255 EC further had this to say. 
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the 
conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. 
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this 
right of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure 
specific provisions regarding access to its documents. 
Thus – pursuant to an explicit requirement of the EC Treaty – the Council’s rules of 
procedure specifically set forth the situations when it was acting in legislative capacity, and 
Article 255 EC (which was the legal basis of regulation 1049/2001) provided that when the 
Council was acting in legislative capacity its documents were to be available to the public. 
That availability was, in turn, governed by regulation 1049/2001. 
What did the Council’s rules of procedure say in this respect? According to the rules in force 
at the relevant time 
[t]he Council acts in its legislative capacity within the meaning of the second 
subparagraph of Article 207(3) of the EC Treaty when it adopts rules which are 
legally binding in or for the Member States, by means of regulations, directives, 
framework decisions or decisions, on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties, with the exception of discussions leading to the adoption of internal 
measures, administrative or budgetary acts, acts concerning inter-institutional or 
international relations or non-binding acts (such as conclusions, recommendations or 
resolutions).
1080
 
Thus the judgment of the ECJ could be seen as doing no more than applying the Council’s 
rules of procedure rather than relying on regulation 1049/2001. Determination whether the 
instrument at issue was legislative or not would, on this view, have been made by the Council 
when adopting its rules of procedure and not by the ECJ when solving a dispute. In that 
connection the width of the formulation contained in Article 7 of the Council’s rules of 
procedure must be noted: like in case of Article 12(2) of regulation 1049/2001, the extent of 
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the formulation contained in the Council’s rules of procedure is such that it would seem to 
leave very little room for any other rulemaking capacity. 
Subsequent case law has not offered much further consideration of the issue. In its judgment 
in case C-280/11P
1081
 the ECJ opined that Article 251 EC procedure was legislative,
1082
 
however that would not seem to add anything to our understanding of legislation in EU law. 
In any case, the judgment was handed down after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It 
might therefore be argued that the source of such statement lies more in the fact that Article 
251 EC procedure became ordinary legislative procedure under the Lisbon Treaty than in 
anything else. While the judgment did not represent any considerable development, it is 
important for in it the ECJ relied very heavily on the objective of regulation 1049/2001.
1083
 
That objective was to provide wider access to information and that was achieved via making 
legislative documents ordinarily available. It is submitted that regulation 1049/2001 and the 
case law relying on it should therefore, as far as the concept of legislation goes, be considered 
sector specific. It is at best doubtful whether they provide any general guidance about 
legislative acts in EU law. 
The only prima facie exception from this could be the judgment of the GC in case T-
529/09.
1084
 In that case the GC had to decide whether the Council was acting in legislative 
capacity when initiating and conducting negotiations concerning a treaty. According to the 
aforequoted article 7(1) of the Council’s rules of procedure such activities are not undertaken 
by the Council in its legislative capacity. The GC decided likewise.  
86. The Council contends that it was not acting in its legislative capacity. In that 
regard, it invokes Article 7 of its Decision 2006/83/EC, Euratom, of 
15 September 2006 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ 2006 L 285, 
p. 47). That article lists the cases where the Council acts in its legislative capacity 
pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 207(3) EC; discussions leading to the 
adoption of acts concerning international relations are not contained in that list. 
87. It should be noted that the provisions invoked, which seek, in essence, to define 
the cases or documents which must, in principle, be directly accessible to the public, 
merely serve as a guide in determining whether or not the Council has acted in its 
legislative capacity for the purposes of applying the exceptions in Article 4 of 
Regulation No 1049/2001. 
88. It should be observed that initiating and conducting negotiations in order to 
conclude an international agreement fall, in principle, within the domain of the 
executive. Moreover, public participation in the procedure relating to the negotiation 
and the conclusion of an international agreement is necessarily restricted, in view of 
the legitimate interest in not revealing strategic elements of the negotiations. 
Therefore, during that procedure, it must be held that the Council is not acting in 
its legislative capacity. 
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The GC’s conclusion on the point was accepted on appeal by the ECJ.1085 The reason why the 
conclusion quoted in bold italics might have a more general bearing is that it would not seem 
to be based on the Council’s rules of procedure. Council’s rules of procedure were deemed no 
more than a guide for the CJEU in deciding whether the Council was acting in legislative 
capacity. The decision that the Council was acting in legislative capacity seems ultimately to 
be based on two premises: (i) initiating and conducting negotiations in order to conclude an 
international agreement fall, in principle, within the domain of the executive and (ii) there is a 
legitimate interest in not revealing details of negotiations.  
As far as premise (i) goes, there would unfortunately seem to be no argumentation in the 
judgment explaining why the GC held that to be the case. On the one hand, the content of the 
immediately preceding paragraphs could suggest that premise (i) was based on the guidance 
contained in the Council’s rules of procedure. On the other hand, dismissal of those rules of 
procedure as mere guidance in paragraph 87 taken together with the tenor of the first sentence 
of paragraph 88 could indicate that the GC relied on some doctrine of separation of powers 
(akin to that obtaining in national laws of all member states) in deciding that treaties are a 
matter for the executive. No clear conclusion would seem possible. 
Relevance of premise (ii), however, seems to have been squarely based on “reverse-
argumentation” from regulation 1049/2001. According to that regulation information 
pertaining to legislative processes was to be made available to the public. Thus the GC seems 
to have concluded from the fact of there being an interest, which it held legitimate, not to 
disclose the information that the information cannot have pertained to a legislative process. 
Otherwise it would have been subject to publication.
1086
 
For present purposes it means that the judgment in case T-529/09 is, like other judgments in 
this strand of case law, based to a considerable extent on regulation 1049/2001 (and/or the 
Council’s rules of procedure). To the extent that it may be taken as a more general statement 
of law all it would be saying is that treaty-making powers are not legislative – and it would be 
offering no reasoning for such a statement. 
4.4.3.2. Second strand of case law 
The cases belonging to this strand have been decided on the basis of directive 2003/4
1087
 by 
which effect was given in EU law to the Aarhus Convention.
1088
 While regulation 1049/2001 
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is drafted in such a way that when information pertains to a legislative procedure, access to it 
must (ordinarily) be ensured, directive 2003/4 provides essentially the opposite: when a 
public authority acts in legislative capacity it need not make information available.
1089
 Thus 
while in disputes on the basis of regulation 1049/2001 private party applicants ordinarily 
claim that some information pertains to a legislative procedure and the EU institutions 
contend that it does not, in disputes on the basis of directive 2003/4 it is private party 
applicants who ordinarily claim that public authorities were not acting in legislative capacity 
while public authorities claim that they were. 
In its judgment in case C-204/09
1090
 the ECJ held that a ministry of a member state was 
acting in legislative capacity when participating “in the legislative process stricto sensu”, i.e. 
not when adopting acts itself but when tabling draft laws, introducing them into the national 
parliament or giving opinions about such draft laws.
1091
 By contrast, when adopting rules of 
law itself, a ministry of a member state was held not to be acting in legislative capacity.
1092
 
“Legislative capacity” in Article 2(2) of directive 2003/4 did not 
refer to all procedures for the preparation of general abstract norms, including those of 
a lower rank than a law.
1093
 
It referred to 
only those procedures that could result in the adoption of a law or a norm of an 
equivalent rank.
1094
 
Aarhus Convention to which directive 2003/4 was intended to give effect distinguished 
between legislative and regulatory acts.
1095
 The ECJ essentially seems to have decided that 
when adopting rules itself a ministry of a member state was acting in regulatory and not 
legislative capacity. The distinction from the situation at issue in case C-204/09 lied in the 
fact that in parliamentary legislative process environmental information was ordinarily 
available to the citizens in an adequate manner; that was said not to be the case when a 
ministry itself was adopting binding rules.
1096
 Thus in determining whether a body was or 
was not acting in legislative capacity the cases in this strand of case law likewise ultimately 
turn on the objectives of the instruments the interpretation of which is in dispute, viz. 
directive 2003/4 and Aarhus Convention. That objective is public access to information. 
For these reasons it is submitted that no general indications about what constitutes a 
legislative act in EU law may be taken away from the case law on access to documents. It is 
too tightly connected with acts regulating that field which acts contain formulations of 
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legislative acts or procedures or capacity which are in turn construed by the ECJ in the light 
of nigh overriding objective – access to information. 
4.5. Convention on the Future of Europe 
The foregoing parts of this section 4 have shown that the concept of legislative act formulated 
in section 4.1 (a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special 
legislative procedure) may not be seen as the concept of legislative act obtaining in EU law. 
It has been severely criticised by commentators, it has led to confusion among both 
commentators and officers of the ECJ, parts of the constitutive treaties have proven difficult 
if not impossible to square with it and the case law of the ECJ offers no solution; if anything, 
it too is occasionally difficult to square with that concept without offering anything in its 
stead. 
Article 289 TFEU on which that concept is based stems from the Constitutional Treaty. That 
was the first EU treaty where the “language of legislation” was widely employed. It is 
submitted that an analysis of its preparatory materials might offer an understanding of 
legislative acts in the current constitutive treaties. It is useful to start that analysis by 
considering the status quo ante, i.e. the EU law as it stood at the time when the Convention 
on the Future of Europe was convened. 
The status quo ante has been helpfully described by Liisberg. He has opined that when the 
work on the Constitutional Treaty commenced there was no clear definition of legislation in 
EC law.
1097
 The ECJ was said to use 
the term “legislative act” in a broad, unspecified sense of the word, probably 
comprising all derived sources of law, at least those of general application.
1098
 
That would certainly seem to be borne out by the case law analysed above (in section 4.4). 
Thus, Liisberg considers that the term “legislation” was 
sometimes used as synonymous with “law” in its most abstract and broad meaning, 
including the Treaties (perhaps excluding non-formalized sources of law), sometimes 
as synonymous with “regulatory measures”, encompassing all sources of derived law 
(perhaps excluding individual decisions).
1099
 
While it was therefore 
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not possible to establish an exhaustive, consistent definition of legislation based on 
who adopts legislation, on how legislation is adopted, or on what separates the content 
of true legislation from other kinds of regulation,
1100
 
Liisberg does state that four characteristics were generally accepted as minimum elements of 
an instrument which constituted a piece of EC legislation. Such an instrument would have 
had to be 
1. a formalised, derived source of law (other than the constitutive treaties 
themselves); 
2. binding; 
3. of general application, i.e. normative; 
4. adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties.1101 
He, nevertheless, shows that ultimately no definition of legislative act was possible under EC 
law.
1102
 
1. Typological definition was not possible because the EC Treaty did not categorise 
any particular type of acts (e.g. directives or regulations) as legislative or non-
legislative. 
2. Authorship definition was not possible because there was no one legislature in the 
EC: in different cases different institutions acting independently or in (various) 
combinations authored various acts. 
3. Procedural definition was not possible because there was no one single procedure 
for adopting acts. 
4. Content-based definition was not possible because the constitutive treaties set not 
criterion for determining which content (expression of original political will? 
basic and fundamental policy choices? something else?) should be decisive in 
determining whether an act was legislative. 
That was the position as a matter of EC law when the Convention on the Future of Europe 
commenced its work. How did the Constitutional Treaty purport to change that status quo 
ante? 
The Final Report of Working Group IX (on simplification of legislative procedures and 
instruments) of the Convention on the Future of Europe started by noting that 
[c]itizens must be able to understand the system so that they can identify its problems, 
criticise it, and ultimately control it.
1103
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The Working Group then went on to suggest three levels of EU acts doing so in spite of the 
fact that in view 
of the special features of the Union's institutional system, it is difficult to make a 
crystal-clear distinction, as is done in national systems, between matters falling to the 
legislative arm and those falling to the executive.
1104
 
Those levels were
1105
 
 legislative acts being the acts adopted on the basis of the constitutive treaty and 
containing essential elements in a given field; 
 “delegated” acts being acts which would flesh out the detail or amend certain 
elements of a legislative act, under some form of authorisation defined by “the 
legislator” and determined by it on a case by case basis as well as enabling it to 
maintain control over such “delegation”; 
 implementing acts being acts implementing legislative acts, “delegated” acts or 
acts provided for in the constitutive treaty itself. 
This formulation alone discloses a problem. In spite of dividing acts into three, there seems to 
be a fourth category: “acts provided for in the constitutive treaty itself”. Nothing was said 
about whether such acts would or would not be legislative. Leaving this problem aside, 
postulating these three levels required some way of differentiating between them. Legislative 
acts in particular were determined by reference to three criteria: definition, adoption 
procedure and type of act. The definition-criterion was formulated as follows: 
legislative acts are adopted directly on the basis of the Treaty and contain the essential 
elements and the fundamental policy choices in a certain field. The scope of such a 
concept is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the legislator. It is 
consequently for the legislator to determine the degree of detail of a legislative act in 
a given field and whether and to what extent certain elements of the act should be 
delegated by way of "delegated" acts.
1106
 
As a general rule legislative acts were to be adopted via co-decision, but the Working Group 
did foresee some legal bases providing for exceptions in this respect.
1107 
The types of 
legislative act were to be laws and framework laws.
1108
  
One could already see a potential problem here. The foregoing quote suggests that legislative 
acts contain both the essential elements and fundamental policy choices, while earlier on in 
the final report
1109
 legislative acts were only said to contain essential elements. Although at 
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first glance it might be difficult to perceive a problem here, a moment’s consideration will 
show that there is one. What could “the fundamental policy choice” mean? While there is no 
express statement of its meaning in the Final Report, it would seem that there are two 
possibilities: it could mean the determination of a basic aspect of approach to be taken by the 
EU in a certain field or it could mean a sensitive political choice. The problem is that the first 
option seems already amply covered by “essential elements” (with the result that the added 
words carry no added meaning), while the latter has never been reserved to the institutions 
which adopt acts via co-decision (i.e. to the Council and the Parliament acting together). The 
power to make sensitive political choices could always be granted by those institutions to the 
Commission.
1110
 It is conceivable that that was what Working Group IX desired to change, 
but considering (i) that this switch occurred in the text of the Final Report without any 
attention being drawn to it and (ii) that both formulations (one referring to essential elements 
only, and the other to essential elements and essential policy choices) are offered following 
an introductory sentence saying that Working Group IX proposes them,
1111
 the better view 
seems to be that the consequences of this switch simply eluded Working Group IX. 
Furthermore, unfortunately, Working Group IX discussed all three levels of acts – legislative, 
“delegated” and implementing – under the heading of “Hierarchy of Union Legislation”.1112 
It is submitted that at best it raises the question of relationship between legislation and 
legislative acts – a question which is not answered in either any document of the Convention 
or in the Constitutional Treaty itself, and is, if anything, made more of an issue by the fact 
that Working Group IX itself seems to have referred to a fourth category of acts (“acts 
provided for in the constitutive treaty itself”). At worst, it indicates the sort of confusion 
which seems to obtain in the Lisbon Treaty, in the case law and in the writings of some 
commentators. 
The Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe did not clarify the matter further. 
Some concerns were expressed about there being exceptions to adoption of legislative acts by 
means of co-decision.
1113
 The Praesidium did, however, state that 
[t]he system described in draft Article I-33 implies that legislative acts are always 
adopted by the legislator.
1114
 
The first two paragraphs of Article I-34 (entitled “Legislative Acts”) of the Constitutional 
Treaty (which substantially, and certainly in all relevant parts, corresponded to the draft 
Article I-33 commented by the Praesidium) read as follows. 
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1.   European laws and framework laws shall be adopted, on the basis of proposals 
from the Commission, jointly by the European Parliament and the Council under the 
ordinary legislative procedure as set out in Article III-396. If the two institutions 
cannot reach agreement on an act, it shall not be adopted. 
2.   In the specific cases provided for in the Constitution, European laws and 
framework laws shall be adopted by the European Parliament with the participation of 
the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, in 
accordance with special legislative procedures. 
The Constitutional Treaty contained no language expressly dealing with legislation (as 
opposed to legislative acts) of the EU. It did, however, purport to explain what non-
legislative acts were. Its Article I-35 was entitled “Non-legislative acts” and read as follows. 
1.   The European Council shall adopt European decisions in the cases provided for in 
the Constitution. 
2.   The Council and the Commission, in particular in the cases referred to in articles 
I-36 and I-37, and the European Central Bank in the specific cases provided for in the 
constitution, shall adopt European regulations and decisions. 
3.   The Council shall adopt recommendations. It shall act on a proposal from the 
Commission in all cases where the Constitution provides that it shall adopt acts on a 
proposal from the Commission. It shall act unanimously in those areas in which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act. The Commission, and the 
European Central Bank in the specific cases provided for in the Constitution, shall 
adopt recommendations. 
Articles I-36 and I-37, to which Article I-35(2) referred, dealt, respectively, with delegated 
European regulations (i.e. European regulations adopted by the Commission in exercise of 
the power granted to it in European laws or European framework laws) and with 
implementing acts (i.e. acts adopted on the basis of some other act by either the Commission 
or the Council). Finally, subparagraphs 2 – 6 of paragraph 1 of Article I-33 set forth types of 
acts. 
A European law shall be a legislative act of general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
A European framework law shall be a legislative act binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
A European regulation shall be a non-legislative act of general application for the 
implementation of legislative acts and of certain provisions of the Constitution. It may 
either be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, or be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
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A European decision shall be a non-legislative act, binding in its entirety. A decision 
which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 
It thus stands to reason that, as suggested in the Final Report of Working Group IX, delegated 
European regulations and implementing acts ended up not being legislative according to the 
Constitutional Treaty. Looking at the three criteria of legislative acts (definition, adoption 
procedure and type of act), the Constitutional Treaty would seem to follow the Final Report 
in respect of types of act: according to subparagraphs 2 and 3 of paragraph 1 of Article I-33 
only European laws and European framework laws are legislative acts. With some hesitation 
it could also be opined that the Constitutional Treaty followed the Final Report in respect of 
adoption procedures: while there were more than “some” exceptions from the rule that 
European laws and European framework laws were to be adopted via ordinary legislative 
procedure (co-decision), that procedure was certainly the most noticeable one; in any case, 
the alternative (special legislative procedure) maintained – like the ordinary legislative 
procedure – the requirement that both main political institutions of the EU (i.e. the Council 
and the Parliament) participate. 
However, consideration of procedures could cause one to re-think the conclusion that the 
Constitutional Treaty followed the Final Report on the issue of types of legislative acts. 
Legislative acts (European laws and European framework laws) could under the 
Constitutional Treaty be adopted via special legislative procedure: by the Council with 
participation of the Parliament or vice-versa. Sometimes that participation would consist of 
granting consent,
1115
 sometimes – of giving an opinion.1116 European regulations and 
European decisions, which according to subparagraphs 4 and 5 of paragraph 1 of Article I-33 
of the Constitutional Treaty were not legislative acts, could however be adopted in exactly 
the same way: for instance competition law was proposed to be regulated precisely by such 
non-legislative acts (European regulations of the Council adopted after consulting the 
Parliament
1117
).  
While in view of the wording of Articles I-33 – I-37 of the Constitutional Treaty it could not 
have successfully been argued that such acts were legislative within the meaning of those 
provisions, it does raise the question what is meant by the “type” of legislative acts. 
Determination of the type should not fall back on the adoption procedure: that was a separate 
criterion. Looking at effect of legislative acts, it would not seem to differ from that of non-
legislative acts bar recommendations and decisions; they are all binding, both groups include 
directive-style acts binding as to the result to be achieved and in both groups only regulation-
style acts are said to be mandatorily of general application.
1118
 Both legislative and (relevant) 
non-legislative acts were to be published in exactly the same way with the same vacatio legis 
(Article I-39 of the Constitutional Treaty). Both legislative acts adopted via special legislative 
                                                 
1115
 See, for example, Article I-54(4) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
1116
 See, for example, Article I-54(3) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
1117
 Article III-163(1) of the Constitutional Treaty 
1118
 Article I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty 
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procedure and relevant non-legislative acts (those adopted via similar procedure) were to be 
signed by the same person: the president of the adopting institution (Article I-39 of the 
Constitutional Treaty). 
Leaving aside the differences in adoption procedure (which, as mentioned, constitute a 
separate criterion, and hence cannot be considered relevant for determining type – unless one 
wants to conflate the two criteria),
1119
 there is no difference in type between (at least some) 
legislative and non-legislative acts in the Constitutional Treaty. The only difference is in 
name. 
Where things get even more problematic is the “definition” criterion. It is useful to set it out 
anew: 
legislative acts are adopted directly on the basis of the Treaty and contain the essential 
elements and the fundamental policy choices in a certain field. The scope of such a 
concept is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the legislator. It is 
consequently for the legislator to determine the degree of detail of a legislative act in 
a given field and whether and to what extent certain elements of the act should be 
delegated by way of "delegated" acts.
1120
 
While Article I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty did say that European laws were to be of 
general application, there was no such statement in the Constitutional Treaty in respect of 
European framework laws. That might be thought surprising since European framework laws 
essentially corresponded to directives, and there was explicit case law of the ECJ to the effect 
that directives were of general application.
1121
 Be that as it may, there was no language in the 
Constitutional Treaty mandating that legislative acts contain any essential elements of a given 
field or any fundamental policy choice. In practice such a requirement would seem untenable: 
it would preclude the Council and the Parliament from employing a legislative act to modify 
a non-essential element of an already existing legislative act leaving such amendments to be 
made exclusively via “delegated” acts. Leaving aside the issue of the different institutional 
bias of the Commission (which according to Article I-36 of the Constitutional Treaty was to 
adopt delegated European regulations) compared to that of the Council and the Parliament, it 
is worth recalling any “delegation” was – according to the Final Report – to be in the 
discretion of “the legislator”. If that legislator cannot decide to change its own acts itself, but 
must grant that power to someone else, it has no discretion in this respect. Furthermore, 
looking at particular legal bases it might be difficult to imagine how a legislative act adopted 
under, for instance, Article III-319 of the Constitutional Treaty and authorising the grant of 
macro-financial assistance to a particular third country could include any essential elements 
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for the relevant field (i.e. any elements essential to the field of granting macro-financial 
assistance to third countries).
1122
 
Thus the Constitutional Treaty adopted only one of the three criteria suggested by Working 
Group IX (procedure), and even that one criteria did not distinguish legislative acts from all 
other acts: some special legislative procedures were the same as several non-legislative 
procedures, for instance the one for adoption of rules regulating competition law. In essence, 
the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts seems to have existed first and 
foremost in name. At this point it is difficult to disagree with the following opinion of 
Liisberg. 
In the end, the introduction of a distinction between legislative and non-legislative 
acts in the Constitutional Treaty, along with attempts to introduce separation of 
powers and a norm hierarchy will not change the genetic code of the EU. The Treaty 
provides no definition of legislation, neither procedural nor material, but simply a 
formal definition, reserving the designation “legislation” to two instruments, 
European laws and European framework laws, which will produce effects and be 
adopted according to procedures not always different from the effects and procedures 
pertaining to non-legislative regulations. The aim of a genuine hierarchy of norms is 
not accomplished.
1123
 
Looking finally at the statement of the Praesidium that legislative acts were to be adopted 
only by the legislator, unless that statement is likewise understood as a formality – since 
those acts are called “legislative”, therefore their adopter is the legislator – the statement 
would seem very confusing. One option would be to understand it as meaning that the 
Council and the Parliament are the legislators (in some substantive sense) because they adopt 
legislative acts. While the Constitutional Treaty contains no such statement, one could – as 
suggested by Praesidium – imply that. The consequences of such implication would be 
unclear. Would the Council when not acting via a procedure which even reminds a legislative 
procedure
1124
 still have been a legislator? If yes, it is unclear why the resulting acts would not 
have been not legislative. If not, then it stands to reason that the legislator (the Council and/or 
the Parliament) is the substantive legislator only when acting jointly. 
If so, however, why would the Council not be a legislator when it acts jointly with the 
Parliament via a procedure which is not called a legislative procedure, but which exactly 
copies another one which is called legislative (as was the case with the Council in the field 
competition law – Article III-163(1) of the Constitutional Treaty)? The only difference lies in 
the name. Yet, if it was the legislator in case of Article III-163(1) of the Constitutional 
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Treaty, it would again be unclear why the resulting acts are not legislative.
1125
 Thus, it stands 
to reason that the legislator (the Council and/or the Parliament) is the substantive legislator 
only when acting via a procedure called a legislative procedure. 
More importantly, if one compares a Commission’s European regulation with a European 
law, it is difficult to see much difference between the two as far as the type of the act goes. 
The adopter and the procedure for their adoption are different, but they have the same effect, 
apply in the same way, are signed upon adoption in the same way and are published in the 
same way. The task set out in the Final Report of ensuring that 
acts which have the same nature and the same legal effect must be produced by the 
same democratic procedure,
1126
 
was not achieved. 
It would thus seem that the contention that the Constitutional Treaty adopted the approach 
under which legislative acts are always adopted by the legislator is untenable in any bar the 
formal sense explained by Liisberg. 
The actual discussions which took place within the Working Group IX do not offer any 
clarification. Bearing in mind that the Constitutional Treaty ended up containing a formal 
(shorthand-like) definition of legislative procedure and that the Final Report advocated a 
material-procedural definition, it should not be surprising that different views were expressed 
within Working Group IX. According to the Secretariat of the European Convention the 
majority of members of Working Group IX 
consider that the concept of legislative act should be defined by its content and not by 
the adoption procedure[, while] some propose defining a legislative act as one which 
determines the fundamental principles and general guidelines in a given area, 
embodies political choices or establishes the essential elements of implementing 
measures in the field in question.
1127
 
It is curious then that the Constitutional Treaty did not incorporate such concept. 
The majority of members of Working Group IX seem to have further thought that 
 designation of an act should depend on its content,
1128
 
and that 
a distinction must be introduced in the treaty between what is legislation and what is 
implementation.
1129
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The latter statement would seem to suggest that majority of the members of Working Group 
IX were of the opinion that there was no such distinction at the time when Working Group IX 
was meeting. Considering that as far as legislative procedures are concerned not much has 
changed with the Lisbon Treaty compared to the EC Treaty and that Article 290 and 291 
TFEU do not deal with types of acts or power to adopt them, but with mechanisms of control 
over the power granted, it would seem to follow that, should the opinions of the members of 
Working Group IX be correct, no such distinction would exist in current EU law either – bar 
that which is constituted by the use of “legislative act” as a term of art. That distinction did, 
however, exist in the EC Treaty (although the terminology differed: see Article 202 EC and 
Article 251 EC). 
Of individual members of Working Group IX Matti Vanhanen seems to have advocated most 
explicitly a content-based approach to legislative acts arguing that 
a legislative act has to be defined by its content, the substance, and not by its adoption 
procedure.
1130
 
He further supported introduction of the distinction between legislation and implementation 
and expressly criticised “legislative procedure” as a misleading term arguing that should it be 
adopted, it would not mean that legislation is not adopted via different procedures.
1131
  
Admittedly, approaches which were based neither on the content of acts nor on the procedure 
for their adoption were advocated within the Working Group IX as well. For instance 
Johannes Voggenhuber suggested that all legislative acts (laws and framework laws) be 
adopted via legislative procedure.
1132
 That could be understood as advocating a procedural 
concept of legislation as well as implying some other concept, but dealing expressly only 
with – on that assumption – a separate issue how legislative acts should be adopted. Michel 
Petite seems to have advocated an institutional concept of legislation suggesting that laws 
were acts adopted by the legislator.
1133
 That would however have necessitated determination 
of the legislator – a task which according to Jean-Claude Piris, a rapporteur of Working 
Group IX and the then director of the Council’s legal service, would have been very difficult 
to complete. 
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Be it noted first that it would be very difficult to transpose to the Union the 
customary clear distinction between legislative and executive authority, i.e. 
between some institutions empowered only to pass laws and others merely 
implementing legislation or issuing regulations. It is certainly open to the Treaty's 
authors, should they see fit, to undertake such a project, but the powers conferred on 
the institutions by the Treaties are so convoluted that such a distinction between 
legislative and executive authority could not be made without upsetting the existing 
balance. The present institutional system of the Union is not modelled on that of a 
State.
1134
 
The point has, even more forcefully, been made by Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast 
who have opined that endowing the EU with legislative power 
could only be achieved at the price of restructuring the Union’s system, from the 
ground up, uprooting the current network of authorities.
1135
 
Piris’s own position as regards legislative acts (unlike the position of the members of 
Working Group IX his position concerned lex lata) seems, at first glance, most akin to that of 
Konstadinides (discussed in section 4.2.2 above): for him all second-level rules, i.e. rules 
adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties, seem to constitute legislative acts 
(regardless of who adopts them; he explicitly mentions ECB in this respect).
1136
 However, he 
would then seem to immediately contradict himself by suggesting that regulatory and 
executive acts may be adopted directly on the basis of the constitutive treaties as well.
1137
 
First, unless one postulates a procedural criterion (which according to aforequoted opinion of 
Piris is virtually impossible), for that distinction to exist one would need to assume some 
content-based criterion of legislation – to distinguish between legislative acts, on the one 
hand, and regulatory and executive acts, on the other (all of which are adopted on the basis of 
the constitutive treaties). Second, it is unclear how – in view of Piris’s own aforequoted point 
about the nature of the EU– it is possible for any act of the EU to be “executive”. 
Writing about the preparatory work for the Constitutional Treaty Liisberg has concluded that 
for all the attempts at defining legislative function vis-à-vis the executive one
1138
 or at 
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distinguishing legislation from implementation
1139
 or at formulating legislative nature (it 
having been frequently assumed during the drafting that some powers were a priori of 
legislative nature)
1140
 the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts ended up 
having little real significant.
1141
 
[T]he distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts should not be able to 
sustain false expectations or fears of a transformation of the EU in the image of a 
national democracy – the EU is still an “unidentified political object” under the 
Constitutional Treaty, regardless of the imported language of legislation from national 
democracies. /.../ The new distinction between legislative and non-legislative act, it 
seems, is basically a harmless ornament in the European construction, the added value 
and beauty of which mainly depend on the eyes of the beholder.
1142
 
It is, perhaps, more correct to say that other than in name the Constitutional Treaty contained 
no such distinction at all. And even naming of some acts as legislative and of others as not 
legislative was to a large extent random.
1143
 
Summing up the foregoing analysis of the Constitutional Treaty, it is possible to say that the 
meaning of legislative act under the Constitutional Treaty – to the extent that one purports to 
endow it with something other than Liisberg’s formal sense1144 – was just as unclear as it was 
before the Constitutional Treaty. It has been opined that before the Constitutional Treaty 
“legislation” was basically a term of convenience in EU law, and that there was no desperate 
need for a definition of that term.
1145
 The foregoing analysis shows that all the Constitutional 
Treaty succeeded in doing was assign significance as a matter of EU law to that term of 
convenience. 
As for the preparatory materials of the Constitutional Treaty, they seem to differ so 
considerably from the treaty itself that not much could be taken away from them. 
Furthermore, the opinions expressed by the drafters are frequently very different one from the 
other. To the extent that a similarity may perhaps be found (support for some content-based 
concept of legislative act) among their opinions, that similarity went “unfinished”: there was 
no debate about legislative or non-legislative nature of various legal bases (the EU may act 
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only on specific legal bases).
1146
 In any event, the aspect in which there was such similarity of 
opinions (a content-based concept of legislative act) did not find its way into the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
It is submitted that in such a situation an attempt to show how and to what extent the meaning 
of “legislative act” found in the Constitutional Treaty was transferred into the Lisbon Treaty 
would serve no purpose. Since there is no such clear meaning aside from a very formal one 
(European laws and European framework laws as legislative acts) akin to that found in the 
TFEU (a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative 
procedure), any result of such an exercise will not be able to offer any additional insight. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Section 2 of this thesis enabled the formulation of a simple concept of legislative act: a 
regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure; all 
other acts are not legislative. The analysis shows that such an approach faces several 
difficulties. 
 It is inconsistent with some parts of the constitutive treaties, but consistent with 
others. 
 There is considerable case law of the CJEU which assumes legislative act to have 
some different meaning. 
 Academic commentary has been mostly critical of that concept. 
 The institutional features which are needed for legislation to fulfil its mandate 
(enhancing legitimacy, avoiding oppression, enhancing the rule of law) are, to a 
large extent, absent as far as acts which are legislative on that concept are 
concerned. 
Furthermore, the term “legislative act” has on several occasions lead legal professionals into 
confusion and error. Consideration of the Constitutional Treaty, if anything, muddies the 
waters even further: no clarity may be found there. 
That is the position even without tackling complex questions such as whether an inter-
institutional agreement (Article 295 TFEU) is a legislative act,
1147
 why is Parliament’s power 
legislative in procedures where all it does is offer its opinion about an act
1148
 or when does 
legislative power of the Council (or the Parliament arise).
1149
 Without being able to deal with 
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Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon Treaty, in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon 
Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (2008 SpringerWienNewYork), page 103. 
1148
 See, for instance, the judgment of the ECJ in case C-217/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, paragraph 42. 
1149
 In its judgment in case C-151/98P Pharos SA v Commission of the European Communities, at paragraph 22 
the ECJ suggested that in what is now a special legislative procedure the Council’s legislative power arises only 
once the Commission has submitted its proposal for the act. It furthermore suggested that Council’s legislative 
power was necessary to modify the Commission’s proposal. 
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the simpler problems (such as finding a consistent concept), there is hardly any chance of 
successfully answering these more exotic questions. 
The analysis disclosed no concept of legislative act which would be reconcilable even simply 
with all provisions of the current constitutive treaties. Looking at legal practice, it seems 
highly likely that in all cases where the constitutive treaties expressly make something hinge 
on an act being legislative,
1150
 the ECJ (in the event of a dispute) would base its decision on 
the wording of the constitutive treaties, i.e. on the concept formulated in section 4.1. More 
importantly, in some cases the concept of legislative act would not even seem to matter at all 
in practice: there may be different ways of achieving the same result.
1151
 
It is submitted that ultimately the concept formulated in section 4.1 being the correct one in 
law is a proposition difficult to justify. First, that concept may at best represent part of the 
entire story.
1152
 It gives no indication and none may be found otherwise as to what the other 
part may be. And if there are some acts which are legislative by virtue of application of some 
other criteria, then what was the point of saying that a regulation, a directive or a decision 
adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedures are is a legislative act? There seems to 
be no answer to that question. 
Second, it should be remembered that the entire exercise of introducing language of 
legislation into the constitutive treaties was undertaken with a view to enhancing legitimacy 
of the EU and the rule of law in the EU. The concept formulated in section 4.1 is unable to do 
that: being based on shorthands that concept itself is nothing more than a shorthand 
(“legislative act” standing for any of a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via 
ordinary or special legislative procedure). If anything, that concept makes EU law more 
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 As is the case with, for instance, application of Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality. 
Important parts of either of them only apply to draft legislative acts (see Article 2 of each protocol). 
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 Article 290 TFEU is a good example. Jürgen Bast has opined that “only a legislative act has the capacity to 
include a delegation pursuant to Article 290 TFEU.” See Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts After the Lisbon 
Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 893. While that 
might, strictly speaking, be correct, it is difficult to see what practical consequences would follow from that. 
Although Article 290(1)(1) TFEU does say that 
[a] legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general 
application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act, 
it was demonstrated in section 3 above that Article 290 TFEU is mechanism for control of the exercise of the 
power granted to the Commission. The same controls as those mandated by Article 290 TFEU could be created 
ad hoc by providing so in the instrument by which the power, which the grantor desires to control, is granted. 
As for amending or supplementing non-essential elements, it has likewise been shown in section 3 that there is 
no distinction between supplementing, on the one hand, and (for instance) implementing on the other. 
Furthermore in ESMA the ECJ explicitly opined that even Articles 290 and 291 TFEU together do not constitute 
a complete legal framework under which certain powers may be granted; grant of similar powers to EU agencies 
was lawful in spite of no provision of the constitutive treaties not simply not providing for that, but not even 
mentioning that (see ESMA, paragraphs 78, 79 and 87). In EURES the ECJ went further still deeming lawful the 
onwards grant by the Commission to a body established by it of the powers which had been granted to the 
Commission by the Council and the Parliament jointly. That was lawful in a situation when that body was 
established in exercise of the very powers which were granted to the Commission and which it then passed on to 
that body. See section 3.2.2 above. That being so, Bast’s contention is strictly speaking correct, but no practical 
consequence follows from that correctness. Nothing hinges on an instrument being a legislative act. 
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 For instance something else would be required to account for the language contained in Article 2 TFEU. 
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complex and confusing opening it up to disputes which would not have arisen prior to the 
introduction of the language of legislation into the constitutive treaties. 
5. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to answer two questions. 
1. What concept of legislative act obtains in EU law? 
2. Have the objectives which were sought to be achieved by means of introduction of 
“language of legislation” (legislative acts) into EU law been met? 
To do so, the thesis began with an analysis of legislative procedures: Article 289(3) TFEU 
would suggest that the concept of legislative acts at the very least relies on legislative 
procedures. Analysing ordinary and special legislative procedures in turn, it was shown that, 
in reality, neither of them is a legislative procedure, but a class of procedures. Each of 
“ordinary legislative procedure” and “special legislative procedure” covers different 
procedures which, in either case, share basic features. 
Via an analysis of ordinary legislative procedures it was demonstrated that legislative 
procedures in general are employed in all areas of competence of the EU (bar the CFSP) and 
in respect of subject-matters of various importance. Acts are equally adopted via legislative 
procedures (and indeed ordinary legislative procedures) in areas of high importance (be it for 
the EU or its citizens) or of – relatively speaking – low importance (be it for the EU or its 
citizens). Furthermore, there was no pattern to the way different legislative procedures were 
dispersed between different areas of competence and different subject-matters. 
Analysing specifically special legislative procedures, it was demonstrated that the class is ill-
defined in EU law: there are at least 41 legal bases in respect of which there is reasonable 
doubt whether the procedure they mandate is a special legislative procedure or a non-
legislative procedure.
1153
 The case law of the CJEU (specifically the GC
1154
) is openly 
contradictory on this point, although it is worth mentioning that advocates general seem to 
favour considering those legal bases as mandating special legislative procedures. On that 
approach, legislative procedures could be seen as covering all areas of EU competence: even 
CFSP.
1155
 
There are only three commonalities between all legislative procedures. First, the consent of 
the Council is always necessary for adopting an act via a legislative procedure. Second, the 
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 The doubt is occasioned by the fact that, unlike others, those legal bases do not call the procedures mandated 
by them “special legislative procedures” despite the fact that they mandate the adoption of a regulation, directive 
or decision by the Council with the participation of the Parliament. According to Article 289(2) TFEU “[i]n the 
specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European 
Parliament with the participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European 
Parliament, shall constitute a special legislative procedure.” 
1154
 There are no decisions of the ECJ in point. 
1155
 Articles 27(3) and 41(3)(1) TEU (falling within the field of CFSP) mandate adoption of decisions by the 
Council after it has consulted the Parliament. 
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Parliament always participates in some capacity in adoption of acts via legislative procedures. 
Third, no legislative procedure sets any substantive criteria to the content of the act which 
results from it (e.g. the act may be general or case specific; it is not even clear whether the act 
needs to be binding
1156). It is worth mentioning that the Commission’s participation is not 
omnipresent in legislative procedures.
1157
 Nor is agreement of both the Council and the 
Parliament to adopt an act always sufficient for adoption of the act via a legislative 
procedure:
1158
 on occasion the consent of either the Commission (Article 226 TFEU) or of a 
particular member state (Articles 25(2), 172(1), 188(2), 223(1)(2) and 262 TFEU) is required. 
Returning to the dispersal of legislative procedures among different subject-matters, the one 
pattern which does emerge from the constitutive treaties might seem surprising: the less 
important an issue is, the likelier it is that the constitutive treaties mandate a “heavy” 
procedure.
1159
 While there are issues of lesser importance regulated by acts adopted via 
“heaviest” of procedures (e.g. Article 195(2) TFEU mandating ordinary legislative procedure 
for adoption of EU measures complementing actions of member states on tourism) and issues 
of higher importance regulated by acts adopted via “light” of procedures (e.g. Article 112 
TFEU mandating a non-legislative procedure altogether for adoption of intra-EU 
countervailing charges), it is nigh impossible to find in the constitutive treaties legal bases of 
lesser importance which mandate “light”, i.e. non-legislative, procedures. Coming from a 
national-law-background this would seem counter-intuitive: the more important an issue, the 
“heavier” is the procedure which is mandated by laws of member states.1160 It is submitted 
that the reason for such a pattern in EU law lies in the fact that the “lighter” the procedure, 
the higher the relative weight of the Council, and hence of each specific member state, in 
such a procedure.
1161
 Thus while national laws ordinarily seek to safeguard more direct 
legitimacy (i.e. input of citizens), EU law seeks to safeguard powers of member states (i.e. 
input of governments of member states). In this respect little has changed compared to the 
pre-Lisbon Treaty position. 
The analysis conducted in section 2 showed that despite being called “legislative procedures” 
their introduction into EU law did not change the procedures for adoption of EU acts so as to 
make them closer to those of a classical nation state. In fact, surprisingly little – if any – 
substantive differences may be found between ordinary legislative procedures and special 
legislative procedures set forth in the Treaty of Lisbon, on the one hand, and, respectively, 
the co-decision procedure and procedures for adoption of acts by the Council with the 
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 See the discussion in section 2.2.1 and specifically the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11. 
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 Article 223(1) TFEU does not and Articles 83(2), 86(1)(1), 87(3)(1) and 89 TFEU might not grant it any 
role in the (special) legislative procedures they mandate. 
1158
 That is so even if one were to discard the extensive abilities of the Commission to abstain from initiating a 
legislative procedure or terminate it (by means of withdrawing its proposal) before any act is adopted. 
1159
 If ordinary legislative procedures are deemed the “heaviest” ones. 
1160
 For instance, in Estonia issues of lesser importance may ordinarily be regulated by regulations of the 
government or individual ministers, while issues of higher importance require an act of parliament, which at 
least theoretically offers a more direct form of legitimacy of public authority. Indeed, the very objective of the 
principle of parliamentary reservation (Parlamentsvorbehalt), common in countries belonging to the Germanic 
constitutional tradition, is to ensure that that is so (see footnote 126 above). 
1161
 This is particularly well-demonstrated by the history what is now Article 64 TFEU. See footnote 350 above 
for a detailed explanation. 
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participation of the Parliament
1162
 set forth in the Treaty of Nice, on the other. There are more 
legal bases in the Lisbon Treaty which mandate what are now ordinary or special legislative 
procedures than there were in prior incarnations of the constitutive treaties, but that is a 
quantitative, not a qualitative change. 
It may therefore be concluded that introduction of “ordinary legislative procedure” and 
“special legislative procedure” is essentially nothing more than a labelling exercise. The 
analysis contained in section 2 showed that “ordinary legislative procedure” and “special 
legislative procedure” are nothing more than terms of art employed as shorthands for 
denoting the procedures described in Articles 289(1) and 294 TFEU (ordinary legislative 
procedures), and 289(2) TFEU (special legislative procedures). Aside from situations where 
some particular legal basis expressly says otherwise, nothing more may be attributed to or 
read into those terms. They bear no connotation at all, and certainly none which could 
somehow, however remotely, be linked with the common understanding of the meaning of 
“legislation” under national laws. 
Having reached that conclusion, the thesis then turns to the issue of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU, viz. delegated and implementing acts. The objective is to assess the relationship 
between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, on the one hand, and legislative acts, on the other.
1163
 
Via an analysis of the case law of the ECJ (as well as the 2016 inter-institutional agreement 
on better law-making and some soft-law instruments
1164
) it was demonstrated 
 that the grantor of power (the “EU legislature”) has1165 a discretion which article of 
the two to resort to in a given case,  
 that the extent of the power granted to the grantee (ordinarily the Commission) was 
not a criterion in deciding which article of the two must be resorted to. The discretion 
of the grantee was, in fact, wholly irrelevant for that purpose,
1166
 
 that the two articles in no way constitute a code on grant of power (by the “EU 
legislature”): grant of power otherwise than under either of those articles is perfectly 
lawful,
1167
 and 
 that the standard of judicial review by the ECJ as to whether a recourse to either of the 
two articles is lawful in any given case is doubly loosened: the ECJ only looks for 
manifest errors in whether the EU legislature could reasonably have thought that 
Article 290 or 291 TFEU, as the case may be, should be employed. 
Furthermore, that analysis enabled to “sharpen” the point where there seem to arise 
difficulties with delimiting the scope of Article 290 TFEU from that of Article 291 TFEU. 
                                                 
1162
 Or vice-versa. There was no common name for such procedures under the Treaty of Nice. 
1163
 How do Articles 290 and 291 TFEU relate to legislative acts and legislative power? Are the powers referred 
to in both of them legislative? Or only in one of them? In that case, which one? Or might neither article be about 
a power which is legislative? If the power to which set forth is legislative, are the acts adopted on their basis 
likewise legislative? If no, then why not? 
1164
 See section 3.3 for details. 
1165
 Subject to hard limits. See text to footnote 1169 below. 
1166
 See, inter alia, Visas discussed in section 3.2.3 above. 
1167
 See ESMA, discussed in section 3.2.8 above, as well as Articles 182(5) and 311 TFEU, mentioned in the text 
to footnote 130 above and in that footnote itself. 
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Such difficulties arose between supplementing (referred to in Article 290 TFEU) and 
implementing (referred to in Article 291 TFEU). Amending, to which Article 290 TFEU 
likewise refers, has a clear, although (like legislative procedure) formalistic meaning: it 
essentially stands for making orthographical changes by the grantee of power in the 
instrument by which the power was granted to it; the content of the changes does not matter. 
It was then demonstrated that virtually all treatments of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU found in 
scholarship are very difficult – if indeed not impossible – to square with the case law of the 
ECJ.
1168
 They all rely on assumptions which either are contradicted by the case law or, on a 
deeper analysis, are shown not to be supported by the constitutive treaties. A 
conceptualisation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, which is fully in accordance with the case 
law and the constitutive treaties as well as the practice which has developed since the Lisbon 
Treaty was offered in section 3.5. Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are not about acts or power of 
the grantee at all. Both use “acts” as a shorthand and both assume existence of granted power 
and at least two level of acts: the granting one and the one adopted in exercise of the granted 
power. The articles don’t even necessarily regulate powers of control of the grantor either: 
they are merely default catalogues of mechanisms of control which the grantor of power 
(ordinarily the Council and the Parliament acting jointly) may employ. While there are some 
“hard” limits when either of the two articles may not be employed,1169 most of the time both 
articles are triggered so that the EU legislature has a choice which one to resort to. That 
choice is essentially political, and the ECJ will not interfere with it; the ECJ will only 
interfere if either of those articles is resorted to in violation of the hard limits. The doubly 
loosened standard of judicial review ensures that: it is sufficiently extensive to determine 
when either of those articles has been resorted to without having been “triggered”, but at the 
same time ensures than when the article has been “triggered” the ECJ does not interfere with 
the political choices of the competent institutions. Articles 290 and 291 TFEU essentially 
represent a partial “treatification” of pre-existing comitology. 
Being nothing more than default catalogues of controls
1170
 over the power granted by some 
institution (ordinarily the Council and the Parliament acting jointly) to another, the question 
whether Article 290 and 291 TFEU power or acts are legislative cannot arise. Posing it is a 
category error. How do Articles 290 and 291 TFEU relate to legislative acts and legislative 
power? – Speaking in terms of hierarchy of acts or structure of EU norms, they do not: 
neither is about acts at all. 
Finally, the thesis tackles the differences between legislative and non-legislative acts. A 
concept of legislative act is offered based on chapters 2 and 3 a (i.e. based on legislative 
procedures and the meaning of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU): a regulation, a directive or a 
decision adopted via ordinary or special legislative procedure;
1171
 all other acts are not 
legislative. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, such a concept finds fierce opposition from most 
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 Treatments by Kieran St C Bradly and Jürgen Bast are notable exceptions here. See sections 3.4.8 and 3.4.9 
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 For instance, Article 290 TFEU controls may not employed when the power is granted to the Council. See 
the text to footnote 866 and that footnote itself. 
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 As evidenced by ESMA the creation of ad hoc controls is perfectly lawful. 
1171
 This is essentially the concept which is contained in Article 289(3) TFEU. 
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academic commentators. While the concepts which they offer in its stead differ (ranging from 
purely procedural to content-based ones), the reason why they offer such alternatives seems 
to be constant. It lies in the fact that introduction of the concept of legislative act into EU law 
was said to have as its objective the increase of democratic legitimacy and transparency of 
the EC as well as simplification of the instruments employed by it when exercising public 
authority.
1172
 The concept formulated on the basis of chapters 2 and 3 is unable to attain, or 
even further the attainment of, any of these objectives: being based on legislative procedures 
and hence shorthands that concept itself is nothing more than a shorthand (“legislative act” 
standing for any of a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via ordinary or special 
legislative procedure). Regardless of whether such concept of legislative acts is ultimately 
correct as a matter of EU law, a jurisprudential analysis (conducted in section 4.2.2) showed 
that such concept of legislative act has very little in common with legislation as understood in 
jurisprudence. If the EU as a polity is conceptualised in the same way as a nation-state and its 
legislative acts are then assigned the same role in the EU as legislation in a nation state, then 
– jurisprudentially speaking – it would at least be arguable that legislative acts of the EU 
would come close to being legislation in opposition of the rule of law. On the concept 
formulated on the basis of section 2 and 3 of this thesis, EU legislative acts would simply not 
have the institutional features which are necessary for legislation to fulfil its mandate. That 
concept of legislative act should not, jurisprudentially speaking, be deemed a concept of 
legislation at all. 
Thus, the position of commentators is understandable. Might the concept of legislative act be 
different from the one initially formulated on the basis of sections 2 and 3 of this thesis? Is 
any of the concepts which the commentators perhaps offer tenable as a matter of EU law? An 
analysis of the constitutive treaties and the case law of the ECJ answers these questions with 
a “yes” and a “no” respectively. 
The analysis of the constitutive treaties shows that the concept of legislative acts as nothing 
more than regulations, directives or decisions adopted via ordinary or special legislative 
procedure is irreconcilable with some parts of the constitutive treaties (e.g. Article 2 TFEU) 
and requires so convoluted an argument to be reconciled with others (e.g. Articles 24(1)(2) 
and 31(1) TEU) as to make the concept very doubtful. The case law of the ECJ on legislative 
acts (or power) offers no help in this respect. There are, by and large, two strands to it. One 
strand, developed on the basis of instruments regulating access to documents, shows itself to 
ultimately turn on the objective of those instruments. Hence no general conclusions about 
legislative acts may reliably be drawn from it. The other strand likewise suffers from 
problems. Most (although not all) authorities in it pre-date the Lisbon Treaty. Different 
language versions of the judgments are difficult to reconcile with one another, and these 
differences are precisely in issues which are of critical importance for present purposes. Thus 
the most (if anything) that may be taken away from it is that it would seem to mandate some 
content-based concept of legislative acts (possibly even legislative acts as general acts). 
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 See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken (14 and 15 December 2001), 
especially pages 22 and 23 (the so-called “Laeken Declaration”), SN 300/1/01 REV 1. 
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However, the more modern and more consistent case law on standing of private parties to 
bring direct actions at the CJEU on the basis of the “regulatory-option” in Article 263(4) 
TFEU (which lest it is forgotten was a Lisbon Treaty innovation) would seem to contradict it. 
While it is submitted that the case law on the “regulatory-option” in Article 263(4) TFEU is 
not yet fully developed, the existing case law does clearly preclude virtually any content-
based concept of legislation. If the concept of legislation were content-based, it would be 
simply impossible to rely on regulative-option contained in Article 263(4) as currently 
interpreted by the ECJ.
1173
 
Thus, it would seem possible to say that the concept of legislative act in EU law cannot be 
content-based. The only seeming exception to that (i.e. the only concept which the case law 
on Article 263(4) TFEU would not seem to preclude) might be a content-based concept of 
legislative act relying squarely on the doctrine of essential elements. However, on a closer 
analysis that concept likewise turns out to be difficult to sustain. First, it was shown
1174
 that 
the Frontex rule on essential elements cannot repartition the division of competences between 
different institutions of the EU. Essentially it was argued that on a proper construction 
Frontex does not reserve any decision to the EU legislature; it reserves decisions on essential 
elements in respect of some subject matter to the institution which is tasked by the 
constitutive treaties with regulating that subject matter. In Frontex the Council and the 
Parliament jointly were the institutions so tasked. Yet, it is not difficult to see that in other 
situations other institutions, for instance the Commission (under Article 106(3) TFEU), may 
be so tasked. Thus, on a content-based concept of legislative act relying squarely on the 
doctrine of essential elements any act of any institution which act is adopted on the basis of 
the constitutive treaties could, but need not be legislative. Whether it is would depend on 
minute analysis of its content.  
Second, as a result of that legal certainty and clarity would decrease: reasonable people might 
disagree with whether a particular rule is an essential element or not. In substance, the Lisbon 
Treaty would be achieving something which is close to exact opposite to the objectives set 
forth in the Laeken Declaration. 
Third, an essential-elements-based concept of legislation would mean that an act of the 
Council and the Parliament by which they amend a provision of their own legislative act, 
which provision is not essential to the subject-matter envisaged by a legislative act
1175
 is not 
legislative even though the amending act might in all other respects be equivalent to the act 
being amended.
1176
 Fourth, it would be completely unclear why it was deemed necessary to 
provide in the constitutive treaties that a regulation, a directive and a decision adopted via 
legislative procedure was a legislative act. Fifth, the ECJ has had the opportunity to connect 
the doctrine of essential elements with legislative acts on numerous occasions (not least in 
Frontex itself, decided after the entry force of the Lisbon Treaty). It has not done so. Nor has 
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 That they can do so is not in doubt. See the judgments of the ECJ in cases 16/88 and C-359/92 mentioned, 
respectively, in footnotes 390 and 470 above. 
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 It must be noted that under any national law of any member state of the EU an act of parliament amending 
pre-existing act of parliament which pre-existing act of parliament is a legislative act would itself be legislative. 
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it ever used the words “legislative act” in such a sense post-Lisbon Treaty. Finally, if that 
were the concept of legislative act, how would the situation be different from the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty one? 
An analysis of the preparatory materials of the Constitutional Treaty (which purported to be 
the first constitutive treaty speaking of legislative acts and on the basis of which the Lisbon 
Treaty was drafted) offers no guidance. Virtually no clear meaning or intention may be 
discerned from the preparatory materials. To the extent that some such meaning may be 
found it did not find its way into either the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty. 
Finally, the concept of legislative act contained in the Constitutional Treaty was essentially a 
name-based concept, i.e. even less than a shorthand for essentially similar instruments were 
in some cases called legislative acts and in others not. 
Thus, the analysis disclosed no one single concept of legislative act obtaining in EU law. It is 
therefore possible to answer the first question of the thesis, viz. what concept of legislative act 
obtains in EU law, by saying that no single concept may be formulated. Article 289(3) TFEU, 
viz. a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via legislative procedure as a legislative 
act, is a useful shorthand, but nothing more. No single concept may be reconciled even with 
the constitutive treaties alone,
1177
 not to speak of the EU law in general. 
Perhaps more importantly, it has been shown that frequently – and perhaps surprisingly – the 
concept of legislative act, while having consequences hinge on it in law, does not necessarily 
matter in practice. EU law has always been heavily reliant on the “undergrowth” which has 
given us for instance comitology and implied powers, viz. instruments not strictly speaking 
provided for in the constitutive treaties (at the time), but developed nevertheless as a practical 
solution. The same seems to be occurring in relation to the language of legislation. ESMA is 
an excellent example of an early step here: with that one judgment the ECJ enabled 
considerably wider grant of (normative) powers than simply under Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU; those articles were no longer the code which it might have been hoped that they 
would be. It is submitted that the same is likely to occur in respect of the concept of 
legislative act proper rendering a specific determination in respect of a particular act of 
whether it is or is not legislative may come to be of lesser importance. 
Admittedly that is unlikely to always be the case: for example, application of Protocols Nos. 
1 and 2 clearly relies on a determination that an act is legislative. It is submitted that it is 
likely that in the event of a dispute as to the precise concept of legislative act the CJEU would 
follow Article 289(3) TFEU formulation (a regulation, a directive or a decision adopted via 
legislative procedure as a legislative act). 
Moving on to the second question of the thesis, viz. have the objectives which were sought to 
be achieved by means of introduction of “language of legislation” (legislative acts) into EU 
law been met, one cannot but note that not much has changed compared to EU law as it stood 
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 E.g. Article 289(3) TFEU provides the shorthand by reference to procedure unique to the EU, yet Article 2 
TFEU seems to mandate a content-based concept which must be equally applicable to the EU and the member 
states while Article 263(4) TFEU as construed by the ECJ essentially excludes content-based concepts. 
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under the Treaty of Nice. The procedures for adoption of acts by the Council and the 
Parliament jointly are largely the same; the acts resulting from those procedures are precisely 
the same (Article 288 TFEU has not been changed); the adoption of acts on the basis of 
granted power is largely the same. Legislative acts have proven to be nothing more than a 
name generic name for acts adopted via co-decision, or by the Council with the participation 
of the Parliament or vice-versa (as these procedures were known under the Nice Treaty). 
There is no concept for which “legislative act” stands; “legislative act” is just a shorthand. 
Considering that no actual change of note has occurred, it is clearly very unlikely – if not 
impossible – for the objectives of the introduction of the language of legislation to have been 
attained. By changing names of institutions which already exist it is simply impossible to 
augment the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the system or to simplify the 
instruments employed by it when exercising public authority all while having a keen eye on 
ensuring the rule of law.
1178
 It is, in fact, submitted that the introduction of the language of 
legislation into EU law has, at least in part, attained the opposite of the objective desired. The 
system has been rendered more complicated and less understandable. 
The foregoing chapters have amply shown that possibilities of different constructions of 
Articles 289 – 291 TFEU, first introduced into EU law by the Lisbon Treaty, abound. 
Sections 2 and 4 demonstrate how difficult it is to develop any structured argument in respect 
of legislative procedures and legislative acts. Section 4.2.2 is an especially stark example in 
this respect: the introduction of “legislative acts” into EU law has even “succeeded” in 
leading professionals of EU law into error. Furthermore, introduction of legislative acts into 
EU law has not supplanted the existing classification of legal acts (set forth in Article 288 
TFEU); it has supplemented it. In such a situation it would, if anything, be ironic to speak of 
clarity and simplicity. 
At the same time no practical benefit has been found to flow from the introduction of 
language of legislation into EU law. There is nothing that can be done now that it is part of 
EU law, but could not have been done under the Treaty of Nice. And in a situation where 
legal professionals are struggling with “legislative acts” in EU law, ordinary citizens are 
unlikely to find the system easier to understand simply because it employs terms which they 
are used to. In fact, the opposite is true since those terms do not bear the same (or even 
similar) meaning to the ones they have in (lest it is forgotten, different) national laws. 
Put bluntly, if lack of legislative acts or power in EC law was a problem, then the Lisbon 
Treaty is not a solution: it offers obfuscation and new terminology; it does no offer 
substantive changes. If lack of legislative acts or power in EC law was not a real problem 
(which, if the current situation under the Lisbon Treaty is not problematic, is an inevitable 
corollary of that not “problamaticity”), then the Lisbon Treaty attempted to fix something 
which did not need fixing in the first place. 
                                                 
1178
 See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken (14 and 15 December 2001), 
especially pages 22 and 23 (the so-called “Laeken Declaration”), SN 300/1/01 REV 1. 
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To sum up, there is no single concept of legislative act which currently obtains in EU law. In 
fact, there is no single concept of legislative act which it is possible to square the constitutive 
treaties. “Legislative act” as employed in Article 289(3) TFEU is nothing more than a 
shorthand meaning an act adopted via a certain procedure (which existed long before the 
Lisbon Treaty). The introduction of language of legislation into EU law has not enabled to 
attain the objectives of the Lisbon Treaty
1179
 (or even helped in this respect) – not much 
changed compared to EC law aside from the added complexity introduced by the language of 
legislation (resulting in further disagreements and disputes
1180
). Thus the better view would 
seem to be that the introduction of language of legislation into EU law (in the way it was 
done) has, in fact, hindered attainment of those objectives. 
However, the foregoing must not be misunderstood as a call for amendment of the 
constitutive treaties. While it has been demonstrated that EC law as it stood under the Treaty 
of Nice was substantively much the same as EU law as it stands under the Treaty of Lisbon, 
and the EC law furthermore had the advantage of being clearer and simpler, the foregoing has 
also demonstrated that making changes to law is liable to create more problems than it solves 
(especially if the existing system works and there is no clarity and single-mindedness to the 
changes; considering the institutional characteristics surrounding any change of the 
constitutive treaties, those qualities are very difficult to achieve). Furthermore, any changes 
of law need time to “bed in”, i.e. time is needed for the practice and the case law to develop. 
Before they do clarity and certainty of law is likely to be lower than the one obtaining before 
the changes were made. It is therefore hoped that rather than further amendments to the 
constitutive treaties what follows is a period of stability giving the ECJ the necessary time 
develop and clarify the existing law (perhaps contributing that way to attaining the objectives 
set by the Laeken Declaration). 
 
                                                 
1179
 To increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the EC and simplify the instruments employed by 
it when exercising public authority all while having a keen eye on ensuring the rule of law. See Presidency 
Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken (14 and 15 December 2001), especially pages 22 and 
23 (the so-called “Laeken Declaration”), SN 300/1/01 REV 1. 
1180
 See sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.5 above. None of the disputes to which those sections are dedicated could have 
arisen under EC law. It is submitted that EU law (and no citizen of the EU) is better off as a result of (the 
possibility of creating) those disputes. 
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Annexe I (list of legal bases mandating ordinary legislative procedures) 
Article
1181
 Content Resulting Act 
Other procedural 
steps
1182
 
Harmonisation Other aspects  
14(1) 
Conditions and principles for services of 
general economic interest 
Regulation    
15(3)(2) Access to documents Regulation    
16(2) 
Protection of personal data when processed by 
the EU or in applying EU law 
    
18(2) 
Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality 
    
19(2) 
Incentivising combat of discrimination based 
on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
  Excluded  
21(2) Freedom of movement    
Residual power (akin to 
mini flexibility clause) 
24(1) Citizens' initiative     
33 Strengthening customs cooperation      
43(2) 
CAP, CFP (competition rules, coordination 
rules, European market organisation) 
 ECOSOC   
46 Free movement of workers Regulation, Directive    
48 Social security (free movement of workers)    Temporary suspension 
50(1) Freedom of establishment Directive ECOSOC   
51(2) 
Disapplication of the rules on freedom of 
establishment 
    
52(2) 
Coordination of national provisions on 
foreigners (public policy, public security or 
public health)  
Directive  Coordination  
53(1) 
Mutual recognition of certificates, diplomas etc 
& coordination of self-employment 
Directive  Coordination in part  
56(2) 
Extension of freedom to provide services to EU 
resident nationals of third countries 
    
59(1) Liberalisation of specific services Directive ECOSOC   
                                                 
1181
 All references to articles in this Annexe I are to articles of the TFEU unless expressly stated otherwise. 
1182
 When only the name of an entity is indicated in this column, it means that consultation of that entity is mandated. 
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64(2) 
Free movement of capital between EU and 
third countries 
   
Corresponding de-
regulation via special 
legislative procedure 
(Article 64(3)) 
75(1) 
Framework for economic anti-terrorist 
measures for achieve freedom, security and 
justice 
  Framework  
77(2) 
Visas, external border checks and internal 
border checks 
    
78(2) Common asylum system     
79(2) Lawful residence in EU, human trafficking     
79(4) 
Incentive for integration of third-country 
nationals 
  Excluded  
81(2) 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters (aside 
from family matters) 
    
82(1)(2) Judicial cooperation in criminal matters  
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
  
82(2) 
Minimum rules on police and judicial 
cooperation on cross-border criminal matters 
Directive 
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
 Temporary suspension 
83(1)(1) 
Meaning of and sanctions for very serious or 
cross-border crime 
Directive 
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
 Temporary suspension 
83(2) 
Minimum rules on definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions 
Directive 
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
 Temporary suspension 
84 Promotion and support of crime prevention  
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
Excluded  
85(1)(2) Eurojust (what it is and what it does)  
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
  
87(2) 
Police cooperation (data protection, 
investigative techniques and various 
exchanges) 
 
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
  
88(2) EUROPOL (what it is and what it does)  
Could be initiated by 
¼ of member states 
  
91(1) Common transport policy  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
100(2) Air and sea transport  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
114(1) 
Approximation of national laws having internal 
market as object 
 ECOSOC   
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116(2) Elimination of distortion of competition     
118(1) Protection of IP     
121(6) 
Procedure for monitoring economic 
developments and policies of member states 
    
129(3) 
Amendments to the statute of the ESCB and 
the ECB 
 
Could be Initiated by 
ECB; ECB to be 
consulted 
  
133 Use of the euro  ECB   
149(1) 
Incentivising cooperation between and 
supporting member states in the field of 
employment 
 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
Excluded  
153(2)(2) 
Employment, working conditions and living 
standards 
 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
157(3) Equality of sexes in employment  ECOSOC   
164 
Implementing regulations for the European 
Social Fund 
Regulation 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
165(4)(1) Education, youth and sport  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
Excluded  
166(4) Vocational training  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
Excluded  
167(5)(1) Culture  
Committee of the 
Regions 
Excluded  
168(4) 
Medical, veterinary and phytosanitary 
measures 
 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
168(5) Protection of human health  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
Excluded  
169(3) 
Supporting, monitoring and supplementing 
policies of member states on consumer 
protection 
 ECOSOC 
Minimum 
harmonisation only 
 
172(1) 
Trans-European networks (including loan 
guarantees and subsidies) 
Guidelines
1183
 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions, 
member state 
concerned 
  
173(3)(1) 
Supporting member states in achieving 
competitiveness of EU industry 
 ECOSOC Excluded  
175(3) Economic, social and territorial cohesion  ECOSOC, Committee   
                                                 
1183
 Although not exclusively 
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of the Regions 
177(1) 
Structural Funds (what they are and what they 
do) 
 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
178(1) 
Implementing regulations for European 
Regional Development Fund 
Regulation 
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
178(2) 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, Guidance Section, and the European 
Social Fund 
 
Renvoi to Articles 43 
and 164 
  
182(1) Multiannual framework programme on R&D  ECOSOC   
182(5) European research area  ECOSOC   
188(2) 
Implementation of multiannual framework 
programme (participation, dissemination of 
results, supplementary programmes) 
 
ECOSOC, member 
states concerned 
  
189(2) European space policy   Excluded  
192(1) Environment  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
192(3) General action programs on environment  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
  
194(2) EU energy policy  
ECOSOC, Committee 
of the Regions 
 
Member states' choices 
on using natural 
resources and energy 
supply not affected 
195(2) 
Complementing member states' measures on 
tourism 
  Excluded  
196(2) Civil protection   Excluded  
197(2) 
Improving administrative capacity for 
implementation of EU law 
  Excluded 
Resulting measures not 
obligatory for member 
states 
207(2) 
Framework for implementing common 
commercial policy 
Regulation    
209(1) 
Implementation of development cooperation 
policy 
    
212(2) 
Economic, financial and technical cooperation 
with non-developing countries 
    
214(3) 
Framework for provision of EU's humanitarian 
aid 
    
214(5) 
Rules and procedures of European Voluntary 
Humanitarian Aid Corps 
Regulation    
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224 EU level political parties and their funding Regulation    
257(1) Creation of specialised courts Regulation ECJ   
281(2) 
Amending the statute of the ECJ (excluding 
title I and article 64) 
 ECJ   
291(3) Comitology Regulation    
298(2) EU administration Regulation    
322(1) Budget, finance and audit (procedure) Regulation Court of Auditors   
325(4) Fighting fraud affecting EU's financial interests  Court of Auditors   
336(1) 
Staff Regulations and Conditions of 
Employment 
Regulation Institutions concerned   
338(1) Measures for the production of statistics    
Without prejudice to 
ECB doing so under its 
statute 
Statute of the ECJ, 
13(1) 
Appointment of and rules of service of assistant 
rapporteurs 
 Initiated by ECJ   
Statute of the ECB, 
40.1 
Article 129(3) TFEU  
Could be Initiated by 
ECB; ECB to be 
consulted 
  
Protocol (No. 7) on 
Privileges and 
Immunities, 12(1) 
Taxation of remuneration of EU officials and 
servants 
Regulation Institutions concerned   
Protocol (No. 7) on 
Privileges and 
Immunities, 14 
Social security of EU officials and servants Regulation Institutions concerned   
Protocol (No. 7) on 
Privileges and 
Immunities, 15(1) 
Determination to whom privileges of EU 
officials and servants apply 
Regulation Institutions concerned   
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Annexe II (list of legal bases potentially mandating special legislative procedures) 
Article
1184
 Content Adopter 
Unanimous 
by Council 
Input of the 
participatin
g institution 
Resulting 
Act 
Other 
procedural 
steps
1185
 
Other aspects 
Name
1186
 
7(1) TEU 
Risk of breach of values by member 
states 
Council 
 No (four 
fifths under 
Article 354 
rules) 
Consent  
Initiated by 
Parliament, 
Commission or 
⅓ of member 
states 
Same could be done by the 
European Council (Article 
7(2) TEU) 
No 
27(3) 
TEU 
The organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service 
Council No Consulting Decision 
Initiated by 
High 
Representative; 
consent of 
Commission 
 No 
41(3)(1) 
TEU 
Access to EU budget for urgent CFSP 
expenditures 
Council No Consulting Decision   No 
49 TEU Admission of new member states Council Yes Consent  
Parliament by 
majority of 
component 
members; 
Commission;  
ratification by 
the states 
concerned 
 No 
50(2) 
TEU 
Conclusion of withdrawal agreement  Council No Consent    No 
19(1)  
Combat of discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation 
Council Yes Consent    Yes 
21(3)  
Social security and social protection to 
ensure freedom of movement 
Council Yes Consent   
Residual power (akin to mini 
flexibility clause) 
Yes 
22(1)  Arrangements for nationals of a member Council Yes Consulting    Yes 
                                                 
1184
 All references to articles are to articles of the TFEU unless expressly stated otherwise.  
1185
 When only the name of an entity is indicated in this column, it means that consultation of that entity is mandated. 
1186
 “Yes” if the legal basis expressly calls the procedure “a special legislative procedure”, “no” – if it does not. 
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state voting at and standing for 
municipal elections in the member state 
of his residence 
22(2)  
Arrangements for nationals of a member 
state voting at and standing for elections 
to the European Parliament in the 
member state of his residence 
Council Yes Consulting    Yes 
23(2)  
Facilitation of diplomatic/consular 
cross-protection 
Council No Consulting Directive   Yes 
25(2) 
Creation of new or strengthening of 
rights of EU citizens  
Council Yes Consent  
Ratification by 
member states 
 Yes 
64(3)  
Making a step back in free movement of 
capital between EU and third states 
Council Yes Consulting   
Corresponding step forward 
via ordinary legislative 
procedure (Article 64(2)) 
Yes 
70 
Arrangements for evaluation by the 
Commission and member states of 
implementation of EU policies adopted 
in the field entitled “Area of freedom, 
security and justice” with a view to 
facilitation of mutual recognition 
Council No Informed  
Initiated by 
Commission;
1187
 informing 
national 
parliaments 
 No 
74 
Cooperation between departments of 
member states and between them and 
the Commission in questions pertaining 
to "Area of freedom security and 
justice" 
Council No Consult  
Initiated by 
Commission or 
¼ of member 
states 
 No 
77(3)  
Regulation of passports, ID-cards, 
residence permits etc. 
Council Yes Consulting   
Residual power (akin to mini 
flexibility clause) 
Yes 
78(3) 
Provisional asylum measures for the 
benefit of member states experiencing a 
sudden inlfow of nationals of third 
countries 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
81(3)(1) 
Judicial cooperation on family law with 
cross-border implications 
Council Yes Consulting    Yes 
81(3)(2) Switching regulation of judicial Council Yes Consulting Decision Veto held by  No 
                                                 
1187
 Initiation by the Commission is separately mentioned only if two conditions are met: the legal basis (i) does not call the procedure a special legislative procedure and (ii) 
simultaneously grants the privilege of initiative to the Commission. By default, the Commission has a privilege to initiate adoption of legislative acts by virtue of Article 
17(2) TEU. 
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cooperation in family matters from 
special legislative procedure to ordinary 
each national 
parliament 
83(1)(3) 
List of areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border 
dimension 
Council Yes Consent Decision 
Initiated by 
Commission or 
¼ of member 
states 
 No 
83(2)  
Minimum rules on definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions 
Council Depends Depends Directive 
Could be 
initiated by ¼ 
of member 
states 
Temporary suspension Yes 
86(1)(1)  
Establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office 
Council Yes Consent Regulation 
Could be 
initiated by ¼ 
of member 
states 
 Yes 
87(3)(1)  
Operational cooperation of national law 
enforcement agencies 
Council Yes Consulting  
Could be 
initiated by ¼ 
of member 
states 
 Yes 
89  
Conditions under which judicial 
authorities or law enforcement agencies 
of a member state may operate in 
another 
Council Yes Consulting  
Could be 
initiated by ¼ 
of member 
states 
 Yes 
95(3) 
Rules prohibiting different conditions of 
carriage of goods over the 
same transport links on grounds of the 
country of origin or of destination of the 
goods and ensuring enforcement of the 
prohibition 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission, 
ECOSOC 
 No 
103(1) 
Implementing competition rules 
contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Council No Consulting 
Regulation, 
directive 
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
109 
Implementing state aid rules contained 
in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU 
Council No Consulting Regulation 
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
113 Harmonisation of indirect taxes Council Yes Consulting  ECOSOC  Yes 
115 
Approximation of laws directly 
affecting the establishment or 
functioning of the internal market 
Council Yes Consulting Directive ECOSOC  Yes 
118(2)  Language arrangements for EU IP rights Council Yes Consulting Regulation   Yes 
121(2) Broad guidelines for economic policies Council No Informed Recommen- Initiated by  No 
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of member states and of the EU dation Commission; 
European 
Council 
125(2) 
Setting forth definition for application of 
financial prohibitions contained in 
Articles 123-125 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
126(11) 
Intensification of measures required of a 
member state to reduce excessive deficit 
Council 
No (Article 
238(3)(a); 
without 
vote of 
member 
state 
concerned) 
Informed  
Initiated by 
Commission 
Assumes pre-existing 
procedural steps (Article 126) 
No 
126(14)(2)  
Replacement of protocol on excessive 
deficits 
Council Yes Consulting  ECB  Yes 
126(14)(3) 
Rules and definitions for application of 
protocol on excessive deficits 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
127(6)  
Conferral on ECB of tasks regarding 
policies related to prudential supervision 
of financial institutions (except 
insurance ones) 
Council Yes Consulting Regulation ECB  Yes 
128(2) 
Harmonisation of denominations and 
technical specifications of euro coins 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECB 
 No 
129(4) 
Adoption of certain provisions required 
by the statute of ESCB and ECB 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECB (or vice 
versa) 
 No 
132(3) 
Rules on fines and periodic penalty 
payments imposed by ECB on 
undertakings for violating ECB's rules 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECB (or vice 
versa) 
 No 
134(3) 
Composition of Economic and Financial 
Committee 
Council No Informed  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECB; 
Economic and 
Financial 
Committee 
 No 
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140(2)(1) 
Deciding whether a member state meets 
conditions for adoption of the euro and 
abrogating the derogation 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
recommend-
dation of 
Article 
238(3)(a) 
majority of 
member states 
whose currency 
is euro; 
European 
Council 
 No 
148(2) 
Guidelines for employment policies of 
member states 
Council No Consulting Guidelines 
Initiated by 
Commission; 
on the basis of 
conclusions of 
European 
Council; 
ECOSOC; 
Committee of 
the Regions; 
Employment 
Committee 
 No 
150(1) Creation of Employment Committee Council 
No (simple 
majority) 
Consulting    No 
153(2)(3)  
Social security and social protection of 
workers, protection of workers upon 
termination of employment contract, 
representation of workers and employers 
and employment of third country 
nationals 
Council Yes Consulting  
ECOSOC, 
Committee of 
the Regions 
Complementing Yes 
153(2)(4) 
Switching protection of workers upon 
termination of employment contract, 
representation of workers and employers 
and employment of third country 
nationals from special legislative 
procedure to ordinary 
Council Yes Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
155(2) Implementation of agreements of Council No (except Informed  Joint request by  No 
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management and labour in Article 153 
matters 
areas of 
Article 
153(2)(3)) 
signatories; 
initiated by 
Commission 
160(1) Creation of Social Protection Committee Council 
Simple 
majority 
Consulting    No 
182(4)  Specific programmes on R&D Council No Consulting  ECOSOC  Yes 
188(1) 
Creation of joint undertakings or other 
structures for execution of EU's 
research, technological development and 
demonstration programmes 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECOSOC 
 No 
192(2)(1)  
Environment (fiscal issues, water 
resources, town and country planning, 
land use, choices as to energy sources 
and structure of energy supply) 
Council Yes Consulting  
ECOSOC, 
Committee of 
the Regions 
 Yes 
192(2)(2) 
Switching from special legislative 
procedure to ordinary in Art 192(2)(1) 
TFEU matters 
Council Yes Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECOSOC; 
Committee of 
the Regions 
 No 
194(3)  EU energy policy (fiscal issues) Council Yes Consulting    Yes 
203  Association of countries with the EU Council Yes Consulting   Not obligatory Yes 
215(1) 
Interruption or reduction of economic 
and financial relations with third 
countries 
Council No Informed  
Initiated by 
Commission or 
High 
Representative 
 No 
218(3) 
Authorising negotiations of international 
agreements and determining the 
negotiator 
Council No Informed Decision 
Initiated by 
Commission or 
(where 
agreement is at 
least principally 
about CFSP) 
High 
Representative 
 No 
218(4) 
Addressing directives to the negotiator 
and designating a committee which the 
negotiator must consult 
Council Depends Informed    No 
218(5) 
Authorising the signing and provision 
application of an international 
Council Depends Informed Decision 
Initiated by 
negotiator 
 No 
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agreement 
218(6)(1) 
Conclusion of international agreement 
exclusively about CFSP 
Council Depends Informed Decision 
Initiated by 
negotiator 
 No 
218(6)(a) 
Conclusion of the following 
international agreements which are not 
exclusively about CFSP: association 
agreements, accession to ECHR, those 
establishing specific institutional 
framework by organising cooperation 
procedures, those with important 
budgetary implication for EU, those in 
the fields where internal measures 
would require consent of the Parliament 
Council Depends Consent  Decision 
Initiated by 
negotiator 
Consent to be granted within 
a time-limit if one has been 
agreed by Council and 
Parliament. 
No 
218(6)(b) 
Conclusion of international agreements 
which are not exclusively about CFSP 
Council Depends Consulting  Decision 
Initiated by 
negotiator 
Opinion of Parliament within 
time limit set by Council. 
No 
218(7) 
Authorising the negotiator to approve on 
behalf of the EU modifications of an 
international agreement and setting 
conditions for such approvals 
Council Depends Informed    No 
218(9) 
Suspension of application of an 
international agreement and 
establishment of positions to be adopted 
in its bodies 
Council Depends Informed Decision 
Proposal of 
Commission or 
High 
Representative 
 No 
219(1)(1) 
Conclusion of international agreements 
on an exchange-rate system for the euro 
in relation to the currencies of third 
States 
Council Yes Consulting  
Recommendati
on of ECB or 
recommendatio
n of 
Commission 
with ECB 
being consulted 
 No 
219(1)(2) 
Adoption, adjustment or abandonment 
of central rates of the euro within an 
exchange-rate system 
Council No Informed  
Recommendati
on of ECB or 
recommendatio
n of 
Commission 
with ECB 
being consulted 
 No 
223(1)(2)  Election of the European Parliament Council Yes Consent  Initiated by  Yes 
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Parliament; 
consent of the 
Parliament by 
the majority of 
members; 
ratification by 
member states 
223(2)  
Duties of MEPs and performance of 
those duties 
Parliament 
No (yes for 
taxation) 
Consent Regulation 
Initiated by 
Parliament; 
Commission 
 Yes 
226(3)  Exercise of right of inquiry Parliament No Consent Regulation 
Initiated by 
Parliament; 
consent of the 
Commission 
 Yes 
228(4)  Performance of Ombudsman's duties Parliament No Consent Regulation 
Initiated by 
Parliament; 
Commission 
 Yes 
246(2) 
Appointment of a new member of 
Commission upon resignation, 
compulsory retirement or death of a 
member 
Council No Consulting  
Common 
accord with 
president of 
Commission 
Decision not to fill a vacancy 
is a unanimous decision of the 
Council upon proposal of 
president of Commission; 
Parliament does not 
participate (Article 246(3)). 
No 
262 
Jurisdiction of the ECJ in the field of 
EU IP 
Council Yes Consulting  
Ratification by 
member states 
 Yes 
286(2)(1) 
Adoption of a list of member of the 
Court of Auditors 
Council No Consulting  
Proposals of 
member states 
 No 
308(3) Amending statute of EIB Council Yes Consulting  
Could be 
Initiated by 
EIB with the 
Commission 
being 
consulted; EIB 
consulted 
 Yes 
311(3) System of own resources of the EU Council Yes Consulting Decision 
Ratification by 
member states 
 Yes 
311(4) Implementing Article 311(3) decision Council No Consent Regulation   Yes 
312(2)(1) Multiannual financial framework Council Yes (switch Consent Regulation Component  Yes 
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to no in 
Article 
312(2)(2)) 
members of the 
Parliament 
314 Adoption of the budget of the EU 
President 
of the 
Parliament 
No Consent Atypical
1188
  Sui generis procedure Yes 
322(2) 
Procedure for making revenue from own 
resources available to the Commission; 
adoption of measures to meet cash 
requirements 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
Court of 
Auditors 
 No 
329(1)(2) 
Authorisation to proceed with enhanced 
cooperation (non-CFSP) 
Council No Consent  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
329(2) 
Authorisation to proceed with enhanced 
cooperation (CFSP) 
Council No Informed  
High 
Representative; 
Commission 
 No 
332 
Deciding that variable expenses of 
enhanced cooperation shall be borne 
otherwise than by participating member 
states 
Council Yes Consulting   
Adopted by members of the 
Council (as opposed to the 
Council) 
No 
333(2) 
Switching from special legislative 
procedure to ordinary in areas where 
enhanced cooperation occurs 
Council 
Yes (but 
only those 
who 
participate) 
Consulting    No 
349(1) 
Application of the treaties to overseas 
territories 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
349(1) 
Application of the treaties to overseas 
territories 
Council No Consulting    Yes 
352(1) "Flexibility clause" Council Yes Consent  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
352(1) "Flexibility clause" Council Yes Consent    Yes 
Statute of 
the ECJ, 
64(1) 
Language arrangements of the ECJ Council Yes Consulting  
Initiated by 
ECJ; 
Commission 
(or vice versa) 
 No 
Statute of 
the ECB, 
Adoption of certain provisions required 
by the statute of ESCB and ECB (called 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
 No 
                                                 
1188
 See the judgment of the ECJ in case C-77/11. 
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41 "Complementary legislation" in that 
article) 
ECB (or vice 
versa) 
Conver-
gence 
Protocol 
(No. 13), 
6 
Adoption of convergence criteria 
referred to in Art 140(1) TFEU which 
replace the protocol 
Council Yes Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission; 
ECB; 
Economic and 
Financial 
Committee 
 No 
Protocol 
(No. 21) 
on UK 
and 
Ireland in 
Area of 
Freedom, 
Security 
and 
Justice, 5 
Deciding that a member state not bound 
by the Title on Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice is to bear 
consequences of a measure adopted 
thereunder by which it is not bound 
Council Yes Consulting   
Adopted by members of the 
Council (as opposed to the 
Council) 
No 
Annexe to 
Protocol 
(No. 22) 
on Den-
mark, 9 
Deciding that Denmark is to bear 
consequences of a measure adopted 
thereunder by which it is not bound 
Council Yes Consulting    No 
Nether-
lands 
Antilles 
Protocol 
(No. 31), 
6(1) 
Reviewing rules (contained in Articles 
2-5 of the protocol) on the import of 
petroleum products from the 
Netherlands Antilles 
Council Yes Consulting Decision Commission  No 
ECSC 
Protocol 
(No. 37), 
2(2) 
Multiannual financial guidelines on 
managing the assets of Research Fund 
for Coal and Steal and technical 
guidelines for its research programmes 
Council No Consulting  
Initiated by 
Commission 
 No 
 
Annexe III (table of equivalence of legal bases of the Lisbon Treaty 
mandating a procedure akin to special legislative procedure without calling 
it special legislative procedure and the corresponding legal bases of the 
Constitutional Treaty) 
Lisbon 
Treaty
1189
 
Constitutional Treaty Act mandated by the Constitutional Treaty 
7(1) TEU I-59(1) Non-legislative 
27(3) TEU III-296(3) Non-legislative 
41(3)(1) TEU III-313(3) Non-legislative 
49 TEU I-58(2) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2)))
1190
 
50(2) TEU I-60(2) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2))) 
74 III-263 Non-legislative 
78(3) III-266(3) Non-legislative 
81(3)(2) III-269(3)(2) Non-legislative 
83(1)(3) III-271(1)(3) Non-legislative 
95(3) III-240(3) Non-legislative 
103(1) III-163(1) Non-legislative 
109 III-169 Non-legislative 
125(2) III-183(2) Non-legislative 
126(14)(3) III-184(13)(2) Non-legislative 
128(2) III-186(2)(2) Non-legislative 
129(4) III-187(4) Non-legislative 
132(3) III-190(3) Non-legislative 
140(2)(1) III-198(2)(1) Non-legislative 
148(2) III-206(2) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article I-35))
1191
 
150(1) III-208(1) Non-legislative 
153(2)(4) III-210(3)(2) Non-legislative 
160(1) III-217(1) Non-legislative 
188(1) III-253 Non-legislative 
192(2)(2) III-234(2)(2) Non-legislative 
218(6)(a) III-325(6)(a) Non-legislative 
218(6)(b) III-325(6)(b) Non-legislative 
219(1)(1) III-326(1) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2)) or 
neither
1192
) 
246(2) III-348(2) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2))) 
                                                 
1189
 All references to articles in this column are to articles of the TFEU unless expressly stated otherwise. 
1190
 Admittedly a non-legislative act being mandated is more likely for Article I-58(2) of the Constitutive Treaty 
mandates consultation of the Commission. According to Article I-26(1) of the Constitutional Treaty any 
legislative act would have had to been proposed by the Commission (unless otherwise provided by the 
Constitutive Treaty which in Article I-58(2) it did not). Making consultation of the Commission a further 
requirement in a situation where the act was proposed by it might be considered unexpected, although not 
impossible.  
1191
 Article III-206(2) of the Constitutional Treaty mandates guidelines. See the discussion in section 2.2.1 above 
pertaining to provisions of constitutive treaties mandating guidelines. 
1192
 Article III-326(1) of the Constitutional Treaty speaks of the Council concluding an agreement. Articles I-33 
– I-37 of the Constitutional Treaty, setting out legislative vs non-legislative typology do not speaks of 
agreements at all. 
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286(2)(1) III-385(2)(1) Non-legislative 
322(2) III-412(2) Non-legislative 
329(1)(2) III-419(1)(2) Non-legislative 
332 III-421 Non-legislative 
333(2) III-422(2) Non-legislative 
349(1) III-421(1) Non-legislative
1193
 
352(1) I-18(1) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article I-35))
1194
 
Statute of the 
ECJ, 64 
Statute of the ECJ, 
64(1) 
Non-legislative 
Statute of the 
ECB, 41 
Statute of the ECB, 41 Non-legislative 
Convergence 
Protocol (No. 
13), 6 
Convergence Protocol 
(No. 11), 6 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article I-35)) 
Protocol (No. 
21) on UK and 
Ireland in Area 
of Freedom, 
Security and 
Justice, 5 
Protocol (No. 19) on 
UK and Ireland in Area 
of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, 5 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2))) 
Annexe to 
Protocol (No. 
22) on 
Denmark, 9 
Annexe to Protocol 
(No. 20) on Denmark, 7 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2))) 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Protocol (No. 
31), 6(1) 
Netherlands Antilles 
Protocol (No. 25), 6(1) 
Unclear (could be either legislative adopted via special legislative 
procedure (Article I-34(2)) or non-legislative (Article I-35(2)))
1195
 
ECSC Protocol 
(No. 37), 2(2) 
ECSC Protocol (No. 
35), 2(2) 
Non-legislative 
 
  
                                                 
1193
 There is, however, no direct parallel with Article 349(1) TFEU. The latter contains two sentences both 
mandating the same procedure, but one calling it a special legislative procedure, and the other – not (see text 
following footnote 386 above). There is nothing of the sort in Article I-421(1) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
1194
 There is, however, no direct parallel with Article 352(1) TFEU. The latter contains two sentences both 
mandating the same procedure, but one calling it a special legislative procedure, and the other – not (see text 
following footnote 386 above). There is nothing of the sort in Article I-18(1) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
1195
 Admittedly a non-legislative act being mandated is more likely for Article 6(1) of the protocol mandates 
consultation of the Commission. According to Article I-26(1) of the Constitutional Treaty any legislative act 
would have had to been proposed by the Commission (unless otherwise provided by the Constitutive Treaty 
which in Article I-6(1) of the protocol it did not). Making consultation of the Commission a further requirement 
in a situation where the act was proposed by it might be considered unexpected, although not impossible.  
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